1. law, govt and politics
2. government

European Journal of Economic and Political Studies 7 (2014) 71-85
Presidentialism: Is It a Better Option for Turkey?
Eyüp AYGÜN*
Institute of Social Sciences, Fatih University, Turkey
Abstract
The role of the government model in the performance of the governments and in
the sustainability of the democratic regime is a controversial issue. Parliamentary
and presidential systems are often compared in that respect. Turkish academic
and political circles have been discussing whether or not presidentialism is a viable
option that would resolve the deep-rooted problems of Turkish political system for
the past three decades. Although, there are different subtypes of presidential
systems, the debate in Turkey focuses on the American presidential system. This
article discusses strengths and weaknesses of the presidential system and assesses
its viability in Turkey by listing some potential difficulties in case such a radical
systemic change is accepted.
Keywords: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Presidential System, Viability,
Parliamentary System in Turkey.
JEL Classification: D72, D73, F50, H11, P5
*
Tel:+90 212 866 33 00 (Ext:1452).
E-mail address: eaygun@fatih.edu.tr
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E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85
1. Introduction
In both academic and political circles, there is an ongoing debate on whether
the parliamentary (PMS henceforth) or the presidential system (PS henceforth) is
able to sustain a more stable democratic regime. While some argue that the PS
entails great risks for democracy because of its some major defects (Riggs 1992;
Linz 1994; Özbudun 1996; Uran 2010; Kalaycıoğlu 2005), others oppose this idea
(Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Fendoğlu 2012). The
issue is also often brought up in Turkish public whenever there is a political crisis
or during the election period of the president. In fact, it has been an issue of
discussion in Turkey in the last three decades. Turgut Özal is known as the first
political figure that instigated the discussion in the late 1980s. Despite losing its
intensity from time to time since then, it has always been a controversial political
debate in Turkey. After Özal’s death, his successor Demirel campaigned for
presidentialism although he had harshly criticized Özal over his efforts for
adopting PS in Turkey (Yazıcı 2002). Since 2002 AKP (Justice and Development
Party) governments have been able remain in power without losing majority in
the parliament, which is an exceptional political phenomenon in modern Turkish
political history. The demands for presidentialism in Turkey should reasonably be
expected to have diminished as a result of AKP’s has success in maintaining
governmental stability for over a decade since its enthusiasts often put forward
the necessity of PS for more stable and effective governments complaining about
ineffective and short-lived coalitions. However, AKP administration has repeatedly
expressed their aspiration for a transition to parliamentarism in Turkey since the
early days of their start of ruling. PM Erdoğan, Cemil Çiçek, Burhan Kuzu and some
top AKP politicians continued the debate about the PS (Öder 2005, 31). Although
there are several forms of PSs around the world, supporters of parliamentarism in
Turkey primarily refer to the PS in the USA as a model when they discuss the
issue. The latest proposal about adopting parliamentarism which was submitted
to the committee of constitution amendments of Turkish parliament has many
features in common with the American model.1
The debate over the PS in Turkish political and academic circles revolves
around the compatibility of PS to Turkey’s realities and its benefits and
drawbacks. The main argument of the proponents of the PS in Turkey is that the
PMS does not meet the requirements of Turkey as a developing country due to
some of its deficiencies such as its tendency to produce short-lived coalitions,
1
For the details of the proposal: http://www.aktifhaber.com/akpnin-22-maddelikbaskanlik-sistemi-teklifi-685366h.htm, accessed on May 27th, 2014.
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dependence of legislative power to the executive power, and its ineffectiveness in
checks and balances. Özal, Demirel, and Erdoğan, prominent political figures of
Turkey, argued that Turkey needs to adopt either the PS or the semi-PS in order to
have a more stable and effective administration since Turkey needs to overcome a
great deal of social, economic, and political problems in order to become a
regional and a global actor (Uran 2010).
Opponents of the PS argue that the PS is not compatible with the Turkish
political culture which has been shaped by a long tradition of parliamentarism
since 1876. Özbudun (1996) argues that it is highly probable that adopting the PS
will have a negative impact on Turkish democracy which has not been
consolidated adequately despite its fairly long history. There are also claims that
the PS is likely to produce more political instability or even turn into an
authoritarian regime let alone resolve current ailments of Turkish democracy
(Kalaycıoğlu 2005).
This article aims to discuss the benefits and drawbacks of the PS and its
viability in Turkey by providing a general comparison of the PS and the PMS. I
argue that pure the PS as it is applied in the US is not compatible with Turkish
political culture; and therefore it cannot be a viable option for Turkey. Semipresidential system will not be mentioned due to the limited scope of this work.
2. Presidential System: Brief History and Key Features
In democratic systems there are different types of government formation
regarding which institutions are formed by the elected representatives of the
public. In fact, forms of government are determined according to the relationship
between executive and legislative branches of a state. Depending on the
relationship between the government, legislature, and the president/president of
republic (some countries may not have one), there are mainly three types of
political systems in the world: parliamentary, presidential and mixed (semipresidential) systems (Cheibub 2007, 33).
The PS was first introduced by the founding fathers of the USA. It emerged in
the late 18th century as an outcome of the political conditions of the time when
Americans fought British rule for independence. Duverger asserts that the
committee of founders who assembled in Philadelphia in 1787 did not aim to
create a new system; on the contrary, they wanted to adopt the British
Westminster System which they considered a well-tried system (Duverger 1994,
78). Similarly, Lijphart (1984) argues that the designers of American PS took British
Westminster parliamentarism as a model changing some of its features while
keeping some of its institutions. To illustrate, in both systems there are two
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legislative bodies, a lower and an upper chamber; they both have single-member
district plurality electoral systems which produced a two-party dominant
democracy; and the president of the USA is elected by electoral college (electors
chosen by popular vote elect the president) which was once used but abandoned
in the UK.
It is argued that the PS is destined to fail in other countries since it is a
peculiarly American form of government that was designed according to the
unique political circumstances and needs of the USA (Yılmaz 2013). The first
president elected with this system was George Washington in 1789. Since then
several countries have adopted the PS taking the American PS as a model
modifying it according to their own needs, so there are different subtypes of the
pure PS. However, none of these replicas has been as successful as its original
form. Making modifications to the original American form could be the reason for
the failure of PS in other countries. Therefore, it would be appropriate to take
American PS as a base and describe it in the first place. In fact, despite some
variations, most PSs share common features with the American model.
Unlike the PMS, the PS is a form of government which depends on a rigid
separation of powers (Schmitt and Shullky 1989, 59). Executive, legislative and
judiciary powers of the state are independent from each other and have equal
political power. American PS was designed in a way that none of three powers
would prevail over the others in order to have checks and balances between the
powers and to prevent centralization of power in one hand (Kalaycioğlu 2005, 15).
The PS has some fundamental features that distinguish it from the PMS.
Lijphart (1992) lists some distinguishing features of the PS: the president is
elected by popular vote (directly or indirectly by Electoral College as in the USA)
for a fixed period of time and becomes both the head of the government and the
state. Except for very rare cases of impeachment, the president completes his
fixed term. And the president has the exclusive authority to determine and
conduct the policies of the executive. He decides whom to be appointed as his
ministers, secretaries as they are called in the USA. He is also able to dismiss them
anytime unconditionally. Secretaries are nonpartisan technocrats who are merely
responsible to the president and perform in accordance with the president’s
policies and orders. Therefore, there is not a cabinet in the PS as in the
parliamentarian sense (Morlan 1975, 176-177). Another significant difference is
that the president is not responsible to the legislature; therefore the executive
does not have to depend on the vote of confidence of it. The government remains
in power even if the president’s party loses the majority in the legislature since
there is no risk of being removed by the mechanism of vote of no confidence as in
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PMSs. In other words, president’s government cannot be removed by the
legislative organs and stays in office until the following elections regardless of its
performance. Due to this feature, minority governments are possible in PSs and
they are more frequent than in PMSs. According to a study on government
coalitions carried out by Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004), 65 percent of
the minority governments in the world from 1946 to 1999 were in PSs.
3. Is Presidentialism a Better Option than Parliamentarism?
In order to comprehend what sort of outcome it may produce if Turkey
adopts the PS, it is necessary to compare and contrast it with the PMS that Turkey
is currently implementing. Such a task is crucial to being able to identify the
strengths and the weaknesses of the PS.
3.1. Stability and Effective Government
The main argument that has been put forward by proponents of the PS is
that governments in PSs are more efficient and stable than in PMSs. Fixed office
period, lack of vote of no confidence of the legislative body, and the possibility of
minority governments enables president and his cabinet to implement their
political agenda without fear of losing office. As a result of this certainty, as
Lijphart (1986) argues, more stable governments are formed. Evcimen (1992)
asserts that due to its monolithic structure presidential governments can make
decision faster and more effectively particularly in times of crisis and emergency.
However, the fact that the president and his government cannot be removed by
the legislature does not automatically produce effective governance. Lack of
comprise and cooperation between the powers may obstruct efficient functioning
of the government.
There is also the issue of coalitions in PSs. That coalition governments in PSs
are rare is an erroneous belief. In fact, coalition governments are quite frequent in
PSs. Amorim Neto (2006) studied government types in PSs from late 1970s to
2000 and found out that 72.6 percent of the cases were coalition governments.
This empirical evidence suggests that presidents forming coalition governments
may have to make some policy concessions in order to include opposition
members in the government. The main motive for the president to take such
course of action is to get the support of the opposition for the desired legislation,
which is necessary for achieving his policy goals. However, it should be noted that
the credibility of such concessions is doubtful since the president does not have to
depend on opposition’s support to remain in office, and presidents in some
countries are granted extensive constitutional decree power as in Latin America.
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Therefore, the president can ignore his promises without fear of losing his office.
Of course such a course of action might have some unpleasant consequences for
the government. However, the role of the electoral systems in the formation of
coalition governments in PSs should also be taken into consideration about the
issue of coalition governments. For example, ‘First Past The Post system’ is used in
the US, which is a simple form of majority electoral system with single-member
districts. Thus, the US system produces the dominance of the two major parties
ruling out the possibility of coalition governments. On the other hand, Brazil,
another country with the PS, uses ‘List Proportional Representation’ electoral
method in which each party presents a list of candidates for a multi-member
electoral district, and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of
the vote (IDEA.INT 2014). In this system, there is always likelihood of a coalition
after an election.
Another argument proposed in favor of the PS about its efficiency is that
ministers (secretaries in the USA) are able to carry out their duties more
professionally and efficiently avoiding populist policies since they are appointed
out of the legislature and they are not worried about being reelected in the
subsequent elections (Linz 1994, 61). In fact, this argument does not seem
plausible since secretaries are directly responsible to the president as in the PMS
where ministers are responsible to the prime minister; thus ministers both in the
PS and the PMS do not perform their duties independently of the president or the
prime minister. Moreover, the secretaries of the president come from various
segments of the society including interest groups, minorities, clans, religious
communities, and etc. Therefore, it cannot be guaranteed that they would serve
impartially paying no heed to their affiliations considering the fact that they do
not have to worry about being accountable to the voters.
Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno’s research (2009) comparing the performance
of presidential and parliamentarian regimes reveals some interesting facts about
the discussion of effective governance that the PS is expected to produce by some
political scientists. The research aimed to find out which system is superior to the
other one. They employed fourteen indicators that fall into three policy areas:
political, economic, and human development. As a result of the study, they
concluded that PMSs have significant advantages over PSs. For instance, in most
policy areas, particularly in the areas of economic and human development such
as telecommunications, infrastructure, import duties, trade openness, investment
ratings, GDP per capita, infant mortality and life expectancy PMSs are associated
with better governance. Interestingly, in no case PMSs were associated with bad
governance. This empirical evidence demonstrates that the assumption that PSs
generate more effective and efficient governance is unfounded.
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3.2. Gridlocks: A Common Problem in the PS
Notwithstanding its advantage of government stability and efficiency as it is
argued by some scholars, PSs are not immune from malfunctioning. An important
drawback of PSs is the possibility of political gridlock. PSs produce more powerful
executive power as they get their legitimacy directly from popular vote (Lijphart
1986, 48-50). Unlike PMSs, in PSs both the executive and the legislative powers
get their socio-political legitimacy from separate popular elections, which creates
two equally powerful political actors. Some call this ‘dual legitimacy’ and they
argue that it is a factor that plays an important role in the predisposition of the
two powers to evade compromise on the issues they have conflicting positions
(Shugart and Carey 1992). A possibility of disagreement between the two powers
may paralyze the system. This usually occurs when the president’s party looses
majority in the legislature which the president relies on to pass the necessary
legislation to achieve his policy goals. Furthermore, the members of the
legislature may have given promises to their voters contradicting the president’s.
And in countries where the party discipline is loose such as the USA, the president
may not even get his own party members’ support in some legislative proposals.
Unlike PMSs, PSs lack the mechanism of vote of confidence to restore trust, which
might resolve the gridlock. Therefore, in such situations the president may have
his hands tied being unable to realize his policy goals (Linz 1994, 8-9). The budget
is also controlled by the legislative body in PSs; in case the budget is not approved
by the legislature a crisis emerges. Such situations would obviously hinder
effective functioning of the government. Since there is not an option of removing
and replacing the government with another one until the next elections in PSs,
such frictions may turn into serious political crises. However, the Senate in the US
is sometimes able to solve such crises. In case of frequent long lasting political
gridlocks, the president could adopt the habit of overriding the resistance of the
legislature using his decree power and executive orders, which may turn the
regime into an authoritarian one as in Latin American PSs. However, it should be
noted that this depends on the extent of constitutionally granted decree powers
to the president; not all PSs grant high decree power to the president.
Linz argues that double-headed legitimacy in PSs causes a crisis of political
and governmental legitimacy because the system lacks mechanisms to resolve
such conflicts unlike parliamentarism which is able to eliminate this problem since
the executive is not independent of the legislative body (Linz 1990, 86). PMSs are
able to solve such crises through vote of no confidence, constructive vote of no
confidence and call for early elections as a final choice. In his comparative study,
Mainwaring (1993) concludes that presidential regimes are less competent in
overcoming crises than the parliamentary regimes. Another study that supports
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this argument was carried out by Powell (1982). In his extensive study, he carried
a comparative study on the post-WWII democratic regimes and concluded PMSs
with proportional electoral systems are more successful in maintaining stability
and governance without use of force than PSs.
3.3. Is Presidentialism More Democratic?
Presidentialism is considered a more democratic form of government by
some political scientists (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Samuels and Shugart
2003) In PSs, presidents are elected by direct vote of the citizens. Voters know
who they are electing as the head of executive power whereas in PMS the
formation of the government is not always predictable; citizen preferences may
not be reflected in the government that is formed after the elections. To illustrate,
a party that has managed to get the largest number of seats in the parliament as a
result of the election may not be able to form a coalition government and be out
of the government. However, it should be noted that this reality depends on the
political culture of the country. In some countries such as Turkey, people know
who will be the prime minister before the election. Moreover, people vote for the
party and the leader; the deputies to be elected are not very important to the
voter. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997, 460-461) argue that PSs are more
preferable in terms of accountability; PSs makes it simple for the voters to identify
who is to hold accountable in case of failure. Similarly, Samuels and Shugart
(2003, 43) claim that presidentialism enhances the prospect of accountability
representation. On the other hand, the fact that the serving period of the
president is fixed and unchangeable except for extreme cases such treason cast
doubt on its ability to respond to citizens’ demands and reactions which is an
important indicator of democracy. Even if the president loses the citizens’ and his
party’s confidence, he can remain in office. Voters have to endure poor
governance, unsolvable gridlocks and crises until the next elections. PSs entails
inflexibility regarding the removal of ineffective president making it extremely
difficult (Linz 1994, 9-10). Kalaycıoğlu (2005, 23) argues that fixed serving term in
PSs causes the president to be unresponsive to popular demands.
Regarding democratic values, the PS is often criticized for its winner-takes-all
results (Lijphart 1984, 159-162). In presidential elections, the winning candidate
takes all and attains a great power, while the loser gets nothing. In other words,
political competition in PSs is a zero-sum game and the government formation is
non-inclusive. In this zero-sum game the presidential candidates of small parties
would not stand a chance and they would eventually disappear from the political
arena as a result of strategic voting of the voters and the strategic entry of the
political elites. Duverger’s law could be employed to explain this phenomenon.
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Duverger’s law states that SMDP electoral system, which is a winner-all-take
system, leads to two-party systems. In practice, presidential elections are very
similar to SMDP electoral system in which the whole country is one constituency
with a single member. Since the presidency is the most important political post in
PSs, and only one person can be elected the president, voters tend to prefer to
vote for the candidates of the big parties that have a higher chance of winning.
This reality suggests that small parties with diverse political ideologies will either
grow smaller or disappear, which could be considered an outcome that is not
compatible with contestation. Robert Dahl (1971, 4-13) identifies contestation as
being particularly important for a regime to be democratic. Therefore, it could be
argued that the PS is not as democratic as the PMS.
Furthermore, winner-takes-all feature of the PS has a potential to cause
heated conflict between the party in power and the opposition particularly when
the opposition has been unable to come to power for a long time. Linz (1990, 56)
is critical of the PS stating that the stakes are high in presidential elections and as
anticipated it heightens tension and polarization. It is also argued by some that
presidentialism decreases the life expectancy of democratic regimes because of
the extreme tension it causes (Przeworski et al. 1996). Mainwaring’s study (1993,
205) could provide some evidence for this argument. He found that by 1992 there
were 31 democratic regimes that had been functioning uninterruptedly for 25
years; and only 4 of them were presidential democracies as opposed to 24
parliamentary democracies. Parliamentarism provides an opportunity to many
parties to come power, and smaller parties may have a chance take a share in the
government through coalitions. They also have anticipation of being an
alternative to the government under favorable conditions. However, it should be
noted that this criticism leveled at PS’s producing winner-takes-all results and
being non-inclusive concerns mostly the American model of presidentialism. As
mentioned above, in the applications of the PS in some countries coalition
governments are always possible; thus it couldn’t be argue that all forms of PSs
are non-inclusive.
3.4. Tendency to Authoritarianism
Opponents of the PS argue that the PS has an inherent tendency toward
authoritarianism mainly due the concentration of power in one man’s hand. Style
of politics in the PS seems to be less favorable for democracy than that of the
PMS. Having been elected by the majority of the nation, the president may regard
himself as the sole legitimate representative of all citizens and this may lead him
to adopt an authoritarian attitude ignoring dissenting voices. Linz (1994, 19)
describes this attitude like this: “The feeling of having independent power, a
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mandate from the people ... is likely to give a president a sense of power and
mission that might be out of proportion to the limited plurality that elected him.”
Since presidents are elected directly by the majority of the public for a fixed
period time, they may consider being responsive to the demands and interest of
the opposition is politically pointless.
Furthermore, recurrent and long-lasting conflicts between the legislature and
the executive may cause a risk of the collapse of the democratic regime in PSs.
According to a study by Fred Riggs (1992), all PSs that were established after 1945
in the third world countries failed turning into single party authoritarian or
totalitarian regimes. In fact, most PSs in Latin American countries turned into
authoritarian regimes as a result of such crises (Linz 1990, 89-89). In the USA,
political gridlocks are often resolved easily as American politics has a developed
culture of making compromise in times of crisis and the US system is based on
strict separation of powers. Regarding this fact, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997,
449) argue that the PS is not feasible in countries where there is high political
polarization among different segments of the society; and presidentialism works
better in countries with undisciplined parties with less ideological variation.
Similarly, Sartori (1994) attributes the success of American presidentialism to its
flexible structure, parties with loose disciplined, and pork-barrel, locality-oriented
politics.
4. A Difficult Systemic Change: From Parliamentarism to Presidentialism
Changing the system of government in a country is a fundamental
institutional change. Political arrangements are extraordinarily difficult change.
Scholars from the school of new-institutionalism explain this phenomenon with
‘path dependency theory’. Regarding politics, the main assumption of this theory
is that the initial arrangements in political institutions strongly affect their
behaviors and outcomes of them, and due to its high cost, it is very difficult or
almost impossible to change them as they are entrenched in the society over a
long time (Pierson 2000; Bridges 2000). Except for several interruptions, Turkey
has had a PMS since the introduction of 1876 constitution of the Ottoman era.
Thus, Turkey has an entrenched PMS. All of her political arrangements are
designed according to this system; switching from parliamentarism to
presidentialism would have a high cost and it might not produce the desired
outcomes. It may even lead to political, social and economic chaos contrary to
expectations. Additionally, Turkish political cultural, which has evolved under the
PMS, will not probably be able to adapt to the PS easily. Gridlocks - as an inherent
characteristic of PS – will most likely to be customary considering the enduring
ailments of Turkish politics such as lack of culture of compromise, and high
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polarization. Modifications in the classical US model according to the needs of
Turkey will probably fail as it did in many countries, some examples of which were
mentioned above.
There are several obstacles in the way of this institutional change. The first
one is the legitimacy issue. Such a fundamental transformation requires high level
of popular support. Constitutional amendments require a super majority of twothirds of the parliament members present and voting according to the Turkish
constitution. No political party has ever managed to attain such a majority in the
Turkish parliament, and reaching a consensus among political parties is not an
easy task considering the increasing political tension polarization in Turkey. Even if
ruling political elites decide to carry out such a radical change seeing it to their
own advantage, various segments of the society will probably oppose due to
several reasons. Adopting presidentialism will not only affect the relationship
between the legislation and the executive but also the whole society to some
extent. Those whose interests or political aspirations will be harmed by such a
change would sternly oppose it. Therefore, there must be high public consensus
on such a reform, which is very hard to reach in Turkey. According to a survey
carried out by BILGESAM (2013), a Turkish Think Tank organization in 2013, public
support for presidentialism is only 32%. 68% of the respondents of the survey
think that parliamentary democracy is a better option for Turkey. An interesting
result of the survey is that support for the PS among the voters of opposition
parties is very low (e.g. MHP: 7%, CHP: 5%), while it is significantly higher among
AKP voters (55%). The most striking finding of the survey is that the great majority
of the participants (78%) think that the presidentialism is being imposed to the
public without discussing it adequately. 63% of the participants believe that
debate on presidentialism is deliberately kept on the agenda just because AKP
wants to maintain its power. This survey indicates that there is not enough public
support for presidentialism in Turkey. Unless the overwhelming majority of the
citizens give consent to the transition, the legitimacy of the new system will
always be a contentious issue. The fact that recent attempts of AKP to introduce
presidentialism in Turkey during the latest workshop over the preparation of the
new constitution in the parliament commission were rejected by all of the
opposition parties indicates the difficulty of adopting presidentialism.
Adopting presidentialism will also cause some technical and financial
problems. Since most of the political system and the bureaucracy need to be
redesigned according to the new system, there will be a financial cost of it. And
adaption to the new system will certainly take a long time. During this adaptation
processes the system may not function properly, and the problems caused by it
may be costly. Finally, there is no guarantee that the new system will be
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successful. The cost of reversal is expected to be even higher. Therefore, the costbenefit analysis of transition to PS needs to be carried out delicately.
5. Conclusion
The brief comparative study presented above indicates that presidentialism is
not an ideal system that is free from defects. No system can be analyzed out of
the context it emerged. Therefore, we need to keep in mind that presidentialism
is a system of government that was designed and has evolved under the unique
circumstances of American politics. The performance of the applications of the PS
outside the USA raises some questions about the feasibility of it in Turkey. As
could be seen from the examples given above, the performance of American
presidentialism is not exceptionally good contrary to widespread assumption.
Government efficiency is not always accomplished in the USA. And empirical
studies a few of which are mentioned in this article indicate that parliamentarism
produces more efficient governments than presidentialism.
Another problem is that Turkish politics is characterized by political crises;
and dual legitimacy in presidentialism will probably exacerbate the current
ailments of the system. Turkish political culture is not mature enough to
overcome political gridlocks which are quite frequent in presidentialism. The fact
that the presidential elections are a zero-sum game in presidentialism will exclude
minor political groups and marginalize them causing serious political and social
conflicts.
The fear for the tendency of the presidentialism to authoritarianism is
another worrying issue in Turkish public opinion. According to the survey carried
out BILGESAM (2013), 65.8% of the respondents think that presidentialism will
eventually turn into an authoritarian rule and 52.6% of them agree that
presidentialism will harm the principle of separation powers.
To conclude, it is undeniable fact the current Turkish system of government
has several flaws that hinder its efficiency. It seems that almost everybody would
agree on taking some steps to solve this problem. However, presidentialism
should not be presented as the only option for the solution. We could either make
reforms on the current system to make it function better such as increasing inparty democracy, or design a form of government according to our needs. In
other words, we need to consider ‘rationalized parliamentarism’, which is defined
as a set of constitutional devices and procedures aimed at promoting the stability
of cabinets while retaining the core features of the parliamentary system,
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including legislative oversight of government policy.2 Any reform in the form of
government model should be handled carefully so that it will function well in
Turkey’s political setting.
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