European Journal of Economic and Political Studies 7 (2014) 71-85 Presidentialism: Is It a Better Option for Turkey? Eyüp AYGÜN* Institute of Social Sciences, Fatih University, Turkey Abstract The role of the government model in the performance of the governments and in the sustainability of the democratic regime is a controversial issue. Parliamentary and presidential systems are often compared in that respect. Turkish academic and political circles have been discussing whether or not presidentialism is a viable option that would resolve the deep-rooted problems of Turkish political system for the past three decades. Although, there are different subtypes of presidential systems, the debate in Turkey focuses on the American presidential system. This article discusses strengths and weaknesses of the presidential system and assesses its viability in Turkey by listing some potential difficulties in case such a radical systemic change is accepted. Keywords: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Presidential System, Viability, Parliamentary System in Turkey. JEL Classification: D72, D73, F50, H11, P5 * Tel:+90 212 866 33 00 (Ext:1452). E-mail address: eaygun@fatih.edu.tr Page | 71 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 1. Introduction In both academic and political circles, there is an ongoing debate on whether the parliamentary (PMS henceforth) or the presidential system (PS henceforth) is able to sustain a more stable democratic regime. While some argue that the PS entails great risks for democracy because of its some major defects (Riggs 1992; Linz 1994; Özbudun 1996; Uran 2010; Kalaycıoğlu 2005), others oppose this idea (Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Fendoğlu 2012). The issue is also often brought up in Turkish public whenever there is a political crisis or during the election period of the president. In fact, it has been an issue of discussion in Turkey in the last three decades. Turgut Özal is known as the first political figure that instigated the discussion in the late 1980s. Despite losing its intensity from time to time since then, it has always been a controversial political debate in Turkey. After Özal’s death, his successor Demirel campaigned for presidentialism although he had harshly criticized Özal over his efforts for adopting PS in Turkey (Yazıcı 2002). Since 2002 AKP (Justice and Development Party) governments have been able remain in power without losing majority in the parliament, which is an exceptional political phenomenon in modern Turkish political history. The demands for presidentialism in Turkey should reasonably be expected to have diminished as a result of AKP’s has success in maintaining governmental stability for over a decade since its enthusiasts often put forward the necessity of PS for more stable and effective governments complaining about ineffective and short-lived coalitions. However, AKP administration has repeatedly expressed their aspiration for a transition to parliamentarism in Turkey since the early days of their start of ruling. PM Erdoğan, Cemil Çiçek, Burhan Kuzu and some top AKP politicians continued the debate about the PS (Öder 2005, 31). Although there are several forms of PSs around the world, supporters of parliamentarism in Turkey primarily refer to the PS in the USA as a model when they discuss the issue. The latest proposal about adopting parliamentarism which was submitted to the committee of constitution amendments of Turkish parliament has many features in common with the American model.1 The debate over the PS in Turkish political and academic circles revolves around the compatibility of PS to Turkey’s realities and its benefits and drawbacks. The main argument of the proponents of the PS in Turkey is that the PMS does not meet the requirements of Turkey as a developing country due to some of its deficiencies such as its tendency to produce short-lived coalitions, 1 For the details of the proposal: http://www.aktifhaber.com/akpnin-22-maddelikbaskanlik-sistemi-teklifi-685366h.htm, accessed on May 27th, 2014. Page | 72 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 dependence of legislative power to the executive power, and its ineffectiveness in checks and balances. Özal, Demirel, and Erdoğan, prominent political figures of Turkey, argued that Turkey needs to adopt either the PS or the semi-PS in order to have a more stable and effective administration since Turkey needs to overcome a great deal of social, economic, and political problems in order to become a regional and a global actor (Uran 2010). Opponents of the PS argue that the PS is not compatible with the Turkish political culture which has been shaped by a long tradition of parliamentarism since 1876. Özbudun (1996) argues that it is highly probable that adopting the PS will have a negative impact on Turkish democracy which has not been consolidated adequately despite its fairly long history. There are also claims that the PS is likely to produce more political instability or even turn into an authoritarian regime let alone resolve current ailments of Turkish democracy (Kalaycıoğlu 2005). This article aims to discuss the benefits and drawbacks of the PS and its viability in Turkey by providing a general comparison of the PS and the PMS. I argue that pure the PS as it is applied in the US is not compatible with Turkish political culture; and therefore it cannot be a viable option for Turkey. Semipresidential system will not be mentioned due to the limited scope of this work. 2. Presidential System: Brief History and Key Features In democratic systems there are different types of government formation regarding which institutions are formed by the elected representatives of the public. In fact, forms of government are determined according to the relationship between executive and legislative branches of a state. Depending on the relationship between the government, legislature, and the president/president of republic (some countries may not have one), there are mainly three types of political systems in the world: parliamentary, presidential and mixed (semipresidential) systems (Cheibub 2007, 33). The PS was first introduced by the founding fathers of the USA. It emerged in the late 18th century as an outcome of the political conditions of the time when Americans fought British rule for independence. Duverger asserts that the committee of founders who assembled in Philadelphia in 1787 did not aim to create a new system; on the contrary, they wanted to adopt the British Westminster System which they considered a well-tried system (Duverger 1994, 78). Similarly, Lijphart (1984) argues that the designers of American PS took British Westminster parliamentarism as a model changing some of its features while keeping some of its institutions. To illustrate, in both systems there are two Page | 73 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 legislative bodies, a lower and an upper chamber; they both have single-member district plurality electoral systems which produced a two-party dominant democracy; and the president of the USA is elected by electoral college (electors chosen by popular vote elect the president) which was once used but abandoned in the UK. It is argued that the PS is destined to fail in other countries since it is a peculiarly American form of government that was designed according to the unique political circumstances and needs of the USA (Yılmaz 2013). The first president elected with this system was George Washington in 1789. Since then several countries have adopted the PS taking the American PS as a model modifying it according to their own needs, so there are different subtypes of the pure PS. However, none of these replicas has been as successful as its original form. Making modifications to the original American form could be the reason for the failure of PS in other countries. Therefore, it would be appropriate to take American PS as a base and describe it in the first place. In fact, despite some variations, most PSs share common features with the American model. Unlike the PMS, the PS is a form of government which depends on a rigid separation of powers (Schmitt and Shullky 1989, 59). Executive, legislative and judiciary powers of the state are independent from each other and have equal political power. American PS was designed in a way that none of three powers would prevail over the others in order to have checks and balances between the powers and to prevent centralization of power in one hand (Kalaycioğlu 2005, 15). The PS has some fundamental features that distinguish it from the PMS. Lijphart (1992) lists some distinguishing features of the PS: the president is elected by popular vote (directly or indirectly by Electoral College as in the USA) for a fixed period of time and becomes both the head of the government and the state. Except for very rare cases of impeachment, the president completes his fixed term. And the president has the exclusive authority to determine and conduct the policies of the executive. He decides whom to be appointed as his ministers, secretaries as they are called in the USA. He is also able to dismiss them anytime unconditionally. Secretaries are nonpartisan technocrats who are merely responsible to the president and perform in accordance with the president’s policies and orders. Therefore, there is not a cabinet in the PS as in the parliamentarian sense (Morlan 1975, 176-177). Another significant difference is that the president is not responsible to the legislature; therefore the executive does not have to depend on the vote of confidence of it. The government remains in power even if the president’s party loses the majority in the legislature since there is no risk of being removed by the mechanism of vote of no confidence as in Page | 74 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 PMSs. In other words, president’s government cannot be removed by the legislative organs and stays in office until the following elections regardless of its performance. Due to this feature, minority governments are possible in PSs and they are more frequent than in PMSs. According to a study on government coalitions carried out by Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004), 65 percent of the minority governments in the world from 1946 to 1999 were in PSs. 3. Is Presidentialism a Better Option than Parliamentarism? In order to comprehend what sort of outcome it may produce if Turkey adopts the PS, it is necessary to compare and contrast it with the PMS that Turkey is currently implementing. Such a task is crucial to being able to identify the strengths and the weaknesses of the PS. 3.1. Stability and Effective Government The main argument that has been put forward by proponents of the PS is that governments in PSs are more efficient and stable than in PMSs. Fixed office period, lack of vote of no confidence of the legislative body, and the possibility of minority governments enables president and his cabinet to implement their political agenda without fear of losing office. As a result of this certainty, as Lijphart (1986) argues, more stable governments are formed. Evcimen (1992) asserts that due to its monolithic structure presidential governments can make decision faster and more effectively particularly in times of crisis and emergency. However, the fact that the president and his government cannot be removed by the legislature does not automatically produce effective governance. Lack of comprise and cooperation between the powers may obstruct efficient functioning of the government. There is also the issue of coalitions in PSs. That coalition governments in PSs are rare is an erroneous belief. In fact, coalition governments are quite frequent in PSs. Amorim Neto (2006) studied government types in PSs from late 1970s to 2000 and found out that 72.6 percent of the cases were coalition governments. This empirical evidence suggests that presidents forming coalition governments may have to make some policy concessions in order to include opposition members in the government. The main motive for the president to take such course of action is to get the support of the opposition for the desired legislation, which is necessary for achieving his policy goals. However, it should be noted that the credibility of such concessions is doubtful since the president does not have to depend on opposition’s support to remain in office, and presidents in some countries are granted extensive constitutional decree power as in Latin America. Page | 75 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 Therefore, the president can ignore his promises without fear of losing his office. Of course such a course of action might have some unpleasant consequences for the government. However, the role of the electoral systems in the formation of coalition governments in PSs should also be taken into consideration about the issue of coalition governments. For example, ‘First Past The Post system’ is used in the US, which is a simple form of majority electoral system with single-member districts. Thus, the US system produces the dominance of the two major parties ruling out the possibility of coalition governments. On the other hand, Brazil, another country with the PS, uses ‘List Proportional Representation’ electoral method in which each party presents a list of candidates for a multi-member electoral district, and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote (IDEA.INT 2014). In this system, there is always likelihood of a coalition after an election. Another argument proposed in favor of the PS about its efficiency is that ministers (secretaries in the USA) are able to carry out their duties more professionally and efficiently avoiding populist policies since they are appointed out of the legislature and they are not worried about being reelected in the subsequent elections (Linz 1994, 61). In fact, this argument does not seem plausible since secretaries are directly responsible to the president as in the PMS where ministers are responsible to the prime minister; thus ministers both in the PS and the PMS do not perform their duties independently of the president or the prime minister. Moreover, the secretaries of the president come from various segments of the society including interest groups, minorities, clans, religious communities, and etc. Therefore, it cannot be guaranteed that they would serve impartially paying no heed to their affiliations considering the fact that they do not have to worry about being accountable to the voters. Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno’s research (2009) comparing the performance of presidential and parliamentarian regimes reveals some interesting facts about the discussion of effective governance that the PS is expected to produce by some political scientists. The research aimed to find out which system is superior to the other one. They employed fourteen indicators that fall into three policy areas: political, economic, and human development. As a result of the study, they concluded that PMSs have significant advantages over PSs. For instance, in most policy areas, particularly in the areas of economic and human development such as telecommunications, infrastructure, import duties, trade openness, investment ratings, GDP per capita, infant mortality and life expectancy PMSs are associated with better governance. Interestingly, in no case PMSs were associated with bad governance. This empirical evidence demonstrates that the assumption that PSs generate more effective and efficient governance is unfounded. Page | 76 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 3.2. Gridlocks: A Common Problem in the PS Notwithstanding its advantage of government stability and efficiency as it is argued by some scholars, PSs are not immune from malfunctioning. An important drawback of PSs is the possibility of political gridlock. PSs produce more powerful executive power as they get their legitimacy directly from popular vote (Lijphart 1986, 48-50). Unlike PMSs, in PSs both the executive and the legislative powers get their socio-political legitimacy from separate popular elections, which creates two equally powerful political actors. Some call this ‘dual legitimacy’ and they argue that it is a factor that plays an important role in the predisposition of the two powers to evade compromise on the issues they have conflicting positions (Shugart and Carey 1992). A possibility of disagreement between the two powers may paralyze the system. This usually occurs when the president’s party looses majority in the legislature which the president relies on to pass the necessary legislation to achieve his policy goals. Furthermore, the members of the legislature may have given promises to their voters contradicting the president’s. And in countries where the party discipline is loose such as the USA, the president may not even get his own party members’ support in some legislative proposals. Unlike PMSs, PSs lack the mechanism of vote of confidence to restore trust, which might resolve the gridlock. Therefore, in such situations the president may have his hands tied being unable to realize his policy goals (Linz 1994, 8-9). The budget is also controlled by the legislative body in PSs; in case the budget is not approved by the legislature a crisis emerges. Such situations would obviously hinder effective functioning of the government. Since there is not an option of removing and replacing the government with another one until the next elections in PSs, such frictions may turn into serious political crises. However, the Senate in the US is sometimes able to solve such crises. In case of frequent long lasting political gridlocks, the president could adopt the habit of overriding the resistance of the legislature using his decree power and executive orders, which may turn the regime into an authoritarian one as in Latin American PSs. However, it should be noted that this depends on the extent of constitutionally granted decree powers to the president; not all PSs grant high decree power to the president. Linz argues that double-headed legitimacy in PSs causes a crisis of political and governmental legitimacy because the system lacks mechanisms to resolve such conflicts unlike parliamentarism which is able to eliminate this problem since the executive is not independent of the legislative body (Linz 1990, 86). PMSs are able to solve such crises through vote of no confidence, constructive vote of no confidence and call for early elections as a final choice. In his comparative study, Mainwaring (1993) concludes that presidential regimes are less competent in overcoming crises than the parliamentary regimes. Another study that supports Page | 77 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 this argument was carried out by Powell (1982). In his extensive study, he carried a comparative study on the post-WWII democratic regimes and concluded PMSs with proportional electoral systems are more successful in maintaining stability and governance without use of force than PSs. 3.3. Is Presidentialism More Democratic? Presidentialism is considered a more democratic form of government by some political scientists (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Samuels and Shugart 2003) In PSs, presidents are elected by direct vote of the citizens. Voters know who they are electing as the head of executive power whereas in PMS the formation of the government is not always predictable; citizen preferences may not be reflected in the government that is formed after the elections. To illustrate, a party that has managed to get the largest number of seats in the parliament as a result of the election may not be able to form a coalition government and be out of the government. However, it should be noted that this reality depends on the political culture of the country. In some countries such as Turkey, people know who will be the prime minister before the election. Moreover, people vote for the party and the leader; the deputies to be elected are not very important to the voter. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997, 460-461) argue that PSs are more preferable in terms of accountability; PSs makes it simple for the voters to identify who is to hold accountable in case of failure. Similarly, Samuels and Shugart (2003, 43) claim that presidentialism enhances the prospect of accountability representation. On the other hand, the fact that the serving period of the president is fixed and unchangeable except for extreme cases such treason cast doubt on its ability to respond to citizens’ demands and reactions which is an important indicator of democracy. Even if the president loses the citizens’ and his party’s confidence, he can remain in office. Voters have to endure poor governance, unsolvable gridlocks and crises until the next elections. PSs entails inflexibility regarding the removal of ineffective president making it extremely difficult (Linz 1994, 9-10). Kalaycıoğlu (2005, 23) argues that fixed serving term in PSs causes the president to be unresponsive to popular demands. Regarding democratic values, the PS is often criticized for its winner-takes-all results (Lijphart 1984, 159-162). In presidential elections, the winning candidate takes all and attains a great power, while the loser gets nothing. In other words, political competition in PSs is a zero-sum game and the government formation is non-inclusive. In this zero-sum game the presidential candidates of small parties would not stand a chance and they would eventually disappear from the political arena as a result of strategic voting of the voters and the strategic entry of the political elites. Duverger’s law could be employed to explain this phenomenon. Page | 78 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 Duverger’s law states that SMDP electoral system, which is a winner-all-take system, leads to two-party systems. In practice, presidential elections are very similar to SMDP electoral system in which the whole country is one constituency with a single member. Since the presidency is the most important political post in PSs, and only one person can be elected the president, voters tend to prefer to vote for the candidates of the big parties that have a higher chance of winning. This reality suggests that small parties with diverse political ideologies will either grow smaller or disappear, which could be considered an outcome that is not compatible with contestation. Robert Dahl (1971, 4-13) identifies contestation as being particularly important for a regime to be democratic. Therefore, it could be argued that the PS is not as democratic as the PMS. Furthermore, winner-takes-all feature of the PS has a potential to cause heated conflict between the party in power and the opposition particularly when the opposition has been unable to come to power for a long time. Linz (1990, 56) is critical of the PS stating that the stakes are high in presidential elections and as anticipated it heightens tension and polarization. It is also argued by some that presidentialism decreases the life expectancy of democratic regimes because of the extreme tension it causes (Przeworski et al. 1996). Mainwaring’s study (1993, 205) could provide some evidence for this argument. He found that by 1992 there were 31 democratic regimes that had been functioning uninterruptedly for 25 years; and only 4 of them were presidential democracies as opposed to 24 parliamentary democracies. Parliamentarism provides an opportunity to many parties to come power, and smaller parties may have a chance take a share in the government through coalitions. They also have anticipation of being an alternative to the government under favorable conditions. However, it should be noted that this criticism leveled at PS’s producing winner-takes-all results and being non-inclusive concerns mostly the American model of presidentialism. As mentioned above, in the applications of the PS in some countries coalition governments are always possible; thus it couldn’t be argue that all forms of PSs are non-inclusive. 3.4. Tendency to Authoritarianism Opponents of the PS argue that the PS has an inherent tendency toward authoritarianism mainly due the concentration of power in one man’s hand. Style of politics in the PS seems to be less favorable for democracy than that of the PMS. Having been elected by the majority of the nation, the president may regard himself as the sole legitimate representative of all citizens and this may lead him to adopt an authoritarian attitude ignoring dissenting voices. Linz (1994, 19) describes this attitude like this: “The feeling of having independent power, a Page | 79 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 mandate from the people ... is likely to give a president a sense of power and mission that might be out of proportion to the limited plurality that elected him.” Since presidents are elected directly by the majority of the public for a fixed period time, they may consider being responsive to the demands and interest of the opposition is politically pointless. Furthermore, recurrent and long-lasting conflicts between the legislature and the executive may cause a risk of the collapse of the democratic regime in PSs. According to a study by Fred Riggs (1992), all PSs that were established after 1945 in the third world countries failed turning into single party authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. In fact, most PSs in Latin American countries turned into authoritarian regimes as a result of such crises (Linz 1990, 89-89). In the USA, political gridlocks are often resolved easily as American politics has a developed culture of making compromise in times of crisis and the US system is based on strict separation of powers. Regarding this fact, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997, 449) argue that the PS is not feasible in countries where there is high political polarization among different segments of the society; and presidentialism works better in countries with undisciplined parties with less ideological variation. Similarly, Sartori (1994) attributes the success of American presidentialism to its flexible structure, parties with loose disciplined, and pork-barrel, locality-oriented politics. 4. A Difficult Systemic Change: From Parliamentarism to Presidentialism Changing the system of government in a country is a fundamental institutional change. Political arrangements are extraordinarily difficult change. Scholars from the school of new-institutionalism explain this phenomenon with ‘path dependency theory’. Regarding politics, the main assumption of this theory is that the initial arrangements in political institutions strongly affect their behaviors and outcomes of them, and due to its high cost, it is very difficult or almost impossible to change them as they are entrenched in the society over a long time (Pierson 2000; Bridges 2000). Except for several interruptions, Turkey has had a PMS since the introduction of 1876 constitution of the Ottoman era. Thus, Turkey has an entrenched PMS. All of her political arrangements are designed according to this system; switching from parliamentarism to presidentialism would have a high cost and it might not produce the desired outcomes. It may even lead to political, social and economic chaos contrary to expectations. Additionally, Turkish political cultural, which has evolved under the PMS, will not probably be able to adapt to the PS easily. Gridlocks - as an inherent characteristic of PS – will most likely to be customary considering the enduring ailments of Turkish politics such as lack of culture of compromise, and high Page | 80 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 polarization. Modifications in the classical US model according to the needs of Turkey will probably fail as it did in many countries, some examples of which were mentioned above. There are several obstacles in the way of this institutional change. The first one is the legitimacy issue. Such a fundamental transformation requires high level of popular support. Constitutional amendments require a super majority of twothirds of the parliament members present and voting according to the Turkish constitution. No political party has ever managed to attain such a majority in the Turkish parliament, and reaching a consensus among political parties is not an easy task considering the increasing political tension polarization in Turkey. Even if ruling political elites decide to carry out such a radical change seeing it to their own advantage, various segments of the society will probably oppose due to several reasons. Adopting presidentialism will not only affect the relationship between the legislation and the executive but also the whole society to some extent. Those whose interests or political aspirations will be harmed by such a change would sternly oppose it. Therefore, there must be high public consensus on such a reform, which is very hard to reach in Turkey. According to a survey carried out by BILGESAM (2013), a Turkish Think Tank organization in 2013, public support for presidentialism is only 32%. 68% of the respondents of the survey think that parliamentary democracy is a better option for Turkey. An interesting result of the survey is that support for the PS among the voters of opposition parties is very low (e.g. MHP: 7%, CHP: 5%), while it is significantly higher among AKP voters (55%). The most striking finding of the survey is that the great majority of the participants (78%) think that the presidentialism is being imposed to the public without discussing it adequately. 63% of the participants believe that debate on presidentialism is deliberately kept on the agenda just because AKP wants to maintain its power. This survey indicates that there is not enough public support for presidentialism in Turkey. Unless the overwhelming majority of the citizens give consent to the transition, the legitimacy of the new system will always be a contentious issue. The fact that recent attempts of AKP to introduce presidentialism in Turkey during the latest workshop over the preparation of the new constitution in the parliament commission were rejected by all of the opposition parties indicates the difficulty of adopting presidentialism. Adopting presidentialism will also cause some technical and financial problems. Since most of the political system and the bureaucracy need to be redesigned according to the new system, there will be a financial cost of it. And adaption to the new system will certainly take a long time. During this adaptation processes the system may not function properly, and the problems caused by it may be costly. Finally, there is no guarantee that the new system will be Page | 81 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 successful. The cost of reversal is expected to be even higher. Therefore, the costbenefit analysis of transition to PS needs to be carried out delicately. 5. Conclusion The brief comparative study presented above indicates that presidentialism is not an ideal system that is free from defects. No system can be analyzed out of the context it emerged. Therefore, we need to keep in mind that presidentialism is a system of government that was designed and has evolved under the unique circumstances of American politics. The performance of the applications of the PS outside the USA raises some questions about the feasibility of it in Turkey. As could be seen from the examples given above, the performance of American presidentialism is not exceptionally good contrary to widespread assumption. Government efficiency is not always accomplished in the USA. And empirical studies a few of which are mentioned in this article indicate that parliamentarism produces more efficient governments than presidentialism. Another problem is that Turkish politics is characterized by political crises; and dual legitimacy in presidentialism will probably exacerbate the current ailments of the system. Turkish political culture is not mature enough to overcome political gridlocks which are quite frequent in presidentialism. The fact that the presidential elections are a zero-sum game in presidentialism will exclude minor political groups and marginalize them causing serious political and social conflicts. The fear for the tendency of the presidentialism to authoritarianism is another worrying issue in Turkish public opinion. According to the survey carried out BILGESAM (2013), 65.8% of the respondents think that presidentialism will eventually turn into an authoritarian rule and 52.6% of them agree that presidentialism will harm the principle of separation powers. To conclude, it is undeniable fact the current Turkish system of government has several flaws that hinder its efficiency. It seems that almost everybody would agree on taking some steps to solve this problem. However, presidentialism should not be presented as the only option for the solution. We could either make reforms on the current system to make it function better such as increasing inparty democracy, or design a form of government according to our needs. In other words, we need to consider ‘rationalized parliamentarism’, which is defined as a set of constitutional devices and procedures aimed at promoting the stability of cabinets while retaining the core features of the parliamentary system, Page | 82 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 including legislative oversight of government policy.2 Any reform in the form of government model should be handled carefully so that it will function well in Turkey’s political setting. References Amorim Neto, Octavio. 2006. “The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas.” Comparative Political Studies 39: 415-40. Bridges, Amy. 2000. “Path Dependence, Sequence, History, Theory.” Studies in American Political Development 14: 109-12. Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Adam Przeworski and Sebastian Saiegh. 2004. “Government Coalitions and Legislative Success under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism.” British Journal of Political Science 34: 565-87. Cheibub, Jos Ant nio. 2007. Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cheibub, Jos Antonio & Limongi, Fernando. 2002. “Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered.” Annual Review of Political Science 5: 151-79. Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Poliarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. Duverger, Maurice. 1994. Siyasal Rejimler. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. Evcimen, Günsev. 1992. “Başkanlık Hükümeti Sistemi, ‘Ratio Politikası’ ve Türkiye.” Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi. Ocak: 317-34. Fendoğlu, Hasan Tahsin. 2012. “Başkanlık Sistemi.” İnönü Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 3 (1): 46-54. Gerring, John, Strom Thacker, and Carola Moreno. 2009. “Are Parliamentary Systems Better?” Comparative Political Studies 42 (3): 327–59. Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. 2005. “Başkanlık Rejimi: Türkiye’nin Diktatörlük Tehdidiyle Sınavı.” In Başkanlık Sistemi, edited by Teoman Ergül. Ankara: TBB Yayını. 1329. 2 Please see Tanchev, E. (1993). “Parliamentarism Rationalized,” East European Constitutional Review, 2:1, p. 33. Page | 83 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 Lijphart, Arend. 1992. “Introduction.” In Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, ed. Arend Lijphart. 1–27. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lijphart, Arend. 1986. Çağdaş Demokrasiler. Transilated by Ergun Özbudun and Esin Onulduran. Ankara: TDV Yayınları. Lijphart, Arend. 1984. Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press. Linz, Juan J. 1994. “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?.” In The Failure of Presidential Democracy, Comparative Perspective, eds. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press. Linz, Juan J. 1990. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy 1: 51-69. Linz, Juan J. 1990. “Virtues of Parliamentarism.” Journal of Democracy 1 (4): 8491. Mainwaring Scott, and Matthew Shugart. 1997. “Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal” Comparative Politics 29: 449-71. Mainwaring Scott, and Matthew Shugart. 1993. “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination.” Comparative Political Studies 26 (2): 198-228. Morlan, Robert L. 1975. American Government, Policy and Process. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. Öder, Bertil Emrah. 2005. “Türkiye’de Başkanlık ve Yarı Başkanlık Rejimi Tartışmaları: 1991-2005 Yılları Arasında Basına Yansıyan Öneri ve Tepkilerden Kesitler.” In Başkanlık Sistemi, ed. Teoman Ergül. Ankara:TBB Yayını. 31-70. Özbudun, Ergun. 1996. “Turkey: How Far from Consolidation?.” Journal of Democracy 7 (3): 123-34. Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” American Political Science Review 94 (2): 251-67. Powell Jr., G. Bingham. 1992. “Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence.” In Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, ed. Arend Lijphart, 223-235. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 1996. “What Makes Democracy Endure?.” Journal of Democracy 7: 39-55. Page | 84 E. Aygün / EJEPS 7 (2014), 71-85 Riggs, Fred. 1992. “Presidentialism: A Problematic Regime Type.” In Parliamentary vs. Presidential Government, edited Arend Lijphart, 216-222. Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press. Samuel, David J. and Matthew Shugart. 2003. “Presidentialism, Elections and Representation.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 15 (1): 33-60. Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. “Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism.” In The Failure of Presidential Democracy, eds. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, 106-118. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Schmitt, Gary J. and Abram N.Shullky. 1989. “The Theory and Practice of Separation of Powers: the Case of Covert Action.” In The Fettered Presidency, eds. L. Gordon Crovitz and Jeremy A. Rabkin. Washington DC. AEI. Shugart, Matthew S. and John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Uran, Peri. 2010. “Turkey’s Hasty Constitutional Amendment Devoid of Rational Basis.” Journal of Politics and Law 3 (1): 2-10. Yazıcı, Serap. 2002. Başkanlık ve Yarı-Başkanlık Sistemleri, Türkiye İçin Bir Değerlendirme. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. Yılmaz, Sait. 2013. “Başkanlik Sistemi: ABD Türkiye’ye Örnek Olabilir Mi?.” Yeni Türkiye Dergisi 51: 617-635. BILGESAM (Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştirmalar Merkezi). Başkanlık Sistemine Toplumsal Bakış. By Salih Akyürek, Mehmet Ali Yilmaz, Esra Atalay, Fatma Serap Koydemir. Rapor No:59 (Haziran 2013). Aktifhaber. 2014. “AKP’nin 22 Maddelik Başkanlık www.aktifhaber.com/akpnin-22-maddelik-baskanlik-sistemi-teklifi685366h.htm (Accessed May 27, 2014). Teklifi.” Congress Base. 2014. “U.S. House of Representatives: Powers and Functions." congressbase.com/100/u-s-house-of-representatives-powers-and-functions/ (Accessed May 14, 2014). IDEA.INT. 2014. “Table of Electoral Systems Worldwide.” (Accessed June 15, 2014).www.idea.int/esd/world.cfm. Page | 85
© Copyright 2024