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28 March 2015
Pax Indica-projecting Indian
power into the Indian Ocean
Suresh George
India’s new
aggressive posturing
and projection of
power in the Indian
ocean
This year, President Obama was the state guest at
India’s Republic Day parade, just days after being
forceful on both China and Pakistan, traditional rivals
of India. During his visit, military cooperation, in
particular the possible building of a new Indian
aircraft carrier using US technology was discussed.
Two weeks before, Indian military forces had staged
a joint military exercise( Al Najda) with India’s closest
ally in the Persian Gulf, the Sultanate of Oman. In
2014, the Indian Navy deployed two warships into
the Persian Gulf to rescue citizens from Iraq. This
was followed in October 2014 by the first ever
Bluewater deployment of an Indian Navy fleet into
East Africa.
In the light of the Obama administration’s ‘Asian
pivot’ strategy, the closing down of 15 US military
bases in Europe and a possible US disengagement
from the Middle East,, there is a case that the Indian
state is augmenting its sphere of influence within the
Indian Ocean.
The Obama administration is very active in trying to
engage with Iran, using the Sultanate of Oman as a
mediator. Given that, Oman is India’s strongest ally
in the Persian Gulf and both countries enjoy good
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Anti China Axis
relations with Iran, there is a strong possibility that
India might play a prominent role with a fully
engaged Iran. Some indication of this comes from
the Indian trade in crude from Iran despite sanctions.
To add to this, Indian and US mistrust of Chinese
interests in both the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific
Theatres have created new synergies. A possible US
naval withdrawal from the Persian Gulf may see a
power transition to the Indian Navy, which currently
is the only Navy in the Asian region that possess two
carrier battle group(CBG) capabilities.
It therefore becomes strategic for countries both in
the Persian Gulf as well as within the Indian Ocean
region to engage with India’s new role as a ‘net
security provide’r in the region.
Why the Indian Ocean?
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India’s historical linkages in the Persian Gulf
(through both diaspora and trade exchanges)
coupled with an increased maritime
engagement with the Indian Ocean can
possibly set up new spheres of Geo-strategic
competition with other powers.
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While providing India with both sea control
and sea denial capabilities vis-a-vis Chinese
and Pakistani territorial ambitions, it may test
the state’s non-aligned, non-interventionist
policy.
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In addition to its traditional role in combating
piracy, the Indian state’s proactive ‘force
projection’ hard activities couple with ‘soft
assets’ particularly in the Persian Gulf region
can be used to augment trade with the IOR
region.
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India may seek to import cheap natural gas
from the US as an alternative to its
dependence on traditional Middle East
suppliers, in return for stepping into security
role.
Given its geographical position in the Indian
Ocean, strong historical and maritime ties to
other Indian Ocean states, rebalancing of the US
foreign policy paradigm and the emergence of
Chinese interest in the region, there are strong
indications, that India is increasing military
influence in the region. Of special significance, is
the fact that the Indian Navy is augmenting its
Bluewater capability in the Indian Ocean region
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to project its ability to protect the sea lanes of its
trade.
A number of key developments in this context are
examined below.
Resurgence of Nationalism
Firstly ,a resurgence of nationalism, globally and
particularly within India, China and Japan as a
tool to spur economic growth coupled with the
rise of both India and China as power rivals in
Asia support the rise of India’s military influence
in the Indian Ocean. India has augmented
thinking on this front after the election of the
nationalist BJP party. The ‘look East’ policy with a
strategic engagement of Indian Ocean states
specifically with states that have disputes with
China is key to India’s sea control and sea denial
strategy in the event of a war with China. The
Navy has boosted its fleet to over 240 vessels
with orders for another 40, including a new
aircraft carrier. Creating a blue water navy with
three battle groups, is expected to extend control
over the northern Arabian Sea as well as into the
Indian Ocean as part of this strategy.
A series of chronological events support India’s
focus on the Indian Ocean:
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2002 - India signs an agreement with
Mozambique for maritime patrolling off its
coast
2003- The Indian navy provided seaward
protection for the African Union summit at
Mozambique.
2003- India signs a bilateral defence
agreement with Singapore
2011- The 550 Indian Naval air Squadron
is based in Male, Maldives to operate
coastal patrols
2011 saw the deployment of four naval
ships into the South China Sea and the
Western Pacific theatre. Port calls were
carried out to important allies in the Indian
Ocean
2013- development of the sagar port in
the Bay of Bengal as a new naval base
2013 - The building of a dedicated naval
base on Karwar on the western coast of
India provides the Navy unhindered
access to the Indian Ocean.
2013-The second aircraft carrier, INS
Vikramaditya, entered service, making
India the only Navy in Asia to have two
carrier battle group(CBG) capabilities.
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Security Shifts in the
Middle east
2013- India gifts a Dornier transport
aircraft and a fast attack naval craft to
Seychelles and Mauritius are respectively.
2014-In October the Indian Navy deploys
four warships from the Western fleet into
East Africa,on its first ever Bluewater
deployment.
2014- Between October and November a
stealth frigate of the Navy, INS Teg visits
Mozambique and South Africa.
2014- In December, Indian Navy ships
respond to water crisis in Maldives by
providing drinking water from an Indian
Navy ship.
2014- Sale of a corvette class warship to
Mauritius and the activation of a
coastguard listening point and radar
station at Narcodam in the Andaman
islands.
2014- Indian invests $100mn in the
Kaladan multimodal transit transport
Project using sitwe in Myanmar to link
landlocked Indian regions with the Indian
Ocean.
Management of the national coastguard
of Mauritius has for several years, been
under the command of an Indian naval
officer.
2015- Indian chief of naval staff visits
Mauritius
Middle East Security umbrella
Secondly, US support to see India as a key actor
in both the Indian Ocean as well as the Middle
East is driving a new power dynamic amongst the
coastal states. In recent times, US India ties
culminating with presidential visits to India have
supported a possible power transition to Indian
forces in the region. A mutual distrust of Chinese
actions in the Indian Ocean through the
establishment of the string of pearls as well as
aggressive posturing in the South China Sea
supports the resurgence of India in the Indian
Ocean. The willingness to cooperate in building
aircraft carriers that can project Bluewater
capabilities, acquisition of long-range maritime
surveillance aircraft, as well as cooperation in the
nuclear power sector for both civilian and military
use confirm Indian- US ties.
India- Iran ties are also key to the US equation
with India. India has been neutral on the Iranian
position vis-a-vis US attempts to engage with
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Iran. Its energy trade with Iran has also increased
over the years.
Chinese ambitions in the region
Thirdly, China’s opaque territorial ambitions in the
Indian Ocean with a so-called ‘string of pearls’
assets has contributed to a fear within the
establishment of its desire to control the sea
lanes. China’s dependence on energy transits via
Indian Ocean sea lanes and vulnerability in the
event of a blockade is key to India’s new thinking.
The strategic Chinese equation with Pakistan and
the leasing of its assets to the Chinese Navy is
perceived to be one reason why the Indian Navy
is testing IOR capabilities. By creating Indian sea
control, Pakistan would need to defend an
additional thousand kilometres of its coast in the
event of a conflict. As part of its Maritime silk
Road Project (MSR), China investment is
developing Gwadar, Sitwe and Chittagong bases
as its naval assets. It is also made in inroads into
Colombo , India’s immediate neighbourhood. The
overwrought influence of Chinese established in
Sri Lanka specifically with the last government
has been a matter of great concern for India. The
new government in Sri Lanka is expected to
rebalance the Chinese equation in Sri Lanka,
particularly if we believe reports that the Indian
military establishment along with its intelligence
apparatus played a key role in mobilizing support
for the new president.
India’s current dominance of the seas
The fourth element of this analysis is India’s
military involvement in the Persian Gulf state.
There are reasons to believe, that the
Persian Gulf states are increasingly
becoming involved in the Navy’s plans,
given its historical and diaspora
linkages. India’s geographical location
between the key choke points of the
Strait of Hormuz on one side and the
Straits of Malacca on the other side,
necessitates in need to engage with the
Persian Gulf states if the dominance of
the Indian Ocean is to be achieved.
The strongest indication are reports of
the activation of listening post at
Oman’s Ras al-Hadd . This post about
400 nautical miles from the Gwadar Port was
built in 2009-2010 and significant because of its
berthing facilities for both Chinese submarines
and naval vessels operating in the Indian Ocean.
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We believe that this listening post is linked to
other posts (Madagascar. Kochi, Mumbai,
Mauritius, Maldives, Andaman Islands) to form a
string of’ Indian string of pearls’ along the Indian
Ocean region.
The Navy’s intelligence gathering along the
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf was augmented
by the deployment in 2013 of India’s first
dedicated military satellite (GSAT-7)which
removed the dependence on INMARSAT. India
has started to share intelligence from the satellite
with Oman.
New Developments
Some key developments in India’s new military
engagement with the Persian Gulf are:
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2003- India and Iran signed the New Delhi
declaration to explore opportunities to
cooperate in defence.
2005- India signs a deal to develop the
south pars gas field in Iran.
2006 - India and Iran start joint naval
exercises.
2008, India and Qatar signs a security
pact that agrees to protect its maritime
and national assets from external threats.
2009-Oman received training from the
Indian air force IAF contingent of Jaguars
through Operation Eastern bridge
2010- The Omani army places order for
the INSAS assault rifle from India
2015- India and Oman engaged in Al Najd
military exercises
2013-The Indian Navy gets exclusive
berthing facilities in Omani ports
2013- Secret work on fencing of the
Oman and Yemen border by India’s
Central public works department
In February 2014, Indian and Saudi
Arabia, signed the defence cooperation
pact, the first ever with the Saudi state.
2014- In November, Indian Deputy
Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Lieutenant-General Anil Bhalla, visits
Bahrain Defence Force (BDF)
Commander-in-Chief Marshal Shaikh
Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Khalif and discusses
military cooperation.
2015- India’s national security adviser, Ajit
Doval visits Iran. Talks are carried out on
developing the Chabahar port which is 44
nautical miles west of Pakistan’s Qwadar
port.
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Conclusion
From this analysis, it becomes clear that India
seeking a more proactive role in the IOR region
to support both economic and geostrategic goals.
By using its strong hard and soft assets in the
Persian Gulf region, it seeks to counter territorial
ambitions of other actors in the region.
However, given the plural form of India’s
democracy, a history of non-interventionism
coupled with political challenges of building a
strong military force, India’s military strategy in
the Persian Gulf should be perceived as an
incremental evolution.
Recent delays in the commissioning of its
indigenous aircraft carrier, reduction in defence
expenditure and a possible slowing of its
economy due to global pressures might delay this
ambition.
Another issue that might compound the problem,
is India’s dependence on carrier battle groups
instead of submarines. Given the China is
concentrating on inserting submarines into the
Indian Ocean and that India lacks in sheer
numbers of submarines to patrol its sphere of
activity, future power projection scenarios using
its current strategy might prove costly.
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