1. No category

IReflect
Student Journal of International Relations
Articles
Hegemonic Masculinity, Victimhood and Male Bodies
as ‘Battlefields’ in Eastern DR Congo
Hanno Brankamp – University of St Andrews
Memory Building within the Colombian Conflict: How
Do Films Contribute? An Analysis of Three Films
Mia Schöb – The Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva
Cocaine – Symbol of the Uniting and Dividing Forces of
Globalisation?
Christian Küsters – Aarhus Universitet
The Divided Union: Why the EU Did not Agree on a
Comprehensive Financial Transaction Tax. A Comparative Analysis of the German and British Positions
Felix Rüdiger – Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
– I reflect –
Looking at Global Politics through the Lens of Indigeneity. Interview with Sheryl Lightfoot, Canada Research Chair of Global Indigenous Rights and Politics,
University of British Columbia
Claire Luzia Leifert
Volume 2
Issue 1
2015
www.ireflect-journal.de
board@ireflect-journal.de
Konferenzbericht zur 8. General Conference des
European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) in
Glasgow, 3. bis 6. September 2014
Laura Peitz
Published by IB an der Spree
EDITORIAL BOARD (V.i.S.d.P.):
Christina Fanenbruck, Michael Giesen, Inna Maliucova,
Sabine Mokry, Isabella Rogner
(Students of the joint MA Programme International Relations
at Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
and Universität Potsdam)
board@ireflect-journal.de | www.ireflect-journal.de
PUBLISHED BY IB an der Spree e.V.
EXECUTIVE BOARD: Laura Werner (Chair), Franziska Luttge, Philipp Neubauer,
Laura Milchmeyer
ADDRESS: Vorstand IB an der Spree e.V.
c/o Geschäftsstelle des Masterstudienganges Internationale Beziehungen
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This Journal is published under Creative Commons License AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Please cite and use accordingly.
Berlin, March 2015
Manuscripts should be submitted electronically to board@ireflect-journal.de.
DISCLAIMER: The Publisher and the Editorial Board cannot be held responsible for errors in
information contained in this journal or any consequences arising from the use of it; the views
and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Publisher and the Editorial Board.
IReflect has been founded in early 2014 by a group of IR-students in Berlin and is published by
‘IB an der Spree e.V.’. The journal focuses on phenomena and developments within International
Relations from a students` perspective and links this with active authorship. This means that all
authors publishing articles are welcome to reflect on their own positions concerning the subject
and the field. All contributions are reviewed in a double blind peer review process by graduate
and doctoral students. The journal is published biannually.
Contents
Editorial
Articles
Hanno Brankamp
Hegemonic Masculinity, Victimhood and Male Bodies as
‘Battlefields’ in Eastern DR Congo__________________________________________ 5
Mia Schöb
Memory Building within the Colombian Conflict: How Do Films
Contribute? An Analysis of Three Films___________________________________ 29
Christian Küsters
Cocaine – Symbol of the Uniting and Dividing Forces of
Globalisation?________________________________________________________________ 49
Felix Rüdiger
The Divided Union: Why the EU Did not Agree on a Comprehensive
Financial Transaction Tax. A Comparative Analysis of the German and
British Positions_____________________________________________________________ 67
– I reflect –
Claire Luzia Leifert
Looking at Global Politics through the Lens of Indigeneity.
Interview with Sheryl Lightfoot, Canada Research Chair of Global
Indigenous Rights and Politics, University of British Columbia___________89
Laura Peitz
Konferenzbericht zur 8. General Conference des European Consortium
for Political Research (ECPR) in Glasgow, 3. bis 6. September 2014_____93
IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1)
1
Editorial
Liebe Leserin, lieber Leser,
stolz präsentieren wir euch hiermit die zweite Ausgabe unserer studentischen Zeitschrift IReflect.
Obwohl erst Anfang 2014 gegründet, konnten wir die erste Ausgabe mit fünf
Artikeln und zwei ‚I reflect‘-Beiträgen im Juli 2014 beim Sommerfest des
Vereins IB an der Spree vorstellen. Im September folgte dann der nächste Call
for Papers, zu dem wir 15 Einsendungen erhielten. Unsere fleißigen Peer
Reviewer haben alle Einsendungen kritisch beurteilt und somit erheblich
zum Entstehen der zweiten Ausgabe beigetragen. Wir möchten uns hiermit
herzlich bei allen Reviewern für ihre Arbeit bedanken!
An dieser Stelle möchten wir außerdem ein großes Dankeschön an alle AutorInnen aussprechen, die sich dem Peer-Review-Verfahren gestellt, Feedback
angenommen und ihre Arbeiten weiter entwickelt haben. In diesem Sinne
möchten wir gerne auch dich, liebe/n Leser/in, auffordern, zu überlegen, ob
auch eine deiner Arbeiten für eine breitere Leserschaft interessant ist und
publiziert werden sollte. Neben längeren Artikeln ist ebenso die Kategorie ‚I
reflect‘ offen für Meinungsbeiträge, Konferenzberichte oder ähnliches.
Alle Beiträge der zweiten Ausgabe bilden wieder ein breites Spektrum der
Internationalen Beziehungen ab. Hanno Brankamp beschäftigt sich mit sexueller Gewalt gegen Jungen und Männer während des Kongo-Konflikts, Mia
Schöb untersucht anhand von drei Filmen die Vergangenheitsbewältigung
des Konfliktes in Kolumbien. Christian Küsters wirft durch seine Analyse des
Kokainhandels einen neuen Blick auf die Globalisierung. Zudem werden
durch Felix Rüdigers Analyse der deutschen und britischen Debatten über
eine Finanztransaktionssteuer auch politische Prozesse in der EU beleuchtet.
In diesem Sinne wünschen wir unseren Leserinnen und Leser viel Spaß mit
der zweiten Ausgabe und freuen uns auf anregendes Lob sowie Kritik.
IReflect Editorial Board
Christina Fanenbruck, Michael Giesen, Inna Maliucova, Sabine Mokry, Isabella
Rogner
2
IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1)
Editorial
Dear readers,
we proudly present the second issue of our student journal IReflect.
Although the journal has only been founded in January 2014, we were able to
present the first issue with its five articles and two ‘I reflect’ contributions at
IB an der Spree’s annual summer meeting. In September, we then issued the
second call for papers and received 15 submissions. Our peer reviewers have
critically assessed all submissions contributing a great deal to our second
issue with its four extremely interesting articles. Here, we would like to thank
all peer reviewers for their amazing work!
Besides that, we would like to thank all our authors who have courageously
faced the peer-review process, accepted the reviewers’ feedback and further
developed their work. Along those lines, we would like to ask you, dear reader, to think about whether one of your student papers might be of interest to
a broader readership. Please, do think about submitting your work! We do
not only publish longer articles, but also shorter items such as discussion
pieces and conference reports.
After our review process, we were able to incorporate four articles into our
second issue. Again, they cover a vast terrain within International Relations.
Two contributions bring fresh perspectives to conflicts that have received a
lot of attention. Hanno Brankamp deals with sexual violence against boys and
men during the Congo conflict; Mia Schöb analyses memory-building processes after the conflicts in Columbia with the help of three movies. Christian
Küsters sheds new light on globalisation processes through his investigation
of cocaine trade. Besides that, Felix Rüdiger’s exploration of German and
British debates on a financial transaction tax looks into political processes
within the EU.
We will now, let the authors and their articles speak for themselves.
Enjoy reading IReflect’s second issue – we are looking forward to your feedback.
IReflect Editorial Board
Christina Fanenbruck, Michael Giesen, Inna Maliucova, Sabine Mokry, Isabella
Rogner
IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1)
3
Articles
4
IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1)
Brankamp: Hegemonic Masculinity, Victimhood and Male Bodies
Hegemonic Masculinity, Victimhood
and Male Bodies as ‘Battlefields’ in
Eastern DR Congo
Hanno Brankamp
Abstract
While sexual violence against women prominently features on
the agendas of international and local actors, sexual crimes
against men and boys are vastly neglected. This article seeks
to examine the interrelation between notions of victimhood,
masculinity, and gender as structural factors in armed conflict,
and takes sexual violence against men in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as a case in point. In particular, the
concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ serves as an alternative,
but not exclusive explanatory model for the use of sexual violence and rape during conflicts in the Eastern DRC. In contrast
to previous studies, the focus lies on the interaction between
widespread notions of ‘female’ victimhood and ‘male’ perpetration that serve as drivers for the emergence of gendered hierarchies, which sanction hegemonic forms of masculinity. The
article shows how these rival versions of masculinity in the
DRC determine each other’s intensity and prevalence, and how
the lack and/or exaltation of these masculinities can translate
into predatory behaviour, such as the targeted use of sexual
violence against men and women.
Keywords: Hegemonic Masculinity, Sexual Violence, Eastern Congo, Gender
Roles, Victimhood, Male Bodies, War Rape.
Introduction
The prolonged conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are
recognised as scenes of widespread civilian suffering. Scholars, politicians,
and practitioners routinely emphasise the particular vulnerability of women
and children. Hence, these conflicts are often viewed as a war against women.
Media coverage on the issue typically displays cynical voyeurism, indulging
IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 5-28
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Brankamp: Hegemonic Masculinity, Victimhood and Male Bodies
in the purposeful depiction of scenarios of gang rape and mutilation. The
dimension and prevalence of sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV) puts
thousands of civilians in the provinces of Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu, and Orientale
(especially Ituri) at risk. Despite international responses, many still live in
fear of abuse, humiliation, and torture at the hands of militias and the Armed
Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) which operate with
de facto impunity (Davis 2009). While sexual violence against Congolese
women and girls receives its deserved attention, similar crimes against men
and boys remain vastly unreported, and carry an additional social stigma
(Christian et al. 2011: 237). On the one hand, it is indisputable that women
and girls represent the majority of survivors of sexual violence in the DRC.
Prevention strategies and networks supporting medical treatment of survivors thus narrowly focus on women. On the other hand, this imbalance disempowers male survivors who suffer equally from physical pain, psychological traumas and social exclusion. The study of sexual violence during conflict
is not merely an academic question posed for its own sake, but aims at illuminating the structure, extent, and nature of the problem, in order to contribute to its solution (Gottschall 2004: 135).
The purpose of this article is to examine the interrelation between notions of victimhood, masculinity, and gender as structural factors in armed
conflict, and takes sexual violence against men in the DRC as a case in point.
To this end, the concept of hegemonic masculinity serves as a key explanatory model, and refers to a specific form of masculinity that sanctions subordinate and deviating gender identities, both male and female. In contrast to
previous studies, this article links the emergence of hegemonic masculinity to
notions of victimhood and wider debates on gender during times of war.
Sexual violence against men is neither new, nor is it geographically or culturally unique. In Eastern DR Congo – as during the wars in the former Yugoslavia – rape and sexual torture of men is an “open secret” (Oosterhoff, Zwanikken and Ketting 2004) rather than a disputed fact. Acknowledging this
violence against men eclipses simplistic explanations that solely stress misogyny and ‘patriarchal rage’ as driving factors of armed conflict.
Although special SGBV training programmes for Congolese government
forces have been underway, positive measures have yet to translate into
substantial change. Furthermore, despite progressive steps taken, international law fails to adequately recognise, address, and punish sexual crimes
against men (Lewis 2009). Failing to comprehend these structural problems
undermines prevention schemes, especially when a detailed analysis of masculinity and gender as conflict factors is neglected. Frankly, gender, as the
structural power relation between men and women, is rarely or never the
cause of war; this is also true for the DRC. While the roots of the conflict are
political, gender and predatory masculinities shape conflict economies and
the way that war is conducted. Narratives of victimhood create justifications
for the deliberate targeting of certain genders, and exacerbate hyper6
IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 5-28
Brankamp: Hegemonic Masculinity, Victimhood and Male Bodies
masculinising tendencies, thus militarising identities within and around
armed groups.
This article will proceed in the following way: Firstly, the political dynamics of the Congolese warscape will be examined, focussing particularly on the
versatile use of sexual violence by virtually all conflict parties during the First
and Second Congo War. Secondly, the discussion will consider conventional
narratives of ‘victimhood’ and male/female gender roles which form the
backdrop on which hegemonic masculinity can materialise and eventually
come into effect. Existing silences on male bodies as ‘battlefields’ are therefore seen as an immediate result of these stereotypical gender positions. In a
third step, the article will discuss the concept of hegemonic masculinity, and
explicate its growth from and interaction with local, Congolese understandings of masculinity and manhood. Fourthly, sexual violence and rape of men
in Eastern DRC will be presented in more detail, using the above frameworks
of victimhood and hegemonic masculinity as reference points to explain the
socio-psychological effects on communities, families, and survivors alike.
Lastly, the author will comment on the usefulness of the concept of hegemonic masculinity, its applicability to Eastern DRC, and propose potential future
alleys for research and practice, so that policy responses can eventually follow.
Framing Conflict and Sexual Violence in DR Congo
To some extent, rape and other forms of sexual violence seem commonplace
and almost unavoidable in war-settings such as the DRC. Following journalistic accounts on DR Congo as the “rape capital of the world” (BBC 2010),
structural violence against the local population is sensationalised, omitting a
serious analyses of the underlying political and gender-related drivers of
conflict.
A regional upsurge of “structural militarism” (Baregu 2002) immediately
after the Rwandan genocide became evident when the regimes of Rwanda,
Uganda and Burundi first invaded Zaïre (later DRC) in 1996. Through backing
Laurent-Desiré Kabila’s Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération
du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL), neighbouring governments pursued the overthrow
of long-term dictator Mobutu Sese Seko who had ruled for over thirty years
(Prunier 2009). Following Mobutu’s demise, Kabila was installed as president
of the then re-named Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Only shortly
after, in August 1998, a Rwandan-backed rebellion of Kinyarwanda-speaking
communities in Eastern DRC served as a pretext for the allied forces to reinvade the Congo (Reyntjens 1999; Prunier 2009). In this second episode of
Africa’s World War, not only bordering countries, but also actors such as
Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Sudan, which had political or economic
stakes in the conflict, engaged in fighting on Congolese territory (Mamdani
1999: 60; Weinstein 2000: 16).
IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 5-28
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Brankamp: Hegemonic Masculinity, Victimhood and Male Bodies
During the two successive Congo Wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003)
sexual violence became a strategy of war employed by belligerents on all
sides. Reports suggest that combatants of the Rassemblement Congolais pour
la Démocratie (RCD)-Kisangani, RCD-Goma, the Rwandan Army (then RPA),
the Mai Mai vigilante militias, the Ugandan army (UPDF), as well as the Burundian Hutu rebels of the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD) routinely and
purposefully used sexual violence against civilians. Human Rights Watch
quite aptly called sexual violence in the DRC a “war within the war” (HRW
2002). Observers state that sexual violence in the Eastern DRC strongly resembles the violence that was committed during the Rwandan genocide, and
which was apparently replicated across the border (Pratt and Werchick
2004: 9; HRW 1996). Despite the withdrawal of the last Rwandan and Ugandan troops in 2003, and the normalisation of political ties between the government actors, civil strife and chronic violence continues to the present day.
Dozens of local militias, guerrillas and proxy forces are still operating in the
provinces of Nord-Kivu, Sud-Kivu and the district of Ituri, not to mention the
FARDC which have become one of the largest perpetrators of sexual violence
in the Congo (HRW 2009). While some argue that the rape of women has
historically symbolised the so-called “spoils of war”, and has been seen as a
common act of warfare (Brownmiller 1993: 32; Elshtain 1995: 4; Leatherman
2007: 53; Cockburn 2005: 22), the scale of sexual violence in the DR Congo
and elsewhere suggests otherwise.
Certainly, the conquering of space by armed forces ritually involves ‘taking’ enemy women. Nonetheless, this theory sits relatively uneasy with the
levels of violence that exceed intercourse rape. Mukwege and Nangini (2009)
therefore label these instances “Rape with Extreme Violence” (R.E.V). Ruth
Seifert provides more insights into why sexual violence and R.E.V occur so
frequently in armed conflict and suggests another four reasons; Rape as an
element of male-to-male communication through women’s bodies (also Rejali
1998: 26; Brownmiller 1994), as a means of boosting an army’s masculine
identity, as a weapon to destroy the enemy’s culture, and finally as an expression of masculine contempt for ‘femininity’ (Seifert 1994: 58-65). Following
this view, once male supremacy becomes unstable, or a re-negotiation of
gender roles is forced upon a society (potentially through civil war or invasion), armed groups and civilians are more likely to use sexual violence in
order to re-assert pre-existing social structures, or more specifically, hegemonic masculinity. Women’s socially assigned roles as transmitters of identity, ethnicity and race, thus makes them prime targets for sexual violence
(Yuval-Davis 2011; Turshen 1998: 9; Blanchard 2003: 1301-1302;
Puechguirbal 2001). Perpetrators can socially control local communities,
instil fear, and discourage deviant behaviour, but also convey feelings of
restoration to disempowered men and youth (Silberschmidt 2005: 196).
Strictly speaking, sexual violence constitutes a combined act of terror and
torture, rather than a tactic of war (Sivakumaran 2005: 1300; Pratt and Wer8
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Brankamp: Hegemonic Masculinity, Victimhood and Male Bodies
chick 2004). Armed conflicts usually exacerbate these tendencies through the
ready availability of small arms and emerging ideals of military manhood.
Therefore, warscapes like the DRC, along with Darfur, Rwanda, Bosnia and
numerous other conflicts, have posed as major precedents for the understanding of ‘gendered places’ in conflict.
Civilian women suffer disproportionately not only during, but also after
the fighting stops. Between 60-80 percent of women in the most affected
(Eastern) regions of the DRC are single heads of households, and many are
exposed to sexual violence, and/or sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), and
face rejection from their communities and spouses (Puechguirbal 2001:
1274). Survivors are usually silenced by cultural norms and taboos that ostracise and stigmatise those that openly admit abuse (GTZ 2009: 8; Avigad
and Rahimi 2004). Individuals frequently suffer from severe psychological
traumas and chronic physical pain. Whereas the vast majority of perpetrators
are men, increasing numbers of ‘victims’ are in fact also male. Eriksson Baaz
notes that sexual violence in wartime is therefore used to reinforce dominance not just over women, but also over men (Baaz 2009: 498). Apart from
the physical infliction of pain and suffering, the symbolic element of sexual
violence makes it consequential weapon of war. To analyse this in detail, the
following section will scrutinise prevailing notions of gender and victimhood
during conflict.
Unravelling Gender in Conflict: Men as Perpetrators, Women as
Victims
In violent conflicts, issues of gender identity become key. While this is true
also for times of peace, war is a moment when social and gender power relations can easily translate into physical combat and cause harm and suffering.
For the purpose of this article, gender will be referred to as “a set of discourses which can set, change, enforce, and represent meaning on the basis of
perceived membership in or relation to sex categories” (Sjoberg and Gentry
2007: 6-7; Connell 2012: 71-72; Butler 1999). Although feminists have advocated a serious examination of the gendered realities that shape sociocultural, economic, political, and inter-personal power relations, political
actors have instead often embraced a reductionist narrative that puts women
indeed centre stage, yet reproduces their role as passive “beautiful souls” and
collective “victims” rather than agents (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 4; Enloe
2000b; Tickner 1992). During war, this view becomes even more prevalent.
Overcoming this dilemma means to acknowledge victimisation as a – literally
and figuratively – disarming practice, that rather serves the preservation of
cemented gender relations than their disruption. As Thompson notes, the
study of conflict can therefore not be content “holding women up to the
light”, but must question the very foundations of gender relations, both in
war and peace (Thompson 2006: 342). Merely emphasising female victimIReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 5-28
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Brankamp: Hegemonic Masculinity, Victimhood and Male Bodies
hood as a constitutive characteristic of armed conflict in Eastern Congo renders the underlying causes and driving forces of conflict marginal, portraying
them as incomprehensible and in fact apolitical. Unravelling gender stereotypes, and rendering their contradictory nature visible, gives more insights
about their workings within armed conflict. Stereotypically, women – as
opposed to ‘warmongering men’ – tend to occupy at least three roles that are
summarised below.
Women’s Threefold Role in Armed Conflict
First, women assume the role of the ‘natural victim’. Despite wellintentioned, and sometimes successful efforts to alleviate women’s suffering
during war, the mantra-like repetition of a “womenandchildren” narrative
has led to the normalisation of victimhood as a feminine trait (Enloe 2000b;
Van Dijk 2009: 3,10; Moser and Clark 2005). Scholars and practitioners walk
a constant tightrope in trying to weigh grass-root responses to women’s
humanitarian needs, and the open re-production of a female imagery that
implies passivity and inaction. Cynthia Enloe (2000b) argues that patriarchy
needs men and women acting in mutually complementary ways. In this logic,
‘passive’ and victimised women are granted protection by men, usually
against the aggressions of other men. Women’s alleged inability to protect
themselves also feeds into notions of inherent nonviolence and peacefulness
as another marker of womanhood (Cohen 2013: 384). Such notions mask a
reactionary and double-edged understanding of the female role. Women are
portrayed as embodying ethical aspirations, such as peace and purity, but are
at the same time deemed unfit for survival in ‘the real world’, at least in the
absence of potent male patrons. Joshua Goldstein points out that feminising
peace reinforces the overdrawn masculinity of the male soldier and protector
(Goldstein 2001: 59).
Women’s second classical role is that of domestic wives and field auxiliaries, or in Steans’ words: “camp followers” (2004: 89). Men’s roles as active
fighters contrasts sharply with women’s responsibility to ‘keep the home
fires burning’. Historically, these gender constructions were key for the legitimisation of masculine nationalism, the waging of wars, and the colonial
conquest at large (Enloe 2000b: 44-45; Amos and Pamar 1984: 14; Steans
2004: 89-90). Sustaining the image of women as virtuous home front labourers co-creates the myth of male ‘warrior heroes’ that they service. Through
this, women receive their own heroic wartime representation that is consistent with societal preconceptions of masculinity and femininity (Steans
2004: 81-82; Enloe 1988). Despite existing legislations that sanction women’s (limited) service in many armies around the world, their socio-culturally
subjugated position remains largely untouched. The same is not necessarily
true for cases in which women substantially participate(d) in guerrilla warfare, such as in Eritrea, Colombia, or in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
10
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Arguably, women’s most consequential role is the ‘nurturing mother’, the
third stereotypical image. Women-as-mothers are often seen as the emotional grounding of society and recognised as vehicles for cultural identity (Rich
1986: 30; Elshtain 1995: 96-97). This leads to their ready exposure to spiralling levels of (sexual) violence, torture, and other inhumane acts, especially in
conflicts that are infused with ethnic mobilisation. Seifert provides a formidable account of the Bosnian War, and asserts that sexual violence against
women serves several interlinked purposes, one of which being the destruction of the enemy’s culture (Seifert 1994: 63). Conflicts in the Congo also
feature this deliberate targeting of women. Even in the aftermath of the
fighting, women bear further humiliation through the birth of ‘war babies’
which often precipitates social exclusion (Watson 2007).
Dominant discourses which, either explicitly or implicitly, feature men as
perpetrators, or at least as silent abettors of (sexual) violence, naturally perpetuate women’s status as victims and conversely negate male vulnerability.
Some argue that the deconstruction of female victimhood – though desirable
– considerably weakens policies that are specifically tailored to women’s
protection during armed conflict (Gillespie 1996). This is certainly a case in
point. However, a nuanced view on victims and perpetrators, that acknowledges the heterogeneity of all genders, especially during wartime, can only
strengthen long-term emancipatory goals that seek to give agency to those
voices that otherwise remain unheard. This includes male survivors of sexual
violence. Of course, the downside is the acknowledgement of women’s equal
potential for murder and cruelty (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007: 4). That said,
Gentry and Sjoberg assert, that “[…] the stereotype of women’s victimization
holds fast largely because it is not entirely untrue;” (Sjoberg and Gentry
2007: 4). Recognising the reality of women’s violence and men’s vulnerability
also means to admit that this is statistically not the norm. For good reasons
few would argue otherwise (Puechguirbal 2001).
To illustrate these reversed wartime roles, Gentry and Sjoberg put forward the case of sexual abuse in the Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq
between 2003 and 2004, that displayed women as perpetrators, such as US
soldier Lynndie England (2007: 8). The fact that male Iraqi prisoners were
publicly exposed to inhumane treatment and sexual abuse at the hands of
female soldiers made the case even more noteworthy. Although quite exceptional in their media coverage, the incidents epitomise the existing contradictions between socially assigned wartime roles and the dire reality (Cohen
2013). Without going into detail, the ensuing scandal was a showcase for the
structural naturalisation of male perpetration vis-à-vis female victimisation,
and society’s unpreparedness to face the subversion of this principle
(Blanchard 2003: 1299). Recent reports from the DRC support this view.
Militiawomen have been found committing sexual violence against women
and men near the town of Walikale (Nord-Kivu), and conducted themselves
as brutally as their male counterparts (Hatcher 2013). Putting sexual violence into a wider structural context of inter- and intra-gender relations
IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 5-28
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Brankamp: Hegemonic Masculinity, Victimhood and Male Bodies
helps to dissolve an arbitrary victim/perpetrator dichotomy. While men are
commonly associated with committing (sexual) crimes in armed conflict
(Eriksson Baaz 2009: 499; Enloe 2000a; Stern 2005), they are too often rendered invisible as ‘victims’. As much as the recognition of some women as
perpetrators does not alter the fact that the majority suffers from armed
conflict, the reverse is true for male survivors. Men’s bodies have rarely been
acknowledged as “battlefields” of war (Brownmiller 1994). The next sections
addresses this shortcoming, and illustrates the unfolding of hegemonic masculinity in the DRC.
Who’s a Man? Hegemony and Local Masculinities
In Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon notes that “white men consider
themselves superior to black men” (2008: 3), and thus states a seemingly
banal truth of the colonial age. The corollary of this banality is that colonial
power relations – especially blackness and whiteness – are also governed by
notions of masculinity, and more precisely, hegemonic masculinity. While
masculinity generally refers to ‘a place’ in gender relations, hegemonic masculinity, according to Connell, epitomises the ultimate supremacy in those
relations (Connell 2012: 71, 77-78). Drawing from a Gramscian model of
hegemony, this particular power position is the centre around which subordinate, marginalised, or complicit masculinities are organised, and which
gains validity through their (at least silent) consent (Lears 1985: 568). During colonialism, black or indigenous masculinity condoned the supremacy of
colonial (white) hegemons. Conversely, however, African masculinities were
perceived as an essential threat to the colonial apparatus, and were thus
coerced into submission (Connell 2012: 75). Hegemonic practice is structurally rather than overtly violent and relies on the complicity, consent, or at
least the constant fear of its subordinates who acknowledge and internalise
their inferiority. Violence and oppression, however, become pronounced and
visible when hegemony comes under threat. By portraying colonial male
subjects pejoratively as ‘feminine’, white hegemonic masculinity wanted to
keep Africans “in their place” (Lindsay and Miescher 2003: 5; Nagel 2000:
119-120) and preserve the colonial order.
Hegemonic Masculinity Re-Considered
Hegemonic practices such as feminisation and victimisation persist. Leatherman argues that this masculine hierarchy reinforces ethnic, race, and class
boundaries, and includes both women and men (Leatherman 2011: 20; Connell 2013: 68). By refining this default patriarchal divide between males and
females, gendered power hierarchies also appear within those categories. In
effect, hegemonic masculinity not only sanctions control over women, but
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most importantly the domination of other men (Hooper 2001: 69-70; Donaldson 1993: 655). In war-torn societies, like the DRC, predominant ideals of
manhood are often popularly exalted and interlaced with emerging “militarised masculinities” that promote hyper-masculinity, gender exclusivism, and
intransigent heterosexuality (Lwambo 2011: 19; Connell 2012: 73-74). Wartime models of masculinity reaffirm themselves by the continuous devaluation of femininity and ‘feminine qualities’. Alternative interpretations of
manliness are marginalised and deemed illegitimate (Silberschmidt 2005:
197; Turshen 1998: 5; Seifert 1994: 60). However, Eriksson Baaz and Stern
suggest that masculinity perceptions within the Congolese army (FARDC)
vary quite substantially and rarely equate military masculinity with battle
heroism (2012a: 38-39). In reality, the majority of men, particularly soldiers,
cannot live up to the idealised versions of maleness to which they aspire. This
can potentially lead to compensatory reactions. Although competing masculinities are a universal phenomenon, it is important to point out that interpretations of maleness, as well as womanhood, are highly dependent on local
geographies, cultures, and the historical periods they evolve in (Berg and
Longhurst 2003). Further, the intensity of these gender locations is in constant change and re-negotiation.
The rather simple argument that the “link between ‘being masculine’ and
causing violence” in Eastern Congo has become an observable reality (Mechanic 2004: 16) calls for further elaboration. When masculinity is confused
with simply ‘being male’, the causal link of ‘man equals violence’ is in harmony with the prevailing narratives on victims and perpetrators. Consequently,
the silences surrounding intra-gender (e.g. male-to-male) sexual violence
become even more profound. To counter the prevailing narratives, the plurality of masculinities needs to be appreciated, as well as the common occurrence of power struggles among men over the hegemonic interpretation of
manliness. Armed conflict often escalates and is also escalated by these
tendencies. For a proper framing of these aspects in the Eastern DRC’s conflicts, local understandings of masculinity must be taken into account. For
methodological reasons, three strongly interrelated types of masculinity are
discussed.
Socio-Economic or Status Masculinity
Masculinities invoke notions of socio-economic potency, material well-being,
and financial security. Lwambo suggests that in the DRC, achieving manhood
is a process inherently connected to one’s ability to provide for a wife, family
and children, thus gaining status and prestige in the extended community
(2011: 55-56). Women also play a vital role in co-creating this masculinity
through the reproduction of social expectations and norms (Lwambo 2011:
12). Violent conflict, poverty and war can hamper men and women alike to
fulfil their assigned roles, mainly due to loss of property, unemployment, or
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physical incapacitation. Status indicators of manhood, womanhood, and
‘familyhood’ are thus key to what is at stake in Africa’s violent conflicts. Aside
from material destruction and physical harm, war in Eastern DRC disrupts
communal cohesion at exactly this point. By incapacitating men that are
considered the heads of households, and the traditional leaders of the community (Christian et al. 2011: 233-234), warmongers question their victims’
status as men within local communities. The absence or perceived incapacitation of men during war makes women develop more independent means of
livelihood. Often a necessity of survival, this emancipation causes new difficulties in the post-conflict period, when male returnees expect ‘their’ women
to conform to pre-conflict gender roles that are no longer viable. Destabilising existing gender patterns can lead to status emasculation of men. As reintegration poses challenges to women and men, domestic violence and communal disputes increase after the actual fighting stops (Handrahan 2004:
434-435).
Sexual Masculinity
In discussions on conflict and gender, sexual masculinity is readily equated
with rape and other forms of sexual violence as “fuel for soldiers” (Askin
2002: 511) which generates testosterone-driven brutality. This view presumes both a narrow interpretation of sexual violence – as exclusively between males and females – and ignores the multitude of motives, the various
types, and the diverging societal implications of sexual violence (Eriksson
Baaz 2009; Sivakumaran 2007: 264-267; Carpenter 2006; Seifert 1994: 5765; Avigad and Rahimi 2004). Some accounts elicit notions of African hypersexualisation as the sole cause of sexual violence in the DRC and thus not only
reinstate a racist colonial imagery, but also create an atmosphere of inevitability to ‘savage’ violence in the Congo (Levine 2013; Nagel 2000; Eriksson
Baaz 2009; Ouzgane and Morrell 2005). Seifert notes that depicting perpetrators as merely following their “instinctive nature” releases them from any
responsibility or agency (Seifert 1994: 55). Sexual violence, with rape in
particular, is not a violent expression of sexuality, but a sexualised expression
of violence (Seifert 1994: 55). Considering the occurrence of male rape committed by heterosexual perpetrators, this insight supports a hegemonic masculinity model based on power, not sexuality. Yet, sexual desires are all but
absent from the accounts of Congo’s conflicts (Eriksson Baaz 2009). Elevating
sexual potency, promiscuity, competence, and bodily virility is often seen as
idealising sexual versions of masculinity. The absence of alternative capacities, such as wealth, social security or fatherhood, can potentially translate
into sexualised violence (Ricardo and Barker 2005: 17; Marsiglio 1988).
Although war rapes have become a distinct feature of conflicts in the Kivus
and beyond (HRW 2002), sexual expressions of masculinity cannot be reduced to this alone. In fact, the structural and personal reasons for commit14
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ting sexual violence are manifold. Sexual masculinity is a catalyst, not a condition of such violence.
Militarised Masculinity
War nurtures variants of masculinity that strongly identify with militarism
and romanticised versions of military brotherhood (Leatherman 2011: 15).
Turshen points out that military institutions – both national armies and renegade militias – function as “male preserves” that celebrate male privilege
and gender exclusivism (Turshen 1998: 5-6). Others argue that male soldiers
wielding “the brute power of weaponry” (Brownmiller 1993: 32) is a potent
image that exemplifies militarised manhood. In the DRC, both national army
(FARDC) and rebel groups have institutionalised and embraced this masculinity (GTZ 2009: 4; Yuval-Davis 2004). In contrast to Western armies, military masculinity in the FARDC prominently omits notions of heroism or a
nationalist protector/protected narrative (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2011: 22;
2012b: 721; Eriksson Baaz 2009: 505). Instead, a defining feature of Congolese military identity, and arguably also in other cultural contexts, is a person’s readiness to commit violence and endure the hardship of combat. This
unique masculinity materialises against the backdrop of a feminine ‘Other’
(Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2008: 67). Reaffirming adamant ‘non-femininity’
through the use of sexual violence constitutes the performative act of hegemonic masculinity.
The interplay of various forms of masculinity as described above is complex. Hegemonic masculinity is informed, altered and co-constituted by them.
Decline in one version of masculinity can mean the rise of another. Where
socio-economic deprivation prevails, the quest for recognition and power is
easily militarised. A flourishing arms market and strong military role models,
from Hollywood or Kinshasa, influence both the intensity and the viability of
‘manly’ fantasies. Military masculinity entails both the willing subordination
to a higher-ranking masculine authority as well as an opportunistic element
of dominating others, most commonly inferior men or women. The perpetrators’ personal failures, in sexual or socio-economic terms, can turn into the
purposeful degradation, rape or torture of inferiors during combat. As Seifert
notes the more unstable an actor’s real power position is, the more likely
becomes the use of sexual violence to bolster perceived power (Seifert 1996:
41; Scarry 1985). This is consistent with hegemonic masculinity and its propensity to violence, especially if faced with rival claims to power. Soldiers in
the DRC have expressed feelings of empowerment, hyper-masculinisation,
and enhanced self-esteem, by establishing roadblocks, and exercising active
control over the local population (Leatherman 2011: 139-140; Trenholm et
al. 2012: 216). In protracted conflict situations, sexual violence and rape
become synonymous with claiming untrodden territory, breaking taboos, and
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living the otherwise unattainable masculine dream of (violent) conquest
(Leatherman 2011: 141-142; Richters 1998).
‘Bush Wives’: Male Bodies as ‘Battlefields’
As opposed to women, male survivors of sexual violence have remained
widely unnoticed (King 1995). This imbalance stems from deep-rooted cultural silence on male victimhood, especially sexual violence. In the DRC, sexual violence against men bears a special social stigma. Perpetrators dehumanise and humiliate their victims that are publicly ridiculed by their own
communities as “bush wives” (Gettleman 2009; Murdock 2011). In neighbouring countries this is exacerbated by legislations that criminalise homosexual acts, and make survivors reluctant to report abuse in fear of prosecution (Seruwagi 2011). Recent reports suggest that the DR Congo’s legislators
might soon follow suit (Bah 2014). Further, advocacy organisations focus
primarily on the unmatched number of female survivors (Sivakumaran 2005:
1276; Del Zotto and Jones 2002) and disregard men. As a result, sexual violence against men has become incompatible with predominant narratives on
conflict in the DRC (Autesserre 2012). Whereas female rape in DR Congo is
arguably estimated at the alarming rate of forty-eight women every hour
(Peterman et al. 2011: 1065), there are few numbers for men. As in other
conflicts, estimates of survivors are highly contested, dependent on reported
cases at specific medical facilities, or are entirely unavailable. Autesserre
estimates that four to ten percent of all rape survivors in the Eastern DRC are
men (Autesserre 2012: 15), whereas Johnson et al. found that over 23 percent of men in the Kivus and Ituri have experienced sexual violence of some
kind (2010: 558). The International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES) states that nine percent of all men in Nord-Kivu have experienced sexual
violence or abuse during conflict, as opposed to 22 percent of women (IMAGES 2012: 5). Despite the lack of statistical hard facts, sexual abuse and rape of
men have long spread in the region’s enduring conflicts. Men and boys are
not only at risk of being selectively massacred or forcibly recruited, but also
of experiencing rape and genital torture (Carpenter 2006). With respect to
prevailing Congolese ideals of masculinity that emphasise financial and socioeconomic strength, bodily virility, sexual potency, and fighting capacity, recognising men as targets of such degrading forms of violence is socially ‘unthinkable’.
Male Rape and Sexual Identity
Accounts of male survivors of sexual violence, though rare, do exist. Men and
boys from the Kivus and Ituri, have reported stories of abduction by armed
men, of enduring humiliation, gang rape, and genital mutilation (IRIN 2011).
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Experiences range from rape, enforced rape at gunpoint, genital mutilation,
enforced nudity, enforced masturbation, to physical emasculation and torture
(Sivakumaran 2007: 264-267). Physical and mental challenges of male rape
survivors include excessive bleeding and chronic physical pain, psychological
traumas, stigmatisation, feelings of dehumanisation, impotence and the perceived destruction of gender identity (SVRI 2011). Cultural taboos and unrestrained homophobia in DRC (DoS 2013) inhibit survivors from reclaiming
their own bodies and sexualities which often results in social isolation. Already low levels of reporting are thus effectively diminished.
In contrast to women, male survivors are less likely to receive either
treatment for their physical and/or mental wounds, or legal support (Carpenter 2006: 95; WHO 2000: 111). Two problems immediately come to mind: the
lack of acknowledgement by political actors and institutions which eventually leads to the silencing of male survivors, and their ‘tainting’ as homosexuals
(Sivakumaran 2005: 1276; Del Zotto and Jones 2002). Sexual violence and/or
rape as performative acts of dominance can only work in ‘gender-stratified’
societies that celebrate the perpetrator’s heterosexuality while feminising,
homosexualising and silencing survivors (MacKinnon 1991: 1282). Social
unacceptability, patriarchy and idealised heterosexuality are thus key to
comprehend these social consequences of male rape. As previously explained, hegemonic masculinity maintains hierarchies and patterns of victimhood that are not bound by an arbitrary male/female divide, but function
on a continuum between masculinity and femininity, encompassing both men
and women (Skjelsbæk 2001: 71). Sexual violence is deeply symbolic. Rape
signifies the ultimate humiliation of the victim and his/her community. Nagel
(2000) notes that masculine notions of honour and purity, as well as the
existence of more or less strict ethno-sexual boundaries, are supportive of
this societal effect. After the Rwandan genocide, ethnic mobilisation projected into the Eastern DRC, making it also a gravity field for genocidal ideology
that comfortably links with predatory and in fact exterminationist masculinities.
Gender Inequality and Symbolism of the Masculine
The multidimensional study by Christian et al. assesses the effects of sexual
violence against men on families and local communities in the DRC (2011:
229). They conclude that the societal impact is mediated by gender constructs, especially pre-existing hierarchies of masculinity (Christian et al.
2011: 228), although they omit a specific reference to hegemonic masculinity.
During their fieldwork, male survivors voiced their shame over being ‘transformed’ not only into women, but into the ‘wives’ of the perpetrators, in this
case Hutu interahamwe militias (Christian et al. 2011: 237-238). The implicit
understanding of women as ‘less than men’ is significant here. Under the
influence of a pronouncedly hegemonic version of masculinity, the degrading
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act of being ‘made into a women’ has severe repercussions. Brownmiller
states that during armed conflict women are not raped because they “belong
to the enemy camp, but because they are women and therefore enemies”
(Brownmiller 1993: 65). This is equally true for male survivors. Within the
confines of hegemonic masculinity, they occupy the lower, subordinate and
marginalised ranks of the masculine hierarchy (Connell 2012), and thus
become eligible, almost natural targets for abuse and domination.
Social norms and perceptions of socio-economic masculinity situate men
at the top of the gender hierarchy, making them heads of households, local
leaders and nominally defenders of their communities in Eastern DRC. During conflicts, rival sources of hegemonic masculine power, that is rebel
groups, armed bandits or government soldiers, severely disrupt indigenous
and local social systems and gender hierarchies (Lwambo 2011). On a communal and family level, male survivors typically experience status emasculation and become physically or mentally unable to contribute to the household
(Christian et al. 2011: 238). Mies (1986) describes this after-effect as
“housewifization” which undermines a man’s position as the family breadwinner. As a consequence, socio-economic deprivation increases and domestic hierarchies begin to unravel. The figurative emasculation of male survivors frequently leads to stigmatisation of the whole family. Children of survivors equally suffer from humiliation, in some cases being ridiculed with the
phrase: “your father is a woman” (Christian et al. 2011: 239). Wives of male
rape survivors in Eastern DRC may start questioning their husbands’ masculinity and traditionally assigned roles as men (Storr 2011).
These socio-psychological implications illustrate how sexual violence not
only seeks to physically and psychologically destroy the victim, but also to
lacerate the social cohesion of families and communities that are constructed
around male supremacy. Violent hegemonic masculinity destroys local gender relations in the target community and establishes new hierarchies, bypassing the emasculated male survivors. On this matrix, gender identities are
altered, reversed, re-negotiated, or utterly destroyed. Men affected by sexual
violence are ‘downgraded’ to the status of women, their masculinity is negated, and they are made into ‘non-men’, unsuitable for exercising their former
social roles. While this opens up new spaces for female agency and selfcontrol, violence is further engrained in the communities’ social psyche and
essentially inhibits empowerment. Armed groups in the Eastern DRC use
(male) rape for social control, instilling fear, and enforcing obedience (Pratt
and Werchick 2004: 10). Incapacitating local resistance at its core, namely
the patriarchal social cohesion, in order to freely access land, resources and
political power, is the metanarrative of these crimes (Lemarchand 2009:
125). Making also male bodies the battlefields in the Eastern DRC has become
another perfidious detail of a conflict which is governed by the symbolism of
‘the masculine’.
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Conclusion
This article has analysed sexual violence against men in the Eastern DRC, and
identified the structural links between victimhood, masculinity, and gender
as conflict factors. Explaining wartime rape with the ‘spoils of war’ rationale
is insufficient and even confuses the symptoms of conflict with its roots.
Asymmetrical gender relations structure the Congolese warscape and exacerbate political and cultural divisions. Hegemonic masculinity is an ordering
principle that functions between and within gender categories. Its power
position is seldom visibly enforced, but instead relies on the silent acquiescence from marginalised, subordinate, and/or complicit masculinities. Both
men and women are co-creators of this gendered system and both are capable of extreme violence. In turn, both can also become ‘victims’ of this violence. While women are not just ‘camp followers’ and ‘nurturing mothers’,
men do not always appear as gun-wielding militiamen. Distinguishing only
between female victims and male perpetrators is counter-productive to empowering those that suffer most from (sexual) violence, namely people at the
social fringes of conflict societies. Victimhood often acts as an enforcement
mechanism to ‘brand’ gender positions and to perpetuate a status quo in
which these are naturalised and cemented.
Making male survivors more visible does not contravene the long-term
efforts to contain and prevent abominable crimes against women in the DRC.
On the contrary, using the prism of hegemonic masculinity is constructive
and viable for several reasons. First, it presents a more nuanced account of
the gender dynamics in Eastern Congo and illustrates how social hierarchies
are constructed and re-negotiated along the parameters of ‘femininity’ and
‘masculinity’, especially at the interstices of gender, status, sexuality, and
ethnicity. Second, during armed conflict, when underlying principles of supremacy, control, and consent are at stake, hegemonic masculinity can turn
violent, and may develop a destructive and predatory character. If so, other
variables, such as status, sexuality, and military identities become salient as
they constantly interact and shape the current hegemonic model. Lastly,
hegemonic masculinity provides important insights that can potentially – in a
post-conflict setting – facilitate change and counter-hegemonic actions
through a detailed understanding of masculinity systems. While this article
only explored some of the wider debates on victimhood, gender, and masculinity with respect to the Eastern DRC, further research on more specific
localities and social anomalies is necessary. Also the colonial and neo-colonial
production of hegemonic masculinities and masculine stereotypes, as well as
pre-colonial attitudes towards gender and sexuality, represent fruitful areas
of future research that can contextualise and historicise gender debates regarding especially Eastern and Central Africa. Empowerment and prevention
programmes for survivors of sexual violence and the reconciliation of families, villages, and communities hinge on the analysis of these long-term processes and cultural stigmas that fuel the internal logic of hegemonic mascuIReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 5-28
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linity. In doing so, the combined study of victimhood, masculinity, and gender
can set the ground for a deeper understanding of what shapes the Eastern
DRC’s conflicts socio-psychologically, and thus create leeway for political
action.
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– I reflect –
As reiterated throughout the article, research on sexual- and
gender-based violence cannot remain an ‘academic question
posed for its own sake’, but almost inevitably influences policies, directly and indirectly. This, however, is not to be understood as a fervent appeal for ‘academic activism’, or as a reminder of the academy’s supposedly inherent ‘duty of relevance’. Instead, the point is that any study on the complex
manifestations of gender, masculinity, and violence, are naturally relevant and influence the policy world at least through
discourse and discussion. This article on Hegemonic Masculinity, Victimhood and Male Bodies as “battlefields” is no exception. Not designed as a series of policy recommendations, but
rather as an analytical piece of how masculinity and victimhood are conceptually tied into wider systems of gender construction, the article examines how violence is born out of
these complex interactions. For a more in-depth understanding of masculinity in Eastern DRC, more field work is necessary, and academia is well-advised to overthink its temporary
‘honeymoon’ with NGOs and humanitarian actors, and rely on
its own data sets and interpretations à la Maria Eriksson Baaz.
Hanno Brankamp
MLitt (International Security Studies), 2nd Semester
University of St Andrews, UK
hb52@st-andrews.ac.uk
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Schöb: Memory Building within the Colombian Conflict
Memory Building within the
Colombian Conflict: How Do Films
Contribute?
An Analysis of Three Films
Mia Schöb
Abstract
This paper adopts an anthropological approach to critically
analysing how cinema contributes to memory-building processes and, through its particular discourse, creates potential
for long-term reconciliation in conflict-affected societies – as
opposed to international concepts like transitional justice. Colombia, a country with a half-century-old armed civilian conflict and an on-going transitional justice process, serves as a
case study. Three Colombian films are analysed to this end.
The analysis shows that the films follow a different logic than
the transitional justice process that seeks to soften the confrontational line between ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’. By creating a common ‘Other’ – the ‘armed actor’ – for both the target audience of the films, the urban upper and middle classes,
and the peasant victims whose stories these films tell, they
contribute to addressing more fundamental fragmentations in
the Colombian society, namely the apathy of large parts of the
urban society, which hamper reconciliation and peace beyond
the victim-perpetrator dichotomy.
Keywords: Memory, Critical Discourse Analysis, Cinema, Reconciliation, Transitional Justice
Introduction
Colombia has been experiencing internal armed conflict for over five decades
and faces desolate human rights and security conditions, counting between
3.4 million (UNHCR 2011: 304) and 5.2 million (CODHES 2011) internally
displaced persons (IDPs) as of today, about ten percent of the population.
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Schöb: Memory Building within the Colombian Conflict
While the conflict goes on, the Colombian government introduced a framework of transitional justice (TJ) in 2005. Besides judicial arrangements with
demobilized armed non-state actors, this framework comprises assistance to
victims of the armed conflict as well as memory-building efforts.
Thereby, this official discourse constructs categories of victims and perpetrators. It is interesting, however, to observe how alternative discourses,
for example in film, address other societal categories. As the three recent
Colombian films selected for analysis illustrate, the very target audience of
these films constitutes another societal group that remains untouched by the
TJ process: the urban upper and middle classes. While the TJ discourse centres on reconciliation and restitution along the victim-perpetrator dichotomy,
the films analysed in this article implicitly point to another fraction of the
Colombian society: the fragmentation into rural and urban societies.1 IDPs
from the rural conflict areas are often exposed to stigmatization by the
aforementioned urban population when fleeing to the larger cities, and thus
become entangled in a ‘cycle of re-victimisation’.
This paper hypothesises that films address the urban middle and upper
class and seek to awaken their empathy for and understanding of the fate of
victims from the rural population. They do so by creating a common ‘Other’ –
that is, the ‘armed actor’ – for both the target audience of the films and the
victims whose stories these films tell. Thereby, films harden the confrontational line that the TJ process seeks to soften: the line between victims and
perpetrators. But, calling for moral support to and identification with the
victims by the target audience, films contribute to addressing more fundamental fragmentations in the Colombian society, namely the apathy of large
parts of the urban society, which hamper reconciliation and peace beyond
the victim-perpetrator dichotomy.
The paper is structured in two main parts. The first part sets the theoretical foundation linking TJ, memory, discourse and film and connects them to
the Colombian case. The second part elaborates briefly on the methodology
applied, and then ponders on the analysis of the three films “Impunity”
(2010), “Los colores de la montaña” (2011) and “Pequeñas voces” (2011).
While the documentary “Impunity” follows Colombia’s TJ process until 2010,
the fiction film “Los colores de la montaña” and the animated documentary
“Pequeñas voces” tell the stories of the largest victim group of the conflict,
the rural population that are forcedly displaced. Given the lack of literature
about Colombian film, findings will draw on academic contributions about
film and memory in Lebanon and Algeria. The analysis is complemented by
an interview with the Swiss-Colombian director of Impunity, Juan José Lozano.
Juan José Lozano referred to “two societies” or “two worlds” (the urban and the rural
population) within Colombia that are complete strangers to each other, but clash when
IDPs from rural areas settle in the cities.
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Schöb: Memory Building within the Colombian Conflict
Theoretical Foundations
TJ and the Concept of Memory
Transitional Justice (TJ) comprises “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of
large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and
achieve reconciliation“(UN Secretary General 2010: 2). It consists of „both
judicial and non-judicial processes and mechanisms, including prosecution
initiatives, truth-seeking, reparations programmes, institutional reform or an
appropriate combination thereof“(UN Secretary General 2010: 3). Scholars
have extensively discussed the normative thresholds between truth and
justice (Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena, 2006), and whether TJ can contribute to (national) reconciliation (Jaramillo et al. 2009: 44; Kaminski et al.
2006: 300).
Kimberley Theidon (2006: 454) considers reconciliation a threedimensional process: individuals with themselves, community members
among each other, and civil society with the state, implying therein that the
entire society needs to be involved if the process shall be successful. She
describes how hegemonic discourse of political elites can instrumentalise the
concept of reconciliation for re-constructing the nation-state (Wilson, 2001,
cited in Theidon 2006: 454). Patricia Lundy and Marc McGovern (2008: 265266, 271) furthermore criticise the top-down approach of TJ frameworks
regarding truth-telling processes, arguing that, for local dialogue to flourish,
it needs to be complemented by the active participation of local communities
linked to collaborative oral history models.
Originally designed for transition periods out of “repressive rule or
armed conflict” (Call 2004: 101; see also Teitel 2003: 69), the ‘toolbox’ of
abstract concepts and guidelines to TJ is also being used within internal
armed conflicts, in so-called “conflicted democracies” (Aoláin and Campbell
2005: 175), in order to promote transition from conflict to peace (Summers
2012: 219, 235), or to consolidate the existing constitutional order (Jaramillo
et al. 2009: 7).
The Justice and Peace Law (Law 975) of 2005 introduced TJ to Colombia
(Laplante and Theidon 2007: 51), raising the buzzwords of memory, truth,
justice and reconciliation to the top of the political agenda (Laplante and
Theidon 2007: 52). Scholars and civil society organisations have criticised
the design and implementation of Law 975, arguing that it served as a tool of
“veiled amnesty” (Laplante and Theidon 2007: 83) to provide impunity for
the demobilised armed actors; an allegation that the documentary film Impunity (2010) materializes in images. Other scholars underline particular
achievements in the area of memory construction (Uribe 2009: 6).
Disregarding the multiple relationships between victims and the armed
actors in Colombia that often blur the distinction between victims and perpeIReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 29-48
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Schöb: Memory Building within the Colombian Conflict
trators (Arjona 2008: 107), the discourses of both the government and civil
society victims’ organisations evolve along a clear victim-perpetrator-line.
While victims’ organisations push for the absolute respect of the victims’
“rights to truth, justice and reparations,2 – rights increasingly viewed as
central to the broader goal of ’national reconciliation’” (Laplante and Theidon
2007: 52), the official discourse of TJ advocates peace and reconciliation
between the two groups through alternative jurisdiction and victims’ rights
promotion (García-Godos and Lid 2010: 516). Peace is regarded dependent
on both victimisers and victims, who are seen as two sides of the same coin
(García-Godos and Lid 2010: 516). However, the majority of the victims included in the Colombian TJ process are IDPs belonging to the ‘rural society’
but migrating to the urban centres to escape violence. The focus of the official
TJ discourse on the ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ categories largely ignores the
‘urban society’, and thus undermines a comprehensive and potentially more
fruitful process of truth-seeking and memory-building in Colombia.
Discourse, Memory and Cinema
Memory-building is an integral part of TJ frameworks. Borrowing conceptually from memory studies, Alexandra Barahona de Brito (2010) locates
memory-building processes within the “politics of memory” (Barahona de
Brito 2010: 360), a broader process of socialisation and identity formation
through the interpretation of past in the narratives of different groups in
society. The “politics of memory” is itself a part of “social memory-making”
(Barahona de Brito 2010: 361), an inherent and continuous process in societies in which decisions about remembering and forgetting through “historical
memories and collective remembrances” (Barahona de Brito 2010: 361) are
constantly negotiated. In this process, “[i]t is only by establishing otherness –
a constitutive outside – that the modern nation comes into being” (Hourani
2008: 288).
In this paper, memory will be understood as “the ways in which people
construct a sense of the past” (Cofino 1997: 1386). Memory finds its articulation and actualisation in the discourse of the present, being “a form of
knowledge and memory of social practices” (Wodak 2004: 199). To Foucault,
objects are systematically constructed through the practices of discourse
(Sarasin 2005: 100). Discourses are alimented by the social power of those
who use them, while, at the same time, they constrain this very social power
(Sarasin 2005: 118). Archives are “the sum of all discursive rules […] the
virtual storage of all possibilities, given at a specific historical moment and in
Despite of its buzzword-character, the right to truth has proven of crucial importance
in practice. As Bell (2011: 209, 218-219) underlines the „long present“ of the Southern
Cone, the past needs to be properly accounted for before the future can start, based on
the responsibilities derived from the past. Establishing this accountability includes the
fight against state-imposed amnesia, and the construction of alternative memories.
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Schöb: Memory Building within the Colombian Conflict
the constrained space of communication a discourse has, to express something” (Sarasin 2005: 112).3 As one of these possibilities, film thus forms part
of the archives of memory.
Barahona de Brito (2010: 362-362) introduces another important concept of memory studies into TJ research: ‘mnemonic communities’. These
memory groups are entities within whose boundaries memories are negotiated, e.g. the nation, ethnic groups, families, but also the categories of victims
and perpetrators. They result from “mnemonic battles” (Van Drunen 2010:
34) over the “power over discourse” (Jäger and Meyer 2009: 38), strategic
decisions, specific memory constellations and meaning-laden social narratives. This “highly political process” (Stern 2004: 124-125, cited in Van
Drunen 2010: 34) produces social collective memory, being social because of
its negotiated nature and its existence through shared relations and interactions, and collective because it is more than the sum of individual memories
(Barahona de Brito 2010: 362; see also Zerubavel 1996: 293-294, cited in
Van Drunen 2010: 33). Applied to the hypothesis of this paper, films may
help construct a mnemonic community composed of both the urban and rural
societies. Film has thus an archival as well as an active function in the present.
In “Foucault va au cinema”, Patrice Maniglier and Dork Zabunyan (2011)
illustrate Foucault’s relationship to cinema. To Foucault, cinema links the
genealogical approach, that is the archival analysis of past discourses, and the
contemporary world (Zabunyan 2011: 33-34).4 Problematising the present,
cinema changes our relations to the past and fights the tendency to amnesia
in our present (Zabunyan 2011: 40). Cinema can thus work as a critique to
the present, emphasising different co-existing truths that define themselves
in relation to other variants of the past (Maniglier 2011: 70). The aforementioned mnemonic battles resurge in Foucault’s idea that history as an ideological affair is constructed on the battlefield of memory, and cinema is where
this battlefield is located (Maniglier 2011: 56-60). Through the “ré-écriture
des traces sur des traces” (Maniglier 2011: 60) in film, memory is effectively
re-coded, that is, the audience is shown what to remember. The pattern of
traces is divided in dominant traces, the official history, and dominated traces, the popular memory. There are qualitative and formal differences between the two traces (Maniglier 2011: 60-61).
As part of popular memory, film – and especially documentary film –
suggests a specific viewpoint on the “filmed reality” (Gautier 1995: 231; see
also Denzin 2000: 425). Films create their “counterhistories to the usual
The translation, like all the following, is mine.
Zabunyan (2011: 33-34) points out that cinema was too young as a medium to be
genealogically approached and thus did not find a solid place in Foucault’s writings.
Citing Deleuze he underlines, however, that archival analysis was only one part of
Foucault’s work, and that cinema served to Foucault as a vector for the diagnosis of his
contemporary world, that is, as the link between his archival analysis – of past discourses – and his actuality (Zabunyan 2011: 35-36).
IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 29-48
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Schöb: Memory Building within the Colombian Conflict
nationalist narratives” (Rosenstone 1995: 5), the official history, according to
their own rules of representation (Rosenstone 1995: 3). Contrary to textual
archives, the visual archives created by film do not count on abstractions, for
example, the victims, but on specific groups of people and their stories who in
turn embody these abstractions (Rosenstone 1995: 8), for example a peasant
child being mutilated through a grenade attack as the incapacitated Colombian nation. Through these allegorical narratives (Wayne 2001: 130), film is
based on the molecularisation of the historical unity, showing le quotidien as
micro-events (Maniglier 2011: 62, 100-101). Through organizing the viewers’ perspective (Maniglier 2011: 86) and problematizing the present, film
can incite the audience to problematize their relationship to the images on
the screen, to question their own identity and standpoint in relation to the
past (Maniglier 2011: 116). With regard to the hypothesis of this paper, this
means that the urban cinema and television audience could be incited to
rethink their present attitude towards the rural population.
Memory-Building in Official History and Popular Memory in Colombia
As Vikki Bell (2011: 209-210) argues for the case of the Southern Cone, stories of the past are highly contested politics of the present that evoke a responsibility towards the future; battles are being fought constantly over
which of the “collected memories” become part of the “collective memory”.
Similarly, memory is a “highly contested terrain in Colombia” (Uribe 2009: 4),
the “political battleground” of official history and popular memory (Uribe
2009: 6). Part of the former is constructed by Memoria Histórica, a unit of the
CNRR (Comisión Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación) (Law 975, Art.
50). Law 975 (Art. 8) understands historical memory as part of “symbolic
reparations”, together with public acknowledgement, apologies, and guarantees of non-repetition.
Interestingly, the CNRR is similar in shape and mandate to the state-led
truth commissions that were installed subsequent to the dictatorships in
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in the early 1980s (Crenzel 2011: 4). In 2012,
the second relevant law of the Colombian TJ process, the Victims and Land
Restitution Law (Law 1448), replaced the CNRR by the Unidad de Atención y
Reparación Integral a las Víctimas (Law 1448: Art. 171) and extended the
competences of the Memoria Histórica section, creating the Centro de Memoria Histórica (Law 1448: Art. 144). Further elements are gradually being
added to the state-led memory construction process, such as a commemoration day, Día Nacional de la Memoria y Solidaridad con las Víctimas on 9 April
(Law 1448: Art. 142) or the Museo de la Memoria (Law 1448: Art. 148). The
investigators of Memoria Histórica have been conducting extensive research
on massacre-torn communities, and captured the stories and memories of a
myriad of victims of armed violence (Uribe 2009: 6).
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Schöb: Memory Building within the Colombian Conflict
Yet, alternative discourses continue to counter the dynamics of remembering and forgetting that the official discourse nonetheless creates via the
“historical truth” collected by Memoria Histórica and the “judicial truth”
gathered in the judicial hearings of demobilized paramilitary leaders. Arts,
and especially film, play a crucial role as alternative discourses (Crenzel
2011: 10). As Mike Wayne (2001: 4) holds, “popular memory is an important
source for Third Cinema”. Evolved in Latin America after the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the politically committed Third Cinema – both documentaries
and fiction – positions itself critically towards its social environment (Wayne
2001: 5-6) and pursues an agenda: concientización (Burton 1978: 50),
“changing consciousness and raising awareness” (Wayne 2001: 4). Colombian Third Cinema traditionally combines sociological analysis and artisanal
production (Burton 1978: 66-68); the Colombian film audience is thus familiar with the film medium as “an effective tool for catalysing and signalling
social change” (Burton 1978: 73). Film audience especially refers to the urban upper and middle classes who have access to cinema, internet, television
and black market copies of ‘guerrilla cinema’, as Third Cinema is also being
referred to (Wayne 2001: 57).
It is important to note at this point that most of the theoretical literature
refers to discourse and memory-building (through film) with regard to a
distant past, to what Foucault describes as “discourses that have just stopped
to be ours” (Zabunyan 2011: 34). The past-present-relation of the Colombian
films, however, differs from this concept in that the related past reoccurs in
everyday life in the present. The filmed time span in Impunity covers the
years 2006-2010, but the events that constitute the plots of all three films –
the testimonies in both Impunity and Pequeñas voces and the fictional story
of Los colores de la montaña – are timeless in the sense that they could have
happened any time in the past three decades up to the immediate present.
These films thus combine the “regard de proximité, coloré d’affectivité”
(Gautier 1995: 232) of films about the present with the power of memory
inherent to documentaries about the past (Gautier 1995: 215). Based on a
“repertoire of collective knowledge” (Wodak 2004: 207), that is, through the
recurrence of emblematic images, documentaries – as well as fiction films –
have the power to evoke “l’impact émotionnel du souvenir” (Gautier 1995:
104; see also Denzin 2000: 423) in the film audience. Wayne (2001: 108,
112) emphasises the dialectical relationship between the past and present
and argues that repressing the memory of a painful experience even
strengthens the ties between past and present, and the pain will resurface
unless properly remembered.
Giorgio Hadi Curti’s (2008) considerations about the relation between
memory, affect and emotion can be helpful to illustrate this point with regard
to the selected films, and link these considerations to the idea of social collective memory: by evoking emotion in the audience through this visual affection and memorisation of the victimisation of the rural population in Colombia, these films construct and actualise a common memory of both the porIReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 29-48
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Schöb: Memory Building within the Colombian Conflict
trayed rural population and the urban population as target audience of these
films. They thus reflect affects and affections embodied in the memories of
several generations in Colombia (compare to Curti 2008: 108), memories
that are being actualised and modified through film, and thus play an “active
role […] in the experience of the presence” (Curti 2008: 107).
Following Barahona de Brito’s logic, the “two societies” Lozano refers to
could thereby become joined in one mnemonic community, or, as Curti puts
it, create identity through the combination of shared emotion and memory
(Curti 2008: 107). It is interesting at this point to get back to Foucault’s concept of popular memory, which, rather than adopting a “we”-perspective or
giving a different viewpoint than the dominant, relies on the dimension of
coming into being, “la dimension du devenir” (Maniglier 2011: 64). Thus
derived the hypothesis of this paper is that the selected films promote the
coming into being of a mnemonic group composed of the urban and rural
societies in Colombia, through the creation of the armed actor as the common
Other.
Analysis
Reflections on Methodology
For Jutta Weldes (2009: 182), film pertains to “low data”, everyday meaningful commonsensical representations that aim to challenge or support dominant representations in “high data”, the official history or hegemonic discourse. Rather than a film critique or conventional critical discourse analysis
(CDA), the analysis in this paper is adapted to the goal of uncovering the
representations of victims and perpetrators in the three selected films in a
synthesised manner. The analysis draws partly on discourse-historical CDA
regarding topics, discursive strategies and linguistic (and visual) means applied and the critical contextualisation of the films (Wodak 2004: 199, 205207).
The questions posed towards the films reflect a social science perspective; the analysis focuses on the discourse of the films. In line with Norman K.
Denzin’s instructions for “Reading Film”, four narrative levels are analysed in
each film: visual text, spoken text, the combination of both within a story, as
well as my interpretations of the three precedent levels (Denzin 2000: 423).5
For the sake of brevity, only the relevant findings of the elaborate analysis
are presented here. The following questions are central to the analysis:
Whose story is being told? How do the films sensitise the audience for the story
5 Due to a lack of literature on the films, I rely on the fourth step of this analysis mainly
as a basis for interpreting their effect on the audience. I am aware that this is to a high
extent subjective, and that my own background and experience introduce certain bias
to the analysis, rendering the potential generalisability of the latter debatable.
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that is being told? How do the stories evolve along the victims-perpetratorsline?
Questions of outreach – funding, distribution and audience – will be included to the extent deemed possible, to clarify who is addressed and whether the target audience is potentially being reached. Finally, the analysis is
complemented by a semi-structured interview I conducted with Juan José
Lozano, the director of Impunity. The interview serves as a means to consolidate or contest findings in the analysis of ‘Impunity’,6 and provides useful
information about the film and cinema in Colombia.7
The Films
The three selected films contribute to the Colombian popular memory about
the armed conflict, collectively as Colombian-made films, and individually
through their plot (compare Austin 2010: 30). Like contemporary Algerian
cinema, Colombian cinema works potentially as a “vector of memory” (Austin
2010: 32), “a crucial instrument against amnesia” (Austin 2010: 34), by recording the past and the present through the voices suppressed or distorted
in official discourse.
‘Impunity’ (2010) is a documentary film by the Swiss-Colombian
filmmaker Juan José Lozano, and the Colombian journalist Hollman Morris.
The documentary accompanies the Justice and Peace Process, therein included the localisation of mass-graves, from different angles: the paramilitary
accounts in the judicial hearings, victims’ personal accounts of their tragedies, expert interviews from academia, national and international jurisprudence and politics. The film contributes to building a visual archive of the
Colombian TJ process, covering accounts that date back to the 1990s.
‘Pequeñas voces’ (2011) is an animated documentary by the Colombian
filmmakers Oscar Andrade and Jairo Carrillo, based on interviews with and
drawings from eight to 13 year-old victims of forced displacement. The film
gives an account – through the children’s own voices – of their war experiences, actualised in the combination and animation of their drawings. The
experiences told by the children capture all forms of victimisation: threats
and armed attacks against civilians, bombings of the village and armed battles, forced disappearances, child recruitment by the guerrilla, forced displacement, and the subsequent problems of unemployment, poverty and
stigmatisation in the cities. It was published in 2011 and produced over a
period of seven years. Given the age of the interviewed children, the related
events may date back 15-20 years.
6 The interview took place on 5th April 2013 in Geneva and was conducted in Spanish.
All translations are mine.
7 Ideally, interviews should have been conducted with the directors of all three films.
Contacting the other directors, however, proved more difficult than expected.
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The fiction film ‘Los colores de la montaña’ (2011) by the Colombian
filmmaker Carlos Arbeláenz tells the story of a village disputed between
paramilitaries and guerrillas, whose inhabitants eventually suffer from different forms of victimisation: from daily harassment of armed groups to antipersonnel landmines in their fields to the assassination of villagers and, finally, to the displacement of the entire population of the village. The film is set in
a village somewhere in the Colombian Andeans, and the story could take
place anytime in the past three decades.
Whose Story is Being Told?
In ‘Pequeñas voces’, the animated drawings only mumble unintelligibly,
which gives exclusive voice to the child-narrators. The film gives an account
of their remembrances. As for ‘Los colores de la montaña’, there is no narrator, but the plot accompanies mostly the main protagonist, the boy Manuel.
The problematic of anti-personnel landmines and the physical presence of
armed actors is elaborated upon through the soccer field and Manuel’s soccer
ball that ends up trapped in a mine field. Further problems, especially with
regard to cooperation of the villagers with one armed actor or another, arise
around the local school. The choice of locations reflects a children’s perspective, their “truth” about the events that lead to their displacement from their
everyday experiences.
‘Impunity’ contrasts with the two latter because it offers a multiplicity of
testimonies and perspectives from different groups in society, though favouring the victims. A male narrator, who appears on the audio level only, comments on developments. As ‘Lozano’ stresses in the interview, the main protagonist of the documentary is the TJ process itself. The purpose of the film
was to create a visual archive for the future, to capture as many angles of
history as possible. This would prevent the emergence of a one-sided official
history. We might conclude that ‘Impunity’ challenges “the structural power
to silence” (Hourani 2008: 304) of the state, for the long-term objective of a
multi-faceted history. Contradictions within the multiple accounts are possible and even desirable (Hourani 2008: 304), and form an integral part of the
technique the film uses to provoke emotion: contradictions between the
visual and the spoken text, even ranging to ironic remarks.
How Do the Films Sensitise the Audience for the Story that Is Being
Told?
If the films construct the nation, “the tragedy suffered by [the] characters
embodies the tragedy of the nation” (Hourani 2008: 291). But how is the
audience of the films, the second half of the mnemonic community in creation, being included in this nation? On the one hand, the films make the na38
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Schöb: Memory Building within the Colombian Conflict
tion known by creating the ‘armed actor’ as the common Other, and as such
as a threat to the nation (compare Hourani 2008: 303). Similarly to the militiaman icon in Lebanese cinema, parties to the conflict – the military, paramilitary groups (AUC) and guerrilla groups (FARC, ELN) – are subsumed in
all films under the stereotypical ‘armed actor’, who embodies destruction,
terror and death, and thereby provides the “otherness” (Hourani 2008: 288)
in opposition to both the victim-protagonists and the audience.
In the entry scene of Impunity, a woman tells how her 12-year-old brother was decapitated by “some armed men” (00:00:17), she does not specify
which group they belonged to and it does not seem to be of importance to
her. Following an armed battle between military and guerrillas, one boy in
Pequeñas voces (00:39:17) summarizes: “All the forces that bear weapons
saw terror, even if they didn’t want to, they saw terror.” In Los colores de la
montaña, the villagers equally fear both the uniformed guerrillas and the
‘plain-clothed’ paramilitaries.8 All three films provoke the same emotional
effect in the audience: aversion and a feeling of alienation towards the armed
actor.
Through the accounts of the emblematic paramilitary leader “HH”, Impunity works to uncover the lie behind the “great theatre peace” of the Justice
and Peace Process (Interview Lozano): the political and economic links between the Colombian elite and the paramilitary, referred to as parapolítica
and paraeconomía. Impunity thereby contributes to filling the archival absence of state responsibility (compare to Hourani 2008: 303-304), and adds
another layer to the depicted otherness: the ‘armed actor’ in Impunity is a
complex figure that incorporates both the armed parties to the conflict as
well as the economic and political elites.
On the other hand, the absence of the urban society is not complete in the
films. Impunity and Los colores de la montaña portray members of the urban
society whose engagement and comprehension for the rural victims evoke
empathy, compassion and admiration in the audience, serving as a model of
identification for the audience. In Impunity, this function is taken by the
street demonstrations in Bogotá against the “process of impunity” (00:48:50
– 00:50:40). Los colores de la montaña, on the other hand, counts on an emblematic character to this end: the young female school teacher from the city,
whose devotion and social commitment is articulated in her resistance
against threats and her refusal to leave the village until most villagers have
fled.
Contrary to the other films, Pequeñas voces does not count on a particular protagonist from the urban society, but the entry and final scenes are
located in Bogotá, where the child-narrators fled to after their displacement.
Two key scenes shall be mentioned here: on the one hand, the city enables
While the identification of the actors is less clear (and less important due to the
infantile perspective) in Pequeñas voces and Los colores de la montaña, Impunity clearly
distinguishes paramilitary, military and guerrilla action.
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Schöb: Memory Building within the Colombian Conflict
the children to recover their childhood. The mutilated boy receives artificial
limbs in Bogotá (00:57:40), and learns to walk and even to play soccer again
(01:01:40). On the other hand, the life in the crowded outskirts of the city is
placed in stark contrast with the peaceful and happy life on the countryside,
as the children recall their lives before the armed actor intruded into their
areas. The children are intimidated by the urban violence directed against
them: “We are doing well at home now, but not in our area. Because in the
street, there are those señores who kill boys” (00:01:24), tells Yasmin, daughter of a forcedly disappeared coffee farmer. These scenes furthermore give an
account about the poverty in which the children are living, with their parents
struggling to find labour as unskilled workers to feed the family (00:01:40).
While the former account implies the potential of reconciliation and recovery of the Colombian nation, the children’s account of the hostile urban
environment – or of their re-victimisation in the cities – also has the potential
evoke empathy within the urban society in one respect: both “societies” suffer from the violence in this environment, and the suffering of the IDPs reveals that they, themselves, are not the evil cause of this violence. There is a
hidden argument in these scenes, which, through evoking empathy for these
children and their families, through the children’s truths about their own
existence, re-humanizes IDPs and works to relieve them from their stigma.
Their positive attitude towards the future suggests that there is potential for
reconciliation: a boy who lost his right arm and leg in a grenade explosion
reflects: “I never wondered who it was, I never wanted to blame anybody for
it (…) the worst thing is to be pitied by others (…) I am human (…) I am pressing forward” (01:00:20-01:01:20).
Furthermore and disregarding the type of film, children as the main protagonists – and the victims of armed violence related in interviews, such as in
the entry scene of Impunity – increase the possibility of identification ‘among
mothers and fathers’, rather than among the two societies. Children are not
only what links adults of different social classes, but they incorporate the
past of a nation, as well as its future, and “function as symbols of survival
beyond trauma” (Austin 2010: 30). Focusing on children also facilitates the
demarcation between innocence – of the ‘victims’ – and guilt – of the ‘armed
actor’.
How Do the Stories Evolve along the Victims-Perpetrators-Line?
Impunity, accompanying the official Justice and Peace process, adopts the
categories of victims and perpetrators. They are treated as two separate
groups, and an emphasis is given to the victims’ indignation about being
treated as guerrilla members by the state and paramilitary (Interview Lozano). The spatial separation of victims and perpetrators during the judicial
hearings gives further weight to the separation of the legal categories.
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Similarly, Pequeñas voces makes a clear distinction between the rural
population (“we”, from the children’s perspective) and the armed actor. That
a child identifies the armed actor with the terror of the villagers further underlines this distinction. The way in which child recruitment is problematized is in line with this approach: even though the recruited boy feels attracted to the false promises of the guerrilla leader at the beginning
(00:17:20), the forceful nature of this commitment becomes evident soon,
and the focus of his story lies in his fear and reluctance to shoot, and his relief
when finally returning to his mother (00:59:31). At no point is he identified
with the otherness that distinguishes the armed actor from the civilian population. On the contrary, the story of his recruitment serves to further dehumanise the ‘armed actor’, while raising empathy for the boy.
While transmitting the same message about the victimisation of the rural
population and their dead-end situation between different armed fronts, Los
colores de la montaña develops differently along the victim-perpetrator line
in two aspects: first, Julian, one of the child protagonists has an elder brother
who allegedly joined “the guerrilla” (00:15:52). Julian, who suffers from domestic violence, considers joining his brother (00:35:31) who has given him a
number of different bullets as a present before leaving the family (00:37:05).
Second, the concierge of the local school, Luisa, allegedly opened the school
for a paramilitary meeting (01:02:24). While it remains unclear whether her
motives are fear or opportunism, Los colores de la montaña problematises
the many facets of voluntary and involuntary collaboration with the ‘armed
actor’. Its general evolution along the victim-perpetrator line is thus less
straightforward, even though the red line of the story evolves along Manuel’s
family, who is clearly positioned as victims, unwilling to collaborate in any
way – which leads to the forced disappearance (01:17:40) and indicated
killing (01:19:07) of Manuel’s father.
In sum, the films acknowledge to some extent the blurry distinction between victims and perpetrators. At the same time, their main plot evolves
along clear categories, and their main protagonists are stereotypes of the
‘innocent victim’. The emotions evoked in the audience are thus empathy and
pity for the victims, contrasted by aversion and condemnation of the perpetrators.
Distribution and Funding
Lozano hints to an interesting development in Colombian cinema in the past
decade: Firstly, Colombian cinema production has risen from a couple to
approximately 20 Colombian film productions a year, thanks to Law 814
(2003) that helped finance and professionalise the small national film industry. Secondly, a shift has taken place with regard to the topics addressed:
while documentaries orient away from conflict-related topics, fiction films
have taken their place. Since the latter have a larger audience, are shown in
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Colombian cinemas and thus also reach the non-sensitised population, this is
an important development (Interview Lozano).
As shown in Table 1, both Los colores de la montaña and Pequeñas voces
are Colombian productions funded by the Fondo para el desarrollo cinematográfico that was created under the aforementioned Law 814. Both films
were released in the Colombian cinema in 2011.9 Impunity, on the contrary,
is an internationally funded production. According to Lozano, the therein
incorporated prospect of catching international attention incited the Colombian jurisprudence (at first) to open their doors to the filmmakers.
Table 1: Distribution and Funding
Source: Author.
Contrary to the other two films, Impunity could not be distributed legally in
Colombia, but the documentary was diffused by television channels from 15
countries, received great attention in international film festivals, and is being
distributed on a hand-to-hand basis (and via black market copies) within
Colombia by NGOs and students. Thus, although it was shown in many projections in community centres and universities, the receptors are “not the
ideal audience” because they are already sensitised for the problematic.
Lozano underlines that in order to reach the indifferent part of the “two
worlds” in Colombia, diffusion through cinema would be necessary. Another
Due to a lack of further accessible information, I am limited to the DVDs as a source of
information, completed by the internet sources provided in Table 1 .
9
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interesting point is that all three films, the censured version of Impunity
included, can be watched in Colombia on Youtube. 10 This is especially relevant for the younger generation.
Conclusion
“Some years ago, I had the ingenuous idea that documentaries could impact
the immediate future, but this is not the case. A documentary serves for constructing memory for later, years later, not for now” (Interview Lozano).
Citing the Chilean filmmaker Patricio Guzmán, Lozano underlines the archival
character of film: “The documentary is for a country what a photo album is
for the family: it captures our history, tells what we are in a specific moment.
A country without cinema is a country without mirrors to look in, without
photos, without reflecting about itself.” Cinema, by constructing and archiving memory, works as a medium for societies to capture their history in order
to understand their own identity on the long run.
Similarly to what Hourani (2008: 289) finds for the case of Lebanese
cinema, the Colombian narrations of the civil war in film are thus “hybrid
documents” that combine different “memories, knowledge formations and
logics of representation”. Yet, as outlined above, they are more than the sum
of individual accounts, but the construction of a “social collective memory”
(Barahona de Brito 2010: 362), or, as Najib Hourani (2008: 288) puts it, “the
narrative construction of a nation.” As the findings suggest, the selected films
pursue the latter by excluding the ‘armed actor’ as the common Other for
both the victim protagonists, the rural society, and the audience, the urban
society. Thereby, they indeed harden the confrontational line between ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ that the TJ process seeks to soften. Whether intentionally or not, the three selected films have the potential to affect the urban
society emotionally, and thereby to function as a vehicle for their concientización. Given that the films reach the non-sensitised part of the urban
society, their potential effect could help construct a larger mnemonic community in exclusion of the ‘armed actor’.11
Their contribution could thus reach even further and is portrayed in the
fate of the aforementioned mutilated boy in Pequeñas voces, who can be regarded as an allegory for the nation incapacitated by the conflict. In Bogotá,
where the two societies coincide, he receives artificial limbs and unexpectedly learns to walk again. Therein implied is a potential for future reconciliation
between the urban and rural societies, which stands in contrast to the goals
10 Unfortunately, I could not get the number of views per country from the owners of
the videos.
11 This is more likely in the case of the legally distributed films ‘Los colores de la montaña and Pequeñas voces’ than for ‘Impunity’. Due to access constraints, I could not
obtain the distribution data for each film that would allow for assessing whether the
films indeed reach the target audience, the non-sensitised urban society.
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of (imposed and official) reconciliation between ‘the victims’ and ‘the perpetrators’ in the Colombian TJ process. Consequently, films contribute to
memory building for times after the conflict, but, as Lozano emphasises,
cannot necessarily contribute to accelerating the end of the Colombian conflict.
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– I reflect –
This article reflects my fascination for Colombia as a case
study for conflict research, as well as a site of thriving culture
driven by incredibly brave, creative, influential and bright
minds. As a student of conflict and peace research, I am interested in the manifold conflict resolution and peace-building
mechanisms that the country has been applying and developing for decades. Analysing the official discourse(s) of transitional justice and memory-building in Colombia, I found a
number of contradictions to the social identities constructed
in music, art, and film. With an academic background in Hispanic literature, I believe that popular culture shapes at least
as many minds and possibly touches more hearts through affect than any official conflict resolution or peace-building
mechanism ever could. Therefore, I developed this paper as an
exemplary demonstration of the diverging discourses of ‘high’
and ‘low data’ and their putative diverging effects on the social
fabric. To me, this article is about us as future international relations scholars opening our minds and lending our skills to
cultural productions, about taking them seriously. Why? Because, to paraphrase Richard Geertz, there’s turtles all the way
down, and not all of them utter official discourses.
Mia Schöb
MA (International Affairs), 2nd Semester
The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva
mia.schob@graduateinstitute.ch
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Gunrium, J. F. / Gobo, G. (eds). Qualitative Research Practice. London,
pp. 197-213.
Zabunyan, Dork, 2011. Ce que peut un film: Foucault et le savoir cinématografique. In Maniglier, P. / Zabunyan, D. (eds). Foucault va au cinéma.
Montroug.
DVDs
Arbeláenz, Carlos, 2010. Los colores de la montaña, DVD. Switzerland: Filme
für eine Welt.
Carrillo, Jairo, 2011. Pequeñas voces, DVD. Switzerland: Trigon films.
Lozano, Juan José / Morris, Hollman, 2010. Impunity, DVD. Switzerland: Intermezzo films.
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Küsters: Cocaine – Forces of Globalisation
Cocaine – Symbol of the Uniting and
Dividing Forces of Globalisation?
Christian Küsters
Abstract
This article asks to what extent cocaine symbolises uniting and
dividing tendencies of globalisation for continents, peoples,
and societies. Cocaine is used as an example to show the
magnitude to which globalised networks of communication,
transport, and market mechanisms exert uniting as well as
dividing power. Following its geographical route from
production via trafficking to consumption, different cases in
point will be studied to show globalization’s features and
interlinkages with the global drug business. The paper reveals
that concerning cocaine, the increasing compression of time
and space through progress in communication and transport
does have uniting effects on a large scale but divides societies
at the local level.
Keywords: Globalisation, Cocaine, Trafficking, War on Drugs
Introduction
Globalisation – an enormous word that describes processes which bring
people from highly distant places closer together. It shortens links in
production chains, fosters communication and travel across continents and
leads to a blending of cultures, habits, and lifestyles. One might say that the
numerous processes of globalisation unite the planet and its people. At the
same time one witnesses the consequences of processes pointing in the
opposite direction. Rising economic inequality within and across regions as
well as conflicts fuelled by ethnic and religious prejudices or migration are
examples of the other side of the coin.
By studying the global cocaine markets, this paper will address the topic
of how they illustrate the dividing and uniting forces of globalisation. Trade
has been one of the drivers of globalisation while simultaneously being
promoted by the processes of globalisation – and this refers not only to the
lawful markets from food to steel, from clothing to finance, but also to the
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understudied illegal bazaars of human and drug trafficking, of illegal arms
and money laundering.
Cocaine is an especially suitable example since it is an inherently
globalised product: Coca, as the base of cocaine, is almost exclusively
cultivated in the Andean region of South America. But the consumer markets
are in the developed countries of North America and Europe,1 which makes
trade inevitable. Furthermore, this example is appropriate to take a closer
look at the processes underlying the production, trade, and distribution of
such a globalised good. The product and especially its basic resource, the
coca leaf, have a century-long history, having been put on the global map
(from a euro-centric point of view) with the colonisation of South America.
Large parts of the world are nowadays involved, from the Andean region and
the Caribbean to West Africa and finally Europe and North America. This fact
allows for a perspective on the illegal and illegitimate economies benefiting
and mutually being influenced as well as influencing globalising tendencies.2
As background, first the term “globalisation” will be introduced drawing
on extensive literature and definitions. Then a brief history of cocaine and the
coca leaf will be presented before taking a closer look at the globalisation of
cocaine production, trafficking, and consumption for which a number of case
studies will be illustrated. Methods and routes of trafficking, the
developments in producer countries and along trading routes as well as
patterns of consumption will be singled out to portray how globalisation
influences drug trade and how drug trade reciprocally has global
consequences and shapes not just individuals but nations and societies. The
paper concludes with highlighting that cocaine, a globalised product, has
uniting effects which are visible against the backdrop of liberalisation in
(financial) trade. However, cocaine symbolises dividing features of
globalisation as well: the ‘War on Drugs’ makes a clear distinction between
producer and consumer countries, and the drug works as a separating status
symbol within societies.
Theoretical Background: What is Globalisation?
The concept of globalisation consists of four central aspects: space, time, the
increasing interaction between people and societies worldwide, and, lastly,
the organisation thereof. David Harvey (1990: 241) identifies globalisation as
a “time-space compression.” He refers to innovations in communication and
transport technology as well as in travel which bring people and products
from all over the world closer together. The ensuing effects are put
Global consumption patterns have recently started to change (see section 4).
to the limited scope of this article some of the topics will only be touched upon
briefly while others – the ones depicting growing social, cultural, political, economic
division respectively unity of the planet through the processes of globalisation – will be
explored more extensively.
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eloquently by Milton Santos (2000: 25): “information has a determinant role
in the use of time […] assuring the simultaneity of actions and, consequently,
accelerating the historical process.”
Hennayake (2010: 4) extends Harvey’s definition by conceptualising
globalisation as “a process that involves a dramatic increase in the
relationships and interconnections of different degrees among various places
and people in all sphere of life at different scales”. The author not only takes
up the first two aspects of Harvey’s definition, but adds a third aspect, which
is growing global interaction and linkages.
In order to reach a definition that is sufficiently holistic for the analysis
undertaken in this paper, Held et al. (1999: 16) are taken into consideration.
The authors perceive globalisation not as one process (as did Hennayake) but
as “a set of processes […] which embodies a transformation in the spatial
organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their
extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or
interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of
power”. This definition now contains all four aforementioned aspects
characterizing globalisation.
Thus, the underlying categories of time and space become less and less
important through means of “the technical-scientific-informational milieu”
(Santos 2000: 191), thereby changing the interaction patterns of people
globally as well as their organisation. Globalisation reveals itself on the
international, regional, national, and local level, and one has to take into
account that “globalization […] produces problems that manifest themselves
in intensely local forms but have contexts that are anything but local”
(Appadurai 2000: 6). This effect lies at the heart of every example examined
in this article: coca eradication in Bolivia, the War on Drugs in Mexico, and
social decay in drug consuming societies.
Despite globalisation’s perceived “newness,” some authors already date it
back to the Roman Empire, while for example Andreas (2011: 412) traces the
globalisation of illicit products (in the form of smuggling) back to the 16th
century with the start of transatlantic trade.
Vélez Quero (2000: 30) identifies central features that link globalising
effects with the international drug business. She recognises the idea of free
trade as the driving force behind globalisation: therefore, the reduction of
tariffs, trade regulation, and border control is at the forefront of political
efforts to promote globalisation (Vélez Quero 2000: 31). Additionally, the
improvements in communication and transport technology have allowed
goods, services, and people to float more freely across borders (Vélez Quero
2000: 31). These tendencies have led and continue to lead to an increasing
permeability of borders (“mayor permeabilidad de las fronteras”, Vélez Quero
2000: 31), significantly facilitating the flow of criminal goods as well (Vélez
Quero 2000: 31). This is what Andreas (2011: 406) calls the “illicit side of
global economy”. Under this label, the author does not only subsume the
trade in prohibited commodities like cocaine and heroin, or the smuggling of
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legal commodities like cigarettes and alcohol in order to avoid taxation, but
also the clandestine movement of people, the trafficking of endangered
species, and money laundering (Andreas 2011: 406).
History of Cocaine
Regarding the history of cocaine, three central aspects can be highlighted that
symbolise its uniting and dividing effects.
A biological discovery made in Germany in the 19th century turns a
millennia-old plant from South America into a highly popular drug, thereby
linking the two continents in a business cycle.
The coca bush is a plant that has been cultivated for millennia in the
Andean region of South America, especially in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia.
The approximately 250 types of coca bushes play a major role in regional
customs, traditions, diets, and medicines. The ingredients of the coca leaves
that are set free whilst chewing them (“acullico”) reduce hunger, tiredness,
thirst, and make living under the straining conditions of extreme climate and
high altitude much more bearable (Farfán 2002).
Coca also contains the alkaloid “Cocaine” which was isolated and
extracted for the first time in the 1860s by German chemists. It started to
become known to a wider audience, amongst other reasons, for its medicinal
purposes promoted by the German company Merck at the beginning of the
20th century (Wink 1998: 31). This alkaloid is the basis for the drug cocaine.
Due to its euphoria-inducing effect the white powder became highly
popular during the last century in the Western world (Vale 2007: 607).
The change in usage of cocaine over the course of the 20th century provokes a
concerted international effort to condemn the drug in a UN convention in the
1960s, thereby uniting and, paradoxically, dividing nations in the fight against
cocaine.
The increasing public health costs of drugs led to a United Nations (UN)
convention on illegal substances in 1961 during which the production of coca
for any reasons other than medicinal purposes was prohibited. Even the
acullico – although a long-standing tradition in the Andean region – was
abolished (Quiroga et al. 1991) and coca was included in the UN list of illegal
substances. Two further conventions on the topic during the 1970s and at the
end of the 1980s only marginally changed the official opinion of the UN on
coca and cocaine (Farfán 2002). These three treaties 3 symbolise how
countries that are affected in entirely different ways by the drug, its
production, consumption, and trade, unite in efforts (at least on paper) to
control it. On the other hand, the three conventions clearly distinguish
3 The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; The Convention on Psychotropic
Substances, 1971; The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988.
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between producer and consumer countries, consequently differentiating
between respective responsibilities. They thereby entail a strongly divisive
feature.
From 1961 on coca was not just a national or at best regional topic
anymore: it became an issue of international scope. During the 1970s global
demand for cocaine rose, especially in the USA.
Particularly under the presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush
the so-called ‘War on Drugs’ was being militarised. American troops and
officers of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) were deployed in Peru,
Bolivia, and Colombia in order to watch over suppression policies on coca
(Marcy 2010).4 The applied policies of eradication proved to be of ambiguous
success. On the one hand, eradication has partially worked and the area
where coca had been illegally cultivated has been reduced significantly in
some regions in the Andeans. At the same time, the lack of alternatives to
gain livelihoods only made the coca cultivators (“cocaleros”) shift their fields
to less accessible areas (Farfán 2002). At the end of the 1980s, for example,
the coca economy in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia combined was worth about
US$ 4.5 billion with about one million people depending on it economically
(Marcy 2010).
Nowadays the cooperation of Andean countries with the USA has been
reduced significantly due to the fact that a) it has proven to be inefficient but
very cost-intensive and b) a political shift towards the left took place that
perceives the US-drug policy as an inappropriate intervention in domestic
politics. Yet in its most radical form, the ‘War on Drugs’ led to a clear
distinction on the international level between producer and consumer
countries, resulting in international quarrels over drug policy and finally
driving a wedge between North and South America.
Current Situation of the Global Flow of Cocaine
It is estimated that in 2011 between 776 tonnes and 1061 tonnes of pure
cocaine were produced globally, which is about as much as the years before
(UNODC 2013: X). Meanwhile, a constant reduction in coca cultivation (to
155.600 ha in 2011) of about 30 percent compared to the area in 2000 is
registered. The rise in cocaine production between 1990 and 2011 can be
explained by increasing efficiency in the manufacturing processes (UNODC
2013: X).5
For further information on the USA’s role in South America see Mott (2002).
For further information: UNODC World Drug Report 2013.
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5
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Küsters: Cocaine – Forces of Globalisation
Figure 1: Trend in main indicators of drug supply and drug supply reduction,
2003-2011.
Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2013, p. 18.
One major change compared to the years before is the stabilisation of
Central/Western European markets for cocaine and the fall in consumption
by about 40 percent in the USA between 2006 and 2011 (UNODC 2013: X),
two markets that account for about half of global consumption (UNODC
2013: 12). This means that a shift of use and trafficking towards newly
emerging regions on the global cocaine map is recognisable: Asia, Oceania,
Central and South America, as well as the Caribbean, all show surging rates of
cocaine prevalence (UNODC 2013: X).6
However, increases in those regions barely set off the losses from the U.S.
market. Thus, overall the international cocaine market is stabilising (see
Figure 1). Importantly, newly emerging markets bear the potential of massive
growth, with cocaine prevalence currently far below the average in North
America and Central/Western Europe (UNODC 2013: 18).
6 One reason for this are so-called ‘spill-over’ effects in South America and West Africa:
More people consume cocaine because of its geographical proximity and consequently
comparatively low prices (UNODC World Drug Report 2013: 39).
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Figure 2: Cocaine seizures in Western and Central Europe, 2000-2011.
Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2013, p. 44.
The geographical shift in consumer markets brings along a realignment of
smuggling routes. The Atlantic route towards Europe is gaining importance,
with Brazil emerging as one major transit hub but also – against the backdrop
of rising incomes – as a destination (UNODC 2013: 42). From there the drug
is shipped to West Africa which has gained a pivotal role since the 2000s as a
region of storing, repacking, and trafficking cocaine (UNODC 2013: 23). After
having used carrier flights and maritime routes for trafficking, land routes
are becoming more popular. They are leading through the Sahara towards
Europe (UNODC 2013: 46), where the drug mostly enters through Spain (see
Figure 2).
In Latin America, law enforcement in Mexico has led to increasing usage
of routes through Central America, particularly through Guatemala and
Honduras (UNODC 2013: 48). In an effort to bypass law enforcement at the
Mexican-US border, Ecuador is emerging as a hub for maritime trafficking of
cocaine (UNODC 2013: 24).
This data shows how interconnected the global market for cocaine is:
Local consumption in the USA is falling while economic development in Asia
and Africa increases demand; this in turn results in shifting trafficking routes
affecting formerly untouched countries (for example in West Africa).
Crackdowns on coca production in Bolivia change cultivation and production
patterns, while increased law enforcement in Mexico leads to Ecuador and
Brazil rising as hubs for maritime trafficking.
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How Does the Cocaine Business Interact with Globalisation?
This section illustrates cocaine’s globalising effects on people, societies and
politics. The examples chosen evoke an impression of the range of
dimensions and levels on which globalisation and cocaine mutually impact
each other: the economic and social effects in producing regions, social and
political consequences along the routes of trafficking, and the ramifications of
consumption in the Western markets.
Production
As mentioned before, the production of cocaine is limited to certain
geographical regions. In 2008, for example, Colombia was the world’s largest
producer of clean-cut cocaine worth US$ seven to nine billion which was
more than half of the world’s production (Pontón 2013: 140). The existence
of consumer demand mostly in the USA and Europe – the largest consumers
of cocaine, with 30.8 percent and 25.7 percent of annual consumption in
2010 respectively (Pontón 2013: 140) – stimulates the maintenance of an
international production and distribution chain of cocaine.
With increasingly cheap and fast methods of communication and
transportation, globalisation enables the functioning of an international
market for cocaine. The market has been growing for a long period of time
regardless of states’ efforts to curb it. As Marcy (2010) explains in detail, the
USA have been at the forefront of fighting coca production in the Andean
countries since the 1960s. But not only is this a bilateral issue potentially
leading to the violation of countries’ sovereignty, it has also become a
multilateral topic since the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961,
which called for the elimination of illicit production and non-medical use of
cannabis, cocaine, and opioids (Room/Reuter 2012: 84). The first convention
was expanded and complemented by two other ones in 1971 and 1988, extending the list of illegal substances (Busse 2010: 1).
Singer (2006: 469) sheds light on the ties between drugs and
development since developing countries are usually “located at the rear end
of the (commercial) chain”. By looking at Central Asian countries along the
heroin route, he identifies ambivalent effects of drug production on local
development: On the one hand, they provide income and livelihood for thousands of families (Singer 2006: 472). Illicit production receives public
support by directly employing locals in the field and during the
manufacturing processes. Furthermore, it also leads to investments in
infrastructure and in better living conditions for the workers and their
families through the compensation for natural disasters etc. (Bastos et al.
2006: 100). In the case of cocaine UNODC (2010: 79) points to the US$ 500
million profit Andean farmers made of the product in 2008 alone, which do
have a positive influence on local development (see section 3).
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On the other hand, illicit substances pose health and social threats
through a variety of effects: During production, the workers come into
contact with dangerous chemicals, usually without proper security gear
(Singer 2006: 472). With regard to social issues, illegal drug production
fosters corruption within the local and regional governments of that area
(Singer 2006: 474), UNODC (2010: 70) finding similar results for cocaine
production in the Andean region and the West African trading hub. These
developments contribute to the erosion of social institutions (Singer 2006:
474, UNODC 2010: 70). Furthermore, wherever a large amount of illicit and
profitable substances is produced, moved, or consumed, violence increases
(Singer 2006: 475; Bastos 2006: 101). In this context Borba and Cepik (2011)
outline the strong economic, social, and structural ties to organised crime.
The UNODC (2010: 70) underlines the threat of political instability against
the backdrop of terrorist groups being involved in the cocaine business (for
example FARC in Colombia, Sendero Luminoso in Peru). These consequences
eventually lead Singer (2006: 476) to the conclusion that “legal and illegal
drugs contribute to the maintenance of social inequality internationally
because of their effect on hindering development”.
The dimension of cocaine production illustrates the mutual influences
between the product and globalisation: First of all, an international cocaine
market can only function due to the technological advances in means of
communication and transport – the central drivers of globalisation. On the
other hand, international treaties for combating illicit substances drive a
wedge between producer and consumer countries. Lastly, Singer (2006),
Bastos (2006), and the UNODC (2010) point to the dividing and uniting
effects the global cocaine market has on the local producers by allowing them
to gain revenue and to move up to the rest of society in terms of
development, while alienating them socially from the majority.
Trafficking
Pontón (2013: 137) estimates the world’s drug trade (‘narcotráfico’ in the
context of South American cocaine) to be a market worth US$ 320 billion.
This explains the high risks that actors take on and the perseverance with
which cocaine trafficking is pursued. Trade is the way in which globalisation
manifests itself most visibly, since a product has to go from the place of
production – in this case, South America – to the lucrative markets of
consumption. The two traditional routes to Europe go either through the
Caribbean, or via Cape Verde/Madeira/Canary Islands to the old continent
(Stori/De Grauwe 2008: 38). But new routes are arising.
Benson and Decker (2010: 134) study the organisational structure
behind the ‘narcotráfico’. Instead of the large cartels of the 1970s and 1980s,
drug trade is currently organised by smaller, informal groups that prove to
be more flexible in adapting to external changes of context and therefore
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more successful (Benson/Decker 2010: 135). This structure poses a
challenge to communication since there is no strict line of command
anymore, now taking place face-to-face (Benson/Decker 2010: 135). This is
only made possible by advances in communication and transportation
techniques, by a growing number of international flights and decreasing
prices of intercontinental travel – a “time-space compression” (Harvey 1990:
241). Burillo-Putze et al. (2012: 523) bring up an example of how the success
of trafficking depends not only on the means of transport and communication
but also on a way to hide the product. By referring to liquid body-packing7
the authors show how increasing law enforcement and control mechanisms
only lead to more innovative ways to circumvent them, and how (inter-)
national legislation triggers creativity thousands of kilometres away in the
regions where cocaine is stored and repacked.
‘War on Drugs’ – The Mexican Case
Piñeyro (2012: 5) identifies the ideologies underlying the global war on
drugs initiated by the USA in the 1960s. After the replacement of
‘developmentalism’8 as the prevailing model of economic development in the
Andes, the author nowadays recognises neoliberalism with its focus on public
security (for foreign and domestic capital and means of production) as the
theoretical ground for statesmen to act. At the same time, the relevant actors
fail to understand that ‘narcotráfico’ is not a provisional but a structural
problem affecting societies in their entirety (Piñeyro 2012: 6). In Mexico, for
example, around 18,000 people went missing since 2006; 100,000 to 150,000
orphans and widows/widowers have been left behind on the civilian side of
the war alone, while the society as a whole experiences a life in fear – “el vivir
con miedo” (Piñeyro 2012: 6).
Interesting in this case is the complexity of globalisation regarding this
phenomenon: Originally, Mexico was not involved in the global cocaine
market, and was only affected by this issue due to its convenient geographical
location. However, the drug business provides jobs for about half a million
people in the country and is estimated to contribute three to four percent to
Mexican GDP (Piñeyro 2012: 13; Lee 2014). In the meantime, it provokes
bilateral and multilateral reactions, like the ‘War on Drugs’, supplied with
funding and intelligence by the USA (Lee 2014), which in turn lead to the
decomposition of the society (Lee 2014; Piñeyro 2012: 11). Paradoxically,
7 The “mule” swallows a solution of cocaine and gel that is not detectable by x-ray
scans.
8 Developmentalism: A national economic strategy promoting industrialisation and
inward-looking policies to increase value of production and decrease reliance on
commodity exports (Bresser-Pereira 2012: 384-385). For further information see
Magno (1983) and Berberoglu (1992: 7-48).
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this development makes the drug business even more attractive and raises
serious questions about policy approaches to the issue.9
Liberalisation of Financial Markets/Flows
Another factor that proves to be linked with globalisation is the liberalisation
of national financial markets and flows. These developments have pushed for
the creation of global financial markets and at the same time are driven by
the forces of globalisation – the interests of corporations and politicians.
They are made possible by new technologies in communications and the ITsector.
Seddon (2008: 723) argues that the increasing flows of money have also
enhanced the capability of money laundering across national borders. Ever
faster and more complex flows of cash in combination with an abundance of
fiscal products and investment opportunities have made it more difficult to
track them. This in turn facilitates laundering and simplifies the injection of
money earned in the drug markets into the legal economy. In the USA alone
the cocaine market is valued at around US$ 19.5 billion annually, of which
about US$ nine billion have to be laundered (Pontón 2013: 149).
Decreasing Border Control in Europe
Seddon (2008: 723) underlines that the free movement of people, goods, and
services is at the core of the European Union (EU). Alongside its own statutes,
borders within the Union have been diminished over the last decades while
the entity itself expanded and came to include 28 states. This in turn means
that it is extremely easy to travel from country to country and to transport
goods within the EU. The author also points towards the doubling of
international migration since the 1980s to about 200 million people moving
regularly between countries in the 2000s (Seddon 2008: 723). Migrants
move across borders, thereby creating new ties between host and home
country. This facilitates the entry of new markets for drugs since a
distribution network can easily be built up in the host country (Seddon
(2008: 723).
Cocaine trafficking shows how globalisation manifests on the political
level, with a group of states diminishing (financial) borders and border
controls amongst themselves, but also on the individual level with a rising
number of people migrating to other countries. Both developments facilitate
For further information see Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy,
(2009).
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the spread of drugs by diminishing the risk of drug trafficking across borders
and by lowering the threshold of entering new markets for cocaine.10
Consumption
Studying informal control and illicit drug trade, Jacques and Wright (2011:
729) outline that, theoretically, legislation and law enforcement are at the
forefront of combating illegal drug trade and are the most popular measures
on the local, national, and international levels (Wright 2011: 732) – they
point to a global convergence in the tools applied against drug consumption.
In their surveys, the researchers also came across linkages between the type
of drugs a person consumes and the income that he/she earns, thereby
localising certain drugs within particular socio-economic milieus (Wright
2011: 757). Interestingly, drugs do not solely lead to division on a global
scale, namely into producer, trafficking, and consumer countries. They also
illustrate socio-economic differences between people on a local scale
(Haasen/Springer 2002; Miech/Chilcoat 2007). As the UK Home Office found
in a study in 2009, cocaine was more widely used amongst participants with
a diploma or a degree as their highest qualification than amongst
respondents without a degree who were about as likely to consume drugs.
Similar results were discovered when comparing household incomes, with
3.8 percent of respondents with a household income of more than £ 50,000
consuming cocaine, whereas only 2.6 percent of respondents earning less
than £10,000 took the drug even though being twice as likely to do any kind
of drug (Rogers 2009). In the same direction points a study recently
conducted by Mark K. Greenwald and Caren L. Steinmiller (2014) on cocaine
users in the USA: the respondents’ income positively correlates with cocaine
intake.
Jacques and Wright (2011: 759) reach the conclusion that repressive
measures in the fight against drugs, which are designed to drive up prices to
curb consumption, are currently not working and need to be further
diversified in order to tackle specific consumer groups. Braun (2002: 364)
offers a similar verdict comparing different social and legislative approaches
to substance abuse, for example in the Netherlands and Germany: Repressive
approaches are less successful than policies focusing on prevention
mechanisms.
Global drug consumption patterns “reflect the second wave of
globalization” (Singer 2006: 469) marked by the removal of trade barriers
which enables uncontrolled flow of products across national boundaries. A
Other aspects and features linked to globalisation that also play a significant role in
the global cocaine business are technological progress and the increasing possibilities
of transferring knowledge and expertise. Since further examples would reach beyond
the scope of this article they are not portrayed in detail.
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second link between globalisation and the global drug business can be seen
in the political efforts to fight consumption. As already pointed out, many
international conventions and treaties on illegal substances exist
(Room/Reuter 2012). Global efforts, no matter how questionable and (un-)
successful, are applied and generate impact, especially in the field of
suppression of production and coca eradication. Although it seems like
cocaine has uniting effects on a global governance level, it becomes apparent
that it is driving individuals apart on the local level, thereby threatening
entire societies.
Conclusion
By studying the global cocaine markets, this paper scrutinised how they
illustrate the dividing and uniting forces of globalisation. As shown in section
2, the concept of globalisation consists of the four central aspects space, time,
the increasing interaction between people and societies worldwide, and the
organisation thereof. Appadurai (2000) points out that these developments
manifest themselves in local contexts where they affect individuals and
communities. Regarding the global business of cocaine, one realises the
complexity of globalisation’s consequences: uniting but also dividing the
international society.
Cocaine is an inherently global product with large geographical distances
between production and consumption regions, making trafficking inevitable.
From the start – the discovery of the alkaloid cocaine in the coca plant in
Germany – this drug has linked regions and continents. The specific (natural)
conditions needed in the context of cocaine production inescapably lead to an
international division of labour in the business.
Another effect making the uniting power of globalisation apparent is the
fight against illegal substances. Repressive measures that are applied in
either producer or consumer countries inevitably take a toll on the other end
of the cocaine business. These connections can affect states that formerly had
nothing to do with it, through shifting trafficking routes. For example, West
African countries were pulled into the vicious circle of drug trade.
The uniting efforts of global (UN) conventions and treaties against illegal
substances prove to be dividing as well. They draw a line between producer,
consumer, and trafficking countries, which is converted into the idea of
shared but differentiated responsibility,11 hindering concerted efforts to
Shared responsibility: „joint undertaking involving government institutions, the
private sector, civil society, local communities and individuals who have agreed to
work together as partners and who have a shared mutual obligation for concerted
action at different levels in response to the drug challenge” (International Narcotics
Control Board 2012: 1); differentiated in this context refers to the different challenges
countries affected by production, trafficking, and consumption are faced with (Costa
2008).
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Küsters: Cocaine – Forces of Globalisation
combat drug trade. Additionally, they allow states like the USA to exert force
in foreign territories as part of their ‘War on Drugs’, further repelling nonconsumer states. Interestingly, the division of societies by cocaine is not just
visible on a global scale, but also in very local contexts amongst societies. The
consumption of cocaine works as a defining symbol of one’s own economic
affluence and an assertion of the proper socio-economic status in contrast to
consumers of other drugs.
In the end, the paradoxical yet mutual influence between globalisation
and the cocaine business becomes apparent: “[there] is a quest for uniformity
in the service of hegemonic actors, yet the world is becoming less unified”
(Santos 2000: 19). Globalisation has been studied in the social sciences for
long, but its illegal and illegitimate sides – from international drug and
weapons markets to trafficking of people and organs – deserve further
academic research to be fully understood. This article sheds light on the
strong connections between globalising effects and an illegal economy
operating internationally. It focuses on the global cocaine market revealing
globalisation’s uniting, yet similarly dividing social, cultural, economic, and
political effects. Similar academic effort can be put into the economies of
weapons smuggling, trafficking of endangered species, of precious wood etc.
in order to provide a better understanding of the interlinkages between
illegal economies and globalization.
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Küsters: Cocaine – Forces of Globalisation
– I reflect –
The phenomenon of globalisation has been studied widely. Its
positive cost-cutting effects on production processes to an
increasing exchange of culture and ideas have been pointed
out just as much as its negative impacts ranging from rising
global inequality to environmental pollution. But what about
the people affected by this development, the ones who find
themselves outside the limelight, sometimes even outside of
society?
Cocaine symbolises a long and complex history of use and
abuse, of power and dependence. Globalisation allows for an
ever faster and wider spread of the drug around the globe,
links the producers tighter to the consumers and, therefore,
bears ramifications from the individual to the inter-state level.
The global ‘War on Drugs’ is one manifestation of this
development. However, in order to deal with cocaine (and
other globalised narcotics) appropriately, we need to
understand its dependence on globalising processes, every
step from production to consumption. And maybe, maybe we
even need to rethink our approach of repressiveness and
prohibition.
Christian Küsters
MA (International Studies), 1st Semester
Aarhus Universitet
christian_kuesters@hotmail.de
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Rüdiger: The Divided Union
The Divided Union: Why the EU Did
not Agree on a Comprehensive
Financial Transaction Tax.
A Comparative Analysis of the
German and British Positions
Felix Rüdiger
Abstract
This paper investigates two EU member states’ disagreement
over the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) in
the aftermath of the financial crisis. By using Schirm’s societal
approach, it conducts a comparative analysis of the German
and British governmental positions between 2011 and 2013
seeking to explain why Germany approved an FTT while Great
Britain strictly opposed such a tax. Following the societal approach, it argues that the governments’ diverging positions
were strongly influenced by domestic economic interests, societal ideas and regulatory institutions: While more regulation-friendly societal ideas and institutions dominated the
government’s decision in Germany, the UK’s distinct interest
in supporting its financial sector and keeping "light-touch"
regulation in place led to its refusal of an FTT.
Keywords: Financial Transaction Tax, financial market regulation, societal
approach, Comparative Political Economy.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, substantial differences in the
way governments pursued the regulation of global finance became apparent.
This holds especially true for the idea of a European Financial Transaction
Tax (FTT). After having failed in the G20, the topic has, since 2009, been
widely discussed among European Union (EU) member states where it has
sparked heated debate. Disagreement over the European Commission’s proIReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 67-87
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Rüdiger: The Divided Union
posal for a European FTT eventually led to the decision of eleven EU member
states to move forward with an FTT under enhanced cooperation, disregarding other members’ refusal to follow their path.
This paper seeks to understand the European Union’s disagreement over
an FTT. After outlining the core components of the Financial Transaction Tax
as proposed by the European Commission, this paper will focus on possible
reasons for disagreement among European governments. For this purpose it
will employ the societal approach (Schirm 2009a, 2009b, 2011, 2013a,
2013b, 2013c, 2014) which holds that diverging governmental positions
arise from differences in important economic sectors’ cost-benefit calculations, fundamental values held by the countries’ societies as well as institutions of their respective regulatory frameworks. It will be used to conduct a
comparative analysis of the German and British positions over an FTT between January 2011 and February 2013 which marks the period that eventually led up to the failure of a comprehensive, EU-wide tax. Germany and Britain were chosen because they can be viewed as representative of the two
diverging European positions – in favour and opposed to an FTT – and therefore allow the comparison between two different sets of ideas, interests and
institutions. This paper draws on various resources in the wide field of domestic politics approaches as well as Comparative Political Economy (CPE).
Many scholars1 have approached the puzzle of diverging governmental positions in global economic governance in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
This paper contributes to this lively discussion and intends to fill in a research gap as divergence over the European FTT has not yet been investigated using the societal approach or any similar CPE research design.
The Proposed European FTT
The recent momentum for the introduction of a transaction tax was triggered
by the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 which, to many observers2, revealed
the instability of financial markets and has cast doubts on the benefits of
financial market liberalisation. As a consequence, the crisis reignited the
debate over the pros and cons of a tax on financial transactions (Schulmeister
et al. 2008: 5). The European Commission adopted a proposal for a Council
Directive on a common system of Financial Transaction Tax on 28 September, 2011. This proposal was instantly met by approval as well as rejection.
The UK government has repeatedly pointed to the numerous negative effects
which it thinks an FTT would have on the EU’s economy – especially in times
Zimmermann (2010), Heyes (2012), Fioretos (2010), Kalinowski (2013), Schrim
(2009) and Hodson (2009) seek to explain diverging governmental positions after the
crisis. Schirm (2009), Schrim (2011), Franke (2012) and van Loon (2013) employ
employ this paper’s societal approach to explain the German and British governments’
differing positions in global economic governance.
2 See Kalinowski (2013), Talani (2011), Semmler (2010), Bieling (2013).
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Rüdiger: The Divided Union
of crisis. Citing the European Commission’s own original impact assessment
in 2011,3 British Prime Minister David Cameron indicated that a European
Financial Transaction Tax could end up reducing the GDP of the EU by €200
billion, cost nearly 500.000 jobs and force much of the financial industry out
of Europe: “Even to be considering this at a time when we are struggling to
get our economies growing is quite simply madness” (Cameron 2012). The
British government further expressed concerns over the negative impact an
FTT would particularly have on Britain with its large financial industry. David
Cameron has repeatedly insisted that he considered the financial service
industry as one of Britain’s main strengths which it should openly support
(see, for example, Cameron 2013).
The German government, on the other hand, supports an FTT since the
CDU/FDP Coalition had reached consensus on this question in May 2010
(Tagesschau 2013). The financial sector, among others, was considered responsible for the financial crisis as well as the ensuing economic crisis (Bundesregierung 2012a; Merkel 2011). As a result, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble repeatedly demanded that
the industry must make a fair contribution to the costs imposed on states and
taxpayers during and after the crisis (Bundesregierung 2012b; Schäuble
2012c). It was in turn regarded unacceptable that financial gains were privatised while costs were socialised (Schäuble 2012a). An FTT was furthermore
viewed as a proper means to limit high frequency trading and its “exaggerations”, thereby stabilising financial markets (Schäuble 2012b).
Due to these diverging governmental positions, it became clear during the
seven meetings of the Council’s Working Party on Tax Questions as well as
the European Council meeting on 22 June 2012 that unanimous support for
an EU-wide FTT could not be reached. As a consequence, eleven Member
States4 – representing about two thirds of the entire EU27 economy – voiced
their intention to request an authorisation for engaging in enhanced cooperation (European Commission 2013a: 2).
The European Commission (2013b) names three main objectives for a
Financial Transaction Tax in the European Union:
"Harmonizing legislation concerning indirect taxation on financial transactions […], ensuring that financial institutions
make a fair and substantial contribution to covering the costs
of the recent crisis […] and creating appropriate disincentives
for transactions that do not enhance the efficiency of financial
markets thereby complementing regulatory measures to avoid
future crises" (European Commission 2013b: 2).
The proposal includes specific tax rates on securities trading as well as
derivate agreements which the Commission considers "financial-market
See European Commission (2011).
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain.
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Rüdiger: The Divided Union
bets" (European Commission 2013a: 8). Securities trading, including shares
and bonds, will be taxed 0.1 percent of the market price, whereas trading
with derivative agreements is taxed by 0.01 percent of the notional amount
underlying the product. Whereas earlier statements suggested an introduction of the tax by January 2014, the cooperating member countries now plan
to have a legal basis for the tax by the end of 2014 and implement it by 2016
(Reuters 2014).
But why did it come this far? Why was the United Kingdom strictly opposed to an FTT while Germany seemed determined to pull through with the
tax even under enhanced cooperation – thereby unfolding a deep division
within the European Union?
The Societal Approach
This paper will employ the societal approach developed by (Schirm 2009a;
2009b; 2011; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2014). It rests on the liberal theory of
International Relations (Moravcsik 1997; Frieden, Rogowski 1996; Katzenstein 1978; 2005), the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall, Soskice
2001; Fioretos 2001) and historical institutionalism (Fioretos 2011; Farrell,
Newman 2010).
Moravcsik (1997) argues that the state is a representative institution
constantly subject to the influence of coalitions of social actors. The relevance
of domestic factors for governments’ foreign economic policies is furthermore emphasised by Frieden (1996) who holds that the preferences of national economic sectors are crucial for governmental policy decisions.
The role of institutional factors in shaping government positions in domestic as well as foreign economic politics is underlined by the Varieties of
Capitalism approach (Hall, Soskice 2001). VoC assumes that there are two
distinctive ideal types of Western economies due to their institutional design
(Hanke et al. 2010). Whereas market coordination mechanisms dominate in
Liberal Market Economies (LME), Coordinated Market Economies (CME)
tend to rely on the institutional governance structures of non-market coordination. LMEs are typically represented by the United States and Great Britain,
while Germany is the main representative of CMEs. The VoC-literature therefore provides useful insights into institutional peculiarities of the German
and British national economies, especially their regulatory frameworks for
financial markets. According to VoC, institutions reflect ideas of the past and
develop over time. They consequentially constrain future actions – illustrating VoC’s linkage to historical institutionalism.
As its core argument, the societal approach holds that "divergence and/or
convergence of the positions of governments towards the financial crisis,
new regulation and economic stimulus are strongly influenced by domestic
ideas and interests" (Schirm 2009b: 4). Governmental standpoints reflect
preferences originating from domestic societal influences prior to interna70
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tional negotiations (Schirm 2014: 2). Furthermore, it assumes that since
governments in democratic systems want to be re-elected, they are responsive "to the way in which both domestic material interests and value-based
ideas relate to globalization and (global) governance of markets" (Schirm
2009b: 4). The societal approach features three independent variables –
economic interests, societal ideas, and domestic institutions – whereas governmental positions are treated as the dependent variable (Schirm 2014: 2).
Interests are defined as material considerations of specific domestic
sectors which react rapidly according to short-term benefits and costs induced by the global economy and new national, regional and global economic
governance initiatives, such as regulatory reforms (Schirm 2009b; 2013b;
2014).
Ideas are defined as path-dependent and value-based collective expectations about appropriate governmental positions and behaviour, in particular,
on how politics should govern the (financial) market (Schirm 2013c; 2009b).
These societal attitudes are thought to be more path-dependent than interests and can therefore not change as rapidly as the latter (Schirm 2013c: 6).
Institutions are defined here as “formal regulations which structure domestic political and socio-economic coordination” that result in “long-term
complementarities” resulting from these regulations (Schirm 2014: 3). The
government is expected to act consistent with long-term institutional settings
because they are, for one thing, considered the foundation of economic
groups’ competitive advantage (Fioretos 2010: 701) and because of their
path-dependent ideational legitimacy. In the context of this paper, institutions as regulatory frameworks are thus expected to reflect society’s basic
convictions concerning the relationship between state and market and the
main goals of regulating financial markets as well as economic considerations
for a regulatory framework consistent with a national economy’s competitive
advantage (Gottwald 2010: 57).
The societal approach expects diverging governmental positions to be
rooted in differing material interests, societal ideas and institutions. Ideas
and interests may interact by reinforcing or weakening each other (Schirm
2009b: 5). Interests are expected to prevail over ideas if governance issues
imply direct cost-benefit calculations of a specific, well-organised economic
sector. Ideas, on the other hand, dominate a governmental position if an issue
does not directly affect sectorial cost-benefit calculations, affected sectors are
less relevant to a nation’s economy and an issue instead involves fundamental questions on the role of politics in governing the market. Domestic institutions do not constitute a variable competing with the two but rather weaken
the impact of those ideas and interests that oppose institutional settings and,
in turn, strengthen the impact of ideas and interests that reinforce them
(Schirm 2014: 4). Concerning the German and British positions on an FTT,
the following hypotheses apply:
H 1.1: Since Great Britain opposes a Financial Transaction
Tax, it is to be expected that societal ideas, economic interests
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and/or domestic institutions cut across increased regulation
of the financial sector.
H 1.2: Because the financial sector contributes significantly
to Britain’s GDP, economic interests predominantly influence
Downing Street’s rejection of a Financial Transaction Tax.
H 1.3: Pro-market ideas, typical for Liberal Market Economies, are expected to reinforce the opposition to a Financial
Transaction Tax
H 1.4: Furthermore, it is to be expected that the British system for financial market regulation reinforces economic interests and societal ideas opposed to an FTT and, consequently,
the government’s opposition to an FTT.
The hypotheses on the German case studies in turn reflect the country’s
position in favor of an FTT.
H 2.1: Since Germany favors a Financial Transaction Tax, it is
to be expected that societal ideas, economic interests and/or
domestic institutions support increased regulation of the financial sector.
H 2.2: With a much smaller financial services sector compared to the UK, an FTT does not pose a major threat to the
German economy. Therefore, material interests of sectorial
lobby groups, be they in favor or against an FTT, cannot dictate the German governmental positions.
H 2.3: Germans are generally more regulation-friendly,
which is considered typical for Coordinated Market Economies. Their ideas will prevail over sectorial material interests
and therefore predominantly influence the government’s decision making.
H 2.4: The German Coordinated Market Economy’s regulatory framework for financial markets is expected to reinforce
regulation-friendly interests and ideas and, in turn, the government’s position in favor of an FTT.
Operationalisation
This paper will conduct an empirical analysis of all three independent variables as well as the dependent variable of governmental positions.
Economic interests will be examined through a content analysis5 (Mayring 2010) of recent publications of business associations concerning the
The text is interpreted using categories, which are developed and revised inductively
in the course of the analysis (Mayring 2000: 3). Reliability is ensured by coding the
examined material more than once (intracoder-reliability) and by allowing other
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Rüdiger: The Divided Union
(non)desirability of a Financial Transaction Tax in the European Union. Three
business associations were selected for each case study: For Germany, the
Federation of German Industries (BDI), Association of German Banks (Bankenverband) and Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry
(DIHK) have been selected. British economic interests, on the other hand, will
be examined through publications by the Confederation of British Industry
(CBI), the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) and the Council of British
Chambers of Commerce in Europe (COBCOE). For the content analysis, two to
three publications were selected for each association, encompassing the
period between January 2011 and February 2013 which corresponds to the
political process resulting in the member states’ disagreement over an FTT.
The three respective business associations represent similar sectors in each
country and thus allow for a convincing comparison. Furthermore, they are
supposed to represent not only the financial sector but also parts of the countries’ manufacturing industries.
The empirical examination of societal ideas will focus on ideas as attitudes concerning the appropriate regulation of markets, taxation and the
general role of government. As ideas are thought to be more stable than
interests, it is necessary to focus on values that are persistent over time and
whose validity has been observed over a period of many years (Schirm
2013c: 6). This is why ideas will be evidenced using longer-term surveys,
namely the World Values Survey and Pew Research’s Global Attitudes Project. More short-term oriented polls on the specific issue of an FTT will thus
only be analysed in the context of their coherence with longer-term values.
As a third independent variable, the study of country-specific institutions
of regulatory frameworks will be based on an analysis of secondary literature
on the subject. Including regulatory institutions is a substantial enrichment
to this paper’s analysis of ideas and interests and can help to explain why in
some cases one of the two variables might predominantly influence the government.
Economic Interests
As could be expected, the examined British lobby organisations voiced their
distinct opposition to an FTT. They feared that, unless adopted worldwide,
the tax would especially affect the City of London as Europe’s largest financial
centre and European financial markets in general, putting the European
Union at a competitive disadvantage with other trading hubs and thereby
diverting financial activities to other jurisdictions (CBI 2012: 1; COBCOE
2011: 2). Particular attention was paid to the presumed negative impact of an
FTT on the real economy, stressing that a Financial Transaction Tax “would
coders to potentially reexamine the material of the content analysis (intercoderreliability). The content analyses were conducted with the help of MAXQDA.
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actually weaken both financial sector operators and the economies in which
they do business, which would ultimately be detrimental to European tax
revenue, to employment and to the citizens of the EU” (BBA 2011: 5). The
European Commission’s strategy of applying a very low tax rate on a very
broad base of transactions was not expected to precisely target speculative
trading – especially because it is considered impossible to distinguish between “good” and “bad” transaction types (BBA 2011). Rather, as an FTT is
expected to be a disincentive to risk hedging in the form of derivatives, according to BBA (2011), systemic risks could actually increase. Accordingly,
British interest groups openly applauded the British government once the
latter had made clear its refusal of an FTT, calling it “absolutely the right
decision not to adopt the European Financial Transaction Tax in the UK” (CBI
2012: 1).
In the examined period leading up to the European Commission’s proposal for an FTT under enhanced cooperation, the material interests of Germany’s leading business associations did not differ significantly from its
British counterparts.
First of all, BDI, Bankenverband and DIHK shared the concerns over the
negative impact of an FTT on Germany’s real economy as well as on private
actors. The main concern referred to possible migration of financial institutions such as banks and investment funds to jurisdictions in which transactions were not generally taxed. Furthermore, the business associations
voiced concerns that it would become more difficult for German enterprises
to borrow money and appropriately hedge risks (DIHK et al. 2011: 3; Bankenverband 2013: 1; BDI, BDA 2012: 1). As a result, the FTT was expected to
even further decrease growth and employment (DIHK et al. 2011: 4).
Considering that British and German business associations jointly voiced
their opposition to the introduction of an FTT, both questioning its meeting
the EU’s objectives and underlining possible destructive effects for the Union’s economy: Why did the British government oppose an FTT from the start
whereas the German government eventually became one of its foremost
proponents?
Following the societal approach, the answer lies in country specific economic structures. Whether or not a government will conform to sectorial
economic interests depends on the relevance of the most affected sectors to
the entire national economy ("sektorale Betroffenheit" Schirm 2013a: 176).
In the United Kingdom, the financial industry’s role for the country’s whole
economy is exceptional: In 2011, the financial and insurance industry
amounted to a share of 9.6 percent of the United Kingdom’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), the highest of all G7 countries (Office for National Statistics
UK 2013: 4; Monaghan 2014). Moreover, the sector employs about 1.1 million people, representing four percent of the British workforce (PwC, City of
London 2013: 2). Altogether, these factors presumably serve as economic
reasons to keep the financial industry strong and maintain the global importance of the City of London (Gottwald 2010: 92).
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The extraordinary relevance of Britain’s financial sector to its national
economy is even more apparent when compared to the German economy. In
2013, the financial sector contributed a share of only four percent to the
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), down from more than five percent
in 2004 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2014: 60). The sector currently employs
one million people or 2.3 percent of the German workforce (Bundesagentur
für Arbeit 2014: 46). These figures show that compared to the UK, the financial sector in Germany – as a percentage of GDP and overall employment – is
less relevant to the overall economy. As a consequence, the fact that Germany’s main business associations have voiced their opposition to an FTT does
not mean that the societal approach’s assumptions need to be refuted. Rather, because the financial sector does not constitute a major cornerstone of
the German economy as it does in the UK, societal ideas are expected to ‘fill
in’ this explanatory gap. The analysis of economic interests therefore suggests that H 1.2 and H 2.2 can be verified.
Societal Ideas
According to Schirm (2011: 50), the British society is expected to oppose
more regulation due to their “pro market ideas” whereas the German society
is depicted as more “regulation-friendly” which would, in the case of an FTT,
correspond to society’s opposition in Britain and its approval in Germany.
But do these assumptions hold true?
Basic societal ideas are empirically tested with data from the World Values Survey 2006 (WVS)6 which includes both Great Britain and Germany and
therefore allows a comparison.
As both countries are capitalist societies, they share certain core ideas.
For instance, a wide majority of Germans (79.7 percent) and Britons (72.5
percent) tend to agree that competition is rather good than harmful which is
considered an indicator for the support of free market capitalism (World
Values Survey 2006). More recent numbers by Pew Research (Pew Research
2012: 3) underpin this overall support for free markets, yet they observe a
decline in support in Britain (61 percent in 2012, down from 72 percent in
2007) while increased support is indicated in Germany (69 percent in 2012,
up from 65 percent in 2007). Similarly, most German (58.6 percent) and
British (55.6 percent) respondents rather agree that wealth can be acquired
so there’s enough for everyone and not just at the expense of others (World
Values Survey 2006).
Concerning specific characteristics of the market system, moderate, not
fundamental, differences can be observed among the two countries:
6 The WVS 2006 constitutes the most current wave in which both the UK and Germany
were included.
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Concerning the question of the proper role of the state, 66.7 percent of
Germans but only 42.5 percent of Britons rather support the statement that
“governments should take more responsibility” whereas a majority of 56.6
percent of British respondents agree that people should take more responsibility, compared to only 31 percent in Germany (World Values Survey 2006).
Yet, it must be noted that more recent figures by Pew Research (Pew Research 2012: 1) suggest a bigger convergence on a similar subject: A majority
of both German (62 percent) and British (55 percent) respondents found that
it was more important that the state guarantees nobody is in need than the
freedom to pursue life’s goals without state interference.
The different values assigned to individual responsibility as opposed to
collective responsibility endorse this tendency of moderate differences:
While 63.6 percent of Germans agree that incomes should be made more
equal and only 31.3 percent maintain that large income divides are required
as incentives, British respondents are virtually split on the subject (49 percent versus 48.8 percent) (World Values Survey 2006).
A third variable, the respondents’ “willingness to pay taxes” is considered
especially relevant for the topic in question: Again, more Germans than Britons display views that rather correspond to CMEs than LMEs (Schirm 2009a:
509). The fact that governments tax the rich and subsidise the poor is considered rather an essential part of democracy by a vast majority of Germans
(71.1 percent) and – to a lesser extent – Britons (59.9 percent) (World Values
Survey 2006).
More recent publications confirm these moderate differences in societal
ideas which tend to support the societal approach’s argument of pro-market
ideas in Britain and more regulation-friendly attitudes in Germany. Yet, ideas
and attitudes expressed in these opinion polls tend to express more shortterm perceptions that greatly depend on the country’s current socioeconomic situation.
While a majority of both Germans and Britons agree that the current
economic system favours the wealthy (72 percent vs. 65 percent), to close
the rich-poor-gap seems far more urgent to Germans, 42 percent of which
view it the government’s top priority compared to 16 percent in the UK
where the lack of employment opportunities dominated peoples’ perceptions
(Pew Research Center 2013: 17).
Asked about the major threats to their state’s economic well-being, the
results are similar: While the lack of jobs tops the list in Britain with 87 percent of respondents regarding it as a major threat compared to 70 percent of
Germans, the power of banks is perceived as a serious threat to 78 percent of
Germans compared to 65 percent in Great Britain (Pew Research Center
2012: 21).
Considering these and the preceding WVS numbers, the hypothesis that
the German and the British society have different attitudes about appropriate
governmental behaviour towards markets can be validated, yet it must be
kept in mind that differences were often small. This can be attributed to the
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fact that both countries, as market economies, share core assumptions and
both agree that the state is to govern markets to a certain extent (Schirm
2011: 50).
Differences in societal opinions on the Financial Transaction Tax are,
however, a lot clearer than these numbers might suggest: For the entire period between 2011 and 2014, Germany continually shows the highest approval
rates for a Financial Transaction Tax, whereas the UK is one of only three
countries in which a majority of the population opposes an FTT.
Figure 1: Approval Rates of Financial Transaction Tax
Source: Eurobarometer Nov 2011-Jun 2014.
This large divergence of public opinion on a Financial Transaction Tax in the
respective countries underlines the need to check the societal approach
against other variables that might better – or jointly – explain the British and
German attitudes towards a European regulatory measure such as the Financial Transaction Tax. This holds especially true for the societies’ overall
stance towards the European Union.
Nevertheless, the findings of this part confirmed the societal approach’s
main expectations about differing ideas and values in both countries. Whereas in Britain societal ideas opposed to increased regulation might have reinforced the opposition of business towards an FTT (H 1.3), the more regulation-friendly attitudes of Germans who maintain the relevance of the role of
the states towards markets and largely support an FTT are expected to have
shaped the government’s approval of such a measure (H 2.3).
Institutions of Financial Market Regulation
The analysis of regulatory institutions complements the notion that the financial sector is not as relevant to the German economy as it is in Britain and
that path-dependent societal ideas and values about the role of the state
towards markets could eventually dominate the German governmental posiIReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1): 67-87
77
Rüdiger: The Divided Union
tion. In Britain, on the other hand, the regulatory framework is expected to
correspond to regulation-averse interests and ideas already observed.
The UK’s system of financial regulation has long been considered to pursue a ‘light-touch’ regulatory approach. While prior to the 1980s, the City of
London had been under the sway of a self-regulating “old-boys network”
(Zimmermann 2010: 131), the growing importance of the City of London as
an international financial centre and several regulatory scandals raised increased concern over the system’s effectiveness. The creation of the Financial
Services Authority in 1997 by the New Labour government can hence be seen
as an attempt to strengthen the City’s regulation and thereby its competitiveness and assuage investor’s worries about the credibility of their savings
(Westrup 2007: 1105). Even though equipped with major competences, the
FSA was nevertheless perceived as ostensibly market friendly which made it
popular among financial institutions (Gottwald 2010: 94; Zimmermann 2010:
132). The FSA’s seven principles reflected a market-oriented, light-touch
regulatory approach by including, among others, the promotion of financial
innovations, the need for due regard of the internationality of financial markets and services, the preservation of the competitive position of the British
market place and the minimisation of any adverse effects of regulatory
measures (FSA 2001: 4). These principles translated into a policy which was
primarily aimed at keeping the financial industry in London: by reducing the
capital gains tax from 40 to ten percent on assets held for at least ten, later
two years, government boosted incentives for hedge funds and private equity
funds to keep their firms in the City (Augar 2009: 41).
The overall aim to encourage new financial innovations and push the
City’s competitiveness was proclaimed a main goal of any British government’s regulatory approach towards financial markets in the past decades:
While in November 2005 Gordon Brown called for "no inspection without
justification, no form filling without justification and no information requirements without justification, not just a light touch but a limited touch"
(Brown 2005), the UK government’s impetus of ensuring that London remains a pre-eminent financial centre has withstood the financial crisis. In
2013, Prime Minister David Cameron argued that "this government has done
everything business has asked for. Business wanted lower corporate taxes,
and we have cut our corporation tax to 20 percent. Business wanted lower
personal taxes: we’ve addressed that issue" (Cameron 2013: 1).
The FSA remained the main institution of the UK’s regulatory system of
financial markets for this paper’s examined period between January 2011
and February 2013 which led to Britain’s refusal of the European Commission’s FTT proposal and the ensuing failure of an EU-wide FTT. Yet, as a consequence of its presumed regulatory failure resulting in the financial crisis of
2007/2008, the British government has restructured its regulatory system
and passed the Financial Services Act in December 2012. It abolished the FSA
and created a new regulatory structure consisting of the Bank of England’s
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Financial Policy Committee, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the
Financial Conduct Authority.
Whilst taking into account these current reforms, they do not constitute a
paradigm shift in British financial markets’ regulation. Britain’s experience
with market failures has led to what Kalinowski (Kalinowski 2013: 485) calls
“a pragmatic approach to financial regulation that acknowledges the need for
a strong regulatory framework for financial actors and products”. Yet, the
United Kingdom remains opposed to any regulation of financial flows.
In line with this pragmatic approach, the Financial Secretary to the
Treasury, Mark Hoban, defined the new regulatory system’s main principle as
“to protect and enhance confidence in the UK’s financial system” (Hoban
2011: 2). Therefore, the British government is still expected to assess any
regulatory reform in the light of its economy being equipped with one of the
major global financial centres. These observations affirm VoC’s main assumptions about Liberal Market Economies which are characterised by free market flows and a low degree of taxation on market transactions.
The financial system in Germany and its corresponding regulatory system
had, for many decades, been oriented towards the great relevance of the
German manufacturing sector. This manifested itself in a close industrycapital-nexus with a system of the so-called “Hausbanken” (house banks)
which provided affiliated companies with long-term finance and allowed
companies to pursue long-term strategies (Zimmermann 2010: 125). This
system, often dubbed “Deutschland AG” (Deutschland Inc.), was accompanied
by a corporatist regulatory framework involving federal and state governments as well as the leading German banks and stock exchanges. The financial supervision thus concentrated on the manufacturing industry’s needs
(Gottwald 2010: 79).
In 2002, this regulatory system was partly reformed when the coalition
government of Social Democrats and the Greens established the Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). It centralised much of the supervision of financial markets and thereby corresponded to repeated calls of German banks, such as Deutsche Bank, which considered the fragmented regulatory structure an impediment to its strategic development. The system was
furthermore adjusted to financial globalisation and the emergence of new
investors such as hedge funds and private equity in 2004 when the so-called
investment modernisation law was passed (Vitols 2004). As a consequence,
the major German banks started to enter more profitable areas such as investment banking, soon followed by smaller institutes which had previously
focused on lending to SMEs (Zimmermann 2010: 129). Eventually, the financial crisis revealed the surprising extent to which German institutes had been
involved in risky, short-term speculation.
Yet, the regulatory regime was never as favourable to these new investors
as the UK’s authorities. This is partly due to the German system traditionally
being subject to “incremental change” which favours small adjustments over
“systemic innovations” (Gottwald 2010: 77). In 2003-2004, unlike most other
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countries, the German government introduced direct regulation models and
distinct legal instruments for hedge funds (Fioretos 2010: 710). According to
Zimmermann (2010: 132), the ensuing calls for increased and coordinated
global regulation of financial markets by the German government can be
interpreted as a defensive strategy which aims to keep new financial actors
under control, to preserve the state’s autonomy and legitimacy and to limit
adjustments in the German SME sector. Countries with a large financial sector profit from short-term-oriented, volatile financial markets as they can
charge more for an increased number of financial transactions and are able to
offer more complex financial products. This does not hold true for the CME
Germany which is, also due to its export-driven economy, stability-oriented
and therefore interested in restricting short-term financial flows (Helleiner
2010). From a VoC-perspective, Germany is thus oriented towards the availability of long-term finance, regulated labour markets and extensive coordination among firms. This allows companies to pursue long-term strategies
and protects them from hostile takeovers. ‘New investors’ such as hedge
funds and private equity are viewed as threatening this traditional basis of
German industry. As a consequence, the initiatives for a Financial Transaction Tax by Germany (and France) constitute a roll-back from previous adjustments to globalised finance. They correspond to CMEs’ continued regulatory hesitance towards market liberalisation which was confirmed and
gained momentum after the financial crisis (Kalinowski 2013: 489).
In sum, a rather light-touch regulatory system which is supposed to
strengthen the City of London’s competitiveness in globalised financial markets is expected to have boosted the observed economic interests and societal ideas which mainly opposed further regulation through a Financial Transaction Tax in the UK. The German regulatory framework, even though partly
reformed and liberalised for ‘new investors’, is traditionally less favourable
to short-term investment and favours long-term investment opportunities
for its export-oriented, manufacturing sector, especially SMEs. This regulatory framework has further weakened the sectorial economic interests which
were opposed to a Financial Transaction Tax whereas it facilitated the capability of societal ideas to influence the government’s position. As a consequence, H1.4 and H2.4 can be verified using a societal approach.
Conclusion
Why did the British and German government hold contrary positions concerning a Financial Transaction Tax which eventually led to the failure of its
implementation in the entire EU? Departing from this question, the preceding
analysis sought to explain the two countries’ diverging views. It therefore
employed a societal approach whose core assumptions were found to be
consistent with the empirical evidence concerning a European FTT which is
why this paper’s main hypotheses H 1.1 and H 2.1 can be verified:
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Economic interests in Great Britain as well as in Germany as expressed in
publications of leading business associations proved to be opposed to the
idea of a Financial Transaction Tax in the European Union. Whereas in Britain this opposition is expected to have highly influenced the government’s
decision concerning an FTT, German economic interests were not met by the
government due to the financial sector’s comparably small significance to the
overall German economy. Following the societal approach, the relationship
between its three different variables can be conflictual. In the case of an FTT,
the small contribution of financial markets to the German economy has facilitated societal ideas to predominantly influence the German government’s
decision. Whereas British society holds more regulation-averse values which
translates into a predominant refusal of an FTT, German society is more
regulation-friendly and has proven to be largely in favour of the European
Commission’s FTT proposal. Herein lies, according to the societal approach,
the main reason for the German government’s decision to collect such a tax in
the future. Finally, the examination of country-specific regulatory frameworks has helped to understand the government’s decision in a wider institutional context.
This paper has only attempted to show whether correlations between
ideas, interests and/or institutions on the one hand and governmental positions and measures on the other hand, as suggested by the societal approach,
could be empirically demonstrated. But how exactly do ideas and interests
make their way into policy measures and how do institutions confine governmental actions? In order to answer these questions and thereby enhance
a mere correlation with concrete mechanisms, the societal approach needs to
be supplemented by theories of political decision-making and political legitimacy (Zimmermann 2010: 122).
Moreover, the impact of two other variables should further be investigated to control for alternative explanations, namely the differences in general
attitudes towards the European Union and the role of party politics in the
respective countries. Further research could thus help to draw a more distinct picture and replace mere correlations with mechanisms. This seems
particularly promising, as this paper has proven the overall rich explanatory
power of comparative, sub-systemic approaches to disagreement in global
political economy.
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– I reflect –
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, politicians around the
globe pledged to introduce policies that would prevent financial market actors from continuously trading with highly
speculative products that had destabilised the financial sector
as well as the world economy as a whole. Soon, many critics
contended that after the obvious bail-outs of financial institutions, the promised stricter regulation of financial actors had
failed to appear, once again proving that state policies were
solely concerned with the interests of global capital. To me,
the Financial Transaction Tax seemed to deliver a much more
nuanced picture, with a number of European states continuously committed to introducing an FTT. The societal approach
seemed promising in terms of explaining the apparent divergence in governmental positions with the help of variables
other than solely material interests, such as societal ideas. Yet,
as I reflect upon my findings, I wonder if the approach really
fulfils this promise. Concerning the German case, my analysis
suggests that only because of the relative irrelevance of its financial sector, the German government found itself able to deliver to the popular demand for an FTT. Thus, it has to be
acknowledged that material variables still figure very prominently in the societal approach.
Felix Rüdiger
BA (Politik und Wirtschaft), 6th Semester
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
felix.s.ruediger@gmail.com
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Schirm, Stefan A., 2013b. Global Politics are Domestic Politics: a Societal
Approach to Divergence in the G20. In: Review of International Studies,
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Schirm, Stefan A., 2013c. The Domestic Politics of the Euro Crisis: Societal
Foundations of Policy Divergence. European International Studies Association. Warsaw.
Schirm, Stefan A., 2014. Domestic Ideas, Institutions or Interests? Explaining
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Schulmeister, Stephan / Schratzenstaller, Margit / Picek, Oliver, 2008. A
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Westrup, Jonathan, 2007. The Politics of Financial Regulatory Reform in
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Zimmermann, Hubert, 2010. Varieties of Global Financial Governance? British and German Approaches to Financial Market Regulation. In: Helleiner, Eric / Pagliari, Stefano / Zimmermann, Hubert (Eds): Global Finance in Crisis. The Politics of International Regulatory Change. London/New York, pp. 121-136.
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– I reflect – Lightfood / Leifert: Interview Looking at Global Politics
Looking at Global Politics through
the Lens of Indigeneity
Interview with Sheryl Lightfoot, Canada
Research Chair of Global Indigenous Rights
and Politics, University of British Columbia
Claire Luzia Leifert
Leifert: You are researching indigenous peoples' global politics. What are you
exactly looking at?
Lightfoot: My research agenda focuses around indigenous rights movements
at the United Nations (UN). However, if you start looking into indigenous
rights work at the UN you end up looking at the movement as a social movement as well as what I would call 'indigenous diplomacies', which I define as
meaning indigenous relationships with states, with non-state actors, with
international organisations such as the UN and also indigenous nations' relationships with one another. So what starts out as a quite particular project
ends up self-expanding very quickly. And necessarily critical IR and postcolonial literatures end up in the mix as well.
What sparked your interest in the intersection of indigenous peoples and International Relations?
This is a personal story that has to do with the two sides of my own identity.
On my mother's side I am Anishinaabe1 and come from the Great Lakes territory of North America. My mother's political background is rights-based
activism coming out of the Red Power Movement in the late 1960s and
1970s. I grew up surrounded by the ethos of a resurgence in indigenous
rights that was looking not only domestically but also transnationally at how
the human rights regimes could be used to leverage some changes in state
behaviour. On the other side, I have a father who was a World War II refugee,
a stateless person. I approached my studies from a very particular lens that
Anishinaabe is an indigenous nation, formerly called “tribe”, whose traditional territory is located around the Great Lakes of North America, especially around Lake Superior, Lake Michigan and Lake Huron. An Algonquin-speaking people, this is one of the
largest indigenous nations in North America, located in numerous reservations in the
United States and reserves in Canada.
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– I reflect – Lightfood / Leifert: Interview Looking at Global Politics
looks at why do certain violences exist? What do human rights mean? How
can we mitigate conflicts so dreadful for people like those that had happened
in Europe? By the time I reached my early thirties I started to ponder if there
was not an intersection between these two interests. I always had an interest
in international politics and tried to answer the kind of larger questions that I
asked. At that time there were a lot of other people in indigenous communities starting to ask these questions: What do these UN movements mean?
What does the UN Declaration of Indigenous Rights mean? How can that help
us reach more peaceful relationships for our peoples? So I set about the task
of looking for those intersections. The indigenous rights movement, the history of it and its activities at the UN presented a natural subject matter to
bring these two very diverse areas together.
You said you are Anishinaabe. In what way do you feel this part of your identity
influences your academic work?
Oh, completely. It defines where I come from. It defines how I see the world,
how I see avenues of resistance, avenues of reconciliation, avenues of conflict
resolution. And also how I see the potential to exist for a better relationship
between indigenous peoples and states. I think in terms of ontology it is
inescapable. Epistemologies and ontologies come from one's backgrounds,
you cannot get away from them. Indigenous ontologies certainly inform both
my methodologies and also the subject matter of what I am looking for.
Speaking of ontologies and epistemologies, in terms of IR theories what approach are you taking to explore your subject matter?
I have been asked this question since my comprehensive exams: “Where do
you place yourself in IR?“. It is an interesting question because when I look
back at my studies and scholarship in IR, there are realist elements of my
work, there are constructivist and critical elements of my work. One of the
things I have noticed early on was that this particular way of studying global
politics brings in all kinds of different traditions and can be studied from a
multitude of perspectives. I seem to have landed in the critical constructivist
camp. I certainly am sensitive to identities and how those are constituting
actions and reactions to global politics. And 'critical' because indigenous
politics is inherently critical of the way that global politics is done.
Do you think this is a rather new approach to the study of global politics?
It is, but I would say it is very similar to other critical approaches like feminist and postcolonial IR and overlaps with both of them. Yet at the same time
it has a slightly different twist on things. Feminist IR would look at IR through
the lens of gender, I see indigenous IR as looking at the world and global
politics through the lens of indigeneity. Postcolonial theory is again very
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– I reflect – Lightfood / Leifert: Interview Looking at Global Politics
similar: It challenges binaries, eurocentric thinking, challenges us to look
beyond some of the assumptions or exposes some of the assumptions and
presumptions within global politics. Also similarly, I would say, it looks at
relations of power within the colonial structure and for us it is still emancipatory but how could we arrange power structures after the colonial structure
– that would mean if we could reach such a thing. However, most of the postcolonial literature is Indian/subcontinent-based and African-based. And for
those contexts colonialism is a post-reality: the coloniser has left, there is a
state behind that is postcolonial that is studied by postcolonial theories. We
do not have this. We have to rather look at how we can define our relationship with the state while the settler-colonial state remains. So it is a very
different course of study but it is definitely coming out of the same tradition
and intellectual history as postcolonial theories: It is emancipatory, it is liberationist. But it is doing so in a very different context.
Do you think your research findings are relevant for the wider discipline of IR
beyond the study of indigenous peoples' politics as such?
I would say, yes. One of the big debates in IR is: “Is the state growing or
shrinking?“. I think indigenous global politics helps us problematize the state
and start to answer this question. Is there something that will come to exist
that is beyond the state or post-state? State structures have only been with us
for several hundred years – in indigenous views that is not very long. There
were other forms of political organisation that existed prior to the state and
there will be something that comes after it, whenever that happens to be. I
think indigenous global politics in practice, and certainly then in theory, is
working towards a reconceptualisation of state sovereignty and in some
ways is actually leading the charge in problematizing the state or even decoupling the state from territorial understandings of sovereignty. Some call it
the miner's canary.
The miner's canary?
It's an old saying. When coal miners worked in the underground mines they
would have a canary in there. If the canary fell ill or died, they knew there
was something happening that they could not detect. The 'miner's canary' is a
way of saying: “Is this the first sign of something new?“. It may be or it may
be an anomaly, time will tell. But why we should study indigenous global
politics in theory is that it may be one of the first openings to something
beyond the state structure. And I think we should be paying attention to that
– all of us studying IR.
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Going back to your own research projects, what are you currently working on?
I have two projects on the go. One is a book project based on my dissertation
which was called simply ‘Global Indigenous Politics’. The book situates indigenous global politics within IR, why it is important for people to look at indigenous politics within IR studies and also in IR practice. Secondly, the book
looks at how and why the indigenous rights movement actually got a set of
rights articulated by the UN: what that journey was like, why it was so difficult and how they overcame all the obstacles to get there. The UN Declaration
of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) passed the UN in 2007 after
about a thirty year effort on the part of indigenous actors at the UN. The third
part of the book is looking at state responses to the Declaration. I try to learn
about state behaviour – is this the miner's canary? Is this something new that
we are looking at that states are particularly resistant to and why? The second project is on the particular topic of state apologies to indigenous peoples.
I am looking at three case studies Canada, the United States, and Norway.
How did the states apologise? Why did they apologise? And also what policy
changes went along with or did not go along with the apologies?
Thank you for the interview!
– Sheryl Lightfoot (Ph.D. Minnesota) is an assistant professor in the First
Nations Studies Program and the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver. Her research interests include
global Indigenous peoples’ politics, Indigenous rights, Indigenous diplomacy,
social movements, and critical international relations. She is currently working on a book project based upon her dissertation, “Indigenous Global Politics” which won the 2010 Best Dissertation Award in Race and Ethnic Politics
from the American Political Science Association. She also has fifteen years’
volunteer and contract experience with a number of American Indian tribes
and community-based organisations in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, including nine years as Chair of the Board of Directors of the American Indian Policy Center, a research and advocacy group.
– The interview was conducted by Claire Luzia Leifert, student in the Joint
MA International Relations in Berlin, currently on exchange at UBC Vancouver.
Contact: luzia.leifert@gmail.com
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– I reflect – Peitz: Konferenzbericht 8. General Conference ECPR
Konferenzbericht zur 8. General
Conference des European
Consortium for Political Research
(ECPR) in Glasgow, 3. bis 6.
September 2014
Laura Peitz
Einleitung
Das ‚European Consortium for Political Research‘ (ECPR) ist eines der führenden Netzwerke zur internationalen Kooperation und Vernetzung in der
Politikwissenschaft. Es organisiert regelmäßig Workshops, Konferenzen
sowie Sommer- und Winteruniversitäten; vergibt diverse Preise und veröffentlicht wissenschaftliche Arbeiten. Seit 14 Jahren veranstaltet die Vereinigung ihre Generalversammlung in verschiedenen europäischen Städten. Das
Programm ist in thematische Sektionen unterteilt, in denen eine Handvoll
inhaltlich verwandter Panels angeboten werden. Die Generalkonferenzen
schaffen so alle zwei Jahre einen Ort fruchtbaren wissenschaftlichen Austauschs. Vorträge, Roundtables, Grundsatzreferate sowie ein ansprechendes
Rahmenprogramm runden das Programm ab.
ECPR goes Glasgow
Gastgeber der 8. General Conference des ECPR war vom 3. bis 6. September
2014 die schottische University of Glasgow. Gegründet 1451 ist sie eine der
ältesten Universitäten im englischsprachigen Raum. Die politikwissenschaftliche Tradition begann hier 1760 mit einer Vorlesungsreihe von Adam Smith.
Heute ist die Universität eine der führenden politikwissenschaftlichen Institutionen im Vereinigten Königreich, insbesondere in der Vergleichenden und
Internationalen Politik sowie der Politischen Theorie.
In diesem Jahr brachte die Konferenz die sagenhafte Anzahl von 2500
Politikwissenschaftlerinnen aus der ganzen Welt zusammen. Im Rahmen von
67 Sektionen wurden 403 Panels angeboten, in welchen über 1600 Forschungspapiere vorgestellt und diskutiert wurden. Wirft man einen Blick in
das fast 200 Seiten umfassende Programm, stechen einige Themen hervor,
die in der wissenschaftlichen Debatte derzeit besonders maßgebend zu sein
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scheinen. Auffallend viele Panels beschäftigten sich mit verschiedenen Aspekten der Wirtschaftskrise und mit Themen zu politischer Repräsentation.
Das Rahmenprogramm umfasste eine Willkommensrede der Stellvertretenden Ersten Ministerin Schottlands Nicola Sturgeon sowie einen KeynoteVortrag von Iain McLean (University of Oxford) zum Thema Steuerföderalismus. Darüber hinaus wurden zwei Roundtables angeboten. Im Rahmen des
ersten gingen unter dem Titel ‚Democracy and its Discontents‘ Dirk BergSchlosser (Universität Marburg), Rosie Campbell (University of London),
Leonardo Morlino (LUISS University, Rome) und Matthew Flinders (University of Sheffield) Ursachen und Herausforderungen für erfolgreiche politische
Repräsentation nach. Im zweiten Roundtable diskutierten Todd Landmann
(University of Essex), John Dryzek (University of Canberra), Christina
Boswell (University of Edinburgh) und Jan W. Duyvendak (University of
Amsterdam) verschiedene Aspekte des Menschenrechtsregimes. In sehr
ansprechenden Vorträgen wurde ein Einblick gegeben in verschiedenste
Menschenrechtsthemen: Die Quantifizierung der Einhaltung von Menschenrechten, Demokratie als Menschenrecht, Rechte von Flüchtlingen und Migranten sowie LGBT-Rechte. Die große Vielfalt dieser Vortragsthemen verhinderte bedauerlicherweise nach Öffnung des Podiums für Fragen aus dem
Publikum eine konstruktive Diskussion der Panelteilnehmer untereinander.
Die Anzahl der Panels, die der Teildisziplin der Internationalen Beziehungen zugeordnet werden können, war überschaubar. Sie hatten zu einem
großen Teil EU-Bezug; darüber hinaus wurden einige Sitzungen zu Internationalen Organisationen, Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und internationaler
Kooperation, insbesondere in der Umwelt- und Energiepolitik, angeboten.
Veranstaltungen zu weiteren Themen der Internationalen Beziehungen, wie
beispielsweise Entwicklungspolitik oder Friedensforschung, waren leider
dünn gesät. Aus aktuellem Anlass und aufgrund der qualitativ sehr hochwertigen Präsentationen sowie der angeregten Diskussion im Anschluss sei an
dieser Stelle das vom GIGA Hamburg organisierte Panel ‚Democracy Prevention: The International Repertoire of Authoritarian Regimes‘ erwähnt. Die
darin vorgestellten Beiträge sollen in naher Zukunft in einer Sonderausgabe
des European Journal of Political Research veröffentlicht werden und gehen
der Beständigkeit und Zusammenarbeit autoritärer Regime in ihrer Vermeidung von Demokratisierung nach. Die präsentierten Forschungsprojekte,
allesamt auf einen starken theoretischen Unterbau bedacht, schienen einen
wertvollen Beitrag zur Theoriebildung in einem relativ neuen Forschungsfeld
zu leisten.
Kritische Würdigung
Allein durch die Größe der Konferenz schafft das ECPR eine für die europäische Politikwissenschaft einmalige Plattform zum internationalen Austausch
und zur Weiterentwicklung von Forschungsprojekten. Die große Anzahl von
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– I reflect – Peitz: Konferenzbericht 8. General Conference ECPR
TeilnehmerInnen hat meiner Meinung nach allerdings auch Nachteile: Die
hohe Vielfalt an behandelten Themen erschwerte die Teilnahme an untereinander thematisch stimmigen Sitzungen. Selbst innerhalb der Sektionen
unterschieden sich die Panels inhaltlich teils sehr; sogar die im Rahmen einer
Sitzung vorgestellten Forschungspapiere standen sich desweilen nur bedingt
nahe.
Mit über 400 Panels in nur drei Konferenztagen war das Programm sehr
dicht gedrängt. Dies hatte zur Folge, dass die Zeit zum Austausch außerhalb
der planmäßigen Sitzungen sehr begrenzt war. Oft reichte sie nur aus, um
noch rechtzeitig den Veranstaltungsraum zu wechseln. Bei einigen Sitzungen
waren zudem nur sehr wenige TeilnehmerInnen anwesend. Die im Anschluss
an die Präsentationen geplanten Diskussionen fielen deshalb gelegentlich
knapp und unbefriedigend aus. Ein weiterer Grund hierfür waren möglicherweise die vollkommen verschiedenen Forschungsstadien der präsentierten
Artikel. Einige Vorträge boten somit wenig Inhalt, geschweige denn konkrete
Methoden und Ergebnisse, die diskutiert werden hätten können.
Zuletzt noch ein Punkt zur Selbstreferenzialität des wissenschaftlichen
Betriebes. An den häufig vorgebrachten Elfenbeinturmvorwuf erinnerten
mich Sitzungen, bei denen die Mehrzahl der vorgestellten Forschungspapiere
von ein und derselben Universität, ja sogar vom selben Lehrstuhl stammten
und darauffolgend von einer weiteren Mitarbeiterin eben jenes Lehrstuhls als
Discussant kommentiert wurden. Diese Panels schienen nicht nur von der
nicht-akademischen Außenwelt entrückt, wie der Wissenschaft häufig angekreidet wird; vielmehr fehlte es hier sogar an zwischenuniversitärem Austausch. Für derartige Besprechungen hätte nicht nach Glasgow gereist werden müssen. Bei einer solchen Panelzusammenstellung wird das ECPR seinen
eigenen Ansprüchen von internationalem politikwissenschaftlichem Austausch nicht gerecht.
Fazit
Die General Conference des ECPR stellt eine gelungene Gelegenheit zum
wissenschaftlichen Dialog dar. Für eine Nachwuchswissenschaftlerin wie
mich schuf die Teilnahme dank des vielfältigen und sehr umfangreichen
Programms die Möglichkeit, einen umfassenden Einblick in verschiedenste
aktuelle Forschungsthemen zu erhalten. Erfreulicherweise hatte ich die Möglichkeit bekommen, meine eigene Forschungsarbeit zur Kreditvergabe der
Weltbank an ehemalige Bürgerkriegsländer anhand des Risikos einer Konfliktwiederkehr auf der Konferenz vorzustellen. Dies gab mir die Gelegenheit,
mich mit anderen Forschenden mit ähnlichen fachlichen Schwerpunkten
über meine eigene Arbeit auszutauschen, wertvolle Hinweise für deren weitere Ausarbeitung zu erhalten und erste konkrete Erfahrungen in der Welt
der Wissenschaftspraxis zu sammeln.
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– I reflect – Peitz: Konferenzbericht 8. General Conference ECPR
Insgesamt betrachtet beeindruckte das größte europäische politikwissenschaftliche ‚Klassentreffen‘ durch eine große Panelvielfalt, die jedoch
enttäuschend wenig IB-relevante Themen bot. Dennoch bestachen die angebotenen IB-Panels durch hohe wissenschaftliche Qualität und fruchtbare
Diskussionen zu aktuellen Forschungsthemen. Doch auch „unser“ Feld war
teilweise nicht vor der oftmals kritisierten Selbstreferenzialität gefeit. Ein
sorgfältiges Durcharbeiten des vollen Programmheftes lohnte sich aber allemal: Besonders als junge Wissenschaftlerin konnte man einen gewinnbringenden Einblick in den Wissenschaftsbetrieb erhalten.
Die nächste Generalkonferenz des ECPR findet von 26. bis 29. August
2015 an der Université de Montréal (Kanada) – und damit erstmalig außerhalb Europas – statt. Der zugehörige Call for Papers startete am 2. Dezember
2014. Darüber hinaus veranstaltet das ECPR alle zwei Jahre eine Graduate
Student Conference, die nächste im Jahr 2016 in Tartu (Estland).
– Laura Peitz studiert im 3. Fachsemester den Master Internationale Beziehungen an der Freien Universität Berlin, der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin
sowie der Universität Potsdam. Sie hat auf der Konferenz ein Forschungspapier vorgestellt.
Kontakt: lpeitz@uni-potsdam.de
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IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1)
97
Peer Reviewer
The Editorial Board would like to express its deepest gratitude to all
reviewers who volunteered to contributed to the evaluation of all articles
submitted for this volume.
Sevda Arslan
Marlen Barthel
Maria Beihof
Anny Boc
Johanna Bögel
Tobias Bunde
Helena Burgrová
Friederike Cossey
Lisa Ditlmann
Jonas Fritzler
Thomas Fröhlich
Sofia Ganter
Patrick Gilroy
Bruno Gomes
Guimarães
Daria Goscinska
Nina Guérin
Charlotte Christiane
Hammer
Isabella Hermann
Angela Heucher
Annette Hidber
Maximilian Hoell
Elena Hofmann
Philipp Huchel
Katrin Jaschinski
Elisabeth Kath
Markus Kirchschlager
Jens Knickenberg
Cedric Koch
Hannah König
Elise Kopper
Anne Köster
Daniela Kroll
Laura Krug
Janosch Kullenberg
Christian Küsters
Johanna Küther
Claire Luzia Leifert
Mathis Lohaus
Stefan Maetz
Henning Möldner
Katharina Nett
Philipp Neubauer
Jesper Nielsen
Philipp Olbrich
Christian Opitz
Sandra Rau
Anne Reiff
Björn Reschke
Janna Rheinbay
Maksim Roskin
Tim Rühlig
Anna Rutetzki
Christina Salerno
Jan Sändig
Johannnes Sauerland
Sonja Schiffers
Sarah Schmid
Lisa Schnell
Annette Schramm
Felix Schulte
Marc Schütz
Marie Schwager
Kilian Spandler
Dorothée Stieber
Florian Stöhr
Franziska Strack
Fabian Stroetges
Felix Syrovatka
Marius Thermann
Lamprini Tsodoulou
Christoph Unrast
Anna Veit
Damjan Vinko
Anastasia
Vishnevskaia
Benjamin Vrucak
Stefan Wallaschek
Jana Wattenberg
Tobias Weise
Wiebke WemheuerVogelaar
Josef Westermayr
Anna Wolkenhauer
Master´s and PhD students who see themselves situated within the field of
International Relations are welcome to join our Peer Reviewer Pool. For
applying, please fill out the document ‘Field of Study’ (available at ireflectjournal.de) and submit it to
board@ireflect-journal.de.
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IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1)
Call for Papers
Option 1: Academic Article
Main criteria:

Develop your student paper into an academic article

The article’s topic relates to the field of International Relations

At the time of writing, you are at least in your fifth B.A. semester
Formal criteria:

Approximately 5000 words excluding references

Not older than two years

Written in German or English

Includes an abstract of 100‐150 words and five keywords

Times New Roman, Font size 12, 1 ½ line spacing, margins 2,5 cm

Cover page includes title, author, study program, university,
semester and seminar in which the paper was written
 Citation style ‘Harvard’, the use of a reference management system
(Citavi or EndNote) is highly appreciated, please hand in the project
file
 Word file (no pdfs)
 Hand in two versions of your contributions: open version with all
your information and an anonymised version
Option 2: Opinion piece – I reflect –
The section ‘I reflect’ includes book reviews, conference reports and
discussion pieces. They should not be longer than 1000 words and should
focus on current issues. Please include three keywords.
Note: Previously submitted papers not published by IReflect are welcome to
be submitted and reviewed again.
Submission
 Until April 30th, 2015 to board@ireflect‐journal.de
 Only contributions that meet the listed criteria can be considered
 In case of questions of any nature, feel free to contact us!
We are looking forward to your contributions!
The Editorial Board of IReflect
IReflect 2015, Vol. 2 (1)
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