1. science

A BRIEF GEOPOLITICAL ATLAS
OF THE RUSSIAN SCIENCE
CITIES (NAUKOGRAD)
KEVIN LIMONIER
NOTE FROM THE OBSERVATOIRE FRANCO-RUSSE
NO11, APRIL 2015
Skolkovo
OBSERVATOIRE
Created in March 2012 and linked to the Economic Council of the Franco-Russian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI France-Russie), the Observatoire aims to
produce an in-depth expertise on Russia, and promote a greater awareness of French
realities among Russian political and economic elites. It publishes policy papers and
the annual report on Russia. It also organizes events such as colloquiums, seminars,
press conferences in Paris, Moscow and Russian regions. The following are members
of the Observatoire’s scientific advisory board, both scholars and experts, who actively participate in its work: Alain Blum, Pascal Boniface, Isabelle Facon, Peter Kopp,
Jean Radvanyi, Marie-Pierre Rey, Georges Sokoloff, Yevgeny Gavrilenkov, Natalia
Lapina, Sergei Karaganov, Fyodor Lukyanov, Ruslan Pukhov, Konstantin Simonov,
Tatiana Stanovaya.
AUTHOR
Kevin Limonier is a doctor of geography, researcher at the Institut Français de Géopolitique (Université Paris VIII) and instructor in geopolitics at the Russian State University for the Humanities (RGGU, Moscow).
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CONTENTS
Introduction............................................................................................................................4
1. The science cities: an archipelago of Russian innovation................................................6
2. A territorial and functional structure inherited from the USSR.......................................8
3. A development model born during the challenges of the transition...........................10
4. The status of “naukograd”: between autonomy and interventionism.........................12
5. Challenges of the revival: the example of Dubna.............................................................14
6. New policies to support innovation: competitive or complementary?........................16
7. The unique voting behavior of the science cities...............................................................18
Conclusion...........................................................................................................................21
Sources.................................................................................................................................22
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INTRODUCTION
At a time when Russia is mired in a serious economic and monetary crisis due particularly to the drop in hydrocarbon prices on the global markets, the ambition of
former president Dmitry Medvedev to make the country into an “innovating power”
seems like a thing of the past given how much the landscape has changed. Yet it
was not so long ago that Medvedev voiced this ambition: the president made the
support for innovation into a major national cause in 2009, when Russia was also
suffering the effects of the international financial crisis of 2008. This crisis realized
the fears expressed by a fair number of politicians since 2003–2005 regarding the
fragility of a Russian economy that had been deemed too dependent on its energy
income, and therefore the shocks of international prices. Worse, the idea that Russia
would become a mere “gigantic oil emirate” was gaining popularity in the media and
threatening to strain the credibility of the political project that was defended not only
by the president, but also and especially by his prime minister, Vladimir Putin. For how
could Russia be promoted as a model of a resurgent power if it was unable to innovate, as much to ensure its future as to reconcile with a Soviet past that undoubtedly
was troubled but whose “technological adventures” of the 1950s–1970s still evoke
great pride? Innovation and research in Russia have this dual insurance value: both
for the future and as a heritage to preserve, because it reveals part of the story of the
Russians and who they are.
It is for all these reasons, and more, that in 2009 President Medvedev decided on
the establishment of an authentic new city on the outskirts of Moscow that was intended to become the showcase of Russia’s technological ambitions: Skolkovo. With
tens of billions of dollars, the government thus wished to give life to an ultramodern
center of excellence in which the strategic orientations of the R&D would often be
in harmony with the legacy dimension of technology and with the space complex,
which Skolkovo’s official website calls a “cultural and spiritual identity.” Quickly gaining the nickname the “Russian Silicon Valley,” the project inspired the enthusiasm
of observers all over the world. The idea of creating a technopole that would gather
the who’s who of Russian R&D was warmly received, and the advertising related to
the project was tinged with the codes of Anglo-Saxon marketing. In addition, the
promoters ensured that corruption, which was viewed as a significant obstacle to
Russian innovation, would have no place in Skolkovo because this was a city built
from scratch and great attention would be given to these issues. Finally, partnership
agreements were signed with many large international businesses, and this guaranteed the project’s solid credibility.
Today, five years after the first stone was laid for the first building of Skolkovo, many
hopes have been dashed. The first corruption scandals appeared quickly, while the
economic crisis and sanctions put an end to many international partnerships the government had been counting on in order to promote the technology transfers that
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the country desperately needs. Although it is not quite an “empty shell,” as of 2015
Skolkovo has not met the expectations it inspired when it was launched. However,
now more than ever before, Russia needs to diversify its economy and sell its technologies abroad, and to do so despite the sanctions and the ruble’s collapse. Given the
global situation, it seems sensible to think that in a near future, Skolkovo will continue
to fall short of its promises because its successes hinged greatly on the connections
that it could create with the global high-technology and advanced industrial giants,
which are largely Western. In addition, the development of the “Russian Silicon Valley” still depends greatly on financial resources that the government is no longer as
willing to provide due to the precarious economic situation.
Thus the question being raised for the country and foreign investors is how to
figure out how to take advantage of all the strengths of Russia, which despite everything is still a scientific powerhouse that benefits from one of the world’s most
educated populations. The response is no longer found in Skolkovo. It is sometimes
found far from the capital and the major urban centers, in small towns coiled in the
depths of a forest or in the bend of a river: the science cities. Vestiges of the former
colossus that was the scientific complex of the Soviet Union, these small cities that
were established for the needs of the Gosplan and the defense of the Soviet Union
constitute a true archipelago comprised of small “islands” with different fates. Some
never recovered from the crisis of the 1990s—too isolated and too dependent on
their former line ministry, they subsequently became cumbersome ghosts. Others,
because they were dedicated to highly strategic activities, remained under government control; visitors could not enter these “closed cities” without a pass. Finally,
there are the cities that survived as research centers and that managed to conserve
their “intellectual and scientific heritage.” Researchers in these cities have sometimes
used their own money to pay to preserve a laboratory that the government no longer
had the funds to maintain. Other researchers have established their undertakings
based on research they carried out on behalf of the Soviet Union.
This scientific archipelago constitutes a little-known opportunity. Not only do the
small islands that comprise it still have a substantial population of researchers and
engineers, but, thanks to strong corporate interdependences, they have also retained an identity and a culture of research whose roots stretch back to the 1950s
and 1960s. This is an undeniable strength for the creation of new innovation ecosystems. This atlas focuses on these cities.
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1. THE SCIENCE CITIES: AN ARCHIPELAGO OF RUSSIAN INNOVATION
A. The archipelago of science cities
Dubna
Ore
Mendelee
vet
Krasnoarmeysk
rolev
heer
hher
hernogolovka
iiazino
a
Istra
St. Petersburg
Dolgoprudny
Peterhof
Mirny
Star
ar Cit
City
ty
Moscow
Zarechye
ye
Krasnoznamensk
tov
Zheleznodorozhny
Zhukovsky
Tr
Moscow
O
Dzerjinsk
bolensk
PPushchino
Pus
Pu
ushhc
Michurinsk
Sarov
Yekaterinburg
Zernograd
NOVOSIBIRSK
Akademgorodok
Koltsovo
Zelenogorsk
Biysk
“Official” science cities (law of 1999)
www.cassini-conseil.com
B. Demographic weight
Union of Science Cities member cities
D. Areas of activity
C. Main features*
In number of science cities,
by specialties listed in the Russian’s framework programs
Nearly 4 million Russians live
in the archipelago of science cities.
In terms of absolute comparison,
this corresponds roughly to the population
of the country’s second-largest city, St. Petersburg.
Workers in the high-technology
Telecommunications
sector account for 30%
of the active population
Space
Weapons
Aviation
No
vos
ibi
rsk
Mo
sco
w
StPet
ers
bu
rg
Sci
en
ce
citi
es
50% of economic production
comes from the
innovation complex
Chemistry
Energy
Nuclear power
* In the “official” science cities
Biotechnologies
0
5
10
15
20
25
The landscape of modern Russian innovation has some distinguishing attributes,
such as a widely varied R&D that is oriented toward both new technologies and areas
that the former Soviet Union excelled in. Its substantial territorial entrenchment, which
is hard to grasp in its entirety and diversity, nonetheless makes it possible to produce
a general cartography of this landscape.
Beyond the major urban centers, where the “creative classes” are traditionally clustered, Russia has a unique type of innovation territory: the science cities. Since 1999
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these cities, whose roots lie in the Soviet Union’s scientific and military complex, have
enjoyed a legal status (naukograd) that protects the “intellectual and scientific potential” that is embodied by their economic, social and cultural organizations that were
inherited from the Soviet era.
Forty-odd cities are currently joined in a “union for the development of science
cities” (A). Among them, around 15 hold the legal status of naukograd. These cities
constitute a true “archipelago” of scattered small islands that are sometimes located
in remote areas but that share an economic profile that is characterized by local activities that are dominated by the sciences and technologies. The specializations of
these cities, which are often determined by history or the presence of a prestigious
institute, are the object of development framework programs. The R&D activities of
the science cities usually coincide with sectors that the government deems to be of
high priority (telecommunication, biotechnologies, energy, aviation), or that are recognized as “vital interests of the Russian Federation” (space, nuclear power) (D).
With a combined population of nearly 4 million people, the archipelago of science
cities has an absolute demographic weight that is comparable to that of the second-largest city in the country, St. Petersburg (B). According to federal legislation,
a significant share (at least 30%) of the active population of the 15 cities that the
government recognizes as science cities works in the research and development
sectors (C).
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2. A TERRITORIAL AND FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE INHERITED FROM THE USSR
А. THE SOVIET UNION’S SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ARCHIPELAGO: A LOGICAL AND FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE
MOSCOW
MOSCOW
LENINGRAD
MOSCOW
PERM
SVERDLOVSK
SVERDLOVSK
Nuclear power
NOVOSIBIRSK
Space
Aviation
Biotechnologies
and chemistry
Electronics
Technical military
centers
www.cassini-conseil.com
Installation area of
technical military capabilities
Major scientific
and technical areas
Moscow’s “green belt,” where most
of the elite cities of the Soviet
scientific complex were established
B. AN OVERABUNDANT SCIENTIFIC SECTOR
C. FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
THAT DEPENDED ON THE MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
AND TERRITORIAL ESTABLISHMENT OF RESEARCH
Share of 1990 Soviet GNP dedicated to R&D
Line ministry
(or military command)
30% of GNP
dedicated to R&D
80% of resources for R&D
are dedicated to the military
and industrial complex
Other regional
and central authorities
Provisioning
Institute or
functional industry
Land-use planning
Culture
& education
Local government
Housing
The modern science cities derive from the Soviet Union’s scientific, military and industrial complex. Most of them were established between 1955 and 1970, in a period
when the housing crisis that the country had been experiencing since Stalin, along
with the growing complexification of research processes, necessitated a new way to
organize technological development.
At the time, the Soviet Union’s scientific complex was characterized by a strong interpenetration with the military sphere (B)—to the extent that it is impossible to clearly
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separate the science cities that were dedicated to civilian research from the military
cities that housed advanced infrastructure (development or maintenance of missiles,
etc.).
This complex gave rise to a genuine “science archipelago,” the small islands of
which have interesting features. First, most of them are dedicated to one or several
specific activities. Second, these urban units, which are shaped first and foremost by
their tasks, are organized according to a functional logic. Map A clearly shows the
installation area of the technical military centers (both strategic bases and development centers) in a belt that encircled the Soviet territory, along with “functional areas”
that were distributed throughout the country. For example, there is the Siberian area
(structured around Novosibirsk and the Siberian branch of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences), and the Ural area, which centered around Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg)
and was dedicated to the development of Soviet nuclear power. The area structured
around Moscow stands out from all the other areas due to the density of the cities
that comprised it, along with the diversity of their specialties. It was there that most of
the so-called elite research units were set up; they boasted a quality of life that was
higher than the national average, in a setting that enjoyed proximity to nature, mainly
in the “green belt” of forests that surround Moscow.
Finally, these cities were characterized by the major role played by the main research institute in all aspects of local life (C): the upkeep of the housing, provisioning
of stores, etc. This institute thus constituted a factor of local experiences for the cities,
whose function often dictated the identity.
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3. A DEVELOPMENT MODEL BORN DURING THE CHALLENGES OF THE TRANSITION
А. THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ARCHIPELAGO IN THE FACE OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION
Dubna
А. THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ARCHIPELAGO IN THE FACE OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION
Chernogolovka
Fryazino
Korolev
Dzerzhinsk
Khimki
Reutov
Moscow
Sevastopol
Zhukovsky
Troitsk
Tomsk
Baikonur
Obninsk
Obolensk
Protvino
www.cassini-conseil.com
Scientific or technical centers
that lost their special status
Scientific or technical centers
that remained closed to foreigners (ZATO)
Territory of the Russian Federation in 1992
Scientific or technical centers
whose leaders established
the “Union of Science Cities”
Scientific or technical centers
that Russia maintained abroad
Former Soviet republics
that gained independence
B. CHANGE
FORFOR
SCIENCE
ANDAND
INNOVATION
HANGEININFEDERAL
FEDERALBUDGET
BUDGETEARMARKED
EARMARKED
SCIENCE
INNOVATION
C. CHRONOLOGY
OF STRUCTURAL
READJUSTMENTS
C. CHRONOLOGY
OF STRUCTURAL
READJUSTMENTS
In billions of 1991 constant rubles
July 14, 1992
Adoption of the
law on ZATOs
30
April 7, 1999
Adoption of the law establishing
a legal status for science cities
25
20
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
15
1999
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1999
10
Early 1990
Establishment of the
Union for the Development
of Science Cities
5
0
1997
October 1993
Asian economic crisis
Defeat of the first draft legislation
on the creation of a “science city” status
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the cities that comprised this archipelago experienced a profound crisis. The slashing of research budgets (B) induced a worrying
“brain drain” everywhere as well as the abandonment of a lot of cutting-edge infrastructure. Furthermore, the central government disengaged itself from the management of most of the cities, aside from the so-called closed cities, which remain,
under a law passed in 1992, administered by line ministries.
Confronted by these changes, the elites of a number of cities organized large-scale
brainstorming in order to try to find a model of transition from public, centralized
management of research toward a market economy. These cities then created the
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Union for the Development of Science Cities (naukograd), the objective of which was
to uphold and build on their “intellectual and scientific potential that was inherited
from the Soviet Union.” The union’s goal was to have recognized, at the federal level
and through a special status, the exceptional nature of these urban units and to organize their safeguarding. As imagined, the process is based on a decentralized management and the corporate interdependences that exist in these cities in order to
ensure the transition. The established economic models were greatly inspired by the
example of the French technopoles (Sophia Antipolis), and they stressed the creation
of training centers and innovating business incubators that stemmed from the research conducted by the institutes inherited from the Soviet era. More than a decade
prior, France had abandoned the strategy of the large national R&D programs (the
Plan Calcul) in order to focus on developing regional innovation centers—this was
reminiscent of the challenges the Russian leaders were facing.
Between 1989 and 1999 (C), the union’s member cities gradually set up such models, albeit with modest successes (especially in the Moscow region) that were nonetheless noteworthy considering the gravity of the economic crisis and the central
government’s obvious apathy toward issues of science and innovation. The new federal elites, who came from environments that were remote from research environments, were hardly sensitive to the cause of scientific networks that no longer occupied in the federal political architecture the dominant position that had belonged to
them in the Soviet era. This is why the recognition of the status of naukograd did not
occur until 1999, at the end of a decade of intense lobbying before the federal elites.
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4. THE STATUS OF “NAUKOGRAD”: BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND INTERVENTIONISM
A. THE “NAUKOGRAD” AND CENTRAL SUBSIDIES*
Per capita municipal budget, in rubles
DUBNA
Klin
42100
Dmitrov
Solnechnogorsk
FRYAZINO
MOSCOW
Share of local budget
coming from federal subsidies
CHERNOGOLOVKA
KOROLEV
Noginsk
REUTOV
ZHUKOVSKI Science cities
Noginsk
TROITSK
25260 15156 9093 5456 3273
Other cities
ZHUKOVSKY
Naro-Fominsk
PUSHCHINO
www.cassini-conseil.com
40 km.
*2009 data
Source : Rosstat, Russian Census of 2010
B. PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING “NAUKOGRAD” STATUS
Initiative
Business case of the
municipality requesting
the status
Development project
Draft framework agreement
between the federal
government, the municipality
and the relevant subject (region,
republic, etc.)
Draft presidential ukase
The municipality itself, or a proposal
coming from subjects of the Russian
Federation, federal ministers or the
Academy of Sciences
Required
documents
Organization
granting
their approval
Ministry of Economic
Development, Ministry of
Finance, Ministry of Education
and Science or the
Academy of Sciences
Federal Science
and Innovation Agency
Federal government
Presidential ukase
The Duma’s 1999 adoption of the designation of naukograd ushered in a new period. That same year, a first city, Obninsk, gained the status as a pilot city. Starting the
following year, several other cities joined Obninsk, including Dubna and Zhukovsky.
Issued at the end of a long process involving numerous key institutions, the new
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status granted cities rights to some federal and regional budget subsidies. In accordance with the philosophy adopted a decade prior by the Union of Science Cities,
the management of these subsidies remained in large part at the discretion of the
municipality that benefited from them despite earmarking for federal programs. In
particular, this aid was supposed to be used to create innovation ecosystems that
were attractive due to the urban renewal and the support of some businesses that
met criteria that were predetermined by the municipality in conjunction with the central authorities.
Starting in 2003, the amount of aid allocated to cities that had gained the status of
naukograd started to rise substantially. One of the causes of this increase lay in the
energy profit Russia was enjoying; this made it possible to finance many renovation
sites and construction sites of new infrastructure. However, the main reason remained
the radical change in attitude of the federal government toward the science cities.
During his first five years in the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin gradually laid the groundwork
of a genuine doctrine of support for innovation and protection of the technological
legacies of the Soviet Union. Thus several sectors were recognized as “vital interests
of the Russian Federation”; some, such as nuclear power and aerospace, pertained
directly to the science cities.
As the map opposite shows, in 2009 the naukograd of Moscow oblast went through
an exceptional budgetary situation compared to that of other cities in the region. The
per capita municipal budget there was much higher than those of other cities that
were nonetheless active (such as Klin, where large alcohol manufacturers were established), and the share of federal funding was much larger there.
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5. CHALLENGES OF THE REVIVAL: THE EXAMPLE OF DUBNA
A. CREATING AN “INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM”
B. CHANGE IN AMOUNT OF SUBSIDIES RECEIVED
BY DUBNA AS PART OF THE
Functional districts
MKB
RADUGA
lga
Vo
NAUKOGRAD PROGRAM (2002–2010)
Functional companies
3000
JINR
Special economic zone
2500
2000
New city center
1500
JINR
DUBNA
TENZOR
MOSCOW
Suspension bridge
(suspend)
1000
New development axis
500
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
www.cassini-conseil.com
C. BUILDING A SHOWCASE OF RUSSIAN INNOVATION
To the special
economic zone
a
Volg
CHERNAYA RECHKA
Prospekt Bogolyubova
(constructed in the 1980s)
The “new city” under construction on the left bank of the Volga
Urbanized area between
1990 and the present
Project of
suspension bridge
Green spaces
Forests
One of the main goals of these funds is to create an attractive environment to reverse the brain drain of scientists that these cities are experiencing, but what does
this mean in practice? The city of Dubna is an instructive example. This small city
of 75,000 inhabitants that lies 120 km north of Moscow has been viewed since the
1960s as a world capital of nuclear physics.
In concrete terms, the city inherited from the Soviet era an urban structure that was
marked by the specialization and well-thought-out distribution of living and activity
areas. Map A clearly shows three so-called functional regions: the eastern one is
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14
organized around the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR), which brought glory
to Dubna. In the west is another district built in the 1970s around the Tenzor factory,
which specialized in the production of safety materials for the nuclear power plants.
In the north, a third district centers around MKB Raduga, an aviation technology plant.
In the Soviet period, these three districts were physically separated and the socioprofessional profiles of their inhabitants differed.
Since the late 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the local authorities
have been trying to unite these three entities within a coherent whole in order to
promote collaboration. The naukograd status, which the city gained in 2001, enabled
the construction of a new, modern city center (map C), while a suspension bridge is
being planned to efficiently link the two banks of the Volga. The construction of a vast
innovation special economic zone was decided on in 2005 in order to house R&D
initiatives that would be able to benefit from the depth and diversity of the talents that
come from the city’s three traditional production centers. This zone, which is supplemented by a “new city” that is currently under construction (image C), is commonly
referred to in the municipal promotional materials as a true “showcase” of the revival
of Russian innovation and the city of Dubna.
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6. NEW POLICIES TO SUPPORT INNOVATION: COMPETITIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY?
A. THE DIVERSIFICATION OF INNOVATION SUPPORT POLICIES
Archipelago of science cities
SWEDEN
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES (SEZ):
A NEW DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Murmansk
FINLAND
POLAND
BELARUS
Innovation SEZ
Dubna
Production SEZ
SKOLKOVO
Zelenograd
Lipetsk
UKRAINE
Port SEZ
Strategic development
axis of SEZ
INNOPOLIS
Alabuga
Ulianovsk
Sovetskaya
Gavan
Titanium
Valley
SKOLKOVO, OR THE ATTEMPT
Togliatti
TO CREATE A NEW MODEL
Tomsk
Skolkovo and Innopolis Kazan
CHINA
KAZAKHSTAN
Partnerships in the export
of the “Skolkovo model”
Customs Union
(Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan)
MONGOLIA
IRAN
www.cassini-conseil.com
B. DISTRIBUTION OF BUDGETARY RESOURCES FOR THE ENACTMENT OF THE
“DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 2013–2020” PROGRAM
C. OVERALL DECREASE IN SCIENCE BUDGETS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF SKOLKOVO
In billions of rubles
“Infrastructure development”,
INCLUDING FUNDING OF SCIENCE CITIES
Funding of Skolkovo (in rubles)
29
Fundamental research
798
INCLUDING FUNDING OF SKOLKOVO
“Institutional development”
442
Fundamental science & innovation
216
“International development”
52
2011
15 bln
Funding of naukograd (in rubles)
2004
1,5 bln
Program implementation
2013
17 bln
2012
22 bln
- 60%
2011
579 mln
23
Until the mid-2000s, the naukograd remained one of the only successful national-level initiatives in support of innovation. However, beginning in 2005, the federal government started adding and diversifying projects in this domain. That year it was decided to create several special economic zones based on a general strategy aiming
to create a large production and research focus including zones that until then had
been affected by the crisis. Most of the time, the high-technology SEZs were created
in the science cities so as to support the development of these cities, such as in Dubna. For these cities, this was an especially prosperous time marked by the consistent
increase in budgetary allocations.
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However, in 2009, the situation changed. The new Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, decided on the creation on the outskirts of Moscow of a large industrial park
named Skolkovo, which soon came to be nicknamed the “Russian Silicon Valley.”
Skolkovo was thought up to become the global showcase of Russian innovation, and
the project was financed at an amount of several tens of billions of dollars. Officially, the development strategy of the naukograd and Skolkovo were compatible: the
naukograd focused on local development while Skolkovo had an international inclination. However, vociferous criticism soon came from the Union of Science Cities,
which blamed Skolkovo for the plunge in allocations for the naukograd beginning in
2010 (C), while the program “Science 2020,” which set major objectives in Russian
innovation between now and 2020, dedicated only a small amount of its allocated
resources to the naukograd (B). This was combined with the fact that the project to
create a new technopole “ex nihilo” was disputed given that the science cities would
already fulfill, on their respective territories, all the conditions required for creating
this attractive environment that was inspired by the American example of Silicon Valley and that offered an excellent quality of life and a true “culture of innovation.”
Beyond an apparent complementarity, this was a confrontation between two philosophies of Russia’s technological development: the philosophy of Skolkovo, which
was centralized and inspired by codes and processes borrowed from the Anglosphere, opposed that of the science cities, which was defined by a culture of independent decision making and which placed importance on the notion of legacy, history and memory.
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7. THE UNIQUE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE SCIENCE CITIES
2007 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
United Russia
DUBNA
YAROSLAVL
Communist Party
TVER
A Just Russia
Dmitrov
Klin
LDPR
CHERNOGOLOVKA VLADIMIR
KOROLEV
Yabloko
Noginsk
Others
MOSCOW
ZHUKOVSKY
Naro-Fominsk
TROITSK
DUBNA
Kevin Limonier, 2014
OVERALL RESULTS
Noginsk
Cities
with naukograd status
Other cities
Russian Federation
RYAZAN
KALUGA
PUSHCHINO
Moscow Region
TULA
2011 LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
DUBNA
YAROSLAVL
TVER
Dmitrov
Klin
CHERNOGOLOVKA VLADIMIR
KOROLEV
Noginsk
MOSCOW
ZHUKOVSKY
Naro-Fominsk
TROITSK
Kevin Limonier, 2014
OVERALL RESULTS
KALUGA
PUSHCHINO
Russian Federation
RYAZAN
Moscow Region
TULA
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At present, what is the true impact of the policies to support innovation in the naukograd, particularly in political and societal terms? Beyond the economic activity that
these programs contributed to reflate, attention must be given to what proves to be
the central aspect of these policies: preserving or creating spaces of socialization
that favor the emergence of new ideas, against a backdrop of a representation of development or common good that is broadly influenced by the government’s political
orientations (safeguarding and celebrating heritage, etc.).
An analysis of the results of the December 2011 elections (legislative elections)
and the March 2010 elections (presidential elections) offers the most noteworthy lessons. In the Moscow region, the naukograd differed from the rest of the territory in
showing a significant change in their voting behaviors. While in 2007, during the
first-round legislative elections, the science cities voted similarly to other cities, this
changed in 2011: in the naukograd, the Russia United vote retracted considerably, to
the benefit of the Communist Party and the social-liberal coalition A Just Russia. It is
therefore striking to see that these same naukograd counted among the territories
of the country in which the party in power fared the worst, a trend that held in the
2012 presidential elections: Vladimir Putin barely got a majority there, contrary to his
showing in the neighboring cities.
This behavior can undoubtedly be explained in part by the climate of dissatisfaction found in the country, which had been shaken by large waves of antigovernment
demonstrations. However, the existing differential between the science cities and the
“ordinary” of the small cities of the Moscow region cannot be decoded only in light
of this data. In reality, a deeper analysis of voting behaviors, at the level of the voting
stations of each city, would show that the majority of the “protest” vote (particularly
the Just Russia and Prokhorov vote) was concentrated in areas that were rehabilitated or built for the benefit of the development program of the naukograd. These
areas are those into which new, young, educated populations had moved, attracted
throughout the 2000s to the naukograd by the development of advanced initiatives.
It can then be seen that although there existed a connection between gentrification
and electoral dissatisfaction regarding the government, this connection was not without its paradoxes: it was the territories and social classes that had most benefited
from the largesse of the federal government that then turned from it. In reality, while
this vote confirmed that the development model of the naukograd was a relative
success (the Just Russia vote would therefore be a good indicator to measure the impact of the revival programs), it also indicated a deepening rift between the “creative
classes” and the elites regarding the meaning to give to local prosperity.
A good example of this rift is offered by the resurgence of conflicts in planning that
some science cities experienced. Since 2009 and the inauguration of the Skolkovo
worksite, the budgetary allocations of the naukograd are falling. These drops lead
the elites of these cities to find new sources of funding and wealth accumulation,
particularly by selling land and real property. Plots of forest, lakes and rivers that were
especially valued by the inhabitants and were symbols of the privilege of a superior
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quality of life were thus sold to developers in some of these cities (Dubna, Zhukovsky
and Khimki). These actions sparked widespread rallying against these projects by
new populations that were fiercely opposed to the destruction of the environment
and that simultaneously accused the authorities of nepotism and corruption.
Henceforth, it would seem that a new challenge that is more far reaching for these
cities, and that pertains to the entire country, is responding to the economic success
of the science cities. In these territories where the safeguarding of the technical and
intellectual legacies of the Soviet Union may be considered successful, new electoral
dynamics and conflicts of planning invite questions on the stability of the development model as proposed by the authorities throughout the 2000s. Indeed, neither
the economic successes nor the preservation of the legacies, which were broadly
evoked in the official arguments to promote the naukograd model, seem to exempt
these cities from a new phase of reassessment regarding the definition of the general interest and the meaning to give to technological development.
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CONCLUSION
The naukograd represent an opportunity for Russia: first, they concentrate in delineated geographic areas a significant share of the scientific and intellectual heritage
that comes from the complex of Soviet research; second, they are the custodians of
an idea, which was inspired by the Soviet ethical code, of the role that science and
innovation must play in society. Indeed, these cities were subject to various revival
and development programs in the 1990s and 2000s. These initiatives, which were
sometimes successful, nonetheless still fall short of the real needs that these territories have in order to complete a transition that has been going on for more than
twenty years. The opaqueness of these revival policies, and the fact that they were
considerably “eclipsed” by the Skolkovo project, has not helped these science cities
gain the publicity that they doubtlessly deserve.
For all that, and despite the aging and the gradual demise of the elite scientists
who were educated during the Soviet era, these cities are changing. As the last
plate of this atlas shows, the surprising electoral results that these cities post are the
mark of profound societal changes. The rise of the social-liberal vote, although it is
localized to particular sectors of these cities, indicates that a certain “gentrification”
is occurring. Due mainly to the influx of young university graduates who are seeking
a pleasant place to live, this new trend sanctions the appearance of a provincial
“creative class,” whereas this type of population is usually seen in the centers of the
large cities (particularly Moscow and St. Petersburg). Beyond the political challenges
that they pose for the established municipal employees, these changes are well and
truly the proof that these former islands of the Soviet Union’s technological power are
transforming and adapting despite everything.
Before the colossal projects in support of innovation that are embodied in Skolkovo and other large technopoles that were built ex nihilo in the provinces (Alabuga,
for example), the science cities thus continue to play their role of incubators and
breeding grounds of skills. Although it is still hard to predict the consequences of the
current economic crisis on these fragile ecosystems, they are no less an opportunity
for Russia and for foreign investors. For all anyone knows, perhaps it is these small,
placid cities that house the ingredient that Skolkovo lacks to become a “Russian Silicon Valley”: a history, a landscape, a heritage—in short, a true culture of life centered
on research and innovation.
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SOURCES
1. THE SCIENCE CITIES: AN ARCHIPELAGO OF RUSSIAN INNOVATION
Union for the development of science cities, 2013.
Rosstat, State Statistics Committee, 2013.
Federal Law n°70-F3 (April 9, 1999) on the status of science cities.
Parliamentary Commitee on local management issues. Doklad o sostojanii gosudarstvennoj politiki o naukogradah i napravenijax ee razvitija (Report on the state and
prospects of the development of public policies for science cities). Moscow : State
Duma, 2006.
2. A TERRITORIAL AND FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE
INHERITED FROM THE USSR
LIMONIER K., « Geopolitical analysis of what is at stake in a policy of power : the case
of science and innovation in Russia ». Hérodote, revue de géographie et de géopolitique n°146-147, 2012. pp. 193-216
OCDE, Science, Technology and Innovation Policies: Federation of Russia. Center for
cooperation with transition economies Centre for Co-operation with Economies in
Transition, Background Report, Vol. 2, 1994.
GLOAGUEN C., « Le complexe militaro-industriel russe » [The Russian Military-Industrial Complex], Le Courrier des pays de l’Est n° 1032, 2003. pp. 4-17.
3. A DEVELOPMENT MODEL BORN DURING THE CHALLENGES OF THE
TRANSITION
Union for the development of science cities, 2012.
KUZNECOV Y. « Finansirovanie grazhdanskoj nauki v Rossii is federal’nogo bjudzheta » (Public funding of civil science in Russia). Otečestvennye Zapiski n°7, 2002.
4. THE STATUS OF “NAUKOGRAD”:
BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND INTERVENTIONISM
Rosstat, State Statistics Committee, 2010.
Parliamentary Commitee on local management issues. Doklad o sostojanii gosudarstvennoj politiki o naukogradah i napravenijax ee razvitija (Report on the state and
prospects of the development of public policies for science cities). Moscow : State
Duma, 2006.
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5. CHALLENGES OF THE REVIVAL: THE EXAMPLE OF DUBNA
LIMONIER K. La cité scientifique de Doubna. De la « ville idéale » soviétique à la
vitrine du renouveau de la Russie contemporaine, étude d’un territoire d’innovation
mis au service d’un discours de puissance. Thèse de doctorat soutenue le 28 novembre 2014, université Paris VIII.
Conseil Municipal de Doubna. Otčet Glavy goroda po itogam raboty za 2010g. (Rapport du maire sur les résultats de l’année 2010)
6. NEW POLICIES TO SUPPORT INNOVATION:
COMPETITIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY?
LIMONIER K. La cité scientifique de Doubna. De la « ville idéale » soviétique à la
vitrine du renouveau de la Russie contemporaine, étude d’un territoire d’innovation
mis au service d’un discours de puissance. [The science city of Dubna. From the
Soviet « ideal city » to the showcase of contemporary Russia’s revival, study on a
territory of innovation in the service of a power discourse] PhD thesis defended on
November 28, 2014, university Paris VIII.
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. State program for the
development of science and technology 2013-2020. Moscow, December 20, 2012.
7. THE UNIQUE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE SCIENCE CITIES.
Election Commission of the Moscow oblast’ (Mosoblizbirkom), 2007, 2011.
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