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Study Guide
2015
28 – 31 May
United Nations
Security Council I
Chair: Alessandra Pozzi
CO-Chair: Oscar Santiago
http://pimun.epanu.org/
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Table of Contents
Welcoming Letter from the Chair……………………………………………………………………2
Introduction to the Committee………………………………………………………………………..4
Topic A: Addressing and counteracting the destabilizing effects that the situation in Libya has
on the Sahel region.……………………………………………………………………………………...6
I.
Historical Background………………………………………………………………………..6
II.
Legal Outer Space Framework……………………………………………………………....7
III.
The Right of Sabotage………………………………………………………………………...6
IV.
UN Secretary General Report................................................................................................10

Caption.........................................................................................................................10

Throwback Revolution..................................................................................................10

Chronology...................................................................................................................11

2014-2015 and the Geneva Talks.................................................................................13
V.
Neighbouring Countires..........................................................................................................14
VI.
The Rise of the ISIS.................................................................................................................16
VII.
Conclusion and Recommendations........................................................................................17
VIII.
Question a Resolurtion Must Answer....................................................................................19
IX.
Bibliography.............................................................................................................................20
X.
Further Research.....................................................................................................................21
Welcoming Letter from the Chair
Honorable delegates,
I welcome you to the Security Council in this year’s Paris International Model United Nations.
Along with my co-chair, Alessandra, we will strive to make this a fun, rewarding and memorable
experience for you. The solutions we think of during the conference will help us later on
constructing a better and fairer world, both here at home and abroad.
As for myself, I was born and raised in Bogotá, Colombia, and am currently studying my Bachelor
in Philosophy and Political Science at the Ruprecht-Karls Universität Heidelberg in Germany. My
love for MUN dates back five years, time in which I have participated on several conferences in
Colombia and Europe.
To describe my chairing style, I believe participants must be allowed to develop freely. A chair’s
task is to simply moderate debate, only directly intervening in a substantial discussion if absolutely
critical. However, I also work to uphold the Rules of Procedure to the best of my ability, for I place
a big value in the strategic use delegates make of the RoP during committee sessions (besides this,
I am a pretty chilled and nice guy).
I very much look forward to meeting you all in Paris.
Best regards,
Oscar Santiago Vargas Guevara
1
Introduction to the Committee
The United Nations Security Council is one of the six main organs of the United Nations.
The Council currently consists of 15 Members. Five of them are recognized as “Permanent
Members” of the Council. These are: the Peoples’ Republic of China, the French Republic, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as well as the
United States of America (in the MUN context they are often referred to as the “P5”). The other
10 seats are granted to different UN Member States on rotational basis, with observance of the
official UN internal regional division, and for a 2-year long term of office. The Security Council
is so designed as to function continuously. For that reason, a representative of each Member of the
Council has to be present at the UN (and also the Council’s) Headquarters in New York at all
times.
The Security Council is a sui generis body with its main goal being maintenance of international
peace and security. If a threat to the international peace and security is determined by the Council
would, it would usually act as follows:
When peaceful means are still considered as possibly sufficient to bring an end to the crisis at
hand:
set forth principles for an agreement;
undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;
dispatch a mission;
appoint special envoys; or
Request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the
dispute.
When the crisis leads to hostilities, the Council may:
issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict;
Dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate
opposing forces and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.
In the last resort the Council may authorize:
economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans;
severance of diplomatic relations;
blockade;
Collective military action.
2
The Security Council can issue a Resolution (a legally binding document) or a Presidential
Statement (a legally non-binding document). In order to react and authorize measures against a
“threat to international peace and security”, nine affirmative votes of the Council’s Members are
needed, including affirmative votes of all its Permanent Members. However, should there be 14
votes in favor but 1 vote against cast by a Permanent Member (so called “veto”), the draft
Resolution at hand would fail.
For more information on the Security Council see, inter alia: http://www.un.org/en/sc/
3
Topic A: Addressing and counteracting the destabilizing effects that the situation in Libya
has on the Sahel region
Limiting the militarization of space in regard to the right of sabotage
With Military capacities of countries increasing, many have the technology, or the possibility to attain it,
to pose a direct threat to satellites. The current framework allows the so-called right of sabotage where
satellites can be shot down by their respective operators. It is upon the delegates to discuss the negative
effects of the framework and how it could be adapted to today’s world to counteract Star Wars.
I.
Historical Background
On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union placed Sputnik-I, the first artificial satellite into orbit,
launching mankind into Space Age. Since then, several countries have launched and developed
ambitious space programs, delving deeper and deeper in the mysteries of the universe. The United
States and the U.S.S.R/Russia have been the leading figures in this process, although every year
more and more countries set their eyes to the stars, even unlikely players, such as Ecuador and
Romania.
Space exploration has soared since 1957. Four years later, Russian astronaut Yuri Gagarin became
the first human to see Earth from its orbit, and on 1969, the United States Apollo 11 mission landed
on the moon. Since then, nine space stations have been built and occupied by astronauts of different
countries, and the International Space Station –a sixteen-nation joint endeavor– currently serves
as a laboratory for microgravity experiments in several scientific fields. Manned space vehicles,
such as the Space Shuttle, which ended operations on 2011, and the Russian Soyuz, still active,
have made regular flights between Earth and low Earth orbit. The development of satellites has
also become a central part of space exploration “The satellite industry is the largest sector of
commercial space activities today. Orbiting satellites, for example, facilitate communication
4
between distant points on Earth. However, space has also become an important military tool.
Satellites have become the eyes, ears and nerves of today’s military forces.” (Wolff 6)
Although the value of these strides in outer space exploration for the development of science and
technology is undeniable, several analysts prefer to understand the space race as inseparable from
geopolitical aims, particularly the arms race between the two superpowers during the Cold War
(Mushkat 113). At the core of this debate lies the potential dual-use of space objects and
technologies, which could be used for either peaceful purposes or advanced warfare. This is
particularly the case with technologies that can be used interchangeably for space launch vehicles
and for ballistic missiles. The Global Positioning System (GPS) , on the other hand, is used for the
guidance of many precision weapons, but also for various civilian consumer applications, blurring
the lines between the civilian and military purposes of satellites (Wolff 6).
II.
Legal Outer Space Framework
Throughout the second half of the XX century, the international community has strived to limit
the militarization of Outer Space and to restrict activities to peaceful uses. The United Nations’
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), established in 1958 by General
Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII), has been chiefly responsible for the development and
codification of international law on Outer Space affairs. The most important instruments of law
that emerged during the last five decades through the work of COPUOS are listed below.

1945
Charter of the United Nations: In 1959, the legal subcommittee of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space issued a report stating that the UN Charter
and the Statute of the ICJ were not limited to the confines of the Earth, extending its
jurisdiction to Outer Space affairs. The UN Charter establishes the basic principles of state
sovereignty, non-aggression, and the right to self-defense, among others.

1967
Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies: The Outer Space
Treaty (OST) prohibits the testing of weapons, the storage of mass destruction weapons,
the holding of military maneuvers, or the establishment of military bases in space. The
Treaty does not contemplate the transit of nuclear weapons through space or nuclear
5
weapons launched from Earth to destroy incoming missiles, as originally permitted in the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (Wolff 7).

1968
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched
into Outer Space: The Rescue Agreement provides that States shall take all necessary
measures to assist astronauts in distress and promptly return them to the launching State.

1972
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects:
The Liability Convention provides that a launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay
compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to
aircraft, and liable for damage due to its faults in space. The convention also provides
procedures for the settlement of claims for damages.

1979
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial
Bodies: The Moon Treaty reaffirms and elaborates on many of the provisions of the Outer
Space Treaty as applied to the moon and other celestial bodies. These bodies shall be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes, and the resources within them are the common heritage
of mankind. As such, any possible future exploitation of its resources needs to be regulated
by an international regime, once such exploitation becomes scientifically feasible.
III.
The Right of Sabotage
Under the current legal framework, the operating country of a satellite keeps the right to dispose
of the object in any way, for as long as these actions do not directly affect another country’s
civilians or infrastructure within Earth’s atmosphere. Operating countries may shoot down
dysfunctional or old satellites under their possession without any international legal repercussions.
This is the denominated right of sabotage.
The main negative consequence of destroying a satellite is the production of big amounts of space
debris. Orbital debris is defined as “all the man-made objects in orbit about the Earth, which no
longer serve a useful purpose. Derelict spacecraft and upper stages of launch vehicles, carriers for
multiple payloads, debris intentionally released during spacecraft separation from its launch
vehicle” (NASA), or, in this case, the remnants of a shot down satellite are all examples of orbital
debris. Satellites and spacecraft are in general able to withstand the collision of particles smaller
than 1 cm, and although the collision with larger objects is unlikely. There is, however, still
6
significant danger. In 2009, for example, an operational U.S. Iridium satellite collided with a
derelict Russian Cosmos satellite.
Particularly worrying for the international community was the intentional destruction on January
11, 2007 of China’s Fengyun-1C weather satellite via an anti-satellite (ASAT) device launched by
the Chinese. China’s action was criticized by several other satellite-operating nations on two
accounts: (1) China’s incursion into ASAT systems may be interpreted as a threat to peace in outer
space, since these technology could also be used to shoot down other nations’ satellites, in itself
an act of war. Chinese authorities have dismissed these criticisms and have restated their
commitment to uphold peace in outer space. (2) The debris cloud produced by the collision
extended between 125 to 2292 miles of altitude, encompassing the entirety of low Earth orbit. The
International Space Stations, along with other satellites in the lower orbit, were put in harm’s way.
Both the intentional destruction of the Chinese satellite and the accidental collision of American
and Russian communication satellites in 2009 currently represent one third of all catalogued orbital
debris (NASA).
There is currently no international treaty that handles orbital debris. However, the Inter-Agency
Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) was created by the world’s leading space agencies
to address orbital debris issues and to encourage operations in Earth orbit that limit the growth of
space debris. Additionally, the orbital debris has been a topic of assessment and discussion in the
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS. Both IADC and COPUOS have published
orbital debris mitigation guidelines.
« As United Nations and international efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the political and
institutional crisis in Libya accelerated during the reporting period, the overall security in the
country continued to deteriorate sharply. »
7
IV.

UN Secretary General Report to the UNSC, February 2015
Caption
The fall of Qadhafi’s regime and his death did not bring stability to Libya – the country is
experiencing strong separatist movements backed by militias of different allegiances and rising
influence of Al-Qaeda in the region. The new government is not in a position to impose a solution.
Meanwhile, the Sahel region depends on Libya’s situation. If it fails to restore the governmental
influence and improve the economy, it will intensify the instability that is gathering in the region,
creating a serious threat to international peace and security. Therefore, delegates should access the
situation at hand and try to find ways of improving it.

Throwback to the Revolution
Today, Libya’s deteriorating internal conflict may be nearing a dramatic turning point. Qadhafi’s
bloody end and the collapse of Libya’s police and armed forces left in its wake an armed population
with 42 years’ worth of pent-up grievances. His longstanding divide-and-rule strategy set
communities against one other, each vying for a share of resources and the regime’s favour.
In order to better grasp the depth and emergency of Libya’s situation, let us take a look at recent
events (BBC World News).

Chronology 2014 – April 2015
8
June 2014 - Prime Minister Maiteg resigns after Supreme Court rules his appointment illegal. New
Parliament chosen in elections marred by a low turn-out attributed to security fears and boycotts;
Islamists suffer heavy defeat. Fighting breaks out between forces loyal to outgoing GNC and new
parliament.
July 2014 UN staff pull out, embassies shut, foreigners evacuated as security situation deteriorates.
Tripoli international airport put out of action by fighting. Ansar al-Sharia seizes control of most of
Benghazi.
October 2014 - UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visits to continue UN-brokered talks between
the new parliament and government based in Tobruk and Islamist Libya Dawn militias holding
Tripoli. UN says 100,000s displaced by clashes. Islamic State extremist militia seizes control of
port of Derna in eastern Libya.
December 2014 - After recapturing most of Benghazi in October, the Army launches offensive to
recapture Derna and push Libya Dawn out of western Libya.
January 2015 - Libyan army and Tripoli-based militia alliance declare partial ceasefire after UNsponsored talks in Geneva. Islamist militants kill nine people in gun and bomb attack on Corinthia
Hotel in Tripoli.
February 2015 - Libya's internationally-recognised government revokes law that barred officials
from the Gaddafi era from holding political posts. The Italian embassy in Tripoli - the last
European embassy in the city - is closed and its staff repatriated due to security concerns. Egyptian
jets bomb Islamic State targets in Libya, a day after the group there released a video showing the
beheading of 21 Egyptian Christians.
Over six months of fighting between two Parliaments, their respective Governments and allied
militias have led to the brink of all-out war. The most likely medium-term prospect “is not one
side’s triumph, but that rival local warlords and radical groups will proliferate, what remains of
state institutions will collapse, financial reserves (based on oil and gas revenues and spent on food
9
and refined fuel imports) will be depleted, and hardship for ordinary Libyans will increase
exponentially”.
To this day, the UN Secretary General reports that armed hostilities spread to the country’s northwest, the eastern oil crescent area and to the southern region. In the east, fighting intensified in
Benghazi, causing the breakdown of much of the city’s public services, resulting in severe
shortages in the supply of food and medicine. The continued indiscriminate shelling and use of air
assets against targets in heavily populated areas and strategic installations across the country
underscores the growing plight of the civilian population and the systematic destruction of much
of the country’s vital infrastructure.
The closure of much of Libyan airspace to commercial flights, combined with an escalation in
fighting across different parts of the country and diminished State capacity to provide basic
services, aggravated the humanitarian crisis triggered over the summer months by the outbreak of
violence in July 2014 and the gradual breakdown of law and order across the country. A video
released by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) showing the mass beheading of 21 men
in February, reportedly near Sirte, preceded by a spate of terrorist attacks targeting public buildings
and foreign embassies, including those of Algeria, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates,
underscored the consolidation of power by extremist and terror-linked groups in the east and their
increased visibility in other areas.

2014-2015 and the Geneva Talks under impulse of UN Special Representative B. Leon
10
Four years since the start of the revolution on 17 February 2011, the country’s faltering political
process has brought Libya dangerously close to complete civil war. The continued presence and
consolidation of parallel executive and legislative bodies has contributed to the further weakening
of the Libyan State and its social fabric.
2014 has seen violence increase again, with multiple bombardment and attacks on civilian
infrastructure. At least 1,000 Libyans have died, many of them non-combatants; and internally
displaced persons have increased from 100,000 to 400,000. The fledging post-Qadhafi state is
dramatic: basic goods and fuel are in short supply; in some urban areas people do not have reliable
access to communications or electricity and are using firewood for cooking. The likelihood of
major militia offensives in cities like Benghazi raises the spectre of humanitarian disaster. Libya
also faces the prospect of insolvency within the next few years as a result of falling oil revenue
and faltering economic governance.
As the crisis has deepened, the positions of the rival camps have hardened, and their rhetoric has
become more incendiary. Libyans, who united to overthrow Qadhafi in 2011, vow for support
from regional patrons by casting their dispute in terms of Islamism and anti-Islamism or revolution
and counter-revolution. The conflict’s reality, however, is a much more complex, multi-layered
struggle over the nation’s political and economic structure that has no military solution. A
negotiated resolution is the only way forward, but the window is closing fast.
The two rounds of talks the UN hosted in Geneva over January 2015 mark a breakthrough: for the
first time since September 2014, representatives of factions comprising the two main rival blocs
met and tentatively agreed to a new framework that will at least extend the talks.
The talks’ chief success so far has been to bring individuals representing a wide array of Libyan
factions together, as inclusiveness is the only viable basis for a sustainable solution. Personalities
loosely associated with the two camps have also attended, but as individuals. Neither camp’s
purported representatives could be said to have gone to Geneva with the genuine blessing of its
official institutions (parliament or government). Additionally, some members view the UN
initiative to bring other parties, such as municipal councils, to the table as an affront to their
11
legitimacy; senior HoR members have said they will oppose any deal that puts in question the
body’s authority. The road is long, and there will be setbacks, for example if parties refuse to
participate or pull out; the General National Council (GNC) in Tripoli only belatedly agreed to
participate in the talks, while the Tobruk-based House of Representative (HoR) announced it was
suspending its participation in them on 23 February. Yet, this is the only political game in town
and the only hope that a breakdown into open warfare can be avoided.
V.
Neighbouring countries
Neighbours are deeply involved in the crisis but also deeply divided. Egypt, Chad and Niger are
in favour of the current House of Representatives; Sudan leans toward the GNC; Algeria and
Tunisia are neutral and try to broker negotiations. Qatar and Turkey are closer to the GNC, though
Ankara has publicly called on all sides to negotiate. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have helped the
rebels politically and militarily. Tunisia and Algeria are working in tandem for a negotiated
solution (Algeria’s own considerations are largely driven by concern about securing its border with
Libya and opposition to a new international military intervention, championed by France in
southern Libya).
All claim to want to assist the UN’s efforts in Geneva. It is commonly argued that a unified Libyan
government, envisioned as a broad tent that would exclude Islamic radicals, would be most
effective in combatting terrorism, to which Cairo is sensitive after IS killed 21 of its citizens in
mid-February.
The conflict has left Libya’s security institutions with little or no capacity to secure the country’s
borders, giving rise to increased opportunities for the movement of extremist groups, transnational
organized crime and illegal smuggling of migrants. Fighting between Libyan factions has also
12
sparked several incidents at or close to border crossing points, most notably attacks on the Ras
Jdair border area between Libya and Tunisia.
Gaddafi’s Libya was a bastion of stability in a volatile region. Its borders were relatively wellcontrolled and Gaddafi could turn into a constructive actor in peace agreements in Mali and Niger.
Libya not only provided much needed foreign direct investment to neighbouring Sahel countries,
but was also a source of employment for people from nearby and faraway African countries.
A joint Arab and Sahel agenda for Libya is hence not likely to materialise soon. While the
neighbours all have legitimate security concerns about the chaos and the opportunities it affords
radical groups (whether pre-existing or new, such as Ansar Sharia or emerging IS-affiliated ones),
many have traditional allies in Libya that are as likely to manipulate them (and powers further
afield) as they are to be influenced by them. Moreover, for some Gulf states in particular, the
approach has little to do with direct security threats, but more with ideology and regional rifts,
notably over what role Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood will play in Libya
and whether they will use its wealth to support like-minded movements elsewhere.
The international community has to apply a regional focus that goes beyond narrow counterterrorism efforts and works with different types of actors to restore local governance structures
and offers livelihood opportunities. Without such a focus, the armed Islamist forces expelled from
Northern Mali will establish new rear-guard bases elsewhere, including in the Southern Libyan
region of Fezzan. Without a new approach, current stabilization efforts will not be sustainable. The
international community will put out a fire one place, only for it to reignite elsewhere in the region
until the process has gone full circle and goes back to where it first started.
VI.
The rise of ISIS
13
Already attested by the rise of radical groups – with the beheading of 21 Egyptians and deadly
bombings by the Libyan franchise of the Islamic State (IS), extremist groups will find fertile
ground, while regional involvement – evidenced by retaliatory Egyptian airstrikes – will increase.
ISIS first announced its presence in Libya is October 2014, when a video appeared online showing
a large group of militants in Derna pledging their allegiance to ISIS’ leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi.
ISIS is allegedly responsible for over 15 terrorist attacks in the past 6 months. The city has a long
history of Islamist radicalism: marginalized during the Gadhafi era, it contributed more foreign
fighters per capita to al Qaeda in Iraq than any other town in the Middle East. It has also provided
scores of fighters for ISIS in Syria.
VII.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In truth, the most and the least promising features of post-Qadhafi Libya stem from a single
reality. Because the country lacks a fully functioning state, effective army or police, local actors –
notables, civilian and military councils, revolutionary brigades – have stepped in to provide safety,
mediate disputes and impose ceasefires. It is past time to reverse the tide, reform army and police
and establish structures of a functioning state that can ensure implementation of ceasefire
agreements and tackle root causes of conflict.
14
Actors with a stake in Libya’s future should seize on the UN’s January diplomatic
breakthrough in Geneva that points to a possible peaceful way out; but to get a deal between Libyan
factions – the best base from which to counter jihadist – they must take more decisive and focused
supportive action than they yet have.
To succeed, according to the ICG, diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict need a push
from the “P3+5”, the countries and international institutions most involved to date: three Security
Council permanent members – the UK, U.S. and France – plus Germany, Italy, Spain, the EU and
the UN itself. The P3+5 face a choice in how to deal with boycotters and other potential spoilers.
They can continue to opt for the ambiguity in their current course: supporting the House of
Representatives’ legitimacy claim; sending strong signals they disapprove of its actions; but doing
nothing about it. The current ambiguity reflects genuine differences among the Security Council’s
five permanent members, hence what can be achieved through the UN. Russia and to some extent
France are signalling they would block any sanctions, particularly on General Haftar, that could
undermine the HoR camp; the U.S. and UK have indicat- ed to the HoR that their support is
contingent on more inclusive, de-escalatory be- haviour; China has avoided taking a position. What
can be done internationally will thus necessarily be limited; for now, efforts should focus on
building on the UN talks and strengthening existing instruments to contain the conflict.
The International Crisis Group, leading think tank of the field, recommends to following
to the Security Council:
“Insist on participation in the UN-led negotiations and on behaviour on the ground, notably
adherence to ceasefires and calls to de-escalate.
Be more forthright in confronting regional actors who contribute to the conflict by
providing arms or other military or political support – notably Chad, Egypt, Qatar, Sudan, Turkey
15
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – and encourage them to press their Libyan allies to negotiate
in good faith in pursuit of a political settlement. Military intervention on counter-terrorism
grounds, as requested by Egypt, would torpedo the political process, and for now should be
opposed.
Devise, without prejudice to the UN’s efforts to achieve reconciliation, political and
military strategies to fight terrorism in coordination with Libyan political forces from both camps
but refrain from supporting outside military intervention to combat the IS.
Keep in place the UN arms embargo, expressly reject its full or partial lifting and strengthen
its implementation to the extent possible
Consider UN sanctions against individuals only if so advised by the Secretary-General and
his representative.
Protect the neutrality and independence of financial and petroleum institutions: the Central
Bank of Libya (CBL), the National Oil Company (NOC) and the Libyan Investment Authority
(LIA); and ensure that these manage the national wealth to address the basic needs of the people
and contribute to a negotiated political solution.”
VIII. Questions a Resolution should answer
The main task of this committee will be to evaluate the current stand of international law on the
Right of Sabotage, taking into account both the possibility of increased space militarization
through the permission of Anti-Satellite Missiles, and the topic of orbital debris. “Because all space
systems, whether civil or military, are subject to the threat or damage from orbital debris, States
need to consider what international norms, laws and agreements may be needed to protect all space
systems” (Secure World)
The main questions that a resolution in the Security Council should answer are:
16
Does the operating country of a satellite have a right to shoot down its own satellites without
consultation with other operators, that may result affected by the orbital debris caused?
How should countries developing Anti-Satellite Missiles technology build trust and
accountability with its partners to guarantee the peaceful objectives of their programs?
Should satellites be placed under international control? How would such a system look like?
IX.
Literature
David, Leonard: “China’s Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud circles Earth, Space.com, 2
February 2007
Hartman, Pierre; Hosenball, Neil: “The Dilemmas of Outer Space Law”, American Bar Association
Journal, Vol. 60, No. 3 (1974)
Kaufman, Marc; Linzer, Dafna: “China Criticized for Anti-Satellite Missile Test”, Washington Post, 19
January 2007
Mushkat, M.: “New Developments in Outer Space Law and their role in increasing International Security”,
Max-Planck-Istitut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1970)
NASA Orbital Debris Program Office: Frequently Asked Questions, Last Updated: March 2012, Accessed
on April 2015. < http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html#16>
Office of Science and Technology Policy: Interagency Report on Orbital Debris, November 1995, URL <
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/IAR_95_Document.pdf>
17
Secure World: “Space Law and Policy”, Last updated: July 2013, Accessed on: April 2015, URL: <
http://swfound.org/our-focus/space-law-and-policy/#>
Vignard, Kerstin: Prologue. Making Space for Security, Disarmament Forum (2003)
Wolff, Johannes: “‘Peaceful uses’ of outer space has permitted its militarization – does it also mean its
weaponization?”, Making Space for Security?, Disarmament Forum (2003)
United Nations: “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies”, 10 October 1967,
United Nations: “Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects launched into Outer Space”, 3 December 1968
United Nations: “Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects”, 29 March
1972
United Nations: “Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies”,
11 July 1984
X.
For further research
United Nations Secretary General Report to the Security Council on the UN support Mission in Libya S
2015/144, February 2015
Special report of the Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of the United Nations presence in Libya,
S/2015 113, February 2015
International Crisis Group, Middle East and Africa, Divided We Stand, Libya’s Enduring Conflicts,
September 2012, ICG
Security Council Report
18
21 Christians Egyptians killed by IS, Testimonial
ISIS comes to Libya, Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi speech, CNN
19