How to move OTC Derivatives Markets on to Exchange A Detailed Guide For Leaders & Specialists A comprehensive hybrid solution is presented:• All the advantages of exchange trading can be realized without breaking the existing business logic of our liquid OTC markets. • The proposal is regulator friendly, will reduce systematic risk and will still be completely sell-side and buy-side friendly. Contents How To Move OTC Derivatives Markets On To Exchange Introduction 1 How To Migrate OTC Derivatives Onto Exchange Without Damaging The Market 2 A. Why reforming OTC-markets is potentially problematic 2 Why banks fear the EET model 2 Why end users don’t like CCPC 3 Valuation issues 3 B. A new (hybrid) exchange trading model 4 A harmonious first step 4 A further useful step 6 Example: How To Move CDS Onto A Hybrid Exchange 8 A. OTC CDS and the compromises made to clear them 8 8 Key features of OTC CDS B. About x-CDS 10 Developments in OTC CDS viewed from an x-CDS perspective 10 Relationship between x-CDS and electronic futures 10 C. How to offer OTC-like CDS whilst actually trading x-CDS 12 Notes 16 Epilogue Back cover Introduction The purpose of this document is to publicise a new paradigm for addressing the problems posed by so called1 OTC derivatives. The proposals are not backed by any think-tank, NGO, government department or large institution, but please do not be put off from giving this guide the attention it deserves simply because I am acting alone2 – These ideas are regulator friendly, will reduce systematic risk and will still be completely sell-side and buy-side friendly3. If you have taken an interest in the role of these markets during the recent financial crisis you will already know that change is needed and also what general form change should take:A. The unrestricted use of a particular sub-class of OTC derivative known as CDS of ABS accelerated the irresponsible subprime lending behaviour of certain US banks and was also the leading factor behind the spread of the resulting bad debt exposures to other institutions both globally and in the US.4 B. In addition the web of contractual links generated by the mainstream OTC derivatives markets is known to have posed a systematic risk in the recent banking crisis. As a result banks at the centre of this contractual web were seen as “too big to fail” and have allegedly been subject to so called moral hazard, further increasing systematic risk. C. In these circumstances it appears that forcing OTC derivatives onto exchange would be a sensible idea based on the fact that EET5 futures and options markets have operated efficiently in the past and that these EET products are derivatives. If one set of derivatives provide regulatory transparency plus low systematic risk in bad times (i.e. just the features OTC reformers are looking for) then why not move others onto the same platform? Unfortunately, trying to force OTC derivatives onto exchange has become very controversial: Both genuine and imagined obstacles preventing progress towards exchange trading have resulted in some policy makers moving in favour of clearing only rather than exchange traded “solutions”6. Fully formed solutions for moving OTC swaps and other derivatives markets onto exchange are very rare7 – Hopefully this document will help people of influence to transcend the earlier debate and provide a new way forward towards exchange-like trading. If you are a political leader, central banker, market regulator, financial journalist, exchange executive, a derivative supplying bank, or an end-user please read this guide and/or circulate it to your colleagues or staff. The recent global financial crisis requires that we respond to it8: I believe that you have a duty to be open to good ideas just as I have a responsibility to make the ideas presented in this guide more widely known. If you have any questions please get in touch. Pavel Pinkava otc-reform@ntlworld.com January 2010 1 How To Migrate OTC Derivatives Onto Exchange Without Damaging The Market In this section I will:- A. Why reforming OTC-markets is potentially problematic A. Describe some of the reasons why moving the OTC derivatives markets onto a traditional exchange, or even Although an EET model would seem to be the way forward the onto a clearing only model, is potentially problematic. consensus has shifted, amid lobbying from banks, towards accepting that a central counterparty clearing (CCPC) only B. Present a hybrid exchange/clearing-only model which “solution” can be desirable without an exchange platform. supports the handling of (formerly) OTC derivatives in a As if this level of dilution was not enough end-users have manner that overcomes all problems. The new model asked to be exempted from even a CCPC model. provides for both pure exchange trading at its centre and apparently OTC-like markets at its periphery, all within a Why banks fear the EET model connected and efficient whole. The reason banks prefer a post-trade CCPC only model is that they fear the alternative. Under an unsophisticated EET The hybrid model maintains the regulatory benefits of model all aspects of the market (pre-trade, trade-matching reduced systematic risk and increased transparency of and post-trade) would become open to all comers. Such a less tailored proposals. However it moves beyond these model is viewed by banks as potentially making the business by introducing margining reforms that meet “end-user” of supplying (formerly) OTC derivatives unprofitable:- needs whilst simultaneously safeguarding the relationships between the liquidity providing banks on the “sell-side” and 1. The ability of competitors to indulge in “cherry picking” their customers on the “buy-side”. and hence “franchise breaking” of individual bank to enduser relationships, would prevent profitable services from funding loss making offerings. 2. The emergence of so called “free-riding” behaviour by relatively minor players “fronting”9 the big banks’ bid-ask spreads would result in these (formerly) major liquidity providers failing to secure enough flow business to The assumption that the interests of existing OTC market users cannot be fully aligned with the interests of reformers and regulators is wrong remain profitable. Reduced profitability or increased loss making by the banks that formerly supplied the OTC market would of course be disastrous for liquidity. In the worst case under an unsophisticated EET model. liquidity could disappear all together, undermining10 the CCPC-house associated with the exchange. For this reason a clearing only solution could paradoxically pose less systematic risk than a failed attempt at a full-blown EET market. 2 OTC derivatives are described as complex when mostly they are not Similarities between OTC and EET Valuation issues Another reason banks don’t like exchanges is that many of OTC derivatives are often described as complex when them do not understand the subtleties of the EET model:- mostly they are not. • For example EET products are perceived as fully Thus for example you do not have to be a markets wizard to standardized and transparent yet there are products where understand when having an option to pay USD 15 million in an end-user can specify within certain limits, the terms of exchange for receiving EUR 10 million on some date three trade e.g. the exercise price, expiration date, exercise type, calendar months from today may have value – This occurs and settlement calculation of so called “flex options”. Of when USD 15 million costs less than EUR 10 million on the necessity these trades occur apart from the central public foreign exchange market (or equivalently when EUR 10 million auction market and are privately negotiated. costs more than USD 15 million). The option will be valuable • Furthermore “block trades” are routinely permitted in the because it gives the option owner the right to buy something EET model in specified futures, options or combination for less than its market price, and this is why the instrument is transaction products. Although such trades are subject useful in hedging against rising prices. to minimum transaction size requirements they too are Likewise it is easy to add the concept of losing your option privately negotiated. The distinction between the OTC if EUR/USD trades up to 1.60 between now and the date in and EET liquidity provision models is therefore less clear question. Yet the option I have just described is a 3 month cut than many bankers believe. EUR Call USD Put Struck at 1.50 with reverse knock-out at 1.60 and is considered an “exotic” option. Hedgers might buy such Why end users don’t like CCPC an option because it is cheaper than the simpler one. From the point of view of end-users both an EET model and a The truth is that complexity arises mostly around valuation CCPC-only model create an equally burdensome overhead. issues i.e. working out a price of an “exotic” option is relatively This is because under either alternative they would have to more complex than working out the price of a simpler service daily margin calls which is not the case in the existing instrument. Understanding what a derivative instrument is OTC markets. Thus for example a derivative that may have can be easy even when working out its fair price is hard. previously been recorded using simple hedge accounting would under either a full blown EET model or a CCPC-only model require daily mark to market settlement. This in turn would lead such end-user firms to have to keep a far greater number of liquid assets on hand than at present, thereby adversely affecting their asset mix and increasing their business risk 11. However to exclude end-user counterparties active in the OTC derivatives markets from any CCPC only initiative would be disastrous – It would lead to a failure to fully simplify the web of contractual links that characterize the OTC derivatives markets and hence a partial or complete failure of the reform process itself. 3 The new model provides for both pure exchange trading at its centre and apparently OTC-like markets at its periphery, all within a connected and efficient whole B. A new (hybrid) exchange trading model Simple solution A solution to the above apparently conflicted positions is for the sell-side banks to explicitly pay to maintain their The assumption that the interests of existing OTC market “franchise” by posting initial and daily variation margin calls users cannot be fully aligned with the interests of reformers to the CCPC-house on behalf of their end-user customers. and regulators is wrong. To formalise this we can define various categories of A harmonious first step participation in the exchange:- You can get a long way towards a solution simply by demanding that all the needs of market actors are met – I will therefore 1. Guaranteed Accounts – These would be entities such seek to meet the needs of regulators yet not exclude the needs as the end-users listed in note 11 and even minor financial of banks and end-users. Let’s begin by listing requirements in players such as smaller funds whose initial margin and the light of my analysis in section A above:- daily variation margin calls are posted for them by their guaranteeing member. I. I think it is safe to assume that in an ideal world regulators want all OTC derivatives to be moved onto a transparent 2. Full Members – These would be entities such as exchange trading platform. Such a solution would of banks and other major financial institutions, including course involve an associated CCPC-house that would some of the largest funds, with the capacity and desire make initial margin and daily variation margin calls. The to post initial margin and daily variation margin calls on solution would also have to involve all market participants, their own positions. including end-users. 3. Guaranteeing Full Members – These would be full II. By contrast end-users do not want to have to post members who in addition to servicing their own positions initial margin and daily variation margin calls because would also post initial margin and daily variation margin calls such a move would adversely affect their businesses as on any positions held by the guaranteed accounts they already discussed above. They are therefore faced with support. a potential conflict with regulators and reformers. honoured the exchange’s market making requirements Only sufficiently capitalized full members who could achieve guaranteeing member status. In other words III. Also as already discussed above one of the things that the major liquidity providing banks would ideally want to achieve is to maintain their “franchises” i.e. tied relationships with end-users. 4 these would be the “sell-side” banks of today. I think it is safe to assume that in an ideal world regulators want all OTC derivatives to be moved onto a transparent exchange trading platform, involving all market participants, including end-users Details of first step explored 3) Each traded derivative element 13 held in an end-user’s The above may at first appear a trivial way out of the problem guaranteed account will generate a net accumulated margin calls cause end-users in an EET model, however, the daily variation margin balance that must be settled with the details of this new solution turn out to have many admirable end-user once that element expires. Thus at expiry either, features:- a) the end-user will be paid from margin accumulated at 1) The solution allows all the participants in the existing OTC the CCPC-house on its behalf; or derivatives market to develop direct links to the exchange’s b) the end-user will have to repay variation margin owed to CCPC-house:- its guaranteeing member i.e. margin that was previously a) The contract between a guaranteed account entity and consumed by the CCPC-house. its guaranteeing full member entity would be a market The result is that a payment identical to a classic OTC standard licensed by the exchange and requiring the contract 14 would be made on the relevant settlement date registration of all entities directly with the CCPC-house. either to or from the end-user, respectively. This is why Because it would define the relationship between a liquidity the proposed model is being presented as an apparently provider and their customer such a contract would play an OTC-like market at its periphery i.e. because end-users’ analogous role to the ISDA Master Agreement in a classic experiences are unchanged even though their positions are OTC market structure (See point 2). connected to the CCPC-house. b) As the guaranteed accounts would be directly visible 4) If necessary the CCPC-house can close out positions in a at the CCPC-house level it would be easy for regulators, member or guaranteed account at the exchange using initial accountants and auditors to check the exposure and/or margin to finance losses just as in existing futures markets. performance of each end-user’s derivatives position and This is of course equivalent to close out netting under an to collect accurate data on the whole market. I believe ISDA Master Agreement:- this could quickly lead to improved accounting rules a) If an end-user defaults on a payment under 3)b) then regarding derivatives. the accumulated variation margin already paid in by its 2) The solution is a “hybrid model” because full members can guaranteeing member must be recovered by the full trade on an exchange-like central market whilst direct bank member privately. Thus not only are the consequences to client liquidity provision relationships are also preserved:- ultimately borne by the guaranteeing member, as is a) Guaranteeing full members would be obliged to make only proper, but the immediate impact is minor on all markets in the central order book for some of the most other members and therefore poses a relatively low liquid contracts, and full members would be required to systematic risk. trade via the order book whenever appropriate e.g. for b) If a guaranteeing member itself defaults then unlike standard sized on-the-run deals12. the OTC situation the end-user is at once protected b) The extent to which an end-user would seek or would because any mark to market profits to date are held be allowed direct access to other members, or even to at the CCPC-house on its behalf as explained in 3)a). the unrestricted central market, would be the subject of Alternatively to avoid closing out positions the entire negotiation with their guaranteeing full member. Such guaranteed account could be transferred to a new negotiation might involve broader access in exchange guarantor perhaps under a prearranged fall back for an end-user promising to supply some or all of their agreement with another full member 15. own margin. 5 5) Perhaps unexpectedly, the burden on full members that A further useful step post margin for the entities they guarantee would usually be Two of the issues raised in section A above implicitly concern relatively light:- the bid/ask spread18 and our treatment of them will be a) A derivative being margined in the guaranteed account improved by a further simple innovation that I believe should would in most instances have been supplied by the be introduced as a final step towards a best-of-breed solution guaranteeing full member itself. In such cases the to reforming the (formerly) OTC derivatives markets. guaranteeing member will hold a mirroring contract with the CCPC-house:- These two questions are:- i) When its client goes into a net accumulated loss the bank must post variation margin to its end-user’s a) How do we discourage the emergence of destructive guaranteed account. However these funds will be “free-riding” behaviour in any central market with an returned to the member as variation margin profits active order book? on its own mirroring position. The net impact will therefore simply be that mark to market profits on the b) How do we handle the issue of calculating fair values19 bank’s own position, that would ordinarily have been for the many “complex” derivatives? received as variation margin under an EET style model, would remain unrealized and instead would merely be To a large extent point a) has already been addressed recorded in the guaranteed account as accumulated through the introduction of guaranteed accounts that are variation margin due from the client to the bank 16. tied directly to their liquidity providing full members. You can ii) When its client makes a profit the variation margin also set a “tic size” to address this point in a traditional way20 paid into the end-user’s guaranteed account will but the innovation I am about to present can address this ultimately have come from the member paying problem still further21. margin on its own mirroring position. Thus mark to market losses on the bank’s own position will always On the topic of point b) is it easy to imagine that calculating be realized. fair values for “complex” derivatives is about discovering the b) In the other cases where the derivative being margined single price at which exposure to such instruments could be in the guaranteed account has not been supplied by fairly obtained from a liquidity provider. However to think this the guaranteeing full member the bank would likely be is to misunderstand the derivative supply process: A bid/ask in the situation described in 2)b). The guaranteeing full spread must cover the provider’s cost of doing business and member would not therefore be fully burdened because therefore cannot be ignored22. of the bank’s ability to collect margin from its 6 client 17. Comparison of OTC, EET and Hybrid Models OTC EET Hybrid Pre-Trade Transparency None or Limited Full Limited for end-users Post-Trade Transparency None or Limited Full Full for regulators but not for all participants Participant Status Clear distinction between buy-side and sell-side Typically all participants are on the same level Clear distinction between buy-side and sell-side Margining End-users do not pay margin All pay End-users do not pay margin Counterparty risks Both banks and end- users are exposed Risks eliminated via margining and replacement liquidity End-users are not exposed to risk of shortfalls amid efficient close out Trading activity Primarily privately negotiated Primarily central auction market Central auction market for on-the-run interbank market / otherwise privately negotiated Mark to market Subjective Centrally provided mark to mid Centrally provided mark to close-out The existing exchange traded model and the hybrid model mirror each other It is interesting to notice that whereas the EET model allows end users with direct access to the electronic central market but with only an indirect relationship to the central clearer, the hybrid model does the opposite: It provides end users with direct access to the central clearer but with only an indirect relationship to the central market. Respecting the bid/ask spread I propose that the following features be included in the new exchange trading model:i. That the bids and asks of guaranteeing full members be the sole basis of settlement. ii. That such bids and asks submitted as part of the end of each day settlement process be processed not into single End-users experiences are unchanged even though their positions are connected to the CCPC-house but unlike the OTC situation the end-user is protected settlement prices (as in an EET model) but into separate bid settlement prices and ask settlement prices. iii. That variation margin called on long positions be generated by reference to settlement bids and variation margin called on short positions be generated by reference to settlement asks. The existence of the above privilege for guaranteeing full members would underline the importance of their responsibilities as set out in 2)a) whilst the daily settlement process combined with the hybrid model would imply that profits were not recognised prematurely by banks23. 7 Example: How To Move CDS Onto A Hybrid Exchange In this section I will discuss the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market in particular and will:- A. OTC CDS and the compromises made to clear them Standard CDS vs. CDS of ABS A. Brief you on classic OTC CDS and the reform of In light of the recent sub-prime mortgage fuelled credit the classic market introduced in 2009 in order to crunch and global financial crisis, I feel I must begin any make redesigned OTC CDS more suitable for central discussion of OTC CDS by making it crystal clear that the counterparty clearing (CCPC). CDS of ABS implicated in the recent crisis are very different from standard CDS. Whilst standard CDS are commendable B. Describe some key features of my 2004 invention of so and hugely useful risk management products, to my mind called x-CDS24 and why this clearable product is superior it is fair to describe CDS of ABS as being unnecessary to the redesigned OTC CDS standards. and even destructive, because they appear to have been created simply to help lubricate the now discredited C. Explain how a bank could effortlessly offer classic originate-to-distribute business model. It was this model (a OTC-like CDS to its customers via trading clearable debased version of classic securitisation) that first infected x-CDS within the hybrid exchange model presented in US mortgage markets and then the global financial markets the previous chapter. with the mountains of bad debt that have ultimately landed at the feet of governments. To be clear, I do not think the It is hoped that the discussion of a concrete example in this world would be any worse off if CDS of ABS never returned section, although necessarily technical, will serve to highlight to prominence or perhaps were restricted by statute. Rather the advantages of my new proposals as set out in the than making the mistake of lumping standard CDS together previous chapter, and will also serve to introduce some of my with similar sounding but actually quite different products25, 2004/2005 ideas for reforming the OTC-markets to a wider standard CDS should be recognised as economically useful audience than they have enjoyed so far. hedging tools. Together with other valuable OTC derivatives markets, all standard, loan-only and most26 index CDS should be transferred onto exchange in an intelligent way i.e. be put onto a hybrid exchange/clearing-only model of the type described in the previous chapter. Such a move would, Recently it has been particularly painful to watch the OTC CDS markets undergo half-baked product redesigns in order to facilitate central clearing... forever de-stigmatise these markets27 as CDS speculator and hedger positioning would become transparent to regulators and the products themselves would become better understood. Key features of OTC CDS I do not need to give a basic description of standard OTC CDS here28. However, in light of the need for better understanding highlighted above I will focus on those points rarely discussed elsewhere. 8 It is hoped that the discussion of a concrete example in this section, although necessarily technical, will serve to highlight the advantages of my new proposals as set out in the previous chapter What do CDS do? higher when they receive an upfront payment (i.e. they make Before I continue, the record must be set straight on a major a negative payment). When there is no upfront payment the misconception: CDS are often erroneously portrayed purely CDS is said to be a “par CDS” and the coupon rate is called as insurance contracts against default, when in fact they the “par coupon rate” or “par swap rate” can best be understood in terms of their broader purpose – CDS are mainly used to hedge the yield spread exposures Classic OTC CDS that arise naturally in portfolios of corporate and/or risky Due to the way CDS are designed there is normally a close sovereign debt. relationship between the par coupon rate quoted in the market at any one time and the credit spread in the debt To be clear the primary purpose of most CDS is not to markets at the same time – The par rate is therefore often provide insurance per se but as traded instruments. Thus, quoted by market makers30. The relationship also explains they are used to hedge against a drop in the market value why, for example, 5-year CDS on XYZ Corp can be such a of investor holdings in underlying debt should credit spreads useful hedging tool for the credit spread component of the widen29. market risk in a 5-year XYZ Corp bond:- Furthermore as with all practically useful hedging instruments there is also a major role to be played by active a) When trading classic OTC CDS a newly generated liquidity providers and speculators. contract would be negotiated and booked using the then prevailing par coupon rate i.e. without any upfront payment The price of CDS contracts and at a coupon rate hedgers would recognise as being Because CDS are traded instruments the most important close to the credit spread they know and understand. feature of these contracts is their market price. The focus b) Later if credit spreads widened and the hedger should be on the way the fair price/premium fluctuates as wished to lift their CDS hedge they could do so at a profit market conditions vary over time and how this affects the offsetting their mark to market losses on the debt they value of existing deals. As already stated the focus should were hedging i.e. the original CDS contract could now be not be on the part of the swap that gives insurance against sold back to the market and would command an upfront default, although ironically the price in question is the payment in the original coupon payer’s favour (now that premium that market participants are willing to pay for the par coupon rates in the market had increased above the insurance element of the swap. coupon rate set in the contract in a) above). c) Conversely if credit spreads narrowed and the hedger It is important to explain that premium can be paid as coupon wished to lift their CDS hedge they could do so at a loss or as coupon plus upfront i.e. via, offsetting their mark to market profits on the debt they 1. Coupons payable quarterly in arrears with the coupon were hedging i.e. the original CDS contract could now rate quoted per annum; plus perhaps be sold back to the market but this would also require 2. An upfront part payment that is either positive or an upfront payment from the original coupon payer (now negative relative to coupon payments. that par coupon rates in the market had decreased below Obviously since the total value of the default insurance being the coupon rate set in the contract in a) above). bought can’t be affected by the method used to pay for it, the coupon rate will be lower when the protection buyer (i.e. coupon payer) also makes an upfront payment but will be 9 Few people have considered the new product opportunities which the transition from open outcry floor based futures trading to electronic futures trading has created. Indeed even today when electronic trading is totally dominant, the only kind of exchange traded derivatives available are futures or options that theoretically could still be traded in the old fashioned open outcry way without any computers at all Clearable Redesigned OTC CDS B. About x-CDS In 2009 OTC CDS were redesigned and relaunched in a pair of initiatives known as the “big bang” and the “small bang” for North American and European referenced debt respectively. Developments in OTC CDS viewed from an x-CDS perspective It has been frustrating to watch the slow pace in which the The trouble with the classic market was that each new OTC CDS market has converged with the proposals set out deal was struck in the manner of a) above and as the par in my “groundbreaking”31 design for x-CDS. Thus as early rate fluctuated many deals with different coupons would as July 2004 I had already understood the need for recovery be agreed. This in turn meant that multiple fair valuation rate auctions, mandatory cash settlement and a credit event calculations would be required at each end of day settlement, committee which were innovations introduced to the OTC even for what was a single CDS exposure type, in our market by ISDA, its trade organization, only in 2005, 2009 example, a 5-year CDS referenced to XYZ Corp. and 2009 respectively32. The redesigned OTC CDS are simply classic OTC CDS but Recently it has been particularly painful to watch the OTC CDS restricted to only a handful of predefined standard coupon markets undergo half-baked product redesigns in order to rates: In redesigned OTC CDS, coupon rates can only take facilitate central clearing in what to me appears a manifestly on values chosen from a few preset choices and new deals suboptimal manner given I have been aware of a better will be agreed at the standard coupon nearest, but no longer solution for the last five years! I invite those that are interested always equal to, the par rate. The limited variety of deal ticket in x-CDS to read the, now LIFFE-owned, patent application coupons reduces the number of distinct deals to be valued and (see note 31 for details), or to contact me directly, or both. hence the number of end of day calculations required at the namely that a) new deals are no longer struck at par which Relationship between x-CDS and electronic futures means hedgers may need to make upfront payments as well Few people have considered the new product opportunities as coupon payments; and b) hedgers may fail to understand which the transition from open outcry floor based futures the link between upfront premium and the par rate, and by trading to electronic futures trading has created. Indeed even extension the link with the credit spread they know and today when electronic trading is totally dominant, the only kind understand. Making a product less user friendly just to make of exchange traded derivatives available are futures or options it more easily clearable is an unfortunate compromise. that theoretically could still be traded in the old fashioned open clearing house. However this improvement comes at a cost, outcry way without any computers at all. In light of the above preamble, it should not surprise you that the key to my x-CDS invention, and my other inventions from the same stable, is a fuller utilisation of the potential of the electronic trading process, specifically by use of computer based mapping-algorithms. These mapping-algorithms allow quoted x-swaps to be broken down into futures-like 10 For the front office trader the products appear to mimic existing OTC-swaps, whereas the rest of the process is as hyper efficient and robust as existing futures markets components tradable and clearable in the tried and trusted Differences between x-CDS and OTC CDS EET environment. For the front office trader the products We need to understand how x-CDS differ from OTC CDS in appear to mimic existing OTC-swaps, whereas the rest of the order to properly describe how to move the OTC CDS market process is as hyper efficient and robust as existing futures onto a hybrid exchange: markets. Another outcome of this approach is that x-swaps • As already mentioned the coupon rate of an x-CDS is can be easily understood by analogy as they have the same not a fixed deal price but a volatile market price subject relationship to OTC-swaps as exchange traded futures have to daily variation, coupled with daily variation margin to OTC-forwards 33. gains or losses. • x-CDS accrue coupons in an unusual way in that the To be specific because x-CDS are made up of futures-like coupon due is drawn down gradually over the entire components (the x-CDS coupons) they automatically benefit quarterly period for which the coupon is effective. from the characteristics of futures:- • After a credit event both x-CDS and OTC CDS will pay • x-CDS must obviously be clearable because their out equal amounts in default compensation. However, futures-like components are clearable. coupon payments due after the credit event are treated • Unlike OTC CDS deals, but like futures, x-CDS trade very differently – Whereas the coupon payments of without reference to any previous deal price – Whereas an OTC CDS are cancelled, those of an x-CDS are OTC-forwards remain locked in at their original deal price, accelerated, with payments for all forward periods futures contracts undergo daily legal variation of their becoming due immediately. price coupled with cash payments in the form of variation Obviously the last point is a key difference and will, under margin gains or losses: As truly exchange traded products the same market conditions, tend to cause par coupon x-CDS, like futures, effectively maintain their original deal rates quoted in x-CDS format to be below those quoted in rate without actually keeping their original deal price34. traditional OTC CDS format35. • Because futures do not support upfront payments neither do x-CDS – Thus in a manner clearly superior to For completeness sake, I would also like to share some insight OTC CDS, an x-CDS will always trade as a pure par coupon as to why x-CDS cannot sustain the coupon cancellation rate maintaining its relationship to the underlying credit approach available in the OTC market and why coupon spread and doing so without the need for any market acceleration is the correct alternative:- standard formula to calculate fair upfront payments. • OTC-like termination would require the original deal By comparison with the above features of x-CDS, the coupon rate to be cancelled and this would require the redesigned OTC CDS with their limited choice of pre-set x-CDS product to lose its futures-like independence from standard coupon rates and lack of hedger utility are a very any previous deal price. This would of course create a inelegant solution. As if this was not enough, another feature paradox by contradicting our previous discussion on the of x-CDS is that the design naturally generates system nature of x-CDS. implied x-CDS forward par rates and hence increases trading opportunities and stimulates the creation of a full credit term structure. 11 As promised I have demonstrated how a bank can effortlessly offer fully clearable classic OTC-like CDS to its customers via trading x-CDS within a hybrid exchange model of the type presented in the previous chapter • Also, as already discussed, a futures-like clearing • Over-hedge position (to deal with coupon process requires daily legal variation of quoted price to acceleration): Book an additional “over-hedge” of long be coupled with cash payments in the form of variation positions in the end-user’s guaranteed account each at a margin. Because these are cash payments the legal price of 0.00% per annum in sizes based on calculations price variation must to some extent represent changes using an assumed recovery rate36 (e.g. 40%). This leads to in the market based present value of the x-CDS and its sizes of USD 75,000 for the first quarterly x-CDS coupon, component coupons. Thus provided there is no credit USD 50,000 for the second quarterly x-CDS coupon, event the value of a single x-CDS coupon will start and USD 25,000 for the third quarterly x-CDS coupon being marked down as it begins to be drawn down i.e. assuming 40% recovery. once its quarterly period has begun. This will, of course, continue until its quarterly period has ended and the Proof coupon has been fully marked down i.e. drawn down You can confirm the equivalence of the OTC-like trade and and hence fully paid. Thus the market value of x-CDS the x-CDS by considering all possible outcomes37: coupons is proportional to the protection period they cover. Applying this principle to a credit event for which i. no credit event all forward protection in the form of forward x-CDS has ii. a credit event at the end of the last coupon become redundant, it is therefore intuitively acceptable iii. a credit event at the end of the third coupon that knocked-out coupons would be immediately marked iv. a credit event at the end of the second coupon down to zero, and that this drawdown would correspond v. a credit event at the end of the first coupon to the coupons being accelerated. i. Equivalence under no credit event C. How to offer OTC-like CDS whilst actually trading x-CDS Recall that in the hybrid model each accumulated daily variation margin balance is settled by the end-user only once the relevant element has expired. In this case the elements Example are x-CDS coupons which if no credit event has occurred are Imagine a bank is a guaranteeing full member of the hybrid drawn down to zero on their normal expiry date. Under these market as described in the previous chapter and that in its circumstances the end-user will pay the bank accumulated role as a liquidity provider it sells a 1-year CDS on XYZ Corp margin on the USD 10 million basic position equal to the in OTC-like format to an end-user’s guaranteed account. margin call generated by the x-CDS coupon price having The deal is struck at a par premium of 0.60% per annum in dropped from 0.15% to zero. The over-hedge positions do a notional amount of USD 10 million and is easy to book in not generate a margin call since these are transferred at zero terms of x-CDS coupons as follows:- price in the first place. Notice that the amount due under • Basic position (providing exposure to default the x-CDS positions is also the same amount due under the insurance): Book four quarterly x-CDS coupons each at allegedly equivalent OTC CDS contract. the agreed price of 0.60% per annum (i.e. approximately 0.15% of notional depending on day counts), each in the agreed size of USD 10 million, with the long positions in the end-user’s guaranteed account and the short positions in bank’s own account in favour of the dealer. 12 ii. Equivalence under a credit event at v. Equivalence under a credit event the end of the last coupon period at the end of the first coupon period. As far as the fourth x-CDS coupon is concerned USD 10 As far as the first x-CDS coupon is concerned USD 10 million million is held in the basic position and there is no additional is held in the basic position and there is an additional position position in the over-hedge. If a credit event occurs at the end of USD 75,000 in the over-hedge. If a credit event occurs at of the fourth coupon period the x-CDS coupon position will the end of the first coupon period the second, third and fourth provide the same amount of default insurance as under the coupons would be accelerated, resulting in a payment of allegedly equivalent OTC CDS contract i.e. they both supply USD 45,000 becoming due on the x-CDS i.e. three coupons the notional amount of USD 10 million. of 0.15% of notional. However at the assumed 40% recovery rate the over-hedge neutralises this by generating exactly the iii. Equivalence under a credit event at USD 45,000 required. Meanwhile the basic x-CDS coupon the end of the third coupon period position will provide the same amount of default insurance as As far as the third x-CDS coupon is concerned USD 10 million under the allegedly equivalent OTC CDS contract as before. is held in the basic position and there is an additional position of USD 25,000 in the over-hedge. If a credit event occurs Concluding remarks at the end of the third coupon period the fourth coupon As promised I have demonstrated how a bank can effortlessly would be accelerated, resulting in a payment of USD 15,000 offer fully clearable classic OTC-like CDS to its customers via becoming due on the x-CDS i.e. one coupon of 0.15% of trading x-CDS within a hybrid exchange model of the type notional. However at the assumed 40% recovery rate the presented in the previous chapter. In general the recovery over-hedge neutralises this by generating exactly the USD rate assumption represents only a residual exposure to 15,000 required. Meanwhile the basic x-CDS coupon position the actually realized recovery rate (see graph on page 14). will provide the same amount of default insurance as under Nonetheless I would expect banks to develop strategies for the allegedly equivalent OTC CDS contract as before. managing these residuals. iv. Equivalence under a credit event at It should be noted, also, that the process just illustrated would the end of the second coupon period normally work in the opposite direction to that presented. As far as the second x-CDS coupon is concerned Thus, the central market in x-CDS would be the dominant USD 10 million is held in the basic position and there is an interbank venue for price discovery and banks would price additional position of USD 50,000 in the over-hedge. If a liquidity provision of OTC-like CDS dependent on where credit event occurs at the end of the second coupon period the x-CDS market was trading. In other words the 0.60% the third and fourth coupons would be accelerated, resulting per annum offered to the end-user in the example would in a payment of USD 30,000 becoming due on the x-CDS i.e. typically not be a starting point. It would be the result of a two coupons of 0.15% of notional. However at the assumed break even calculation by the bank and would represent the 40% recovery rate the over-hedge neutralises this by level where the end-user’s x-CDS overspend on the basic generating exactly the USD 30,000 required. Meanwhile the position38 could fully fund their x-CDS underspend on the basic x-CDS coupon position will provide the same amount over-hedge position. of default insurance as under the allegedly equivalent OTC CDS contract as before. 13 Recovery rate exposure: 5 year CDS It is very common to have to make recovery rate assumptions The graph shows the impact of an actual recovery rate when handling CDS calculations even in the existing OTC differing from a 40% assumed rate for a 5-year CDS struck markets. Thus for example the market standard formula at a par premium of 0.60% per annum. As can be seen the discussed in note 30 also requires such an assumption. The x-CDS gives virtually the same exposure as the OTC product uninitiated reader should not therefore be concerned that a although at high (low) recovery rates the over-hedge recovery rate assumption is needed to generate the correct underperforms (over-performs) resulting in a tracking error. over-hedge sizes. x-CDS with overhedge performs similarly to OTC 3.00% 0% Actual Recovery Rate 40% Actual Recovery Rate 2.00% 60% Actual Recovery Rate 80% Actual Recovery Rate 100% Actual Recovery Rate 1.00% (% of notional) x-CDS with overhedge payout minus traditional OTC CDS payout 20% Actual Recovery Rate 0.00% 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 -1.00% -2.00% -3.00% -4.00% Year in which credit event occurs 14 4.00 4.50 5.00 Comparison of CDS Market Models The experience of end-user customers trading x-CDS with an over-hedge within a hybrid model is closely akin to their experience in the classic OTC CDS market: Classic OTC CDS (high grade credit) Redeisgned OTC CDS 1:1 x-CDS in EET model x-CDS with over-hedge in hybrid model 1:1 x-CDS in hybrid model Pre-Trade Transparency None or Limited Full Limited for end-users Post-Trade Transparency Limited Full Full for regulators but not for all participants Central market users pay Margining End-users need not pay margin End-users do not pay margin as this is done by their guarantor Central market in terms of x-CDS par coupon rate Trading activity Coupon rate Primarily privately negotiated in terms of OTC par coupon rate Par for new trades, original deal ticket coupon for close outs Fixed standard coupons Recovery rate assumption Routinely required in upfront payment calculations Upfront payments Routinely required Coupon payment Payment due at end of period plus privately negotiated trades with end-user customers over-hedge on trades with customers Always trades as a pure coupon (x-CDS par rate is lower than OTC CDS par rate) negotiated par x-CDS rate for end-users Not required negotiated par OTC like rate for end-users Required for calculating over hedge Occur only as part of normal profit or loss through variation margin Floating coupon rate generates daily variation margin payments Payment due only at coupon contract expiry for end-users Forward coupons are accelerated Effect of credit event on coupons Marking to market Forward coupons knock out Difficult due to large variety of deal ticket coupons Easier due to limited number of standard coupons Forward coupons appear to knockout on end-user trades due to over-hedge Very easy as is based on closing x-CDS par rates in central market with no recovery rate assumptions required and requires recovery rate assumption 15 Notes 1 The epithet “OTC” stands for “over the counter” and is used to denote markets in privately negotiated instruments and indeed such instruments themselves. 2 Given the finance industry is full of smart people, why has no one else developed and published a fully workable reform like mine? I have two theories to offer on the matter: • Perhaps bankers have simply jumped to conclusions and hence not seen it as being in their own interests to think very deeply about how to put OTC derivatives markets onto an exchange like system? • Or perhaps the topic itself is simply so esoteric and technical that too few people other than me have acquired the necessary breadth of understanding, or indeed the will, to take a sufficient interest? If it is bankers’ fears that are the cause, then it is rather ironic that the solution presented in this guide not only poses no threat to the vested interests of the sell-side banks but actually legitimises such interests by aligning them with those of regulators and those of the buy-side Whatever the reason, I hope that the reader does not jump to any negative conclusions simply because I am at present acting alone. The ideas recommended in this guide should be judged on their own merits and not be prejudged simply because it is convenient. 3 The “sell-side” are the banks that supply OTC derivatives whilst the “buy-side” are the end-users who consume OTC derivatives as hedging tools. 4 These derivatives helped banks build and hedge the so called collateralised debt obligations which brought down banks as far away from the US housing market as Germany. They also played a direct role in the demise of AIG. 5 I use “EET” in contrast to “OTC” to denote the “existing exchange traded” market model, or instruments traded in that model, or indeed to denote “existing exchange trading” as a process. 6 See for example “Reforming OTC Derivative Markets – A UK perspective” by the Financial Services Authority & HM Treasury, December 2009. 7 This document introduces a blueprint for workable systematic reform which supports the full agendas of regulators, liquidity providing banks and endusers... Although my earlier work was described in the UK patents courts as “groundbreaking”, it was not complete. This is because my earlier inventions, which were wrested from me after a legal action by my former employer LIFFE (The London International Financial Futures & Options Exchange), focused entirely on product related reforms and not on creating a market structure that makes reform both efficient and palatable. My original ideas have yet to be implemented by LIFFE as a result of this incompleteness, however, the full solution proposed in this guide includes my previous work. Not only this but it also details for the first time a hybrid market model that can deliver OTC-like derivative products. 8 Blaming bankers’ greed and trying to curb bonuses Energy North America, General Electric Company, is not a very constructive or efficient response even GID Investment Advisers LLC, Goodrich Corporation, though it may be an expedient one for politicians: Grove Property Fund LLC, Harley-Davidson Inc., HCA • Bankers’ have been receiving large bonuses for Inc., HCR ManorCare, Health Care REIT Inc., Helix years and years so it is quite obvious that bonuses Funds, Hersha Hospitality Trust, Hobbico Inc., Host per se cannot be the primary cause of this crisis. Hotels & Resorts Inc., IBM, Independent Petroleum • Also, only a tiny sub-set of bankers’ dealing in Association of America, Industrial Energy Consumers sub-prime mortgages, CDS of ABS, CDOs, SIVs of America, Information Technology Industry Council, and other highly structured products can be said International Housewares Association, Invenergy LLC, to be at fault. It is not fair to tar all bankers with the Johnson & Johnson, KBS Capital Advisors, KBS Real same brush. Estate Investment Trust, KBS Real Estate Investment In the long run, no one will thank our leaders for Trust II, Kinder Morgan, Lefrak Organization Inc, cheapening such an important question with knee-jerk Legacy Reserves LP, Lexmark, Loews Corporation, attacks on bonuses when the real problems lie elsewhere MarkWest Energy Partners L.P., MeadWestvaco, and perhaps remain unattended. Medtronic Inc., Meredith Corporation, Mid-America Apartment Communities Inc., MidAmerican Energy 9 There is nothing wrong with tighter bid ask spreads Holdings Company, MillerCoors, Millipore Corporation, due to healthy competitive pressures. However, Mississippi Manufacturers Association, Monday posting speculative prices on exchange that are Properties, National Association of Manufacturers, entirely dependent on other liquidity providers’ prices National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, is effectively a negative parasitic behaviour that can Natural Gas Supply Association, National Grid, damage the long term health of the market. National Gypsum Company, Newfield Exploration, Northwestern Energy, Novation Capital, Novelis Inc., 10 Unless there is liquidity a CCPC-house cannot NRG Energy, Owens-Illinois Inc., PPL Corporation, lay-off the risks it inherits from a failed member. Thus Praxair Inc., Procter & Gamble, Progress Energy, without liquidity a CCPC-house can become a source PSEG, Questar Energy, Regency Centers Corporation, of systematic risk rather than a solution to it. Retail Energy Supply Association, Ryder System Inc., ScanSource Inc., Sempra Energy, Shell Oil Company, 11 In October 2009 a letter from a “Coalition for Simon Property Group Inc., Simons Petroleum Inc., Derivatives End-Users” was sent to every member of Southern Company, Stellar Industries Inc., Strategic Congress explaining their concerns about “proposals Hotels & Resorts Inc., Superior Graphite Co. , Superior that would require all OTC derivatives used by Woodcraft Inc., Tenaska Marketing Ventures, Tenaska business end-users to be centrally cleared, executed Power Services, Targa Resources, Tennant Company, on exchanges or cash collateralized or subject end- Teradata Corporation, The Boeing Company, The users to capital charges” the letter was signed by Commonwealth Group LLC, The Durst Organization, 171 entities including individual companies and some The JBG Companies, The John Buck Company, The umbrella organizations, namely:- 3M, Acadia Realty Pinnacle Companies, The Process Gas Consumers Trust, Air Products and Chemicals Inc., Allegheny Group, The Real Estate Roundtable, The Williams Technologies Incorporated, Alpha Natural Resources, Companies, Thomas Properties Group Inc., TRW AMB Property Corporation, AMC Entertainment Automotive, United Launch Alliance, U.S. Chamber Inc., Ameren Services, American Chemistry Council, of Commerce, Vanguard Natural Resources LLC, American Electric Power, American Forest & Paper Vermeer Corporation, Volvo Group North America, Association, American Gas Association, American Washington Gas, Weather Risk Management Residential Communities LLC, Anadarko Petroleum Association, Weingarten Realty Investors, Corporation, API - American Petroleum Institute, Weyerhaeuser Company, Whirlpool Corporation, Xcel Apple Inc., ARAMARK Corporation, Associated Energy, Yocum Oil Company, and Zimmer Inc. Estates Realty Corporation, Association for Financial Professionals, Bayer Corporation, Behringer Harvard, 12 Such a requirement would not necessarily apply to Boston Scientific Corporation, BP America, Brady very large deals or for unusual dates e.g. dates not on the Corporation, Brookdale Senior Living Inc., Bunge, 1w, 2w, 3w, 1m, 2m, ..., 1y, 2y etc cycle that is standard to Business Roundtable, Cabot Corporation, Cargill some products. Incorporated, Caterpillar Inc., CDW Corporation, Chesapeake Energy Corporation, CNL Financial 13 For example this could be a single cash flow Group, Coca-Cola Bottling Company United Inc., within a swap. Cohen Brothers Realty Corporation, Commercial Developments International Inc., Commodity Markets 14 Provided, of course, that the traded contract Council, Community Health Systems, Compass carries the appropriate exposure in and of itself. Minerals, Constellation Energy, Cooper Tire & Rubber Company, Corporate Properties of the Americas LLC, 15 The new guarantor would have to replace initial Covidien, Cummins Inc., Deere & Company, Devon margin that was supplied by the old guarantor. The other Energy, Digital Realty Trust, Direct Energy, Dominion, details of the relationship between the new guarantor Donaldson Company Inc., DTE Energy, Duke Energy and the defaulting old guarantor could vary from case to Corporation, Dynegy, Eastman Chemical Company, case subject to negotiations and the extent to which one Eaton Corporation, Ecolab, Edens & Avant, Edison guarantor insured the other etc. Electric Institute, EFCO Corp., El Paso Corporation, Electric Power Supply Association (EPSA), Eli Lilly and Company, Emdeon Inc., Enbridge Energy Partners and Subsidiaries, EnCana Oil & Gas (USA) Inc., Energy Future Holdings, Entergy Corporation, Exelon Corporation, Financial Executives International, First Energy, FMC Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Forest City Enterprises Inc., FPL Group, GDF SUEZ 16 16 As explained in 3)b) the end-user will eventually 24 I use “x-CDS” to describe my particular designs what the DTCC has achieved in this space starting in have to repay variation margin owed to its for an exchange tradable CDS. I have also designed 2005. The irony is that I repeatedly tried to convince guaranteeing member unless it defaults as explained “x-IRS” and “x-OIS” as separate innovations each of my ex-employer to accelerate their implementation of in 4)a). Also as explained in 1)b) regulators, which build on an underlying breakthrough concept. my ideas and to cooperate with me but they became accountants and auditors can easily confirm the level Together I refer to these as “x-swaps”. obsessed with conflict – an approach which has hurt both me, themselves and obviously their shareholders of accumulated margin owed to the bank. Indeed, from the bank’s point of view given accumulated 25 CDS of ABS could easily be renamed as “pay- too. I can say this with confidence because on their margin is recorded for each traded derivative element as-you-go-swaps” because of their distinct legal own LIFFE have completely failed to make proper use separately, it is easy to split this into current assets structure and settlement mechanisms, which are very of these inventions even though they spent so much (due within one year) and long-term assets. Finally, different from standard CDS. money to secure them. 26 Some index CDS are actually index CDS of ABS. 32 Incidentally I was also the first person to propose it should be noted that the bank’s risk management department can easily use this information to decide tradable fixings in a meeting with Lee McGinty of JP the size of any credit default swap hedge against the end-user defaulting it may need in future. 27 The cause of the stigmatization has been the fact Morgan in January 2004 which implemented in 2005 that going long CDS referenced to a company is see http://www.creditex.com/press/credit-fixings.pdf. 17 With an end-user supplying some or all of their own related to going short in that company’s stock – It has margin (but perhaps less frequently than daily) the been argued that unregulated CDS trading contributed 33 Hopefully the reader knows enough about the often relationship would be analogous to derivatives prime to the severity of the recent bear market in stocks. poorly understood and rarely explained relationship between OTC-forwards and futures to see this is not a broking in the existing OTC model. 28 Presumably the reader will know where to get trivial point. Just as there cannot be a futures contract 18 The “bid” is the price/quotation at which banks basic information on CDS for themselves or perhaps is without a hosting futures exchange so there cannot are willing to take a long exposure (i.e. buy) whilst the already familiar with the basics of these products. be an x-swap without a hosting exchange. Hopefully the reader will also appreciate that giving x-swaps a “ask” is the price/quotation at which banks are willing 29 The “credit spread” is the term given to the relative distinct name is not just a gimmick: x-CDS are not yield that a debt instrument must offer in the market to simply cleared OTC CDS which are made available on 19 This is of course an issue for the CCPC-house and attract bidders i.e. relative to another benchmark yield, a trading platform. They are constructed ab initio for it may be imagined that keeping on top of this issue typically government debt yield. Most corporate bonds the sole purpose of being listed on exchange, whether would require a very significant overhead of staff trained for example trade at a yield higher than government that be under an EET model or a more sophisticated in quantitative finance. debt of comparable maturity yields. An appropriate hybrid exchange model as proposed here. Feel free to way to view a corporate bond is therefore that it carries contact me if you require further explanation. to take a short exposure (i.e. sell). 20 The emergence of so called “free-riding” behavior the risk of its benchmark government debt (known as is prevented in the EET model by setting a “tic size” interest rate risk) plus the risk of its credit spread. The 34 Since this property of “original deal price because this sets a threshold beyond which “fronting” former can be hedged with government bond and other independence” is a defining feature of best-of-breed is not possible by creating a minimum bid/ask spread. interest rate derivatives. The latter can be hedged with exchange traded products it is interesting to notice CDS. Should its credit spread widen the corporate how the hybrid model creates OTC-like products 21 Under point iii in the proposal below, “free- bond will sell off relative to govies but the CDS hedge precisely by reversing deal price independence in a riders” holding positions overnight would (as well as will appreciate in value to compensate. deliberately controlled manner. As discussed in the previous chapter this is achieved under my proposals having to post initial margin) suffer a mark to market variation margin loss equal to the cost of closing 30 The details of the relationship between market via the introduction of guaranteed accounts and out their position with the real (i.e. guaranteeing full quotations in terms of par coupon rate and equivalent the requirement that accumulated daily variation member) liquidity providers. Thus “free-riding” would trade settlements in terms of pairs of actual deal margin balances must be recorded for each element no longer be free! coupon plus fair upfront payment need not concern separately. Again, I would be happy to expand on this us here: All we need to know is that a market standard observation if contacted. 22 To be clear, the derivative provider’s cost of doing formula for making this transformation exists and is business is their cost of hedging. Setting a fair bid/ask available on systems such as Bloomberg. 35 This is because due to the coupon cancellation feature following a credit event, a notionally higher spread is just as important to a liquidity providing bank as the difference between wholesale and retail prices is 31 The designs describe how the trading and clearing OTC CDS coupon would, all else remaining equal, lead to a retailer. It is true that the valuation methodologies process under an electronic futures market can be to lower payments in practice as compared with the used within banks are often based on academic work adapted to handle derivatives such as interest rate lower x-CDS quote, so the two formats would in fact that imagines a simplified world with no hedging costs. swaps (x-IRS) and credit default swaps (x-CDS). be equivalent. However using these artificial models is only a first step Unfortunately ownership of my x-swaps inventions was and the theoretical values they generate only serve as wrested from me. The inventive moments for x-swaps 36 The recovery rate is the price of the defaulted a starting point, over which a bias such as the volatility occurred independently of my employment in July debt after a credit event as determined by the credit smile, and around which bid/ask spreads, must be 2004. However I naively tried to share my x-CDS idea event auction. added to cover the hedging costs dealers expect might with my employer, LIFFE (The London International be incurred in the real world. Financial Futures & Options Exchange), because I 37 I have based the calculations in this example on the knew they were an ideal venue to implement my ideas. simplifying assumption that credit events occur only 23 The net effect of these ideas together with the Once I had finally got management’s attention the at the end of whole periods. It would not be hard to guaranteed account concept is that the guaranteeing issue of ownership quickly arose. In early 2005, whilst lift this assumption but it would make the over- hedge banks would initially have to fund the bid/ask spreads on leave because of bullying from a senior manager, I more complex (and dynamic) as I would need to hedge that their clients’ guaranteed accounts had paid away applied for US patents on both kinds of x-swaps (the the cancelled un-accrued portion of the effective OTC as variation margin losses. Therefore banks could applications were published in 2006 as 20060224491 CDS coupon – Presenting the full detail would make not claim bid/ask spreads as upfront profits, since and 20060224492). My ex-employer then spent in the example unnecessarily complicated. these would not be realized until variation margin the region of six hundred and fifty thousand pounds was returned under 3)b). Such a novel set up is convincing the UK courts that I had been “employed 38 There is an overspend because the par coupon clearly music to the ears of regulators who have been to invent” in order to gain control of x-swaps (and was rate market quoted in x-CDS format will be below concerned about distortions caused by profits being even granted the other two of my patent applications the 0.60% per annum quoted in traditional OTC CDS recognised too early. that concerning cash products and which I had format – see note 35 for an explanation of why. actually developed in early 2005 whilst on leave). The inventions were described as “ground breaking” in court and they undoubtedly constituted an enormous business opportunity at the time, especially in light of 17 Epilogue I hope you have enjoyed reading this guide and that it will serve its intended purpose in stimulating a paradigm shift in the way (formerly) OTC derivatives are handled. The hybrid model can cover any exchange tradable instruments and my former work (which is now owned by LIFFE) covers interest rate swaps (x-IRS and x-OIS) as well as x-CDS. Since forex futures and options already exist these too can be included. By the way, last year I also further developed my ideas on reforming another OTC market, namely, the global money markets (the original ideas are also owned by LIFFE) and would be happy to share my thoughts on improving the global economy by improving transparency and yet controlling capital flows in an open capital account in a manner which also prevents financial necrosis from spreading between banks both domestically and internationally – If anyone wants me to contribute on this other topic please also get in touch. Chi pò, non vò; chi vò, non pò; chi sà, non fà; chi fà, non sà; e cosi, male il mondo và Italian proverb translation: “Who can do, does not want to; Who wants to, cannot do it; Who knows how, will not do it; Who does it, knows not how; and, so, badly goes the world.”
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