1. society
2. unrest and war

OXFORD INTERNATIONAL
MODEL UNITED NATIONS
12TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE
7TH – 9TH NOVEMBER 2014
DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
CONTENTS
Topic A: Transition of security duties in
Afghanistan
- Introduction .......................... pg 3
-Topic History ......................... pg 4
-Discussion of the Problem ... pg 6
-The Future .............................. pg 10
-Points Resolutions
Should Address .... ................... pg 10
-Bloc Positions ......................... pg 11
-Further Reading
and Bibliography...................... pg 12
Topic B: International Collaboration on the
management of non-state actors
-Introduction............................ pg 13
-Topic History ......................... pg 13
-Discussion of the Problem ... pg 14
-The Future .............................. pg 16
-Bloc Positions ......................... pg 16
-Further Reading ..................... pg 17
-Bibliography............................ pg 17
Committee Director:
Name Tagore Nakornchai
tn509@ic.ac.uk
Assistant Directors:
Name Kyle Chan
kylechanpols@gmail.com
Beenish Saeed
saeedbeenish@gmail.com
[DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY COMMITTEE]
Topic A: Transition of security duties in
Afghanistan
Topic B: International Collaboration on the
management of non-state actors
A Message from your Directors:
Dear Delegates,
Welcome to the Disarmament and
International Security Committee.
DISEC’s role is at the heart of the
founding principles of the UN: the
promotion of international peace and
security through international
cooperation and diplomacy.
The topics to be discussed are, perhaps,
two of the most relevant topics of our
time, dealing with the rise of global
terrorism, and how international
cooperation can help combat this threat
(Topic B), and the situation in
Afghanistan after the withdrawal of ISAF
forces.(Topic A)
In keeping with the themes of the
conference, both issues are of immense
global importance, but are issues that
www.oximun.org
Page 2
must be tackled at their fundamental
roots.
contributing to much of the infrastructure that
exists in Afghanistan today.
Delegates are expected to be familiar
with the study guide, but are also highly
encouraged to further explore the topics,
through the links provided as well as
through their own reading. We expect
engaging, lively and multifaceted, and
most importantly, enjoyable debate,
discussion and (hopefully), results!
Afghanistan has been in a near-constant
state of civil war since 1978, when a Soviet
backed coup by the communist People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan broke out.
Continuing instability contributed to a Soviet
intervention and installation of a Soviet puppet
government. An American-supported proxy
war ended up driving Soviet troops out of
Afghanistan, but this was soon followed by the
warlords turning on themselves, and a takeover
by the extremist Taliban. The Taliban were
driven out of power, though still possess
considerable resources and pose a continuing
threat to the stability of the Afghan nation.
Regards,
Afghanistan is a highly diverse country
with numerous ethnic and tribal groups
despite the rebuilding process of the past 10
years, It is also incredibly poor; 40 years of civil
war have devastated the country’s infrastructure,
and the ongoing conflict deters foreign
investment
Beenish, Kyle and Tagore, DISEC Chairs.
TOPIC A: TRANSITION OF
SECURITY
DUTIES
IN
AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan has always, to a certain extent, been
the convergence point of various civilizations,
thanks to its key position along the Old Silk
Road, and its role as a centre of Islamic
civilisation during the Islamic Golden age.
Ruled by Persians, Greeks, Huns, and Mongols
during various in history, an independent
Afghan nation first emerged in the 18th century.
Throughout the 19th century, it was a major site
of the continuing Anglo-Russian conflicts for
supremacy in Central Asia immortalised as “The
Great Game” by Arthur Conolly and Rudyard
Kipling.
During the 20th century, Afghanistan
gradually moved into the Soviet sphere of
influence, with Soviet advisors and aid
Afghanistan remains a continuing source of
instability in the region, in particular of
neighbouring Pakistan; directly across the
border from current Taliban stronghold in
South-eastern Afghanistan are the old North
West Frontier Province, and the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These areas
have large Pashtun populations, and their
madrassas have long been fertile recruiting
grounds for the Taliban.
The focus of this conference will be on
establishing a lasting peace to bring an end to a
civil war that has spanned four decades,
ensuring a well-governed and prosperous
Afghan state, and safeguarding the rights of the
various religious and ethnic minorities.
Page 3
www.oximun.org
TOPIC HISTORY
Afghanistan since 1979
The infighting within the People’s Democratic
Party PDPA in the aftermath of the coup
resulted in the assassination of the Sovietbacked President Taraki, and his replacement by
Hafizullar Amin, a man who eventually was
considered unreliable by Moscow. Attempts to
implement a more Communist system in
Afghanistan, through land and legal reforms,
resulted in an insurgency.
As the situation deteriorated, the KGB believed
that the uncompromising plans of the PDPA
were a major cause of the instability. Soviet
forces then launched their own operation to
remove Amin, and installed a much more pliable
leader.
The Soviets now found themselves facing a
renewed insurgency, not only against an
unpopular government, but given extra fuel by
perceptions of a Soviet “invasion”. Central
government control of Afghanistan was now
only nominal. Over the next 10 years, the Soviet
Union would be embroiled in a long, devastating
war against various irregulars in an attempt to
re-establish control. This war would sap Soviet
power and resources and is believed to have led
to the conditions that forced Gorbachev to seek
re-engagement with the West.
The backbone of the insurgency during the
Soviet era, were groups of Islamist fanatics
called the Mujahadeen,. This movement
attracted Islamist fighters from throughout the
Islamic World, though a disproportionate
number came from neighbouring Pakistan. One
of the most infamous of these fighters was
Osama Bin Laden who would later turn against
his former sponsors.
Cynically, the United States saw an opportunity
to fight a proxy war against the Soviet Union,
through support of anti-Soviet fighters,
particularly the Mujahadeen. Pakistan, always
resentful of Soviet influence in its neighbour,
also contributed significantly to the anti-Soviet
cause through facilitating American smuggling
operations, and facilitating Mujahadeen
recruitment in Pakistan.
After ten years of long, devastating war, the
Soviet army finally withdrew in 1989, leaving
behind a weakened PDPA administration that
would soon be toppled by the various
Mujahadeens. Over a million people are
believed to have been killed, and several million
more fled the country during the conflict and
the aftermath.
Ironically, the American-trained and equipped
Mujahadeen, including portable Surface-to-Air
Stinger Missiles, which still plague allied air
forces to this day.
The Taliban Takeover
In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, the
Communist government collapsed. Without a
common enemy, the various warlords who had
banded together to fight the Soviets began
bickering among themselves. The abundance of
abandoned ex-Soviet small arms and equipment
allowed the warlords to continue fighting, even
as American aid dried up.
Figure 1 : The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Page 4
www.oximun.org
A disaffected warlord, with alleged support from
the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, formed
the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamist group
with a hard-line interpretation of Islam. Several
early victories gave the Taliban enough
momentum to capture the national capital of
Kabul in 1995, and established nominal rule
over much of the country. The remaining
warlords still resisting the Taliban were hemmed
into an ever smaller portion of Northern
Afghanistan.
nominally under the control of anti-Taliban
forces.
Taliban rule was marked by oppression
of ethnic and religious minorities, and the
institution of Islamic Sharia law. The Taliban
also harboured other Islamic fundamentalists,
such as Osama Bin Laden’s then-fledgling AlQaeda. The Taliban were internationally not
recognized as the legitimate government of
Afghanistan, but a lack of appetite for
intervention in the so-called “Graveyard of
Empires” meant that Taliban power was left
unchecked through the 1990s.
In December 2001, the Bonn Conference was
convened by the UN, where non-Taliban
opposition groups gathered together to discuss
the future framework. This led to a transitional
government, and eventually to the first
democratic elections held in Afghanistan, in
2004.
Even after the fall of Kabul, many warlords
continued the fight against the Taliban, forming
the Northern Alliance. While the Taliban
advance into Northern Alliance territory slowed,
by early 2001, the Northern Alliance was clearly
on the strategic defensive, and struggling to
maintain ground.
The Taliban was shattered and retreated to the
south. Coalition forces then began deploying
to Afghanistan, in a bid to root out and
eliminate the remnants of Al-Qaeda. Early on,
progress seemed very promising for the
Government and the Coalition as the Taliban
had melted away and reconstruction efforts
began to get off the ground.
United Nations supported in aiding Afghan
reconstruction by passing UNSC Resolution
1386 to create the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide military
support for the fledgling Afghan state. UNSC
Resolution 1401, passed in 2002, created the
United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA) to help coordinate UN
aid.
Coalition Involvement and the Bonn
Agreement.
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks,
the Bush Administration began seeking to find
and root out Osama Bin Laden. An Americanled NATO intervention supported the Northern
Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces as they
counterattacked and recaptured swathes of
Northern Afghanistan. Within three months,
the Northern Alliance had captured Kabul, and
by the end of the year, all of Afghanistan was
Figure 2 - UN Talks in Bonn, 2001
The Taliban Resurgence
Throughout 2002, the newly formed ISAF
continued cracking down on the remnants of
Page 5
www.oximun.org
the Taliban forces. Large scale, highly
publicised operations were conducted to root
the Taliban out from their mountain
strongholds. This pace would not be sustained,
however, and the Iraq War would divert
Western attention and resources away from
Afghanistan, allowing the Taliban and other
anti-government insurgents to lick their wounds.
To a large extent, the Taliban retreated into
Pakistan, where, shielded by members of various
Pakistani Intelligence services, they recruited
new fighters from madrassas. As Taliban
numbers began to rise, they moved back into
southern Afghanistan where they were able to
blend into the Pashtun population. Most
Taliban campaigns against ISAF were conducted
indirectly, through attacking isolated outposts,
roadside bombs, suicide bombings, terrorising
the civilian population, or attacking Afghan
army units, while avoiding direct confrontation
with heavily armed Coalition troops.
A combination of drone strikes, corrupt local
government officials, and foreign Islamist
fighters were a huge boon to the Taliban, and
helped to replenish, and even grow their
depleted numbers. Other Islamist groups, with
similar goals and outlooks, such as the Haqqani
network or the Party of Islam, are much smaller
than the Taliban, but still represent significant
threats.
Coalition/ISAF counterinsurgency tactics often
sought direct engagements with the Taliban,
where the Coalition could bring its
overwhelming firepower to bear. This was very
successful in creating “body counts”. The
United States also began increasing usage of
unmanned drones for reconnaissance and
targeted strikes against key Taliban leaders.
Some drone strikes targeted Taliban leaders
inside Pakistan. This, in combination with other
violations of Pakistani sovereignty led to
deteriorating American-Pakistani relations that
further complicated Coalition cooperation to
root out key Taliban forces.
‘Afghanisation’
By 2008, the Afghan war had been going on for
7 years. The Obama administration did not
inherit its predecessor’s appetite for a sustained
counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. Almost
immediately, Obama began preparing an “exit
strategy”, which would involve a gradual
drawdown of American combat operations, and
an increasing role for the Afghan forces.
However, in order to stabilise the situation, the
Obama administration authorised a large troop
surge just prior to the withdrawal. This
coincided with the height of the insurgency was
in 2010 and 2011, and coalition casualties in
those two years were far heavier than they were
pre-2008. Troop levels continued to fall
throughout 2012 and 13, and the last combat
troops are projected to leave by the end of this
year.
The surge was supposed to pave the way for a
permanent handover of the counterinsurgency
to the ISAF-trained and assisted Afghan
National Army. However, it was found that the
ANA could often be wanting, with many units
having insufficient training or poor morale. The
Taliban, while bloodied, still remain a major
threat in parts of the Southeast, and control
large parts of the country outside of urban areas.
DISCUSSION OF THE
PROBLEM
The Coalition leaves Afghanistan in a dire state.
The pace of Afghan reconstruction and
establishment of national institutions has also
been disappointing. Institutions like the police
are still ineffective, corruption and graft remain
Page 6
www.oximun.org
rife, and this year’s presidential elections have
been plagued by allegations of ballot rigging.
Security requires a multi-faceted approach, and
Governance
Post-2001, Afghanistan underwent a provisional
and then transitional government where the
underlying framework of the new Afghan state
were laid. Afghanistan has a semi-presidential
system with a president, and a ministerial
cabinet which is appointed by the president but
approved by the National assembly. The first
elections in 2004 were won by Hamid Karzai, an
old resistance fighter, who was subsequently reelected in 2009. New elections, held earlier this
year, were controversial, with both leading
candidates accusing the other of having
attempted to stuff ballot boxes.
Afghan governmental authority is very limited
outside Kabul, with significant power lying with
various local warlords and officials. Much of
the power derives from the ability of members
of the central government to deliver patronage
to its local constituent. At this local level
corruption and government mismanagement is
rife. Cronyism and splits among tribal lines
have fuelled resentment, and often leads to
locals packing their bags and joining the Taliban.
Figure 3 Afghan warlords and their territories, 2006
Dealing with graft, corruption, the patronage
and lack of transparency will be key in ensuring
that aid delivered to Afghanistan would be spent
on reconstruction, rather than ending up in a
local warlord’s pocket.
The downfall of the Taliban also caused large
numbers of Afghan refugees, many of them
displaced since the Soviet invasion, to return to
Afghanistan, with some estimates saying up to 5
million refugees had returned. These returnees
have been significant in providing the Afghan
economy with cash flow and valuable skills.
At the time of writing, Afghanistan remains
divided by a presidential election. Two leading
candidates, Ashraf Ghani, and Abdullah
Abdullah remain in a deadlock over a closer
race, and allegations of electoral fraud threaten
the fragile consensus that is the Afghan
government. Finding an equitable solution that
would leave both factions satisfied in a
government of national unity, rather than
marginalised, will be important in preventing a
renewed civil war as one side decides to fight for
what it believes should be its own.
The Afghan Police and the Afghan
Army
As the ISIS mandate comes to an end,
responsibilities are increasingly being transferred
to the Afghan Armed forces. Recreated in 2002,
the Afghan army has slowly assumed military
responsibilities from withdrawing Coalition
troops.
American military advisors continue to play an
important role in shaping a new, modern
Afghan army that would cement central
government control from warlords and
insurgents. Afghan units have held well under
fire, and cooperated well with Western support.
Even post-withdrawal, up to 10,000 American
troops are expected to remain in Afghanistan to
train and advise. However, this depends on the
signing of a comprehensive bilateral agreement
with members of the coalition, the signing of
Page 7
www.oximun.org
which has been delayed, due to political
disagreements.
Despite the influx of modern aid, much of the
equipment remains out of date, often barely
being better than the equipment of the
insurgents they are fighting. Soviet era vehicles
and aircraft remain the mainstay of the force.
They are highly dependent on US capabilities,
particularly airlift, logistical, mobility and aerial
reconnaissance.
It is likely that, without
American support, the already high levels of
casualties being suffered by Afghan forces
would rise exponentially
Morale and the loyalty of troops can be a
particular concern. The recent collapse of the
similarly American-trained and equipped Iraqi
army has highlighted deficiencies in those forces
once American support is withdrawn. Afghan
Army units do preform well with American
support, but their operation independent of
Western forces remains to be seen. It would be
important to ensure the army Particularly
egregious incidents where Afghan soldiers have
opened fire on their Western counterparts
highlight the questionable loyalty of some
members of the armed forces, and highlights the
risks of the army being split among tribal lines
and simply being used as instruments by
warlords.
Equally important, however, is the role of the
Afghan police. The police will play a role in
securing cities and towns against various
insurgent treats, but also, as the situation
stabilises play a role in the more traditional roles
in fighting crime and maintain order.
The
police have had a less than stellar track record
with corruption, with many turning a blind eye
to the opium trade, or even the Taliban, while
others would abuse their position to demand
bribes from the local population. Eliminating
corruption in the police forces will be vital for
creating trust and making a more efficient force.
Ethnic groups
Afghanistan has a large variety of ethnic groups.
Four ethnic groups compromise the majority of
the population; Pashtuns (or Pashtos), Tajiks,
Hazaras and Uzbeks. However, there are also
significant numbers of Turkmen, Balochs, and
other ethnic groups with their own niches.
The
largest
ethnic
group
are
the
Pashtuns/Pushtuns, comprising nearly half of
the Afghan population. They speak Pashto, and
are clustered around the southern half of the
country.
The Taliban is composed predominantly of
Southern Pashtuns. While Pashtuns are a major
source of Taliban support, there are also many
Pashtuns who fought against the Taliban in the
Northern Alliance, and, indeed, many members
of the current Afghan administration, including
Hamid Karzai himself, is a Pashtun. Notably,
there are also significant Pashtun populations
across the border in Pakistan in the federally
administered tribal areas.
Close behind the Pashtuns in numbers are the
Tajiks, who tend to speak a variety of Persian
languages. They tend to be very anti-Taliban,
and mostly reside in the North.
The other ethnic groups with significant Hazara
were particularly badly persecuted during the
Taliban control of the country, and it would be
important to ensure that their minority rights are
protected in the future Afghan state.
Ensuring stability and equality in a multi-ethnic
nation would be difficult, but necessary. The
current method of divvying up various
government offices between the ethnic groups
has helped to maintain an uneasy peace, so far.
Social and Economic Issues
Despite the Coalition and the UN pouring
billions of dollars into the Afghan economy via
Page 8
www.oximun.org
foreign aid and development programs,
Afghanistan remains an incredibly poor and
underdeveloped country. Much of the
infrastructure around Kabul has been repaired,
but the southern Pashtun provinces have been
slightly neglected due to the ongoing instability
Further, large proportions of the population
remain un- or underemployed, and education
and literacy are generally poor. Many girls,
particularly in insurgent-contested areas, are also
unable to attend school. Life expectancy
remains low, and healthcare a luxury.
the end of a Taliban insurgency, and less
corruption and graft.
Finally, a major part of the Afghan shadow
economy consists of poppies and the opium
trade. The underground trade provides jobs for
numerous Afghans, but the proceeds have also
played major roles in funding various warlords,
and even the Taliban. While the Coalition have
been keen to crack down on these, destroying
opium fields tends to create resentment towards
the government and leads to impoverished
farmers joining the insurgents.
Aid and Support
Figure 4 - Floods in Afghanistan, 2014, an example
showing the incapability of the state to handle disaster
risks
The Afghan economy retains a significant
dependence on Agriculture, which employs a
significant chunk of the population, and
produces many of the country’s exports. This,
while useful, leaves Afghanistan very vulnerable
to price fluctuations or drought, and
diversification away from this sector would be
key.
Afghanistan does have significant mineral and
energy reserves, which have only just begun to
be tapped. The continuing instability has made
Western companies hesitant to invest in Afghan
mines, though a few Chinese companies have
started probing into opening mines. Extracting
and harnessing these could be key to securing a
better future, but would rely on more stability,
It is clear that Afghanistan still requires
significant foreign aid and support in order to
help it progress. Joint agreements such as the
US-Afghan Strategic Partnership promise the
withdrawal of American combat troops, but
retains American troops in an advisory rule to
train the new Afghan army, and American
civilian employees will continue to help
organizing the reconstruction. It would be
important to maintain and identify an aid plan
through which other countries could hep
Afghanistan in similar ways.
The Taliban
The elephant in the big Afghan room is, of
course, the Taliban. Without a serious recommitment of coalition forces, which seems
increasingly unlikely, given the situation in
Eastern Syria-North-western Iraq, and in
Ukraine, the Afghan National Army stands little
hope of eliminating the insurgency.
As Western forces continue to withdraw, and as
Afghan forces have continued to be inadequate,
Afghan government control of much of the
Southeast continues to be tenuous. This has
Page 9
www.oximun.org
prompted the Afghan government and the
coalition to open dialogues with various
branches the Taliban to allow for a power
sharing agreement where the Taliban would give
up the insurgency n return for a meaningful
place in Afghanistan’s future. Managing these
negotiations, without compromising the rights
and freedoms of Afghans, will be a huge step in
finally ending the insurgency.
While the Taliban are generally unpopular
among the Afghan people, and few desire a
return to Taliban-rule, the ongoing instability
have caused
THE FUTURE
Ultimately, an unstable Afghanistan would
continue to be a source of instability for the
whole region, and even the world. During the
1980s many foreign Islamist fighters would learn
their trade in Afghanistan and would then go on
to spread their experience elsewhere around the
world, and there is a high chance of history
repeating itself in this case.
Peace Talks
Recently, Pakistan is trying to broker a peace
deal between the Taliban and Afghanistan. The
goal is no other than stabilizing the state prior to
the withdrawal of coalition forces. Last year,
Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar , a top Taliban
prisoner was freed from Pakistan. The Afghan
government saw Baradar as a figure to help
move towards a peace solution with the Taliban.
However, this move was met with severe public
outrage, as Baradar was one of the founding
members of the Taliban along with the group's
leader Mullah Omar. The world is sceptical
about the release of Taliban prisoners as there is
always a worry that they will strike back once
they are free. Pakistan’s role in the brokering of
such a peace is also questioned as the state had
historical ties with the Taliban.
Yet how will the peace talks continue is still
subject to many changes. Afghanistan will
probably have to buy time from the peace talks
but as well as keeping Taliban prisoners and
conditions favourable for the stability of the
state.
Nation Building
As a result of prolonged conflict since the Soviet
Invasion in 1989, the nation has had little room
to fabricate their infrastructure. Most of its
infrastructure pre-dates the Soviet invasion, and
not to mention most of these are destroyed
during the years of wars and instability. To
stabilize and develop Afghanistan, not only a
military solution has to be arrived at , but also
an economic and financial plan to improve life
standards in the nation.
The 2014 Presidential election in Afghanistan
made it clear that and the political system has to
be optimized to prevent post-electoral disputes
and conflicts, which took place this year. The
Afghan people should be better represented as
well, in both the executive and legislative organs.
The Coalition’s continuing role
The Coalition’s continuing political and
economic support would surely play a key role
in the future Afghan state. To what extent the
members of the current coalition, as well as
other members of the UN are involved in the
reconstruction will be key.
POINTS RESOLUTIONS
SHOULD ADDRESS
-
Afghan Nation Building and forging of
an Afghan National identity
Security Agreements between the
outgoing coalition and the Afghan
Page 10
www.oximun.org
-
-
-
-
-
government to ensure continued
support for the development and
operations of the Afghan Armed Forces
Political reform to ensure proper
representation and inclusion of the
various minorities
Steps to bring an end to Taliban de facto
control of much of South-eastern
Afghanistan
Potential for continued talks with the
Taliban?
Ensuring the cooperation of
Afghanistan’s neighbours in combatting
threats to the Afghan state.
Directions for enhancing Economic
Growth, Development, and continuing
aid and international investment
Ensuring attainment of educational and
health goals
Diversification of the Afghan Economy,
in particular, dealing with the Opium
trade and exploitation of Afghanistan’s
rich natural resources.
BLOC POSITIONS
Afghan stability is something everybody wants;
It is in almost nobody’s interest to leave a
festering civil war in Central Asia. The
differences are in the details of what the nationbuilding should actually involve. How involved
should other nations be, how much foreign
support would be needed, and in particular,
what reforms are required, what role should the
Taliban play in Afghanistan’s future, if it should
play a role at all?
The Coalition
The nations involved in the NATO (North
Atlantic Treaty Organization)-led intervention
want to create a stable, democratic Afghanistan,
but in general, are balking at the costs required
to do so.
The last several years have seen a surge in
troops being deployed into Afghanistan,
followed by a gradual drawdown and handing
over of equipment and responsibilities to
Afghan security forces.
While support for continuing combat operations
is low, particularly in light of the threats in other
parts of the world, members of the coalition
generally remain committed to supporting the
Afghan state through financial and advisory
means. The coalition wants to be able to claim
to have created a “stable”, legitimate Afghan
government. Some members of the coalition,
particularly the United States, want a permanent
Coalition military presence, and continuing
political influence, in a vital strategic area.
However, the coalition’s diminishing role and
slow withdrawal has drastically reduced the
influence it has over Afghanistan’s government.
The withdrawal of the last American combat
forces in 2014 may also represent the end of
direct western influence on afghan governance
or even a sharp decline in aid. Increasing
tensions between the coalition and the Afghan
government have already resulted in a slashing
this year’s aid budgets, and the risk is that the
Afghan population could suffer from a spat
between Kabul and the West.
Pakistan
Pakistan has a schizophrenic approach towards
Afghanistan. While publically supportive of
coalition efforts to help stabilise and rebuild the
country, there have been many allegations raised
that various elements within the Pakistani
Intelligence Services have provided equipment
and shelter to Taliban forces. Reconciling
Pakistan’s responsibilities to the international
community
Pakistan is not unique in this position – many
other Islamic nations have also, for a variety of
ideological, political or religious reasons, also
Page 11
www.oximun.org
provided significant financial support to the
Taliban.
FURTHER READING
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
AND
“The Bonn Agreement” , United Nations,
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.
org/files/AF_011205_AgreementProvisionalArr
angementsinAfghanistan%28en%29.pdf
(accessed 31 Aug 2014); This framework, agreed
by Afghan exiles and Anti-Taliban rebels, laid
the framework for the new Afghanistan.
Security Council Resolution 1386,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c4e945
71c.html <- UNSC 1386, Creating and defining
the mandate for ISAF.
Security Council Resolution 1401,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d5282
162.html <- UNSC 1401, Creating the UN AMA
“Salvaging Governance Reform in Afghanistan,
Council on Forein Relations
http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/salvaginggovernance-reform-afghanistan/p27778
(accessed 31 Aug 2014); A good piece on
problems faced by the Afghan government
Afghan People’s Dialoguse for Peace, United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan,
http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA
/human%20rights/Eng_%20Report%20%20Afghan%20Peoples%20Dialogues.pdf
(accessed 5 Sep 2014);<- <- A report on the
peace process from The Website of the
UNAMA (United Nations Assisstance Mission
in Afghanistan)
“Independent Assessment of the ANSF” CNA
Corporation
http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research
/CNA%20Independent%20Assessment%20of%
20the%20ANSF.pdf (accessed 5 Sep 2014);<An assessment of the requirements and
capabilities of Afghan security forces
“So much for the Good War” Foreign Policy,
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/19/so
_much_for_the_good_war (accessed 3 Sep 2014
– an assessment of the Obama surge
“Clock Watching”, The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/216030
61-some-american-forces-will-stay-afghanistannot-long-clockwatching?zid=308&ah=e21d923f9b263c5548d5
615da3d30f4d (accessed 26 Aug 2014), a nice
quick introduction to the politics of the
withdrawal
9. “Misjudgements”, The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/news/books-andarts/21600958-why-western-engagementafghanistan-has-failed-misjudgments(accessed 26
Aug 2014), review of a book arguing about the
potential role of Pakistani Intelligence services in
supporting the Taliban
10. “Talking to the Taliban”, The Eonomist,
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/215798
74-peace-afghanistan-distant-not-impossibletalking-taliban (Accessed 4 Sep 2014)
Particularly keen delegates can also attempt “A Distant
Plan”, a political simulation of the Afghan conflict
created by a CIA analyst
Page 12
www.oximun.org
TOPIC B: INTERNATIONAL
COLLABORATION ON THE
MANAGEMENT
OF
VIOLENT
NON-STATE
ACTORS
In the 21st century the world has been shaken
by rising incidents of unconventional warfare
and attacks. In the past, security policies of
countries were accustomed to state belligerents.
However, as more and more attacks and threats
arose from violent non-state actors, countries
begun to adjust themselves against these new
unconventional threats. Recent rise of the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) in
Syria and Iraq, Boko Haram in Nigeria, AlQaeda , Taliban & etc. has threatened world
peace.
While many international operations have been
carried out world-wide, their effectiveness is
disputable.
For
instance,
NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
deployed in Afghanistan is accompanied with
rising number of incidents of insurgent attacks.
This has forced the international community to
shift their strategy to a milder, indirect approach
towards these international violent non-state
actors (IVNSAs).
Entering the second decade of the new century,
the Disarmament and International Security
Committee (DISEC) will review the recent
strategies of international collaboration on this
matter, and what changes should be made to
make remedies more effective.
covert sabotage operations, which aimed to slow
down German advancements in North Africa.
These so-called “covert operations” involve no
other than sabotages, assassinations and
shootings that are so familiar to the scene of
terrorism nowadays.
In the 1950-60s, British forces began injecting
political implications in these operations. British
forces used this unconventional strategy the
most in Malaya during the Malayan Emergency
(1948-1960) and later the Confrontation with
Indonesia (1963-1966). Here British forces
began pacification operations with the locals.
Meanwhile, these operations accompany with a
determined anti-communist message.
In the 1970s, the US begun involved with these
operations when they begun negotiations with
the opposition during the Iranian Revolution. It
was at this period the US was accused of
funding religious violent state actors such as the
Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviet invasion
in Afghanistan (1979-1989). These beneficiaries
later evolved into the most notorious IVNSA
such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
The US Strategy in the Middle East continues
this way. The US has had operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq which are aimed to topple
the local government. These operations created
a power vacuum and IVNSAs took up the gap.
It appears that ironically state governments
invented the contemporary terrorist strategy and
helped IVNSAs to learn and make use of it.
Fire against Fire
TOPIC HISTORY
Global Terrorism: An invention by
mistake?
International Violent Non-State Actors
(IVNSA) share heritage with the early change of
national military strategies. As early as in World
War Two, British forces were engaged in several
In response to the rising violence carried out by
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda , NATO forces were
deployed to engage the militants. After almost a
decade of operations , they have successfully
reduced the scope of IVNSAs but they forced
IVNSAs to relocate operations from one
country and another. For instance , the Taliban
relocated themselves to Northwest Pakistan.
Page 13
www.oximun.org
In the last decade , it appears that NATO-led
operations against the IVNSA insurgencies have
averted massive attacks but they did not
improve security in countries which they were
once based. Academic research showed there is
an increasing trend of attacks instigated by
insurgents in Afghanistan since 2010 and the
presence of foreign troops have become a
nuisance to the local populace.
Capacity building and regulation are new
approaches to the IVNSA question focuses
more on creating an environment to weaken
IVNSAs. While direct intervention could be
done bilaterally, such as NATO on Afghanistan,
capacity building and regulation requires closer
international collaboration to realize. How
should the international community coordinate
itself on this matter?
Changing Strategy
DISCUSSION
It has become clear that direct foreign military
intervention does not effectively subdue
IVNSAs. Sometimes they in turn supported the
IVNSAs as they spark hatred against foreign
intervention.
Bilateral Actions
In 2004, the UN Security Council passed
resolution 1540 which prohibits proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to nonstate actors. This resolution has formulated the a
“1540 Committee” which is now dedicated to
the capacity building for states which are having
difficulties in preventing non-state actors from
gaining access to these weapons. A bulletin of
requests and offers in this regard has been
established under this committee.
In 2006, United Nations General Assembly
Adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy. A huge part of the strategy involved
building states’ capacity to prevent and combat
terrorism. It appears the international
community is shifting its strategy to tackling the
IVNSA question by
General disarmament is also a noticeable
approach for the IVNSA question. The UN
Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) has
found that much of the non-State actors
ammunition and weapons are illicitly diverted
from state security force. In this sense,
prohibiting the development and transfer of
arms would in turn weaken IVNSAs.
Although the international community has
recently shifted its attention to indirect
approaches such as capacity building and
regulation, bilateral agreements and direct
foreign intervention is not entirely unnecessary.
Sometimes when foreign intervention is
requested by a state, for example, when Mali
requested French military assistance in 2012 and
was approved by the Security Council resolution
2085, bilateral actions in tackling IVNSA
could
be
justified.
Figure 5 : French military intervention in Mali
However, if bilateral operations are not well
planned or simply too narrow, IVNSAs might
migrate to another country and affect more
victims in another country. How the
international community could tolerate bilateral
actions as well as coordinate their efforts against
IVNSA is up to the debate.
Page 14
www.oximun.org
Responsibility sharing and
shouldering in capacity building
Although these indirect approaches are
identified it is always hard to realize them.
Countries have different capacity handling these
new regulatory frameworks or simply engaging
IVNSAs. The 1540 Committee reported in 2011
that ”…implementation depends on national
discretion in what States devise as appropriate
and effective policies, the usefulness of sharing
experience is limited, inter alia, by a lack of
capacity or resources.”
Some requests for assistance from the 1540
committee assistance bulletin dates back to a
decade ago when the committee was firstly
established in 2004, for instance, Albania’s
request for legal assistance regarding EU
standards, Bahamas’ request of training of police
force & etc. While various member states have
provided offers of assistance in the form of a
point of contact, these requests appear to be left
unattended. It appears that responsibilities and
duties could be more clearly stated and listed in
the assistance exchange regime.
Some member states have committed
themselves in the exchange of assistance, for
Example , member states of the Community of
African , Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP)
, are obliged for the cooperation and provision
of “ Financial and technical assistance in the
area of cooperation to counter the proliferation
of WMDs by … non-state actors” in the joint
ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement. To what extent
member states of these agreements have
followed the agreement and exchange assistance
is debatable.
Ideologies of IVNSAs and their
political implications
As discussed above, IVNSAs utilized a military
strategy that was once used by the UK and the
US for political purposes. Today, IVNSAs also
conveyed political messages in their operations.
For example, the ISIS aims to unite all Muslims
in the world and bring them under the rule of a
single Caliph. The religiousness of the political
message does not only move many of its
believers, as well as putting certain Islamic
countries in a difficult position as to decide how
should they differentiate themselves from
radical religious regimes.
When IVNSAs are anti-government, some
countries might be able to use them to confront
other countries. For example, in 1980s-90s
Afghanistan, the US funded the Mujahedeen
against the Soviet Union. To certain countries,
it might come into conflict with national
interests to engage IVNSAs in this sense.
Complication in Failing States
Most IVNSAs have established operations in
states that are, or once were instable. For
instance, the recent Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIS) insurgency found its roots in the
civil-war-torn Syria and launched a surprise
attack
on
Iraq.
Figure 6 : ISIS Insurgent executing civilians
Political instability in certain countries has
accounted for a more conducive environment
for illicit arms trade and eventually the
strengthening of the combat ability of the
IVNSAs, according to the UN Office for Drug
and Crime (UNODC). The Office has
emphasized coups found in Mali (2012) ,
Guinea-Bissau (2012) , Niger (2010) & etc. has
contributed to the increase of arms trade. For
Page 15
www.oximun.org
instance, Niger currently did not have any
regulatory programs in place according to their
national report to the 1540 committee.
States already prone to civil war is even more
susceptible to infiltration of violent NSAs.
According to a policy alert by an INGO,
Violence among non-state actors could bring
Sudan and South Sudan into war, further
complicating the already difficult situation in the
country to engage IVNSAs.
Role of other armed NSAs
While many NSAs discussed above are violent,
not all NSAs are detrimental towards national
security. Some other NSAs including private
military companies (PMCs) , security contractors
and mercenaries are also armed but not
essentially hostile towards regimes. For example,
Academi , previously known as Blackwater or
Xe Services , is a major security contractor to
the federal government of the United States.
Cooperation with other NSAs is frequently
mentioned in the UN regime. However,
regulation of the arms used by these NSAs
could be difficult as well. In what way the other
NSAs should be incorporated into member
states’ national policy against IVNSAs is still
open for debate.
THE FUTURE
General Disarmament Projects and
the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
One way to weaken IVNSAs is to prevent them
from acquiring new weapons. Border Controls,
Export Controls and Licensing were part of the
1540 Evaluation Matrix in determining a
country’s implementation of the 1540 mandate.
Member states could use this matrix as a
guideline to improve these control mechanisms
further.
In 2013, the General Assembly has adopted the
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) which aims to control
the flow of arms from falling into instable
regions or regions in conflict. The Treaty is not
yet entered into force, as it requires more
member states to sign and ratify it.
Regional Capacity-building
Certain regional bodies have begun their
capacity-building projects. For example, the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
of NATO is launching a series of training and
assistance programs to the Afghan national army
(ANA) as part of the transition of security duties
from the ISAF to the ANA.
However, whether capacity-building programs
shall be done on a regional level or an
international level is still up for the debate.
BLOC POSITIONS
Figure 7 : Canadian Police being trained by Academi
It is reasonable to deduce that NATO countries
would be interested in making use of traditional
way of tackling the IVNSA question while other
developing nations would prefer having the
more indirect approach.
Member states of regional intergovernmental
organizations such as the EU, ASEAN, the
African Union , MERCOSUR, CARICOM &
Page 16
www.oximun.org
etc. would be able to provide regional financial
assistance when required , however how to
maximize the effectiveness of the capital would
be under debate.
3. UN Office for Disarmament
Affairs
–
Small
Arms
POINTS RESOLUTIONS
SHOULD ADDRESS
4. UN Office for Disarmament
Affairs – Arms Trade Treaty http://www.un.org/disarmament/
ATT/
 How should member states make
use of bilateral agreements against
IVNSAs;
 How should member states
coordinate better in the exchange
of capacity-building assistance;
 How should member states make
use of general disarmament
projects to weaken IVNSAs;
 How should member states help
failing states (i.e. , those which are
caught in civil wars and/or
politically instable) engage
IVNSAs;
 What are the roles other armed
NSAs could play;
 Any other points necessary.
FURTHER READING
1. UN 1540 Committee Website http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/
2. UN Global Counter-terrorism
Strategy
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/act
ion.html.
http://www.un.org/disarmament/convar
ms/salw/
5. Security Council resolution 67/97,
Report of the Committee
established pursuant to Security
Council resolution 1540 (2004),
S/2011/579 (12 September 2011),
available from
undocs.org/S/2011/579.
6.
General Assembly resolution
C.1/67/L.21 , Assistance to States
for curbing the illicit traffic in
small arms and light weapons and
collecting them A/C.1/67.L.21 (18
October 2012) , available from
http://www.un.org/ga/search/vie
w_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.1/67/L.
2
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. “About Us – Global
Operations” , Academi ,
http://academi.com/pages/ab
out-us/global-operations
(accessed 31 Aug 2014);
2. “Abyei: Renewed Violence
Increases the Risk of War”,
enough ,
http://www.enoughproject.org
/news/abyei-renewed-
Page 17
www.oximun.org
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
violence-increases-risk-war
(accessed 31 Aug 2014);
Cotonou Agreement, E.U.A.C.P., Nov. 04, 2010, 287
O.J.L. 2010.
“Firearms Trafficking in West
Africa,” UNODC,
http://www.unodc.org/docum
ents/toc/Reports/TOCTAWe
stAfrica/West_Africa_TOC_F
IREARMS.pdf (accessed 31
Aug 2014);
O’Hanlon , M & Livingston ,
I.S. Afghanistan Index : Also
including selected data on
Pakistan. Brookings. 31 Jul
2014. P.9
Security Council resolution
67/97, Report of the
Committee established
pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1540 (2004),
S/2011/579 (12 September
2011),
Security Council resolution
AC.44/2004/(02)/159, Annex
to the note verbale dated 23
October 2008 from the
Permanent Mission of the
Niger to the United Nations
addressed to the Chairman of
the Committee, (25 March
2010), available from
http://www.un.org/Docs/jour
nal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/AC.44/2
004/(02)/159
“Summary Offers of Assistance
from Member States”. 1540
Committee,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/154
0/assistance/offers-ofassistance/states.shtml
(accessed 31 Aug 2014);
9. Taillon , J.P.B. (2001) The
Evolution of Special Forces in
Counter-Terrorism: The British
and American Experiences.
Westport , CT : Praeger.
Page 18
www.oximun.org