INSIGHTS GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS VOLUME 5.1 • JANUARY 2015 Getting Closer to Home Getting Closer to Home KKR GLOBAL MACRO & ASSET ALLOCATION TEAM HENRY H. MCVEY Head of Global Macro & Asset Allocation +1 (212) 519.1628 henry.mcvey@kkr.com DAVID R. MCNELLIS +1 (212) 519.1629 david.mcnellis@kkr.com FRANCES B. LIM +61 (2) 8298 5553 frances.lim@kkr.com REBECCA J. RAMSEY +1 (212) 519.1631 rebecca.ramsey@kkr.com JAIME VILLA +1 (212) 401.0379 jaime.villa@kkr.com AIDAN T. CORCORAN + (353) 151.1045.1 aidan.corcoran@kkr.com While the general backdrop for risk assets remains favorable, we are no longer advising folks to “Stay the Course” as we did in our January 2014 Outlook piece. Rather, given where we are in the cycle and the magnitude of gains in recent years, we have begun the inevitable process of “Getting Closer to Home” in terms of our asset allocation targets. Importantly, though, we think this transition should be more evolutionary than revolutionary, but we do advise folks to raise some cash and to tilt the invested part of the portfolio to become more opportunistic in 2015. In terms of key themes, we see several compelling “arbitrages” in the global macro landscape that CIOs and portfolio managers should pursue this year. First, we believe that China’s slowing is not an aberration. As such, its role in the global economy is materially shifting, which means that we expect to see sizeable restructuring and recapitalization opportunities in sectors that previously over-earned and/or overstretched their footprints. Second, many corporations still have inefficient capital structures, including too much cash and too little debt, in our view. As such, investors can still benefit from corporate and/or shareholder actions to lower companies’ cost of capital and/or improve growth, including buybacks, dividends, capital expenditures and acquisitions. Third, despite a slew of liquidity in the system, many companies across both emerging and developed economies still can’t get proper access to credit. Hence, we still see a compelling illiquidity premium that is worth pursuing, particularly in today’s low rate environment. Fourth, in a world of contango commodity pricing, we continue to favor private real asset investments with upfront yield, growth and long-term inflation hedging relative to traditional liquid commodity notes and swaps. Finally, government deleveraging in the developed markets is disinflationary, which drives our thinking about the direction of long-term interest rates as well as the relative value of risk assets against the risk-free rates. MAIN OFFICE Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. 9 West 57th Street Suite 4200 New York, New York 10019 + 1 (212) 750-8300 COMPANY LOCATIONS AMERICAS New York, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Menlo Park, Houston, Louisville, São Paulo, Calgary EUROPE London, Paris, Dublin, Madrid ASIA Hong Kong, Beijing, Singapore, Dubai, Riyadh, Tokyo, Mumbai, Seoul AUSTRALIA Sydney © 2015 Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. All 2 KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS Rights Reserved. “ The best safety device is a rearview mirror with a cop in it. ” DUDLEY MOORE ENGLISH ACTOR, COMEDIAN, MUSICIAN, AND COMPOSER Since my team and I arrived at KKR in 2011, our asset allocation targets have been consistently aggressive relative to the benchmark against which we measure ourselves. In particular, given our strong view that the global economic recovery would last longer than the consensus, we have been willing to overweight public equities, “spicy” credit, private real assets, and other illiquid products to garner excess returns that we viewed as unachievable through many traditional liquid asset classes, including generic commodity notes and sovereign debt. This strategy has served us well (see performance Exhibits 74, 75, and 76) in recent years, but now we think it is time to start “Getting Closer to Home” on the asset allocation front, including raising some cash and getting more opportunistic across the portfolio in 2015. To be sure, as we discuss in detail below, we are still running with a pro-risk tilt, but after 67 months of economic expansion, we just do not think that it is necessary — as Dudley Moore so eloquently stated — to wait to fully see the policeman in the rearview mirror before we began to embrace some higher level of safety. Several influential macro considerations shape our more opportunistic approach. First is cumulative performance this cycle of risk assets. All told, the S&P 500 has now appreciated six consecutive years in a row, returning a full 204% through December 31, 2014 versus an historical average of 115% during bull markets (Exhibit 39). During this period its multiple has expanded a full 40%, now in line with the historical median of 42% (Exhibit 39). Outside the U.S., valuations are certainly less demanding; however, consistent with our Asynchronous Recovery thesis (see Investment Implications of an Asynchronous Global Recovery), we still expect some additional bumpiness in 2015 as many parts of Europe, Latin America, and Asia must endure some important but painful economic restructuring initiatives, including debt deleveraging, fiscal belt-tightening, and wage compression. Finally, we think the monetary backdrop is becoming more complicated. On the one hand, the central banks in Europe, Japan, and China are all likely to be more accommodative during 2015 in order to stoke growth. On the other hand, the U.S. Federal Reserve is now in the process of reducing its ultra-accommodative stance (Exhibit 4). Hence, unlike in past years, central bank policy around the world is now less in synch, which could create some tension in global capital markets, currencies in particular, during parts of 2015. So, against the macro backdrop that we envision for 2015, how should one position a multi-asset class portfolio? Our highest conviction asset allocation ideas are as follows: • We further embrace our Asynchronous Global Recovery theme by lifting our highest conviction idea, Distressed / Special Situation, to a 15% allocation from nine percent previously. We now target a full 15% allocation, notably above our benchmark weighting of zero, to Distressed / Special Situation. Our bottom line: This sizeable allocation allows us to efficiently invest behind – not against — the Asynchronous Global Recovery we continue to forecast. Importantly, beyond the European restructurings/ recapitalizations that we have been highlighting for some time, two recent trips to Asia confirm to us that we are now seeing “emerging” opportunities in Asia as the China Growth Miracle wanes – and companies are forced to restructure, recapitalize, and resize. Finally, we believe some notable dislocations across the energy market, the U.S. in particular, are also starting to emerge for managers of opportunistic capital. • To pay for this increased overweight position, we have lowered our growth equity allocation in our Other Alternatives bucket. To underwrite our increased Distressed / Special Situation allocation, we take five percent from Growth Capital / VC / Other and reduce this weighting to zero versus a benchmark of five percent. Importantly, given the carnage we are seeing in areas like U.S. energy, European banks, and Asian commodity plays, we are more interested in taking advantage of current dislocations around the globe, and in so doing, we seek to avoid some of the hefty valuations we now see in “hot” growth parts of the market, including the Internet and life sciences (Exhibit 61). • Our Fixed Income allocation also becomes less “spicy” in 2015, but we increase flexibility in the liquid credit portion of our portfolio. For the past three years, we have been substantially overweight “spicy credit,” including Mezzanine, Direct Lending, and Fixed Income Hedge Funds, based on our view that the economic cycle 1) would be longer than expected in duration; 2) the illiquidity premium represented a massive opportunity amid lower rates; and 3) the return profile of spicy credit would approach that of equities but with less risk. In 2015, however, we are shifting course by beginning to dial back some of our less liquid, “spicy” credit positions. Specifically, we are moving our Mezzanine allocation to two percent from five percent versus a benchmark weighting of zero. Within our liquid book, we are reducing our hedge fund allocation, but we are increasing our weighting towards Actively Managed Opportunistic Credit to seven percent from four percent. Our intent is to allow investment managers to toggle between bank loans, high yield, and other credit-sensitive products as opportunities/dislocations present themselves this year. Separately, we have added three percent to investment grade credit versus a benchmark of five percent and a previous weighting of zero percent. Our goal is to add some ballast to the fixed income portion of the portfolio during what we believe could be a more volatile year for the asset class. Overall, our total fixed income book remains small at just 18% of the portfolio versus a benchmark of 30% and is unchanged from June 2014. • We are reducing our long-term overweight positions in Public Equities back to equal weight and are now more opportunistic at this point in the cycle. Our research suggests less upside for equities than in past years, and as such, we now want to be a little more opportunistic in our approach. As we discuss below in more detail, our base view is that not only is the absolute return in global equities likely to be lower on a go-forward basis, but we also believe the Sharpe ratio is likely to decline. From a regional perspective, we stay overweight Asia and move to underweight in Latin America to reflect our cautious view on Brazil’s near-term prospects. • In order to become more opportunistic in equities, we are raising Cash to start 2015 with — boosting this allocation to three percent from zero during the entire 2011-2014 period. KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 3 • Risks/Hedges: Tactically, we consider buying downside protection in equities, currency, and rates when volatility compresses. We think that investors should expect spasms of risk asset de-ratings in 2015 when either growth and/or forward inflation expectations periodically drop towards uncomfortable levels. Consistent with this view, we are also increasingly concerned that the currencies of commodity exporting countries may cause further dislocations across the global capital markets in 2015. Our research shows that we are not likely to have a full 1997 unwind, but we are going to continue to endure a sizeable adjustment period ahead. In terms of implementation, we believe an investor should use periodic compression of volatility levels to purchase tactical protection across equity, currency, and fixed income markets. Details below. “ We now think it is now time to start “Getting Closer to Home” on the asset allocation front, including raising some cash and getting more opportunistic in 2015. “ 4 KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS KKR GMAA JUNE 2014 TARGET (%) • Currency: We believe the USD freight train remains on track. At the risk of staying in a crowded trade, we remain positive on the U.S. dollar against most major currencies, including the euro, Japanese yen and commodity currencies, including Brazilian real, Russian ruble, and Nigerian naira. Within the EM currency arena, we favor the Indian rupee, while in terms of EM “crosses,” we champion MXN over BRL again in 2015. KKR GMAA 2015 Target Asset Allocation STRATEGY BENCHMARK (%) • Within Real Assets, we believe investors should still avoid traditional commodity notes and swaps with no yield; we stay overweight income-producing Real Assets and short Gold. As in past years, we continue to stay away from liquid commodity swaps/notes again in 2015, particularly given 1) near-record negative roll features (Exhibit 62); and 2) our view that spot oil and other commodity prices could display some additional downside volatility in 1H15. We also stay short Gold again this year, as we see deflation, not inflation, as the bigger near-term risk. By comparison, we still think that there is a substantial opportunity to own cash-flowing hard assets that can produce yield, growth, and long-term inflation hedging. Our favorites include real estate, infrastructure, and pipelines. Given the significant price appreciation in certain gateway cities, however, we have reduced our Real Estate weighting to three percent from five percent and a benchmark weighting of two percent. EXHIBIT 1 KKR GMAA JANUARY 2015 TARGET (%) While we think that 2015 could again be another up year for many stocks, our view is that more volatility lies ahead than in recent years. So at the moment, we think it finally makes sense to have a little “dry powder” to add to risk assets in the event of a downdraft in 2015. 53 53 55 U.S. 20 20 20 EUROPE 15 15 16 ALL ASIA 13 12 13 LATIN AMERICA 5 6 6 18 30 18 GLOBAL GOVERNMENT 3 20 3 MEZZANINE 2 0 5 HIGH YIELD 0 5 0 BANK LOANS 0 0 0 HIGH GRADE 3 5 0 EMERGING MARKET DEBT 0 0 0 ACTIVELY MANAGED OPPORTUNISTIC CREDIT 7 0 4 FIXED INCOME HEDGE FUNDS 0 0 3 DIRECT LENDING 3 0 3 REAL ASSETS 6 5 8 REAL ESTATE 3 2 5 ENERGY / INFRASTRUCTURE 5 2 5 GOLD -2 1 -2 20 10 19 TRADITIONAL PE 5 5 5 DISTRESSED / SPECIAL SITUATION 15 0 9 GROWTH CAPITAL / VC / OTHER 0 5 5 3 2 0 ASSET CLASS PUBLIC EQUITIES TOTAL FIXED INCOME OTHER ALTERNATIVES CASH Strategy benchmark is the typical allocation of a large U.S. pension plan. Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation (GMAA). Importantly, our asset allocation framework for 2015 is driven by five key top-down themes that we think represent macro “mismatches,” or arbitrages between real and perceived values. They are as follows: 1. First, China’s fixed investment slowing is not an aberration. China’s environmental headwinds, including pollution, water concerns and food safety, now represent potentially more contentious political issues than job creation, in our view. This priority realignment is a big deal because it means fixed investment and low-end manufacturing will be de-emphasized. As such, we believe that investors should expect to see sizeable restructuring and recapitalization opportunities in sectors that previously overearned and/or overstretched their footprints during the China 2. Second, many corporations still have inefficient capital structures, including too much cash and too little debt. Hence, we believe that investors can still benefit from corporate actions to lower their costs of capital and/or improve growth, including buybacks, dividends, capital expenditures and acquisitions. Without question, activist managers are clear beneficiaries, but we also think LBOs and MBOs make sense. 3. Third, despite a surge in the global monetary base, access to credit remains a major issue, particularly for small- to medium-size businesses. As such, investors should continue to be able to garner an attractive illiquidity premium in the private markets. Interestingly, our research shows the premium actually widens again in 2014 (Exhibit 27). In the public markets, there too is opportunity as balance sheet downsizing across Wall Street and limited dealer inventory should fuel periodic market dislocations for investors with patient capital. 4. Fourth, in a world of contango commodity pricing, we continue to favor cash-flowing private real asset investments, including real estate, infrastructure, and energy, with upfront yield, growth and long-term inflation hedging relative to traditional liquid commodity notes and swaps. Already, the relative performance between these two sub-asset class groups has widened substantially in recent quarters, but we still see more opportunity ahead for even greater divergence. 5. Finally, government deleveraging in the developed markets is disinflationary, which drives our thinking about the direction of long-term interest rates as well as the relative value of risk assets against the risk-free rates. In particular, given our view that the economic cycle will stretch into 2017, we think that many public and private equity stories with capital management and operational improvements still appear attractive. Importantly, several of the aforementioned themes are continuations of high conviction ideas that we have developed during the past few years. Put another way, while we are beginning to turn more conservative in our overall outlook towards risk assets, we still feel very strongly about the key macro trends we are championing – and more importantly – their ability to deliver alpha again in 2015. What has changed, however, is that 1) we are now 12 months later in the cycle at a time when asset prices are higher and the world’s most influential central bank is about to shift its stance on monetary policy (and our models point towards stronger growth by late 2015/ early 2016); 2) China’s structural overbuild in its fixed investment arena is now under greater pressure than the consensus now appreciates, which has broad-based implications for global industrials, commodities and currencies. We believe that China is also likely to influence global inflation rates as it tries to export away some of its excess capacity. EXHIBIT 2 The Recovery Remains Asynchronous, with Carnage in Oil as the Latest Stress Point Credit Suisse HY Index Energy & Coal Excluding Energy & Coal 800 750 12/4/2014 758 bp 700 650 Spread to Worst Growth Miracle that defined the 2000-2010 period in the global economy. 9/29/14 536 bp 600 536 bp 550 500 450 482 bp 400 350 300 12/31/2013 3/31/2014 6/30/2014 9/30/2014 Data as at December 4, 2014. Source: Credit Suisse Research. EXHIBIT 3 China’s Fixed Asset Investment Is in Structural Decline, Which We Think Is a Major Macro Investment Theme China: YTD Fixed Asset Investment Y/y (%) 35 Jun-09 33.6 30 25 Nov-14 15.8 20 15 09 10 11 12 13 14 Data as at December 12, 2014. Source: China National Bureau of Statistics. KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 5 EXHIBIT 4 EXHIBIT 5 We Believe Central Bank Differentiation Will Be a Key Theme in 2015 Change in Central Bank Balance Sheet Additions 2014-2015 United States: Structural Fiscal Expansion/(Consolidation), % 0.3 $944bn $902bn U.S. Fiscal Drag Is Now Finally Waning -0.2 -0.3 $520bn -0.7 -1.0 -1.2 -2.2 Total SECTION I: Key Trends/Themes for 2015 Less Government Austerity and Lower Commodity Prices May Help to Drive Global Growth Higher, but We Expect the Recovery to Remain Asynchronous Today, as we peer around the corner on tomorrow, we think that less government “drag” on the global economy could provide a nice tailwind to global growth in 2015. In the United States, for example, less government austerity is a significant growth driver, as it is expected to be just a 30 basis point “drag” versus a 1.0% drag in 2014 and a full 2.1% in 2013 (Exhibit 5). This reduction could go a long way towards reducing the sizeable gap that has existed between the private sector and overall GDP since as far back as 1Q10 (Exhibit 6). KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 180bp less austerity in '15e vs. '13 -2.1 2013 2014e 2015e Measured as change in general government underlying primary balance, adjusted for cycle and one-offs. Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 96 Database. EXHIBIT 6 Real Private Sector GDP Has Outpaced Overall U.S. GDP Growth by Approximately 90 Basis Points, On Average, Since 2010. This Gap Should Narrow in 2015 U.S. Real GDP y/y U.S. Real Private GDP y/y 4.5% 4.0% 3.5% Avg. 3.1% 3.0% 2.5% 3Q14 2.9% 2.4% Avg. 2.2% 2.0% 1.5% 3Q14 1Q14 3Q13 1Q13 3Q12 1Q12 1.0% 3Q11 Of course, there are always macro risks to consider. As we discuss in greater detail in our hedging section, we think that one risk for 2015 lies in maintaining inflation expectations at proper levels. Stocks and high yielding credit are really only attractively priced relative to sovereign debt if the earnings come through. Our base case is that they will, but when inflation expectations crater (as they did in October 2014), multiples can get de-rated quickly. At the moment, the U.S. seems to be decoupling from some of the “bad” inflation levels we see in China, Japan and Europe, but history has often shown that – over time – decoupling tends to be a flawed investment theory, particularly in an increasingly global economy. Separately, while reserves are higher and external debt lower in many EM countries than in 1997, many developing countries are increasingly facing both fiscal and export-related headwinds. Finally, we think that EM consumers who binged on credit are likely to see some retrenchment in 2015. For instance, we take a cautious stance on high-priced Brazilian consumer stories as we expect to see below consensus growth amid weaker employment trends. 2012 1Q11 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: European Central Bank, Federal Reserve Board, Bank of Japan, Macrobond, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation estimates. 6 2011 3Q10 BOJ 160bp per year, on average over three years 1Q10 ECB -$478bn FED -1.3 -1.4 -1.7 Data as at 3Q14. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Haver Analytics. European austerity, which has also been a big macro theme in recent years, is also starting to wane. One can see this in Exhibit 7, which shows that fiscal drag in 2015 could be essentially zero. Ironically though, a comparison of the data in Exhibits 5 and 7 also suggests that Europe, despite being in the press all the time for major budget tightening initiatives, has actually implemented less fiscal consolidation than the U.S. All told, Europe’s structural budget deficit closed, on average, by just 100 basis points per year from 2011-2013 versus 160 basis points in the United States. That said, we do think the headline austerity numbers in Europe may actually understate the actual impact. Key to our thinking is that Europe’s numbers mask the fact that the region’s fiscal contraction took place amidst 1) notable regional fragmentation and 2) without as much offsetting monetary stimulus for the hardest hit countries. As such, some work done by my colleague David McNellis concludes that every percentage point of fiscal consolidation has equated to a full 1.4% GDP drag in Europe of late (Exhibit 8), which is far above the 0.50-0.75% GDP drag we might expect from the same austerity impulse in the U.S. (Exhibit 5) EXHIBIT 7 Fiscal Headwinds in Europe Are Now Slowing … Euro Area: Structural Fiscal Expansion/(Consolidation), % 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 100bp per year, on average over three years -1.2 -1.4 -1.3 2012 2011 70bp less austerity in '15e vs. '13 2013 2014e 2015e Measured as change in general government underlying primary balance, adjusted for cycle and one-offs. Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 96 Database, Haver Analytics. EXHIBIT 8 …Which Is Critical, as Austerity Has Taken a Big Economic Bite Out of Growth in Recent Years in the Eurozone ('09-'14e) Annualized Real GDP Growth 3% y = -1.4x + 1.6% R2 = 82.4% Germany 2% 1% France 0% Italy -1% Ireland Spain Portugal One percentage point of fiscal contraction has equated to 1.4% slower GDP growth In Japan, there is also good news on the austerity front these days. What’s changed is that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has successfully pushed to have the second leg of the consumption tax increase shelved. To review, after increasing the consumption tax to eight percent from five percent in April 2014, Abe recently shelved the proposed follow-on tax scheduled for October 2015, which was intended to increase the consumption tax to ten percent from eight percent. While the impact of the consumption tax would have been minimal in 2015 as it was scheduled for 4Q15, GDP growth in calendar year 2016 may now reach 1.8% versus 1.0% if the tax regime had been implemented1. Separately, the other big consideration for the global economy’s growth trajectory is the potential benefit from lower commodity prices. If we use Brent oil as a proxy, it has declined a sizeable 50% over the past few months to $57.33/barrel (bbl) from a high of $115.06/ bbl in June 2014. Beyond adding what we estimate to be over $1.7 trillion of annualized savings for energy consumers worldwide (Exhibit 12), we think the fall in the price of Brent crude also provides an important tailwind to central bank policy in many of the world’s major economies. Already, with oil prices now acting as a less of a drag on one of the world’s most dependent commodity importers, Japan has allowed its currency to rise to a high of 120 yen per U.S. dollar from 101 in July 2014.2 Meanwhile, in China — with inflation falling all the way to 1.4% in November 2014 from 6.5% in July 2011 — President Xi Jinping and Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang recently worked with the country’s central bank to cut rates for the first time since July 20123. In our view, this rate cut is a direct response to slower growth in the real economy and the increasing threat of deflation, and as such, we now expect additional easing measures after the Lunar New Year in February 2015. Lower commodities – among other developments – are also shaping monetary policy in Europe, in our view. European Central Bank President Mario Draghi recently commented that he was not only going to increase the ECB’s balance sheet by one trillion euros but also that, beyond asset backed and covered bond purchases, “other unconventional measures might entail the purchase of a variety of assets, one of which is government bonds.” This statement, in our view, is a big deal, and as Exhibit 12 suggests, a lower-priced commodity environment now gives him a lot more flexibility to pursue a broader range of non-conventional measures to counter the downward pressure we now see on forward-looking inflation expectations. -2% -3% -4% -5% Greece 0% 2% 4% Structural Deficit Reduction, % GDP Per Year ('09-'14e) e = IMF estimates. Data as at October 7, 2014. Source: KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis of IMF data. 1 Data as at December 1, 2014. Source: Morgan Stanley Equity Research, Four Punches Knock Out Deflation. 2 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. 3 Data as at December 9, 2014. Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, Haver Analytics. KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 7 EXHIBIT 9 EXHIBIT 11 The ECB Target for Inflation Is Two Percent. Only Services Is Currently Even Close to Reaching That Level Our Base Case Is for 3.1% GDP Growth in 2015, Helped by Lower Commodity Prices and Less Fiscal Drag Eurozone Inflation in Aggregate and by Sector, y/y % 1.5% 1.1% 1.0% 4% 0.5% 0.3% 5% 3% 0.0% -0.1% 2% 1% -2.0% 0% -2.5% -1% -2% 2018e 2017e 2015e 2016e 2014e 2013 Data as at November 30, 2014. Source: ECB, Haver Analytics. Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis. EXHIBIT 10 As Such, Inflation Expectations Are Now Falling to Dangerously Low Levels EXHIBIT 12 Eurozone Inflation y/y Market Expected 3yr Fwd Actual y/y Memo: ECB Target 4.0% 3.5% 3.0% Jan-13 2.0% 2.5% 2.0% Nov-14 0.8% 1.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.3% 0.0% -0.5% -1.0% 2.8% 2.9% 2.0% 3.3% -3% 2010 Food, Services Alcohol and Tobacco 2009 Energy 2007 Nonenergy Industrial Goods 2008 Inflation 2004-2014 2014-2018e (Base) 2014-2018e (Bear) 2014-2018e (Bull) 2004 -2.7% -3.0% Memo: CAGR 2006 -1.5% 2012 -1.0% 2011 -0.5% 2005 0.5% KKR GMAA Global Real GDP Growth Estimate, y/y% 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 Market expected inflation is as per Eurozone inflation swaps. Data as at November 30, 2014. Source: Eurostat, Bloomberg. So, our bottom line is that the collective benefit of both less government drag and lower commodity prices on global growth could be one of the more important macro stories in 2015. Consistent with this view, we are now comfortable forecasting that global growth will reach 3.1% in 2015 versus 2.7% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2013. One can see this in Exhibit 11, which also shows that the global economy finally starts to turn down around 2017 in our base case. Lower Oil Could Be an Important Tailwind to Both Growth and Central Bank Policies Across Many of the World’s Major Economies CRUDE OIL PRICE US$/ BBL GLOBAL OIL BILL (US$ TRILLIONS) SAVINGS VS OIL AT $110 (US$ TRILLIONS) SAVINGS % GLOBAL GDP 110 3.7 0.0 0.0% 100 3.3 0.3 0.4% 90 3.0 0.7 0.9% 80 2.7 1.0 1.3% 70 2.3 1.3 1.8% 60 2.0 1.7 2.2% 50 1.7 2.0 2.7% 40 1.3 2.3 3.1% Note: Using $110 as the reference point, 2013 global oil consumption rate of 91 million barrels per day, 2013 Global GDP of $75 trillion. Data as at December 31, 2013. Source: BP Statistical Review, IMF, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis. That said, our bigger picture view for 2015 is that we still expect ongoing bouts of significant volatility during this Asynchronous Recovery for several reasons. First, while a recent rate cut by China could help, it does not overshadow the structural issues the country faces as it shrinks its outsized fixed investment outlays.4 Also, given that China and its emerging market brethren are expected to account for nearly 74% of global growth (Exhibit 14), we worry that these estimates place too much responsibility on the emerging consumer 4 Data as at November 30, 2014. Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, Haver Analytics. 8 KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS to drive growth up without some hiccups along the way. Let us not forget that U.S. and European shoppers still out-consume the BRIC countries by nearly a 3.5:1 ratio5. Second, we think the recovery will remain asynchronous because the global economy still lacks the type of overall demand that we have seen in prior recoveries. We believe real wage growth across the developed markets remains a major issue. As such, it is impossible for every country to narrow its deficits through more competitive exports when the lion’s share of countries we visit are now more focused on producing goods, not consuming them. Third, governments in the developed markets still need to deleverage, which historically has led to increased volatility in the global capital markets. Finally, we think many emerging market economies must deal with the overhang from too much money supply and credit growth in recent years. As a proxy, we note that today China’s M2 money supply growth is now running in the low double digits, versus a peak of around 30% in 20096. Without question, this slowdown in China’s M2 is affecting the growth trajectory of global fixed investment, commodity-related inputs in particular. EXHIBIT 13 We Remain Committed to Our View That This Recovery Remains Asynchronous, Including Lower Than Expected Inflation 2015 GROWTH & INFLATION BASE CASE ESTIMATES KKR GMAA TARGET REAL GDP GROWTH BLOOMBERG CONSENSUS REAL GDP GROWTH KKR GMAA TARGET INFLATION BLOOMBERG CONSENSUS INFLATION U.S. 3.2% 3.0% 0.7% 1.5% EURO AREA 1.3% 1.1% 0.4% 0.6% CHINA 6.9-7.0% 7.0% 1.8% 2.0% BRAZIL 0.25% 0.85% 6.5% 6.4% GDP = Gross Domestic Product. Bloomberg consensus estimates as at December 31, 2014. Source: KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis of various variable inputs that contribute meaningfully to these forecasts. “ Unlike in past years, central bank policy around the world is now less in synch, which could create some tension in global capital markets, currencies in particular, during parts of 2015. “ 5 Data as at July 1, 2014. Source: World Bank, Haver Analytics. 6 Ibid.3. EXHIBIT 14 Consensus Forecast Now Relies on Strong EM Growth to Carry Global Growth. We Are More Cautious 2015 Real Global GDP Growth (%) 4.5 +0.5 4.0 +0.5 3.5 U.S. makes up 13% +1.6 3.0 2.5 Other Emerging Markets make up another 43% of growth in 2015 2.0 1.5 +3.8 +1.2 1.0 China alone makes up 31% of growth in 2015 0.5 0.0 China Other Emerging Markets U.S. Other World Data as at October 8, 2014. Source: IMF, Haver Analytics. Ongoing Commodity Pressures Amid Declining Currencies Could Create a Major Change in the Outlook for Both Commodity Producer and Consumer Nations While the recent decline in oil is noteworthy, we think it is more reflective of three bigger macro trends that we see playing out in the global commodity arena. First, after a decade of China literally consuming almost all the incremental commodity supply (Exhibit 15), we think that its insatiable appetite is now waning. True, recent initiatives by the People’s Bank of China to lower interest rates could provide a short-term boost, but we do not think it will be enough to offset fixed investment overcapacity amid a period of slowing growth and falling inflation. Ultimately, China needs more credit extension in the consumer sector, not the corporate sector (which caters more to exports and fixed investments). However, as it stands now, consumer mortgages have higher capital charges (they can’t be securitized), have less of a government-implicit guarantee, and are being impaired by lack of deposit growth in the channel. Second, technological improvements, particularly in the area of oil production, are contributing to record supplies of oil and natural gas. In 2014, for example, we estimate global crude oil supply grew by almost 1.5 million barrels per day (Mb/d), which is far higher than the roughly 1.0 Mb/d of run-rate demand growth we expect in coming years7. As has been well documented in the press, the trend towards robust production is most apparent in the United States, but over time we also expect additional transfer of skills and technology to certain international destinations, including Mexico. Moreover, beyond ongoing technological advances, our research shows that Iran and Libya are still currently producing far below their historical rates and normalization could add to global supply over the longer term. However, unless there is an agreement on the Iranian nuclear 7 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: IEA, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation estimates. KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 9 program that reduces sanctions that currently keeps about a million barrels per day of Iranian crude off the market, we do not expect significant additions in 2015. Third, given that many commodities are quoted in U.S. dollars, recent appreciation in the greenback has put further downward pressure on prices – a trend history suggests will continue (see Currency section for more details). Key to our thinking is that, as their currencies depreciate versus the dollar, local producers in countries like Russia, Brazil and South Africa are encouraged to still produce as it may be profitable in local terms, even if it is not in U.S. dollar terms. In many instances, commodity producers in EM countries can be affiliated with the government, often serving as a major source of fiscal revenue. The examples can be striking: While crude oil fell about 50% in USD terms in June-December 2014, it was down only 9% in Russian ruble terms over the same period. Similarly, gold was down 10% in USD terms, but fell only three percent in South African rand. In Brazil, in coffee, Arabica futures were up 50% in USD terms in 2014, but up fully 69% in Brazilian real .8 So our bottom line is that we think that the current unwind of the commodity boom that defined much of the 2000-2010 period will continue. Importantly, amid this decline we do not think it is unreasonable for commodities to trade through their marginal cost curves. To be sure, we think that there will be opportunities amid the carnage, but a purge is coming as access to the recently outsized flow of credit wanes, suggesting that a much smaller universe of low-cost and lowly leveraged companies in sectors like copper and unconventional oil and gas garner outsized profits, not the entire sector as the consensus had – until recently – come to believe. Over time, this purge should be bullish. According to the investment bank Morgan Stanley, looking at when oil dropped 20% or more since 1982, 85% of the time the average one-year forward return was 34.9% (Exhibit 38). EXHIBIT 15 China Consumes More Than 40% of Global Commodities in Eight of Fifteen Categories Below CHINA % WORLD CONSUMPTION 1990 1995 2000 2010 2013 CEMENT 18.6% 31.5% 35.7% 56.2% 58.5% PORK 34.9% 48.0% 46.9% 49.9% 51.3% 3.7% 5.1% 37.2% 50.5% COAL 23.7% 30.6% 30.7% 48.2% 50.3% STEEL 10.8% 12.7% 15.1% 44.6% 49.8% NICKEL ALUMINUM 9.3% 13.4% 39.8% 47.2% COPPER 7.4% 12.4% 38.3% 46.7% 4.9% 10.2% 44.0% 41.9% COTTON LEAD 23.3% 22.0% 25.0% 40.2% 31.8% RICE 36.9% 36.1% 33.8% 31.1% 30.7% POULTRY 8.8% 19.5% 17.4% 16.1% 15.9% BEEF & VEAL 2.7% 8.4% 9.6% 9.9% 12.2% OIL 3.5% 4.9% 6.2% 10.4% 11.8% NAT GAS 0.8% 0.8% 1.0% 3.4% 4.8% NUCLEAR ENERGY 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 2.7% 4.4% Data as at December 31, 2013. Source: USDA, USGS, World Steel Association, China National Bureau of Statistics, EIA, IEA, BP Statistical Review, World Bureau of Metal Statistics, Bloomberg, Haver Analytics. EXHIBIT 16 History Suggests Oil Should Be Bottoming, While Real Metals Could Fall Further DATES (PEAK TO TROUGH) LENGTH IN YEARS % CHANGE IN PRICE REAL METAL COMMODITIES “ China’s environmental headwinds, including pollution, water concerns and food safety, now represent potentially more contentious political issues than job creation, in our view. “ APR 1974 -JUL 1975 1.2 -47% MAR 1979 – MAY 1986 7.0 -65% APR 1989 – SEP 1993 4.3 -49% JUL 1995 – DEC 2001 6.3 -53% APR 2008 – DEC 2008 0.7 -60% AVERAGE 3.9 -55% FEB 2011 - CURRENT 3.8 -29% DEC 1979 – JUL 1986 6.5 -84% OCT 1996 – DEC 1998 2.1 -62% SEP 2000 – NOV 2001 1.1 -50% JUL 2006 – JAN 2007 0.5 -33% JUN 2008 – FEB 2009 0.7 -70% AVERAGE 2.2 -60% JUN 2014 - CURRENT 0.5 -50% REAL CRUDE OIL Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse Research. 8 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg, Haver Analytics. 10 KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS Against this backdrop, we think that the commodity-dependent countries like India and Japan stand to benefit mightily. Importantly, India is starting to enjoy not only lower inflation but also a smaller current account deficit (compliments of lower prices of imported oil and higher interest rates), which is important for its currency. Japan too should benefit from lower oil prices, given that it is a major oil importer. Already, the country’s central bank has elected to run with a significantly cheaper currency because oil prices become less of a deterrent to consumer spending at $50-$70 a barrel than they do at $95-$105 a barrel. We believe both the U.S. and Europe should see stronger consumer activity in 2H15 if commodity prices, oil in particular, remain subdued. All told, our research shows that each 10% drop in oil initially adds around 0.2% to U.S. GDP growth. At the consumer level, we note that, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, gasoline/motor oil usage represents about $2,600 of total household income of around $64,0009. So the recent 40% drop in gasoline prices, coupled with the 50% drop in oil, provides at least $1,000 of incremental shopping power per household10. Importantly, though, our work shows about a 12-month lag (i.e., lower oil prices are not a coincident indicator); moreover, given the importance of energy activity in fueling U.S. GDP growth during the 2010-2014 period, we do think that there will be important offsets to the standard notion that lower oil prices are universally good for growth throughout the United States. EXHIBIT 17 Our Model Suggests a Notable Tailwind from Oil Price Declines, but Cautions That the Benefit Might Not Be Felt Fully for Several Quarters Oil Px, Approximate Contribution to U.S. GDP Growth, According to Our Statistical Model 1.0% 0.5% 3Q16 0.8% 3Q10 0.9% 0.0% 2Q15 0.0% -0.5% -1.0% 4Q12 -0.8% 3Q09 -1.2% 4Q03 4Q04 4Q05 4Q06 4Q07 4Q08 4Q09 4Q10 4Q11 4Q12 4Q13 4Q14 4Q15 4Q16 4Q17 -1.5% 3Q17 0.0% Note: Our statistical leading indicator uses seven variables to predict U.S. GDP growth twelve months in the future with a backtested r-squared of 74%. The 12-month moving average of Brent oil prices is a key input to the model. Specifically, the model assumes that a 10% fall in 12-month moving average oil prices leads to a ~20 basis points uplift to GDP growth four quarters later. Data as at December 19, 2014. Source: Haver Analytics, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis. 9 Data as at December 31, 2013. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 10 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation estimates. EXHIBIT 18 We Think the Fall In Oil Prices Will Provide a 1.6% Boost to U.S. Consumers, Which Is Only Partially Offset by the Hit to Domestic Oil Producers BARRELS / DAY ANNUAL VALUE ($BN) IMPLIED GAIN/ (LOSS) (000) @ $100/ BBL @ $60/ BBL $BN % GDP U.S. CRUDE CONSUMERS 19,010 694 416 278 1.6% U.S. CRUDE PRODUCERS 8,595 314 188 -125 -0.7% U.S. NET CRUDE POSITION 10,415 380 228 152 0.9% -20 -0.1% MEMO: POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL HIT TO UPSTREAM INVESTMENT (1) ESTIMATED TOTAL NET BENEFIT TO U.S. ECONOMY 0.8% ¹We estimate U.S. upstream investment may need to fall by roughly $40bn, half of which we assume is funded by credit, and therefore not captured by the $125bn cash hit to producers shown above. Data as at December 19, 2014. Source: Energy Intelligence, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Haver Analytics, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis. On the other hand, we expect that the fiscal situations in Russia, Nigeria, Chile, South Africa, and Brazil will remain under pressure as the “hangover” effect from lower commodity prices ripples through the economic outlook for these commodity export-dependent economies. This viewpoint is significant because we think it also means that their currencies and certain related credits could remain under pressure. Already, many of the aforementioned commodity plays have seen their currencies fall substantially since the beginning of 2014. However, given that many of these countries are now experiencing declines in both export volume and price, we still see bumpier roads ahead as fiscal balances are harder to achieve amid increasing social unrest and rising inflation. At the moment, we are most cautious on the economies of Russia and Brazil. If there is good news, in the near term we think that the overall markets can withstand the tension being created between beneficiaries of and losers from lower prices in the commodity arena. As such, we expect to hear a lot in the investment community about a “decoupling” of commodity beneficiaries from commodity-inflicted countries. However, we should not underestimate the impact of shifting $1.7 trillion of value from producing nations to consumer nations in a relatively short period of time (Exhibit 12). Our work, which we detail below, shows neither a global recession nor a capital markets crisis is likely, particularly given higher reserves and lower debt levels. KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 11 However, we think that the ongoing tension that is already being created in the global capital markets from this massive shift of economic value from commodity producing nations towards consumer-oriented, import-dependent nations is not likely to abate, and as such, it could be one of the biggest macro stories in 2015. EXHIBIT 20 …But Some Countries Are Still Challenged vis-à-vis Import Cover Reserves in Months Import Cover 1997 EXHIBIT 19 10.5 Brazil In Aggregate, External Debt to GDP Levels Are 25% Lower Than in 1997… 3.0 Russia 7.7 Colombia Emerging Markets: External Debt as a % of GDP Korea 45 1.7 Nigeria 1999 40.0 3.3 Malaysia 5.0 Indonesia 35 Turkey 1997 33.8 30 3.1 Mexico 2013 25.7 Argentina 98 01 04 07 10 13 Data as at December 31, 2013. Source: IMF, Haver Analytics 7.1 6.7 7.0 16.2 5.8 8.8 18.4 3.3 2.1 3.1 Vietnam 80 83 86 89 92 95 7.3 4.7 Egypt 20 9.6 5.9 2.5 South Africa 14.7 6.1 Venezuela 25 18.8 8.5 8.0 8.2 8.8 8.1 India 40 15 Current Data as at November 30, 2014 or latest available. Source: Above referenced respective central banks, World Bank, Haver Analytics. EXHIBIT 21 Overall, Though, Reserves Are More Than Sufficient to Cover Short-term External Debt Needs… Reserves / Short Term External Debt “ Our base view is that not only is the absolute return in global equities likely to be lower on a go-forward basis, but we also believe the Sharpe ratio is likely to decline. “ 1997 Nigeria 1.3 Brazil 1.5 1.7 Colombia Indonesia 0.5 Vietnam 0.8 Mexico 1.0 Argentina Malaysia Turkey Venezuela India Egypt 11.5 2.1 Russia 0.7 Current 5.1 4.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.1 1.5 2.7 1.5 1.5 2.1 1.1 3.6 5.5 4.6 6.8 Data as at November 30, 2014 or latest available. Source: Above referenced respective central banks, World Bank, Haver Analytics. 12 KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS EXHIBIT 22 EXHIBIT 23 …And Most Countries Have Less External Debt Today Than in 1997 Lots of Liquidity Has Not Impacted the Money Multiplier… Money Multiplier (M2/Monetary Base) Reserves / Gross External Debt 1997 0.2 Mexico 0.1 0.1 Egypt 0.2 0.2 Venezuela 0.2 Japan We again expect the Euro area money multiplier to decline as the repayment of the T-LTRO caused the spike 7 6 Falling multiplier 5 4 3 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 8 0.5 0.3 Argentina Nigeria 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.4 Turkey Malaysia 0.7 0.4 0.1 Euro Area 10 9 0.6 0.3 Colombia Indonesia 1.1 0.3 India Vietnam U.S. 0.3 Brazil Russia Current 0.3 Data as at November 30, 2014 or latest available. Source: Above referenced respective central banks, World Bank, Haver Analytics. 2 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Data as at November 30 2014. Source: ECB, BOJ, Federal Reserve Board, Haver Analytics. EXHIBIT 24 …Even During Periods of Great Balance Sheet Expansion Central Bank Balance Sheet % GDP Financial Services “Plumbing” Still Not Working, in Our View, Despite Surging Global Monetary Base Though it has been 75 months since Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, our work shows that the traditional financial services industry is still not functioning properly. Supporting our view is that, as one can see in Exhibit 23, the money multiplier remains somewhat “broken.” This realization is particularly noteworthy, given the size of the increases in central bank balance sheets in recent years (Exhibit 24). To be sure, the illiquidity premium that we identified three years ago has begun to erode in some areas of the market (and hence, why we have reduced some of our overweight positioning). However, in a world of extremely low government bond yields, we think that the benefit of 300-400 basis points of illiquidity premium that one can obtain through the direct, non-bank lending market is extremely compelling versus a seven percent hurdle rate for many pensions and – depending on the country – a 50 basis points to 2.5% 10-year “risk-free rate” in today’s market environment. Also, given the lack of liquidity in the traditional credit markets these days, we are of the mindset that there is an ongoing blurring between the over-the-counter and the negotiated private markets, particularly during periods of stress in the system. 100 90 Fed ECB BoJ 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Data as at November 30, 2014. Source: ECB, BOJ, BOE, Federal Reserve Board, Haver Analytics. What’s driving this opportunity set? In addition to a deflated money multiplier, the traditional banking industry is also suffering from its inability to facilitate customer flow the way it did in the past. Indeed, as Exhibit 26 shows, dealer inventories have shrunk to a puny $59 billion in November 2014 from a sizeable $285 billion in October 2007. Not surprisingly, this decline coincides with a dramatic fall-off in leverage within the broker-dealer and universal bank community, which has collapsed by more than 40% since 2008 (Exhibit 25). Moreover, because of heightened regulation, traditional financial intermediaries are unable to participate in many of the higher margin, KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 13 non-traditional lending opportunities at a time when many small- to medium-size businesses need access to credit. Finally, there are just more needy industries that are either impaired and/or require customized lending solutions. As such, we expect skilled managers to be able to increasingly earn near distressed-like returns, but in performing situations. EXHIBIT 27 A Yield Comparison of Originated vs. Traded Leveraged Loans Suggests the Illiquidity Premium Is Still Significant Weighted Average Yield of Originated Senior Term Debt EXHIBIT 25 Leverage for Broker-Dealers Has Collapsed, Creating a Significant Opportunity for Non-Traditional Lenders 19 16 -42% in aggregate, but varying between -27% and -66% on a company level 15 14 11 3Q14 10.6 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 9.6% 8.3% 7.8% 5.8% 5.8% 6.0% 5.1% 8.2% 4.8% 2.0% 12 07 9.7% 4.0% 0.0% 13 06 12.0% 11.4% 10.8% 11.3% 10.7% 6.0% 17 05 11.2% 8.0% 3Q08 18.2 18 12.0% 10.0% Wall Street Assets / Equity Ratio 10 12-Month Average Yield of Traded Loans 14.0% 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 YTD Weighted average yields of senior term debt and yield of traded loans. Senior term debt data as at September 30, 2014; traded loans data as at November 30, 2014. Source: S&P LSTA, public company filings of Ares Capital Corporation. Aggregate of GS, MS, BAC, C, and JPM balance sheets. Data as at 3Q14 Source: Factset. EXHIBIT 28 EXHIBIT 26 Lower Inventories in the Broker Dealer Community Have Massively Dented Liquidity Primary Dealer Positions: Corp Securities, U.S. $ Billions 300 Oct-07 285 250 0.9% 7% 2.4% 0.5% 4% 8.0% 3% 2% 4.1% 1% 100 0% 50 59 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 Data as at November 30, 2014. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Haver Analytics. 14 8% 5% 150 0 9% 6% A decline of nearly 80% 200 Over 240 Basis Points of Illiquidity Premium on Offer in European Middle Market Loans Today KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS European Credit Risk Syndicated Premium for Leveraged Loan Middle Market New Issue Loans Spreads (B+/B) (Note 2) (Average senior leverage: 5.0x) (Note 1) Illiquidity Premium (Note 3) Underwriting Fees (Note 4) All-in Spread plus fees for European Middle Market Loans (Average senior leverage: 4.7x) (Note 5) Data as at November 30, 2014. Source: KKR Credit. See endnote 1 for important disclosures1. Importantly, we see this opportunity set as a global one. In Europe, for example, banks appear to be backing away from smaller companies and credits that are non-traditional or complex. Separately, in many parts of Asia we see a growing number of non-bank lending opportunities, including India and Indonesia. To be sure, these types of investments require more due diligence and a higher risk premium, but our conclusion is that the global disconnect between the growing demand for non-traditional capital by small- to medium-size businesses as well as the inability of traditional financial intermediaries to meet this need – despite a sea of central bank-induced liquidity – remains one of the great anomalies in the global capital markets. Styles to Pursue Within Public Equities: We Retain a Barbell Approach We approach global equities with two dramatically different strategies in 2015. On the one hand, in the developed markets we retain our bias for relatively inexpensive stocks with excess cash flow that is being redeployed in the form of dividends, buybacks and/or acquisitions. Without question, we still favor our Brave New World names (see our earlier note Brave New World: The Yearning For Yield Across Asset Classes for further details), which places an additional emphasis on rising dividends and improving returns on equity. Importantly, we are not alone in this view, as the recent surge in activist investors validates our view that many companies in the United States are operating with cost of capital that is equal to their cost of equity and significantly in excess of cost of debt, which is usually sub-optimal outside of the hyper-growth part of the market. Consistent with this view, we also expect global M&A activity to exceed 2014’s level of $2.9 trillion.11 EXHIBIT 29 We Remain Constructive On Stocks With Yield and Growth Indexed Returns for Various Dividend Yield Buckets Index 1990 = 1 35 0-1% 30 1-2% 25 2-3% 20 3-4% 4-5% 15 >5% 10 5 0 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: S&P, Factset. 11 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. 2010 2014 EXHIBIT 30 A Record Number of European Companies Now Have Dividend Yields Above Corporate Bond Yields 70% 65% % of companies with Dividend Yield > Corp Bond Yield 60% Average 55% 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 Data as at October 21, 2014. Source: Datastream, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Adventures in Wonderland. We see similar opportunities to buy attractively priced high dividend yield, cash flowing companies outside of the United States. In Europe, for example, nearly 65% of the companies now trade with a dividend yield that is above their corporate bond yield. Importantly, as Exhibit 29 shows, positioning appears quite clean as many investors exited the region in the fall of 2014 after the IMF cited concerns about Europe’s growth profile. On the other hand, in the emerging markets we are willing to pay up for high quality consumption stories that are linked to improving GDP per capita dynamics versus just GDP growth. Our favorites for 2015 again include both India and Mexico. In India, we are more bullish than the consensus expectations for lower inflation, which we think is constructive for trading multiples. We also believe that earnings growth could be stronger than many folks think as improving confidence encourages both consumers and businesses to spend more. In Mexico we think that the negative shock of last year’s tax increases has abated. Meanwhile, Mexico’s export economy is accelerating at a time when even the naysayers of President Enrique Pena Nieto’s reforms acknowledge that this multi-year transition is still ahead of schedule in many areas12. To be sure, lower oil prices will hurt government spending in the near term, and we are closely watching the Pena-Nieto administration’s response to recent rule of law and corruption allegations. Nonetheless, our overall view is that both Mexico’s capital markets and its currency represent good long-term value at current levels. Within Mexico we are most favorable on real estate; in particular, we think that commercial real estate is underpriced at a time when many multinationals are increasingly considering calling Mexico City, not Sao Paulo, their home base in Latin America. 12 Data as at November 26, 2014. Source: Itaú BBA. KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 15 EXHIBIT 31 SECTION II: Asset Class Review Reforms May Have Hindered the Performance of Mexican Large Cap Names versus Their Mid Cap Peers, a Trend We Expect to Continue… Mexico Midcaps (IMC30) vs. Mexico Large Caps (MEXBOL) December 31, 2013 = 100 120 IMC30 MEXBOL 115 108.2 110 105 100 101.0 95 90 Dec-14 Nov-14 Oct-14 Sep-14 Aug-14 Jul-14 Jun-14 May-14 Apr-14 Mar-14 Feb-14 Dec-13 Jan-14 85 EXHIBIT 32 …While In India, Reforms Seem to Have Bolstered Performance, Particularly in Relation to Other Large Emerging Markets India Nifty Index vs. MSCI EEM December 31, 2013 = 100 India NIFTY MSCI EEM 131.4 135 There is no harm in repeating a good thing. Plato When we did our 2014 mid-year outlook update (see Midyear Outlook: Four Big Macro Trends at Work), we spent a significant amount of time discussing why we believe that in today’s uneven growth environment investors should consider allocating more capital to special situations-type investments. In the past, many of the most attractive opportunities were related to corporate restructurings and deleveraging stories in the developed markets. However, based on recent trips to India, Indonesia and China, we see that many banks in the region are now carrying too much bad corporate credit and, as a result, there is a growing role for private lenders and restructuring professionals to step in and provide value-added capital to struggling corporations across a variety of sectors in the emerging markets. Importantly, we see this opportunity as secular, not cyclical, as credit creation in the emerging markets in recent years has been outsized. In many instances these deals are large and complicated, requiring not only expertise in financial engineering but also in operational capability. This insight is important, we believe, because many investment managers in emerging markets are currently set up to do public investing and/or private equity, but not the restructurings, recaps, and deleveragings that we think are needed. As a result, we think many firms, particularly in the alternatives space, will be forced to overhaul their models. In particular, we think the ability to move up and down the capital structure and provide corporate partners with value-added financial and operational expertise will go from being a luxury offering to becoming a prerequisite for success in the new era of emerging market investing we now envision. Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. 145 Distressed/Special Situation: Our Largest Wager for 2015 125 EXHIBIT 33 Credit as a % of GDP Has Ballooned in Many EM Countries Domestic Credit to Private Sector % GDP 115 2000 2007 2013 160 105 95 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. Dec-14 Nov-14 Oct-14 Sep-14 Aug-14 Jul-14 Jun-14 May-14 Apr-14 Mar-14 Feb-14 Dec-13 85 Jan-14 94.0 120 80 40 0 India Turkey Brazil Vietnam China Thailand Data as at December 31, 2013. Source: World Bank, Haver Analytics. 16 KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS EXHIBIT 34 EXHIBIT 35 EM Credit Has Mushroomed Since the Great Recession EMERGING MARKETS DOMESTIC BANK LOANS AS A % OF GDP 2008 AUGUST 2014 If OPEC Will Not Cede Market Share, Our Work Suggests That Rig Count May Need to Fall Considerably… Y/Y Production Growth (000 bpd) CHANGE PER ANNUM (%) U.S. Oil Rig Count (4Q Lead) 1,400 1,577 1,600 EMERGING MARKETS 70.7 94.1 4.0 EM ASIA 97.6 123.9 4.4 CHINA 99.6 139.1 6.7 800 INDIA 49.8 55.6 1.2 600 INDONESIA 23.7 32.2 1.4 SINGAPORE 93.8 128.4 5.7 THAILAND 90.2 122.1 5.5 -200 200 HONG KONG 192.8 323.9 20.7 -400 0 LATIN AMERICA 30.0 47.6 3.0 -600 -200 BRAZIL 43.3 71.2 4.9 MEXICO 17.0 21.7 0.8 ARGENTINA 9.9 12.5 0.4 EMEA EM 48.1 44.2 -0.7 RUSSIA 36.8 50.9 2.4 SOUTH AFRICA 76.8 69.4 -1.3 TURKEY 30.7 68.4 6.2 1,200 1,000 1,103 1,200 1,000 800 400 600 200 400 1Q04 4Q04 3Q05 2Q06 1Q07 4Q07 3Q08 2Q09 1Q10 4Q10 3Q11 2Q12 1Q13 4Q13 3Q14 2Q15 1Q16 4Q16 0 Data as at December 19, 2014. Source: Energy Intelligence, Baker Hughes, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Haver Analytics, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis. EXHIBIT 36 … As Will Overall Upstream Investment Y/Y Production Growth (000 bpd) U.S. Upstream Energy Investment (SAAR $Bn, 4Q Lead) 1,500 1,400 1,200 1,000 R2 = 65% 146 Relationship suggests that for production growth to drop to 750k bpd, investment needs to fall ~25% to $110bn vs. $146bn current 1,103 120 100 600 400 80 200 60 0 -200 40 1Q15 1Q16 1Q14 1Q13 1Q12 1Q11 1Q10 1Q09 1Q08 1Q07 1Q06 -400 -600 160 140 800 1Q05 We also think that the recent carnage in energy will ultimately prove to be an interesting investment opportunity. According to work done by my colleague David McNellis, both rig counts and investment could fall notably over the next 12 months. One can see his research in Exhibits 35 and 36. Without question, calling the bottom in commodities is hard, but as Exhibit 37 shows, there is certainly a lot of stress now in the system, which we think could create some opportunities to support low cost producers with differentiated strategies as well as help to repair the finances of companies that were too optimistic about both prices and drilling activity. Importantly, derivative structures, including selling puts that harness the market’s outsized volatility in the energy sector, appear compelling. All told, volatility in the sector is now upwards of 60%, nearly triple where it was in the spring of 2014 (Exhibit 37). 1,400 Relationship suggests that for production growth to drop to 750k bpd, rig count needs to fall ~40% to ~950 rigs vs. 1,577 current 1Q04 Data as at August 31, 2014. Source: JPMorgan Research, IMF. R2 = 82% 20 Data as at December 19, 2014. Source: Energy Intelligence, Baker Hughes, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Haver Analytics, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis. KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 17 EXHIBIT 37 EXHIBIT 39 E&P and Oil Service Volatility Is Up 200% Since June 2014; Our Intent Is to Harness It DATE OF TROUGH DATE OF PEAK DURATION TROUGH TO PEAK (MONTHS) % CHANGE TROUGH TO PEAK P/E MULTIPLE APR-42 MAY-46 49 157.1% 177% JUN-49 DEC-52 42 96.2% 87% SEP-53 AUG-56 35 119.0% 51% DEC-57 JUL-59 19 53.8% 45% OCT-60 DEC-61 14 38.9% 39% JUN-62 JAN-66 43 79.8% 2% SEP-66 NOV-68 25 48.0% 35% JUN-70 JAN-73 31 73.5% 32% OCT-74 DEC-76 26 72.5% 57% MAR-78 NOV-80 32 61.7% 21% AUG-82 AUG-87 60 228.8% 166% DEC-87 JUL-90 31 64.8% 18% OCT-90 MAR-00 112 417.0% 113% OCT-02 OCT-07 60 101.5% -1% 41.3 115.0% 42% 68 204.0% 40% Implied Volatility, % 80 Market Vectors Oil Service 60 SPDR S&P Oil & Gas Exploration and Production 40 20 Nov-14 Oct-14 Sep-14 Aug-14 Jul-14 Jun-14 May-14 Apr-14 Mar-14 Feb-14 Dec-13 Jan-14 0 Data as at December 15, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. EXHIBIT 38 Looking at History, There Seems to Be Opportunity When Oil Declines 20% or More TIME PERIOD U.S. $ PRICE / BARREL DECLINE, YOY # OF OCCURRENCES AVERAGE 1 YR FORWARD RETURN MEDIAN 1 YR FORWARD RETURN HIT RATIO ON POSITIVE RETURN 1982 TO CURRENT -20% OR MORE 60 +34.9% 28.3% 85% Data as at December 12, 2014. Source: Morgan Stanley. Public Equities: Less Aggressive Posture to Start the Year As we indicated earlier, we have begun to lower our Public Equities allocation for the first time since joining KKR in 2011. We are not bearish per se, as we expect S&P 500 earnings to grow a solid 6.0% in 2015. Overall though, we need to recognize that this bull market has been an over-achiever from almost any vantage point, recent dollar gains are now likely to more than offset the benefits of corporate buyback activity, and the tailwind from multiple expansion is now finally abating, in our view. All told, as Exhibit 39 shows, the total return on the S&P 500 is now already 204% this cycle versus a historical norm of 115%. Moreover, as Exhibit 40 shows, even amid some of the great bull markets, the propensity for the market to go up consistently every single year is not that high this late in the cycle. KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS AVERAGE MAR-09 WTI SPOT OIL PRICE, % CHANGE OF U.S.$ PRICE / BARREL AND SUBSEQUENT 1 YEAR FORWARD RETURN 18 Performance This Cycle Is Well Above Historical Norms DEC-14 Performance on a monthly basis, peak to trough. PE Multiple as of nearest month end. Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Standard & Poor’s, Omega Advisors. “ There is certainly a lot of stress now in the system, which we think could create some opportunities to support low cost producers with differentiated strategies as well as help to repair the finances of companies that were too optimistic about both prices and drilling activity. “ EXHIBIT 40 EXHIBIT 41 2014 Will Be the Sixth Consecutive Year of Cumulative Positive Return in the S&P 500 The Low Volatility Rally Tends to End as the Fed Starts Its Tightening Cycle… S&P 500 Performance Around First Fed Hike CONSECUTIVE YEARS OF POSITIVE RETURNS # YEARS START END CUMULATIVE RETURN 3 1904 1906 67% 19% 3 1954 1956 111% 28% 3 1963 1965 60% 17% 3 1970 1972 40% 12% 4 1942 1945 143% 25% 4 1958 1961 102% 19% -10 5 2003 2007 83% 13% -15 6 1947 1952 148% 16% 6 2009 2014 159% 17% 8 1921 1928 435% 23% 8 1982 1989 291% 19% 9 1991 1999 450% 21% AVG. CAGR 19% CAGR Cumulative total return on an annual basis. Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/, Bloomberg. As one can see in Exhibit 42, price-to-earnings ratios tend to contract around decisions by the Federal Reserve to become less accommodative. This outcome makes sense to us as the transition from a P/E led market to an earnings-driven one means that volatility typically increases. We certainly expect this fact pattern to hold true in 2015, though we do expect less multiple compression this tightening cycle for two reasons. First, commodity prices are falling, which lowers the risk premium on owning stock in many equity markets, particularly developed ones. Second, as we describe below in detail in the fixed income section, we think that low inflation will encourage the Federal Reserve to keep its tightening campaign quite mild by historical standards. In particular, we expect the Fed to hike only 275 basis points this cycle versus 319, on average, during prior cycles (see Exhibit 55 for details). Higher vol, range bound market 10 5 0 Low vol rally -5 -20 -24 -20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 First Hike 4 8 12 16 20 24 Months from First Fed Hike Includes first Fed hikes of Nov-54, Jul-58, Jul-61, Oct-67, Feb-71, Feb-72, Feb-74, Nov-76, Jul-80, Apr-83, Nov-86, Jan-94, May-99, and May-04. Source: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/, Bloomberg, S&P, Thomson Financial, Federal Reserve, Haver Analytics. EXHIBIT 42 …Because Multiples Often Contract, Volatility Tends to Rise When the Fed Begins to Raise Rates Average S&P 500 Characteristics Between Start of and End of Fed Hiking Cycles Unannualized Annualized 28.2 13.8 8.6 2.8 -13.4 -9.3 P/E Change (%) EPS Change (%) Price Change (%) Data as at October 31, 2014. Source: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/, Bloomberg, S&P, Thomson Financial, Federal Reserve, Haver Analytics. So as we look ahead, we think that the S&P 500 can deliver around $126 in earnings in 2015, which would represent around 6.0% in earnings growth, versus $118.50 in 2014. We also think that the multiple on the S&P 500 can trade at 17.1 times in 2015, down from 17.5 in 2014. If we are right about a slight multiple contraction in 2015 against a backdrop of modest earnings growth, then our outlook KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 19 for 2015 would suggest a target for the U.S. market index of around 2,155 (Exhibit 45). Including a dividend yield of just under 2.0%, we therefore expect the S&P 500 to return of 6-7% in 2015. EXHIBIT 44 …However, Real GDP Growth of 2-3% Implies a Higher P/E Multiple Than in the Past EXHIBIT 43 In Current Environment, Falling Yields Look Like a Valuation Headwind… 20x Median Trailing P/E for Various Real 10 Yr Yield Environments (1948-Current) Trailing Price-to-Earnings Ratio 19 17 15 13.8 14.0 13 11.2 14.5 Median 15.5 12x 16.0 11.4 12.3 13.0 10x 8x 8.1 <0 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 >5 5-Year US Real GDP Annualized Growth Rate % 7 5 16.9 14.3 14x 10.8 11 9 17.8 16x 16.0 15.8 2013 to 2017 Real GDP CAGR 2-3% 18x 17.6 17.7 We are here Median S&P 500 Normalized Price-to-Earnings for Various Growth Environments Normalized Price-to-Earnings valuation ratio = Price divided by average of past 5 years EPS. Study from 1900 to 3Q14. Source: BEA, Historical Statistics of the United States, Factset, S&P, Bloomberg, stock market data used in “Irrational Exuberance” by Robert J. Shiller. <-2% -1-2% -1-0% 0-1% 1-2% 2-3% 3-4% 4-5% 5-6% >6% Real 10 Year Treasury Yield % Data as at October 31, 2014. Source: Thomson Financial, S&P, Federal Reserve Board, Factset. EXHIBIT 45 Amid Some Volatility, We See More Modest Gains for the S&P 500 in 2015 S&P 500 PRICE TARGET FOR DIFFERENT EARNINGS AND VALUATION LEVELS S&P 500 2014E 2015E S&P 500 P/E MULTIPLE KKR S&P 500 S&P 500 P/E MULTIPLE EPS 16.0 16.5 17.0 17.5 18.0 18.5 EPS Y/Y 16.0 16.5 17.0 17.5 18.0 18.5 118 1888 1947 2006 2065 2124 2183 -0.4% -6.3% -3.4% -0.6% 2.3% 5.2% 8.0% 119 1904 1964 2023 2083 2142 2202 0.4% -5.5% -2.6% 0.3% 3.1% 6.0% 8.9% 120 1920 1980 2040 2100 2160 2220 1.3% -4.7% -1.8% 1.1% 4.0% 6.9% 9.8% 121 1936 1997 2057 2118 2178 2239 2.1% -4.0% -1.0% 1.9% 4.8% 7.8% 10.7% 122 1952 2013 2074 2135 2196 2257 3.0% -3.2% -0.2% 2.7% 5.7% 8.7% 11.6% 123 1968 2030 2091 2153 2214 2276 3.8% -2.4% 0.6% 3.6% 6.5% 9.5% 12.5% 124 1984 2046 2108 2170 2232 2294 4.6% -1.6% 1.4% 4.4% 7.4% 10.4% 13.4% 125 2000 2063 2125 2188 2250 2313 5.5% -0.9% 2.2% 5.2% 8.2% 11.3% 14.3% 126 2016 2079 2142 2205 2268 2331 6.3% -0.1% 3.0% 6.0% 9.1% 12.2% 15.2% 127 2032 2096 2159 2223 2286 2350 7.2% 0.7% 3.8% 6.9% 9.9% 13.0% 16.1% 128 2048 2112 2176 2240 2304 2368 8.0% 1.5% 4.6% 7.7% 10.8% 13.9% 17.0% 129 2064 2129 2193 2258 2322 2387 8.9% 2.2% 5.4% 8.5% 11.6% 14.8% 17.9% 130 2080 2145 2210 2275 2340 2405 9.7% 3.0% 6.2% 9.3% 12.5% 15.7% 18.8% Data as at December 31, 2014 Source: Factset. 20 S&P 500 IMPLIED TOTAL RETURN FOR 2015 INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS EXHIBIT 46 larly fixed investment and exports. Moreover, our work shows that Petrobras, one of the Bovespa’s largest constituents, will continue to face regulatory and financial challenges in 2015. In Europe, we are targeting equities with bond-like features. In a world in which we think that the European Central Bank does move towards traditional quantitative easing, shares of capital return stories are likely to be significantly re-rated. Acquirers Are Still Being Rewarded for Acquisitions Acquirers Average One Day Stock Performance Relative to the S&P 500 2.6% 2.9% 1.3% 0.7% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% -0.1% 05 06 07 -1.1% 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 Data as December 18, 2014. Universe: All M&A deals with target region United States, value greater than US$1B. Source: Bloomberg, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis. Dividends and Stock Buybacks Remain Strong, Growing at a 22% CAGR from 2009-2014E S&P 500 Dividends & Gross Share Buybacks $B Dividends 1000 900 700 600 340 247 07 08 100 196 206 09 10 240 11 U.S. Germany 8 7 Dec-15e Dec-14 2.60 2.17 4 2 399 1 0 138 247 9 10-Year Government Yield 3 476 299 300 0 German Yields Are Likely to Remain at Historic Lows… 5 544 409 400 200 EXHIBIT 48 6 Buybacks CAGR of 22% Since 2009 589 500 While fixed income is never easy to predict, we do feel some relief as we think about 2015. Why? Because we think the direction of global rates has become more of a relative call – not an absolute one. Specifically, our message for how the long-term rates trade remains unchanged: follow the German bund and then decide how much you think Treasuries can trade above that. At the moment, the yield on the Bund is approximately 54 basis points. As Exhibit 49 shows, the US 10-year has not traded more than 200 basis points above the Bund in over 25 years, and as such, we are willing to wager that rates stay bound within this range in 2015. Specifically, we see the U.S. 10-year yield rising only modestly to 2.6%. 10 EXHIBIT 47 800 Fixed Income: Less “Spicy” but More Opportunistic 281 12 312 13 351 14e Data as at December 18, 2014. Source: Standard and Poor’s, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis. Outside of the United States, we are overweight Asia, underweight Latin America and equal weight Europe. In Asia, we see equity markets in India, Japan and China all doing well. Key to our thinking is that, as a region, we believe Asia benefits mightily from lower oil prices. By comparison, we retain our negative stance towards Brazil, Latin America’s largest market. As our below consensus GDP forecast indicates, we are quite concerned about growth, particu- 0.54 0.70 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. “ Our goal is to add some ballast to fixed income portion of the portfolio during what we believe could be a more volatile year for the asset class. “ KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 21 EXHIBIT 49 EXHIBIT 50 …And With the U.S.-German Spread Near a Historic High, We Think It Will Constrain the Near-Term Upside to U.S. Treasury Yields. KKR GMAA FUNDAMENTAL KKR GMAA QUANT “FAIR VALUE” MARKET KKR GMAA VS. MARKET (BASIS PTS.) 10YR YIELD, 2015 2.60% 3.00% 2.43% 17 10YR YIELD, 2017 3.25% 3.25% 2.68% 57 10YR REAL, 2015 0.70% 1.00% 0.50% 20 10YR REAL, 2017 1.25% 1.25% 0.71% 54 5YR YIELD, 2015 2.20% 2.60% 2.15% 5 5YR YIELD, 2017 3.00% 3.00% 2.67% 33 5YR REAL, 2015 0.40% 0.50% 0.37% 3 5YR REAL, 2017 1.00% 1.00% 0.63% 37 U.S. - Germany 10yr Rate Spread (%) 2.2 1.7 Interest Rates: We Forecast a Slow Crawl to Higher Levels Apr-89 2.16 1.2 May-99 1.51 Sep-05 1.18 Dec-14 1.63 Dec-15e 1.90 0.7 0.2 -0.3 -0.8 -1.3 -1.8 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 e = KKR GMAA estimates. Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation. At the moment, our forecast envisions German yields of 70 basis points next year, based off forwards market pricing that looks reasonable to us given the disinflationary forces at work in Europe. Importantly, our “fundamental” 2.6% forecast for the U.S. 10-year next year, which incorporates the relative value impact of ultra-low German rates, is well below the 3.0% rate forecast of our “quantitative” modeling, which is based purely on the present value of our future short-term rate expectations. One can see the difference between our “fundamental” and “quantitative” forecasts in Exhibit 50. Looking further ahead, our modeling suggests a U.S. 10-year yield that could reach a fair value of 3.25% by 2017, which coincides with what we believe will be the approximate peak for this cycle. Importantly, though, in the near term, we do not see a lot of wiggle room in longerterm rates. Consistent with this view, our rates forecasts imply only slight upside to current market pricing this year (on the order of 10-20 basis points), whereas we are 30-50 basis points higher than the consensus on three-year forward implied expectations for interest rates. “ Despite a surge in the global monetary base, access to credit remains a major issue, particularly for small- to medium-size businesses. “ 22 KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS KKR GMAA “fundamental” forecast for 2015 assumes that U.S. 10yr yield is capped at 2.6%, which is 190 basis points above the one-year forward German 10yr yield of 0.7%. Quantitative fair values are based on our estimates of the present value of future short term rates. Data as of December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis. Implicit in our forecasts is that inflation stays low not only in Europe but also in the United States. Otherwise, we think the relative comparisons versus Europe would become irrelevant and our Fed outlook would likely need to accelerate too. But from where we stand today, U.S. inflation seems set for an exceedingly moderate reading of just 0.7% or so in 2015. Exhibit 51 details our expectations. On the one hand, we forecast core CPI to remain at 1.75%. Moreover, we expect food inflation to continue to run around a relatively elevated 3.0% rate, spurred by continued tight conditions in animal protein markets (Exhibit 51). On the other hand, we expect energy deflation of fully 12% or so, which envisions that OPEC continues its policy of not supporting oil markets, holding oil range-bound around $50-70 per barrel. Beyond 2015, we see oil stabilizing and eventually moving back towards $80-100 per barrel, as EM countries eventually achieve higher economic growth and producers reduce previously anticipated growth expectations. As such, we ultimately see the longer term outlook of inflation reverting back towards two percent (Exhibit 64), but investors should make no mistake that inflation is going to be extraordinarily low in 2015. EXHIBIT 51 EXHIBIT 53 Implicit in Our Rates Forecast Is That Inflation Stays Low in 2015 KKR GMAA 2015e U.S. Inflation Forecast U.S. Average Hourly Earnings Rise as Unemployment Decreases. We See This as a Risk to the Front End of the Curve by 2H15/1H16 U.S. Average Hourly Earnings Y/y For Various U.S. Unemployment Rates (1985-2013), % 3% 1.75% 0.7% Current unemployment rate = 5.8% 4.5 3.8 4.0 3.5 3.1 3.0 2.7 +70bp 2.5 +40bp 2.0 Food 2.3 +30bp 1.5 -12% Core CPI (ex Food & Energy) 2.4 Energy 1.0 Headline CPI 0.5 0.0 Data as at December 19, 2014. Source: KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation estimates. ≤ 5% 5–6 6–7 7–8 > 8% Based upon monthly data from January 1985 to December 2013. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Haver Analytics. EXHIBIT 52 Our Fed Expectations Are Above the Market’s, but Below the Fed’s Own Forecasts Fed Funds Expected Rates FOMC Forecast GMAA Forecast EXHIBIT 54 We Finally Think Some Wage Growth Could Be a Risk by 2H15 as More Firms Commit to Adding Workers Market Net % Planning to Raise Worker Compensation (L) 4.0% US: Average Hourly Earnings Y/y (R) 30% 6% 25% 5% 2.0% 20% 4% 1.5% 15% 3% 10% 2% 5% 1% 3.5% 3.0% 2.5% 1.0% 0.5% FOMC Forecast = Median forecast of Federal Open Market Committee participants as of December 17, 2014. Market = Pricing based on Fed Funds futures through June 2017 and Eurodollar futures thereafter. Source: Federal Reserve, Bloomberg, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis. Dec-19 Jun-19 Dec-18 Jun-18 Dec-17 Jun-17 Dec-16 Jun-16 Dec-15 Jun-15 Dec-14 0.0% 0% 85 88 91 94 97 00 03 06 09 12 15 0% Data as at November 30, 2014. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Federation of Independent Business, Haver Analytics. Our low near-term inflation backdrop also influences our short-term rate views. Specifically, while we believe that growth and employment trends remain solid, we see few examples of the wage inflation that might be required to inspire the Federal Reserve to hike aggressively in 2015 and beyond. At the moment, our base case is that the Fed begins hiking around June 2015, then proceeds at a historically slow pace of just 150 basis points per year (Exhibit 55), which KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 23 EXHIBIT 55 We Believe Next Interest Rate Hike Cycle Will Be Historically Mild Relative to History TROUGH MONTH PEAK MONTH FEB-83 PEAK RATE CHANGE (BASIS POINTS) RATE OF CHANGE (BASIS POINTS/YR) CPI Y/Y AT PEAK REAL FED RATE AT PEAK 11.50% 300 200 4.3% 7.2% 394 163 5.4% 4.4% 300 279 2.9% 3.1% 175 175 3.2% 3.3% 5.25% 425 205 4.3% 1.0% 4.6% 7.8% 319 204 4.0% 3.8% 0.25% 3.00% 275 150 2.0% 1.0% MONTHS TROUGH RATE AUG-84 18 8.50% DEC-86 MAY-89 29 5.88% 9.81% JAN-94 FEB-95 13 3.00% 6.00% MAY-99 MAY-00 12 4.75% 6.50% MAY-04 JUN-06 25 1.00% 19 ~20-24 AVERAGE KKR GMAA ‘15-’17 EST. Data as at December 4, 2014. Source: Federal Reserve, Bloomberg, KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation Forecast. Separately, we retain a zero percent weighting in Emerging Market Debt in 2015. We continue to see EM growth as disappointing, and we believe that the recent explosion in both sovereign and foreign debt means that issuer quality may have declined more than the consensus may now currently think. 24 KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS U.S. High Yield STW vs. U.S. Equities Earnings Yield* 10% Mar-09 7.7% 8% 6% Dec-00 4.7% 4% Jan-10 -0.5% 2% 0% Dec-14 -1.0% -2% Apr-13 -2.6% May-07 -3.7% -4% 2013 2011 2009 2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 1997 -6% 1995 At the moment, our work shows that instruments still appear attractive on both an absolute and relative basis. As Exhibit 56 shows, the implied “earnings yield” on high yield bonds versus stocks has not been this compelling since January of 2010. We see a similar message when compared on a relative basis as one can see in Exhibit 57. To be sure, we are not arguing that we are back to a 2009-like buying opportunity, but – following the recent energy-related sell-off in 4Q14 – the risk profile of credit, high yield in particular, now appears more attractive in our view. As Exhibit 58 also shows, we think that high yield looks attractive relative to bank loans at the moment, though we fully acknowledge that this may change during the year as technical forces and renewed fears about the Fed gain momentum (hence, the desire to bolster our Opportunistic Credit allocation this year). High Yield Relative Valuation Is Most Attractive Since Mid-2010, but Still Near Low End of Historical Range Because of QE Debt Relatively Attractive In terms of credit, we have bolstered our Opportunistic Credit allocation in 2015 to take advantage of ongoing dislocations we are now seeing across high yield, bank loans, and other credit instruments. In addition to heightened government regulation on the dealer community, pure technical flows, including the now sizeable ETF market, can periodically create attractive entry prices for managers who are patient and nimble. EXHIBIT 56 Equity Relatively Attractive equates to hiking 25 basis points at six of its eight meetings each year. Thereafter, we see rates topping out around 3.0% in 2017, then rolling over in 2018 as a mild recession takes hold. Exhibit 52 shows that our medium-term Fed expectations are considerably higher than current market pricing as expressed by Fed Funds and Eurodollar futures, but considerably lower than the Fed’s own forecasts. Hence, we continue to think that this arbitrage between market pricing versus ours and the Fed’s forecasts is one of the more interesting hedging opportunities in the global rates space. Data as at December 31, 2014. * Spread to worst of U.S. high yield market, sector-weighted to match the S&P 500 vs. NTMe EPS yield of the S&P 500. Source: Bloomberg. “ We are now 12 months later in the cycle at a time when asset prices are higher and the world’s most influential central bank is about to shift its stance on monetary policy. “ EXHIBIT 57 EXHIBIT 59 On a Spread Basis, Junk Yields vs. Equity Earnings Yields Are the Most Attractive Since Mid-2010 Bond Index Fund Flows Have Increased Over 400% Since 2008 Debt Relatively Attractive Current Yield Spread of U.S. High Yield vs. U.S. Equities* 12% Dec-00 9.7% 10% 8% 350 Mar-09 9.6% 300 250 6% 200 Jun-10 0.9% 2% 0% -2% 150 Dec-14 0.3% Apr-13 -2.0% Data as at December 31, 2014. * Yield to worst of U.S. high yield market, sector-weighted to match the S&P 500 vs. NTMe EPS yield of the S&P 500. Source: Bloomberg. The Spread Between U.S. High Yield and Leveraged Loans Has Moved Back Towards 2011 Levels Spread: US High Yield - Leveraged Loans (bp) 500 Nov-08 445 450 400 350 300 Sep-11 159 250 200 Dec-14 120 Avg Since '07, 112 50 0 May-07 47 -50 07 50 0 04 06 08 10 12 14 Data as at October 31, 2014. Source: Investment Company Institute, Haver Analytics. Other Alternatives: Growth Capital Allocation / VC/ Other Comes Down EXHIBIT 58 100 100 02 2013 2011 2009 2007 2005 2003 2001 1999 1997 -4% 1995 Equity Relatively Attractive 4% 150 Exchange-Traded Fund Assets: Bond Index Funds (Bil.$) 08 Dec-09 49 09 10 11 Apr-13 -10 12 13 14 15 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: JPMorgan High Yield Bond Index STW US (CSSWUS), JPMorgan Leveraged Loan Index Loans Spread to Maturity (JLSMLLI), Bloomberg. Beyond the sizeable opportunities we see in Distressed / Special Situation, we retain a five percent allocation to Traditional Private Equity because we believe that this asset class can play a meaningful role in both boosting performance and increasing diversification. From a regional perspective, we are particularly bullish on Asia private equity as we believe it is a superior asset class to public emerging market equities, many of which are plagued with large state-affiliated — and often underperforming — companies. Also, private equity allows an investor to get access to key themes, including healthcare, environmental services, and education, that may not be available or well represented in a public stock market index. That said, in the traditional public markets EM’s relative underperformance has been extreme in many instances, which now seems to be creating valuation opportunities not currently seen in the developed public equity markets these days in sectors like consumer durables and industrials. Separately, we are more reserved in Latin America, as we think that a Dilma Rousseff-led Brazil still needs to do more to stabilize its macro backdrop. Mexico clearly has a better macro backdrop than Brazil, but we think a local presence and solid industry expertise are prerequisites for success. Meanwhile, we still see some interesting opportunities in the traditional developed market buyout space, though less so at this point in the cycle. In the U.S., for example, we think that managers must find companies where there is substantial opportunity for consolidation and/or operational improvement. Even so, given that we are 67 months into an economic recovery, we think any new long-term investment likely needs to incorporate some type of recession into its base case forecast. As Exhibit 60 shows, we are also becoming more skeptical of sponsor-to-sponsor transactions, given the recent surge in activity. Separately, in Europe, we believe that the consumer “trade down” thesis, which was so vibrant in the United States post-2009, KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 25 is now gaining momentum. We also see the opportunity for PE firms to acquire global players that are occasionally trading at discounted valuations because they are domiciled in Europe. EXHIBIT 60 Sponsor LBO Volume Spiked Notably in 2014, While Traditional LBO Volume Has Shrunk Real Assets: Strategy Still Working – Outlook Largely Unchanged Distribution of LBO Volume by Type (Based on Transaction Volume) Sponsor Public Corporate Other 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 3Q14 Jan-Sep 14 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2003 2002 2004 10% 0% Data as at 3Q14. Source: S&P Capital IQ, S&P LCD. EXHIBIT 61 The Valuations of Hyper-Growth Investments Now Appear Rich to Us in Many Instances Price-to-Book, Change From January 2012 to December 2014 Nasdaq Internet Index Nasdaq Biotechnology Index 8.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 Jan-12 Dec-14 Data as at December 15, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. 26 KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS As we mentioned in our introduction, we are less sanguine on growth/VC investments. Valuations have moved up considerably in both the private and public markets (Exhibit 61), and we now view this part of the market as more expensive relative to risk-adjusted return profiles we think that investors can achieve being higher up in the capital structure at this point in the cycle in restructurings, recapitalizations, and certain de-leveragings. Whether we have been lucky or good, we have been strong advocates of owning private real assets with yield, growth, and inflation hedging versus traditional liquid commodity swaps and notes. We have held this view for two reasons. First, our cautious view of the China growth story, fixed investment in particular, has made us question the sustainability of permanently elevated commodity prices. Second, as Exhibit 62 shows, the negative roll feature has made these investments both beta and alpha destroyers in recent years. All told, the S&P GSCI index has underperformed the underlying commodities by a full 89% since 2004. Importantly, as we look ahead, we are neither bullish on prices nor on the roll feature on which liquid products depend. In fact, our most recent analysis shows that a full 18 of the 24 underlying commodities in the GSCI are now in contango, as measured by spot (or front month) to 1-year future/forward price. This sizeable percentage is meaningful as these 18 commodities represent a full 89% weighting in the index. Moreover, in many instances the discounts are quite large. Indeed, as shown in Exhibit 63, the major weights in the GSCI, including Brent, WTI, Gas Oil, Corn and Wheat, are all currently in 1-year forward contango, with a range of five to 18%. By comparison, we still see a somewhat differentiated opportunity in the private market for real assets. Key to our thinking is that by owning value-added real estate, energy wells and infrastructure, we get real assets that yield cash flow and are less dependent on pure commodity prices and/or the shape of their respective curves. As such, an investor can often get paid handsomely each year to own non-correlated assets that also have the capability to outperform if inflation does ultimately rear its ugly head. Without question, we like this type of broad-based optionality, particularly in today’s low rate environment. Importantly, the yield on offer is quite compelling as infrastructure and other real assets often allow us to earn a coupon that is in many instances higher than what one can get in most traditional fixed income instruments – and sometimes without the same level of credit risk. “ We think that EM consumers who binged on credit are likely to see some retrenchment in 2015. “ EXHIBIT 62 EXHIBIT 64 S&P GSCI Has Underperformed Commodity Prices for Quite Some Time We Believe Inflation Is Running Too Low Today and Will Rise Over Time S&P GSCI Total Return Relative to S&P GSCI Spot Return 20% KKR GMAA U.S. Inflation Forecast 2.25% 0% 2.25% -20% 2.0% 2.0% 2018 2019 -40% -60% -89% -80% -100% -120% In essence, this is the “roll return” which has been negative due to contango (upward sloping futures curve) -140% -160% -180% 0.7% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. 2015 S&P GSCI Set Up to Underperform: 1-Yr Forward Curves of Largest Index Weights in Contango by Five to 18 Percent Degree of 1yr Forward Contango; Measured as % of Spot U.S. Fed Funds Rate, % Points Above/(Below) U.S. Nominal GDP Growth Wheat Corn Restrictive Policy Rates 115% 110% 105% Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. Jan-16 Dec-15 Nov-15 Oct-15 Sep-15 Aug-15 Jul-15 Jun-15 May-15 Apr-15 Mar-15 100% Feb-15 Current Monetary Policy Is Rewarding Real Assets With Yield and Growth 6% 3yr Moving Avg. 1982 5.7% 4% 2009 1.0% 2% 0% 2019e -1.1% -2% -4% -6% 1978 -5.6% 2005 -4.2% 2014e -3.8% 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014e 2017e Brent WTI Gas Oil Heating Oil EXHIBIT 65 Loose Policy Rates 120% Jan-15 2017 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation forecast. EXHIBIT 63 95% 2016 e = KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation estimate. Our estimate assumes the Fed does not tighten until mid-2015 and that nominal GDP growth averages 4.5% annually between 2012 and 2014. Data as at December 19, 2014. Source: KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation analysis. Within Real Estate, we did lower our allocation in 2015 to three percent from five percent. This reduction is predicated on our view that certain gateway cities have gotten expensive. We note that London and New York have now become a “safe haven” for foreign capital, driving up property values while reducing existing inventory. By comparison, we still continue to see good opportunities across non-core KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 27 and opportunistic in the U.S., Europe and even certain parts of Asia. Consistent with this view, we still see buyers finding opportunities to enter at seven to eight percent capitalization rates, with the opportunity to create property improvements that can drive valuations down 100 to 300 basis points and still retain upside to annual lease-based pricing. Currencies: Expect Periods of Volatility; U.S. Dollar Bull Market Continues When a train goes through a tunnel and it gets dark, you don’t throw away the ticket and jump off. You sit still and trust the engineer. Corrie Ten Boom While there will certainly be periods of “darkness” along the way that might test one’s conviction, our “trust” level is still high as we remain convinced that we have entered a sustained, multi-year U.S. dollar bull market. We certainly appreciate our pro-dollar outlook is now somewhat the consensus view, but in this instance we think the consensus is right. There are several important forces at work that should be considered, in our view. Indeed, at a time when both the Bank of Japan and the ECB are embracing even more extreme forms of quantitative easing (QE), the Federal Reserve has not only ended its tapering campaign but also laid out a rate increase forecast that is still notably more aggressive than the market consensus. Moreover, our research leads us to believe that lower oil prices could provide $278 billion of increased purchasing power to U.S. consumers by early 2016 (Exhibit 18). As such, we think that the dollar could have another compelling year against the yen, the euro and even the British pound. EXHIBIT 66 We Are Less Than Halfway Through the Dollar Bull Cycle… US Trade Weighted Major Dollar: Trough to Peak: Indexed: Trough=100 160 Sep 1980 (54m) 139.7 Aug 2011 (40m to-date) 140 130 Aug-98 Dec-14 120 Oct-99 110 100 154.5 Apr 1995 (82m) 150 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. 28 KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS EXHIBIT 67 …And the Dollar Is Still Undervalued US Dollar REER: % Over (Under) Valued 45% Mar-1985 38.1% 35% +2 25% Feb-2002 16.0% +1 15% 5% Dec-2014 -3.3% Avg -5% -15% -25% 70 –1 Sep-1980 -7.5% –2 75 80 85 Jun-1995 -12.6% 90 95 00 Jul-2011 -17.7% 05 10 15 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Federal Reserve Board, JP Morgan, Bank of England, OECD, IMF, World Bank, BIS, Haver Analytics, Bloomberg. Within the emerging market currencies arena, we again look for the Mexican peso to outperform the Brazilian real in 2015. Growth in Mexico remains largely linked to the U.S. recovery, while growth in Brazil is related to the China story, in our view. Furthermore, there has been significant progress on the reform front in Mexico, while Brazil continues to face the same issues of slow growth, high inflation, twin deficits and policy paralysis. We also like the Indian rupee against the Japanese yen. While both countries benefit from weaker oil prices, the Indian rupee has a higher carry of five percent versus the yen. India is also benefiting from lower inflation, which is positive for the rupee, while Japan is trying to increase inflation, which is negative for the yen. Finally, while reforms in India work to unleash its demographic dividend in order to raise real growth to seven percent from five percent, reforms in Japan are fighting against its demographic decline in order to lift Japan towards a nominal growth rate of just three percent. Notably, India has already made great strides in achieving lower inflation, a lower fiscal deficit, and a lower current account deficit, while Japan is still struggling to raise inflation and growth, narrow its fiscal deficit and lower its debt burden. “ Traditional financial intermediaries are now unable to participate in many of the higher margin, nontraditional lending opportunities at a time when many small- to medium-size businesses need access to credit. “ EXHIBIT 68 Outside of Russia, Volatility in Most EM Currencies Has Remained Surprisingly Low RUB, MXN, BRL, CLP and COP 3 Month Implied Volatility Russian Ruble Mexican Peso 50 Colombian Peso Brazilian Real 40 Chilean Peso Importantly, because of the significant excess capacity that exists because of over-investment, we think China is likely to continue to run with a negative producer price index (PPI). Thus far, this cycle China’s PPI has been negative for 33 consecutive months14. Our take: As the world’s leading export economy, there is a growing risk that China begins to export some of its deflation to other parts of the global economy. If we are right, then this issue is likely to affect both internal prices for consumer goods as well as the underlying currencies in which these goods are bought and sold in local terms. 30 20 12/1/2014 11/1/2014 10/1/2014 9/1/2014 8/1/2014 7/1/2014 6/1/2014 5/1/2014 4/1/2014 3/1/2014 2/1/2014 1/1/2014 10 0 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. EXHIBIT 69 We Think BRL Remains Overvalued, and As Such, Faces Further Depreciation Headwinds U.S.$/Brazil Real Spot Rate 2.70 2.50 2.30 2.10 1.90 1.70 Dec-14 Aug-14 Apr-14 Dec-13 Aug-13 Apr-13 Dec-12 Aug-12 Apr-12 Dec-11 Aug-11 1.50 Apr-11 bring nominal lending back down towards nominal GDP13. As this transition unfolds further, we believe commodity prices are likely to remain under pressure on a global basis as the Chinese try to pivot their economy more towards services. Importantly, our recent trip to China underscored that environmental concerns are now a major focus, which means that the government is more focused on services growth than construction/manufacturing. This economic transition is a big deal, and it significantly affects our thinking on where we expect stress in the global economy during 2015. Second, the European economy now seems to be running with dangerously low inflation. As wages are brought down to be more competitive, this development is likely to affect demand – and hence, inflationary expectations. Also, with oil and other commodity prices falling, we think that inflation could turn negative in 1H15. Our recent travels confirm this threat. In fact, in France, for example, already about one third of the CPI inputs are in deflation. Against this backdrop, bond yields have collapsed around the world. Not surprisingly, risk assets, equities in particular, look attractive relative to low yielding government bonds in this environment. We tend to agree with this argument, but we are watching two areas closely. First, as we saw with Japan in the 1990s, low interest rates were foreshadowing a fall-off in corporate profitability and growth. Our current global outlook is more positive, but we do want to continue to remind ourselves that there is historical precedent for bonds and stocks giving investors the wrong macro signals. Second, because of central bank intervention, long-term interest rates are likely below fair value. Indeed, as we described in the fixed income section of this report, our quantitative value for the U.S. 10-year Treasury is closer to 3.0%, not the 2.2% at which it is currently trading – compliments of QE (Exhibit 50). So, the correct conclusion may – in fact – be that bonds are expensive – not that stocks are cheap. Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. Risks The sources of deflation are not a mystery. Ben S. Bernanke, Deflation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here, November 1, 2002 Without question, we see any downside risk to the global markets through the lens of a deflationist in the near term. There are two macro situations we are watching closely that are heavily influencing our thinking. First, China gross capital formation, which accounted for 48% of GDP in 2013, is slowing as the government is forced to 13 Data as at November 30, 2014. Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, Haver Analytics. 14 Ibid.14. KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 29 EXHIBIT 70 the periods of volatility we expect in 2015. Credit per Unit of GDP in China Is on an Upward Trajectory That We View as Worrisome China: Credit per Unit GDP 12 9.9 10 5.9 6.6 5.6 5.2 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.0 4 2 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 Data as at October 31, 2014. Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, Haver Analytics. EXHIBIT 72 EXHIBIT 71 Equities, Including the S&P 500, Only Look Attractive Relative to the Risk Free Rate if Earnings Trends Are Sustainable S&P 500 Earnings Yield US 10 Year Yield 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 EUR/USD 3-month Implied Volatility, % per Year 23 18 13 So, in the event that the aforementioned macro risks do dent investor confidence, we think that long volatility strategies can work, including equity index, interest rate, and certain FX “crosses” – if purchased and traded tactically. In S&P options, for example, three- and sixmonth put spreads remain attractive hedging vehicles when implied volatility compresses. In our view, the periodic times when the VIX trades to 12% - 13% are often the best times to accumulate put spread structures. At the moment, the “skew” or premium of downside puts over the “at the money” levels can drastically reduce the cost of just owning outright puts. We believe this could be the most attractive vehicle for leveraged protection against risk assets during KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. 15 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. Mar-14 Aug-14 Oct-13 Dec-12 May-13 Jul-12 Feb-12 Apr-11 Sep-11 Nov-10 Jan-10 Jun-10 Mar-09 3 Aug-09 Jan-2011 Jan-1999 Jan-2005 Jan-1987 Jan-1993 Jan-1981 Jan-1975 Jan-1969 Jan-1963 Jan-1957 Jan-1951 Jan-1945 Jan-1933 Jan-1939 Jan-1921 Jan-1927 8 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Source: S&P, Shiller, Thomson Financial, Federal Reserve Board, Haver, Factset. 30 Options Can Provide Substantial Leverage to an Idea at Current Prices… Oct-08 0 Finally, U.S. interest rate volatility remains low by historical standards, despite the end of QE and pending removal of historic accommodative conditions. For example, 6-month, 10-year swaption volatility – which represents the costs of owning a 6-month option to short 10-year swaps (i.e., 10-year bonds) – is currently 77 basis points. At 77 basis points, the market is pricing 10-yr swaps to move just +/- 5 basis points a day to break even on a long option position. This is a historically “cheap” level that should conceivably move back to its long run average of 100 to 120 basis points once the Fed suppression of interest rate levels returns to normal. As such, if one had a bias towards higher rates, owning swaption volatility would be a smart way to leverage those protection bets. May-08 6 9.9 Dec-07 8 9.4 Secondly, we think euro currency volatility is also cheap enough to own. While it has moved from 6 to 8.5% over the last few months, EURUSD volatility consistently realized between 12-16% for over four years following the financial crisis15. While EUR volatility is probably not going back to premium levels seen during the worst bouts of the euro crisis, if one has a directional view, options afford smart leverage at current prices. EXHIBIT 74 …Particularly Given That Volatility is Low by Historical Standards The KKR GMAA Target Portfolio Has Both Strong Absolute and Relative Returns Since its Inception US 6-month Into 10-year Swaption Volatiltiy, Basis Points per Year 190 15.0% KKR GMAA Global Asset Allocation Jan 2012 to Dec 2014 (%) Monthly Returns GMAA Portfolio 170 10.0% 130 110 90 5.0% 0.0% -5.0% Aug-14 Oct-13 Dec-12 May-13 Jul-12 Sep-11 Feb-12 Apr-11 Nov-10 Jun-10 Jan-10 Aug-09 Oct-08 Mar-09 May-08 Dec-07 50 Mar-14 70 Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: Bloomberg. Conclusion: Getting Closer to Home As we have detailed in this outlook piece, we are of the mindset that the general backdrop for risk assets remains favorable. However, given where we are in the cycle and the magnitude of gains in recent years, we have begun the inevitable process of “Getting Closer to Home” in terms of our asset allocation targets, including raising cash and tilting the invested part of the portfolio to be more opportunistic in nature during 2015. Importantly, given some of the dislocation we are already seeing across Europe and Asia as well as in the U.S. energy complex, we feel confident having a sizeable 15% of our portfolio in the Distressed / Special Situation investing bucket. We like this investment opportunity not only for its global appeal but also because it allows us to move up in the capital structure – and potentially still earn equity-like returns but often with less volatility/risk. -10.0% 35% 30% 5 4 3 2 0 0 3 4 1 2 1 2 0 0 2 2 4 25% 3 3 1 1 1 1 -1 -2 -2 -2 22 2 01 20% 15% -1 -3 -2 -6 10% 5% Jan-12 Mar-12 May-12 Jul-12 Sep-12 Nov-12 Jan-13 Mar-13 May-13 Jul-13 Sep-13 Nov-13 Jan-14 Mar-14 May-14 Jul-14 Sep-14 Nov-14 Monthly Returns (%) 150 40% Cumulative Returns (%) EXHIBIT 73 0% Gross returns. Weights as per KKR white paper “Where To Allocate,” January 2012, “Real Estate: Focus on Growth, Yield and Inflation Hedging,” September 2012, “Outlook for 2013: A Changing Playbook,” January 2013, “Asset Allocation in a Low Rate Environment,” September 2013, “Outlook for 2014: Stay the Course,” January 2014, and “Midyear Outlook: Four Macro Trends at Work,” June 2014. Private equity returns as of 2Q2014, and using 0% for remaining months. Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation, Bloomberg, Factset, MSCI, Cambridge Associates. “ We think the ability to move up and down the capital structure and provide corporate partners with value-added financial and operational expertise will become a prerequisite for success. “ KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 31 EXHIBIT 75 macro landscape that CIOs and portfolio managers should pursue. First, China’s slowing is not an aberration. As such, its role in the global economy is materially shifting, which means that we expect to see sizeable restructuring and recapitalization opportunities in sectors that previously over-earned and/or overstretched their footprints during the China Growth Miracle. 2014 Returns Were Driven by Real Assets and Alternatives, Though Equities and Fixed Income Selections Lagged KKR GMAA Global Asset Allocation Performance Relative to Benchmark Jan 2012 to Dec 2014 (basis points) GMAA vs Benchmark Cumulative Outperformance (bp) 94 100 80 60 40 96 1000 73 65 57 56 49 454542 43 3632 24 26 9 11 20 11 325 1 800 40 600 28 1919 16 16 7 0 11 16 1 21 12 400 0 -10 -1 -20 1200 -29 -29 0 Jan-12 Mar-12 May-12 Jul-12 Sep-12 Nov-12 Jan-13 Mar-13 May-13 Jul-13 Sep-13 Nov-13 Jan-14 Mar-14 May-14 Jul-14 Sep-14 Nov-14 -40 200 Performance vs Benchmark (bps) Outperformance in Basis Points 120 Third, despite a slew of liquidity in the system, many companies across both emerging and developed economies still can’t get proper access to credit. As such, we still see a compelling illiquidity premium that is worth pursuing, particularly in today’s low rate environment. Importantly, with Wall Street leverage low and an increasing portion of the global economy under stress, we see a more intense blurring across many parts of the liquid and illiquid fixed income markets in 2015. Fourth, in a world of contango commodity pricing, we continue to favor private real asset investments with upfront yield, growth, and long-term inflation hedging relative to traditional liquid commodity notes and swaps. Already, performance between these two subasset classes in the real asset arena has been substantial, but we still see more opportunity ahead. Gross returns. Weights as per KKR white paper “Where To Allocate,” January 2012, “Real Estate: Focus on Growth, Yield and Inflation Hedging,” September 2012, “Outlook for 2013: A Changing Playbook,” January 2013, “Asset Allocation in a Low Rate Environment,” September 2013, “Outlook for 2014: Stay the Course,” January 2014, and “Midyear Outlook: Four Macro Trends at Work,” June 2014. Private equity returns as of 2Q2014, and using 0% for remaining months. Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation, Bloomberg, Factset, MSCI, Cambridge Associates. Overall though, we do think now is the time in the cycle to start “Getting Closer to Home” in terms of risk exposure. Importantly, we think this transition should be more evolutionary than revolutionary. Rates are low, global growth should be solid, and central banks are easing in many instances. Moreover, we still see several compelling “arbitrages” in the global Second, many corporations still have inefficient capital structures, including too much cash and too little debt, in our view. As such, investors can still benefit from corporate actions to lower their costs of capital and/or improve growth, including buybacks, dividends, capital expenditures and acquisitions. Finally, government deleveraging in the developed markets is disinflationary, which drives our thinking about the direction of long-term interest rates as well as the relative value of risk assets against the risk-free rates. In particular, given our view that the economic cycle will stretch into 2017, we think that many public and private equity stories with capital management and operational improvements still appear attractive. To be sure, there are risks to our strategy amid what remains an unsettled time across the global capital markets. First, in terms of both duration and performance, the economic cycle in the United States is already notably beyond average at 67 months. However, with oil EXHIBIT 76 Arithmetic Returns, Volatility, and Return/Risk of the Target Portfolio as at December 2014 RETURNS VOLATILITY RETURN / RISK GMAA BENCHMARK DIFFERENCE GMAA BENCHMARK DIFFERENCE GMAA BENCHMARK DIFFERENCE 2012 14.8 11.3 3.5 9.3% 8.9% 0.4% 1.6 1.3 0.3 2013 14.6 10.6 4.1 7.4% 6.9% 0.5% 2.0 1.5 0.5 2014 4.2 2.2 1.9 6.7% 6.4% 0.3% 0.6 0.3 0.3 Gross returns. Weights as per KKR white paper “Where To Allocate,” January 2012, “Real Estate: Focus on Growth, Yield and Inflation Hedging,” September 2012, “Outlook for 2013: A Changing Playbook,” January 2013, “Asset Allocation in a Low Rate Environment,” September 2013, “Outlook for 2014: Stay the Course,” January 2014, and “Midyear Outlook: Four Macro Trends at Work,” June 2014. Private equity returns as of 2Q2014, and using 0% for remaining months. Data as at December 31, 2014. Source: KKR Global Macro & Asset Allocation, Bloomberg, Factset, MSCI, Cambridge Associates. 32 KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS prices falling and consumer leverage low, we still feel comfortable owning a pro-growth portfolio. Also, while we think China’s economy will continue to slow, we do not think it is poised to collapse. As we discussed earlier, Europe and Japan should again be able to muddle through with less government drag in 2015. Second, central bank differentiation is now upon us as 2015 will be the first year since before the Great Recession where the Federal Reserve will be reducing its liquidity profile (Exhibit 4). Third, while China is transitioning well towards a service economy, the legacy of its fixed investment boom remains a major overhang on the global economy. Our bottom line: We continue to embrace a pro-risk portfolio, but we think “Getting Closer to Home” reflects not only where we are in the cycle but also assigns some value to the strong appreciation in asset prices we have had in recent years. Moreover, by building up a little cash and turning a little more conservative in our overall allocations, we now have more flexibility to embrace volatility during 2015, an option that was not available to our fully invested portfolio in 2014. “ We do think now is the time in the cycle to start “Getting Closer to Home” in terms of risk exposure. Importantly, we think this transition should be more evolutionary than revolutionary. Rates are low, global growth should be solid, and central banks are easing in many instances. “ i Note 1: New issue leveraged loan spreads rated B+/B as per S&P LCD Q3 2014 Quarterly Report. Average senior leverage on these loans is 4.9x. Note 2: Difference in loss given default for Middle Market leveraged loans and larger company leveraged loans. Middle Market loans are defined as those with €200m or lower facility size. Large company leveraged loans are those with a facility size of €200m of larger. Total default volume and leveraged loan market size is based on the Credit Suisse European Leveraged Loan Index. The proportionate split between middle market loans and larger leveraged loans is based on S&P LCD loan pipeline issuance statistics with facility sizes of less than or greater than €200m. Defaults by size is based S&P LCD Default and Recovery Database cross-referenced versus S&P historic issuance to evaluate facility size. Average recovery rate is assumed at 79% based on the study “Loss-Given-Default of Corporate Bank Loans: Large-Scale Evidence from Europe” by Laurence Deborgies-Sanches, Lyubka Sokolova & Michel Van Beest, March 2014. Note 3: This is the difference between the average coupon and fees described in Notes 4 and 5 and credit risk premium and spreads described in Notes 2 and 1 respectively. Note 4: Average underwriting fees for all European Direct Lending deals executed in KKR Lending Partners L.P. and CCT is 2.8%. Assuming a 3 year life for the loans, this equates to an average incremental return of c.0.9% per annum. Note 5: Based on average coupon (including Euribor floors) based on active European Direct Lending pipeline as at 5 November 2014. Average senior leverage of 4.7x, plus the fees described in Note 4. KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS 33 34 KKR INSIGHTS: GLOBAL MACRO TRENDS Important Information The views expressed in this publication are the personal views of Henry McVey of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. (together with its affiliates, “KKR”) and do not necessarily reflect the views of KKR itself or any investment professional at KKR. This document is not research and should not be treated as research. This document does not represent valuation judgments with respect to any financial instrument, issuer, security or sector that may be described or referenced herein and does not represent a formal or official view of KKR. This document is not intended to, and does not, relate specifically to any investment strategy or product that KKR offers. It is being provided merely to provide a framework to assist in the implementation of an investor’s own analysis and an investor’s own views on the topic discussed herein. The views expressed reflect the current views of Mr. McVey as of the date hereof and neither Mr. McVey nor KKR undertakes to advise you of any changes in the views expressed herein. Opinions or statements regarding financial market trends are based on current market conditions and are subject to change without notice. The views expressed herein may not be reflected in the strategies and products that KKR offers, including strategies and products to which Mr. McVey provides investment advice on behalf of KKR. It should not be assumed that Mr. McVey has made or will make investment recommendations in the future that are consistent with the views expressed herein, or use any or all of the techniques or methods of analysis described herein in managing client accounts. Further, Mr. McVey may make investment recommendations and KKR and its affiliates may have positions (long or short) or engage in securities transactions that are not consistent with the information and views expressed in this document. This publication has been prepared solely for informational purposes. The information contained herein is only as current as of the date indicated, and may be superseded by subsequent market events or for other reasons. Charts and graphs provided herein are for illustrative purposes only. The information in this document has been developed internally and/or obtained from sources believed to be reliable; however, neither KKR nor Mr. McVey guarantees the accuracy, adequacy or completeness of such information. Nothing contained herein constitutes investment, legal, tax or other advice nor is it to be relied on in making an investment or other decision. There can be no assurance that an investment strategy will be successful. Historic market trends are not reliable indicators of actual future market behavior or future performance of any particular investment which may differ materially, and should not be relied upon as such. Target allocations contained herein are subject to change. There is no assurance that the target allocations will be achieved, and actual allocations may be significantly different than that shown here. This publication should not be viewed as a current or past recommendation or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any securities or to adopt any investment strategy. The information in this publication may contain projections or other forward-looking statements regarding future events, targets, forecasts or expectations regarding the strategies described herein, and is only current as of the date indicated. There is no assurance that such events or targets will be achieved, and may be signifi- cantly different from that shown here. The information in this document, including statements concerning financial market trends, is based on current market conditions, which will fluctuate and may be superseded by subsequent market events or for other reasons. Performance of all cited indices is calculated on a total return basis with dividends reinvested. The indices do not include any expenses, fees or charges and are unmanaged and should not be considered investments. The investment strategy and themes discussed herein may be unsuitable for investors depending on their specific investment objectives and financial situation. Please note that changes in the rate of exchange of a currency may affect the value, price or income of an investment adversely. Neither KKR nor Mr. McVey assumes any duty to, nor undertakes to update forward looking statements. No representation or warranty, express or implied, is made or given by or on behalf of KKR, Mr. McVey or any other person as to the accuracy and completeness or fairness of the information contained in this publication and no responsibility or liability is accepted for any such information. By accepting this document, the recipient acknowledges its understanding and acceptance of the foregoing statement. The MSCI sourced information in this document is the exclusive property of MSCI Inc. (MSCI). 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