1. No category

Export Decision under Risk∗
José De Sousa, Anne-Célia Disdier and Carl Gaigné†
March 2, 2015
Very preliminary and incomplete
Abstract
Does demand volatility matter for exports? How do exporting firms deal with
skewed demand? A simple model of downside risk aversion shows that on average
exporters increase export prices and reduce export volumes when demand volatility
in destination markets increases. They behave the opposite way when demand
skewness rises. We find that the moments of the demand distribution also affect
the number of exporting firms and the industry supply. These adjustments may
lead some firms to increase their exports when demand volatility increases. These
theoretical predictions are put to the test by using French firm-level exports across
destination markets with different levels of demand volatility and skewness. The
firm-level results, over the period 2000-2009, are consistent with our predictions.
JEL classification: D81, F12, L25
Keywords: Uncertainty, Demand volatility, Firm exports, Skewness
1
Introduction
Does demand volatility matter for exporters supply decisions? According to the Capgemini 2011 survey of large companies, 40% of respondents say that demand volatility is their
number one business driver. Indeed, in numerous industries, sellers need to decide production levels or input procurements before the output is marketed or the market price
∗
We thank Holger Breinlich, Maggie Chen, Gabriel Felbermayr, James Harrigan, Keith Head, Nuno
Limão, Gianmarco Ottaviano, John McLaren, John Morrow, Denis Novy, Mathieu Parenti, Ariell Reshef,
Veronica Rappoport, Daniel Sturm and seminar and conference participants at U; of Virginia, U. of George
Washington, CEPII, U. of Caen, London School of Economics, U. of Munich (ETSG), U. of Strathclyde,
and U. of Tours for their helpful comments. This work is supported by the French National Research
Agency, through the program Investissements d’Avenir, ANR-10-LBX-93-01.
†
José De Sousa: Université Paris-Sud, RITM and Sciences-Po Paris, LIEPP, jose.de-sousa@u-psud.fr.
Anne-Célia Disdier: Paris School of Economics-INRA, anne-celia.disdier@ens.fr. Carl Gaigné: INRA,
UMR1302 SMART, Rennes (France) and Université Laval, CREATE, Québec (Canada). Email:
carl.gaigne@rennes.inra.fr.
1
for output is known. Demand cannot be known for certain at the time the contracts with
the importers are signed as expenditures for an industry are subject to random shocks. In
this paper, we analyze how demand volatility affect the export decision at the firm level.
In most of the trade literature, the firm knows the state of demand function with certainty and only the level of foreign market size plays a key role in firm export performance.
However, for a same level of demand (apparent absorption), we observe a significant demand volatility in destination markets. This point is illustrated in Figure (1) from data
on world sectoral-level data.
15
EGY
10
USA
USA
PAN
5
Log of Apparent Consumption (Mean) - 3 digit
20
Figure 1: Demand (apparent consumption) level and demand volatility
JPN DEU
USA
USA
JPN
JPN
USA
USA
JPN DEU JPNUSA
USA
FRA
JPNUSA
USA
USA
FRA
USA USA
KOR USA
JPN
JPN KOR
USA IND
GBR
DEU DEU
CHN
USA
USA
KOR
ITA USA
USA
DEU
USA
CHN
USA
DEU
USA
USA
IND
USAJPN
ITA
USA
ITA
ESP
JPN
CAN
FRA USAFRA
USA
BRA SGP
KOR
JPN
GBR
JPN
MEX
USA
JPN
ITA
USA
DEU
DEU
USA
JPN
AUS
DEU
KOR
KOR
CHN
JPN
ITA
DEU
RUS
CAN
RUS
USA
USA
FRA
GBR
CHN
USA
JPN
USA
JPN
FRA
JPN
GBR
DEU
IND
USA
USA
ZAF
JPN
DEUKOR
BRA
ESP BRA
KOR
MEX
GBR
USA
ESP
JPN
ITA
JPN
ITA
ITA
JPN
JPN
FRA
CHN
MYS
AUS
USA
JPN
JPN
SWE
USA
DEU
GBR
DEU
JPN
DEU
ESP
BRA
FRA
FRA
CAN
FRA
TUR
GBR
ITA
USA
USABLX
CHN MEX
IND CHL
POL
DEU
IRL
DEU
TUR
GBR
USA
GBR
ESP
USA
FRA
FRA
IRL
CAN
JPN
JPN
JPN
ITA
ITA
USA
USA USA
JPN
CHN
FRA
CHN
TURJPN
CAN
JPN
JPN
ITA
FRA
KOR
CHN
BRA
FRA
CAN
IRN
CAN
MEX
JPN
DEU
FIN
ITA
BLX
JPN
USA
SGP
GBRAUSDEUITA
DEU
KOR
ZAF
DEU
GBR
USA
CHN
ESP
CHN
DEU
FRA
GBR
MYS
ESP
MEX
ITA
MEX
GBR
GBR
JPN
AUT
DEU
ITA
GBR
FRA
CAN
DEU
JPN
DEU
ITA
AUS
ESP
DEU
JPN
IRNHUN
SGP
DEU
IND
ITA
IND
SWE
GBR
ESP
DEU
DEU
NLD
TUR
TUR
CAN
IDN
USA
RUS
DEU
KOR
MEX
IND
POL
CHN
NLD
FRA
DEU
GBR
CHN
ITA
FRA
KOR
MEX
POL
GBR
GBR
BLX
GBR
FRA
FRA
CAN
CAN
ESP
USA
GBR
SWE
ITA
BLX
FRA
CHN
CHN
ITA
USA
POL
FRA
ESP
CHN
FRA
FRA
USA
TUR
ESP
BLX
KOR
ITA
JPN
DEU
TUR
BRA
AUS
MEX
BLX
POL
KOR
MYS
AUT
BRA
ESP
JPN
CZE
CHN
CZE
IND
ESP
HUN
DEU
HUN
KOR
IND
ITA
IRN
KOR
DEU
SGP
AUS
ITA
AUS
JPN
ITA
BLX
GBR
ESP
CAN
BRA
GBR
IDN
GBR
AUS
ITA
CAN
DEU
AUT
GBR
MYS
NLD
DEU
JPN
GBR
BRA
ITA
FRA
JPN
ITA
FRA
KOR
FRA
FRA
GBR
DEU
ESP
IND
GBR
DEU
BRA
IND
NLD
ITA
IDN
KOR
GBR
ESP
GBR
DEU
KOR
SGP JPN RUS
JPN
KOR
IDN
NLD
UKR
ESP
JPN
ESP
AUS
ZAF
GBR
HUN
CAN
ESP
BRA
AUT
ITA
GBR
ITA
BRA
KOR
MYS
FRA
ESP
CZE
USA
ITA
NOR
ESP
JPN
CHN
JPN
ITA
KOR
ESP
GBR
MEX
RUS
ITA
CAN
FRA
CAN
RUS
FRA
IND
MYS
CAN
CAN
RUS
BLX
ESP
ITA
IND
CAN
KOR
FRA
KOR
CAN
CAN
NLD
ESP
MEX
TUR
DEU
KOR
MYS
NLD
ITA
BRA
AUS
DEU
AUS
ISR
DEU
GBR
BLX
CZE
KOR
CAN
AUT
DEU
ZAF
PRT
CAN
IND CHN
POL FRA
CHN
DEU
NLD
TUR
JPN
ZAF
AUS UKR
ROM
CAN
JPN
NOR
AUS
MEX
DEU
CAN
AUT
ITA
HUN
GBR
USA
MAR
IND
CHN
IRL
COL
POL
FRA
FIN
NOR
DEU
ITA
ITA
BLX
SWE
OMN
TUR
JPN
ESP
ITA
AUS
ESP
ITA
SWE
KOR
MYS
DEU
RUS
PER
IND
BLX
MEX
IRL
AUS
UKR
TUR
TTO
ESP
AUT
BRA
ITA
KOR
IND
MEX
SWE
CAN
IND
GBR
FRA
ESP
FRA
BLX
KOR
GBR
GBR
FRA
DNK
SWE
FRA
AUS
CAN
POL
AUS
RUS
NLD
NLD
ESP
PRT
NLD
ITA
ESP
CAN
GBR
RUS
CHL
CAN
RUS
JPN
CZE
AUS
CAN
IRN
AUS
ESP
RUS
ROM
IND
NLD
BRA
AUSJPN
SWE
SWE
AUT
FRA
BRA
BRA
IND
SGP
ESP
IDN
IDN
GBR
AUT
NLD
RUS
IDN
NLD
IND
FRA
DNK
IND
JPN
ITA MEX
ITA
NLD
ISR
ESP
CHN
KOR
FRA
AUS
MEX
ITA
ESP
HUN
VNM
KWT
FRA
ZAF
AUS
POL
IDN
TUR
POL
KOR
ITA
CAN
FIN
ITA
HUN
AUS
GBR
TUR
BLX
JPN
CAN
ISR
GBR
AUS
KOR
CAN
NOR
ESP
DEU
CAN
BLX
POL
NLD
NLD
AUS
DEU
CAN
POL
PRT
ISR
ROM
FIN
ESP
CAN
RUS
ESP
DNK
BRA
GBR
IDN
KOR
SGP
POL
MEX
ITA
BRA
PER
IND
UKR
SWE
TUR
SWE
GBR
BRA
NOR
FRA
IRN
ESP
KOR
GBR
ECU
BRA
FRA
POL
ESP
HUN
FRA
GBR
IRL
ESP
DEU
BLX
BLX
VNM VNM
BLX
COL
CAN
KOR
KOR
SWE
MEX
PRT
NOR
IRL
TUR
MEX
NOR
NOR
DNK
ESP
KOR
TUR
RUS
COL
MYS
IND
RUS
AUS
SVK
PRT
BLX
JOR
ITA
AUS
COL
IND
BRA
MYS
FIN
MEX
CAN
ESP
DNK
IND
FIN
BRA
FIN
CZE
SGP
ITA
POL
BLX
BLX
CAN
KORAUT
PRT
ESP
KOR
NOR
SWE
AUS
AUT
ESP
ISR
AUS
IND
DNK
BLX
AUS
POL
TUR
BLX
FRA
CHL
GBR
NLD
ROM
NLD
NLD
IND
TUR
FIN
FRA
BLX
AUT
NOR
BLX
PRT
AUS
HUNIDN
KOR
CHL
FIN
DEU
DEU
SGP
TUR
TUR
BLX
FIN
DEU
JPN
CAN
IRN
KOR
IND
ESP
AUT
OMN
BLX
FIN
SWE
SWE
DEU
DNK
MAR
ZAF
SWE
KOR
AUT
MYS
POL
CZE
SWE
UKR
MEX
CZE
IND
ISR
JPN
IND
POL
COL
BLX
MYS
UKR
FIN
IRN
POL
AUT
CAN
AUT
IRL NLD
AUS
POL
BLX
PER
CZE
AUT
AUT
CZE
MEX
SWE
SGP
POL
SWE
MEX
NOR
POL
TUR
BLX
ITA
MYS
SGP
MYS
DNK
NOR IND
IND
PER
KOR
SWE
TUR
POL
SWE
ISR
NOR
CZE
KAZ
AUS
NLD
HUN
COL
IND
URY
ECU
TUR
SWE
NLD
PRT
AUS
CZE
MEX TUR IDN
CAN NLD
TUR
CZE
HUN
CHL
POL
SGP
TUR
FIN
CAN
IND AUT
POL
KOR
NLD
SVN
PRT
GBR
MEX
AUS
ROM
COL
GBR
IRL
TUR
TUR
ZAF
SWE
IND
MEX
ESP
AUS
POL
IND
FIN
IND
AUS
SWE
SVN
AUT
CZE
PRT
TUR
AUT
PRT
ISR
NLD
LTU
MAR
AUT
POL
IRN
ROM
IND
GRC
TUR
CHL
FRA
IDN
ROM
POL
AUT
NOR
BLX
MEX
AUS
POL
AUS
MEX
AUT
SGP
CAN
TUR
HUN
SGP
SVK
POL
CAN
FIN
BLX
GRC
HUN
ESP
NLD
DNK
GBR
SGP
IRL
NOR
SWE
DNK
DNK
MEX
UKR
FIN
BLX
KEN
AUT VNM
BLX
CAN
FRA
BRA
AUT
COL
POL
AUT
ESP
BLX
MAR
ZAF
CZE
MEX
AUS
TUR
UKR
KAZ
AUT
MEX
FIN
ESP
SWE
IRN
IND
DNK
IDN
IDN
IRL
DNK
BRA
CZE
KOR
POL
DEU
MYS
FIN
FIN
MYS
FIN
KOR
JOR
AUT
NOR
SWE
LTU
BLX
POL
AUT
AUT
UKR
ISR
AUS
ROM
NLD
NOR
SVK
NOR
IRL
SVK
GBR
GRC DNK
MYS
MAR
IND
SWE
AUS
BLX
BRA
CZE
DEU
FRA
POL
NOR
SGP
GBR
SWE
POL
BGR
DNK
BLX
IND
MYS
GRC
AUT POL ROM
PRT
KOR
BLX
NLD
GRC
BRA
POL
ECU
COL
HUN
TUR
IRL
SGP
AUS
NLD
AUS
GBR
IND
DNK
SWE
TUR
HUN
BRA
IRN
SVN
POL
DEU
UKR
FIN
NOR
NLD
DNK
HUN
CZE
FRA
NOR
FIN
UKR
FRA
NOR
IRN
GRC
HUN
NLD
DNK
ROM
SWE
POL
ITA
ITA
DNK
AUT
JOR
BRA
MAR
KOR
NOR
COL
COL
PRT
IRL
IRN
FIN
BLX
TUR
GRC
AUT
PRT
BGR
PER
CZE
IRN
BLX
ROM
BLX
UKR
MYS
IND
MYS
CAN
CZE
PRT
FIN
GBR
SGP
IND
ISR
IRL
MAR
PER
EGY
PRT
TUR
NOR
NLD
POL
POL
BLX
IND
TUR
POL
IND
PRT
IRN
DNK
COL
NOR
COL
AUS
AUS
KOR
DNK
FIN
ESP
IRN
PRT
CHL
MYS
CZE
KOR
IRN
POL
MYS
HUN
FIN
NLD
PRT
SWE
FIN
UKR
ESP
PRT
CZE
BRA
ROM
MEX
GRC
TUR
FIN
NOR
SWE
IRL
PRT
FIN
COL
CAN
POL
VNM
NLDIDN
SEN
PRT
COL
ROM
LTU
CZE
OMN
PER
NOR
MYS
DNK
MAR
BLX
ECU
TUR
NOR
GBR
HUN
IND
EGY
CZE
RUS
UKR
AUT
DNK
ISL
TUR
IDN
TUR
IDN
COL
MYS
DNK
SGP
MAR
IDN
UKR
FIN
IRN
TUR
AUS
IRN
DNK
NOR
AUT
NLDIDNMEX POL
CYP
PER
GRC
DNK
NOR
MYS
NLD
GRC
UKR
IDN
AUS
MAR
IND
BRA
CZE
EST
MYS
DNK
ROM
CAN
ROM
MYS
MYS
NOR
ROM
EGY
IRL
IRN
MYS
FIN
CHL
ETH
NOR
IRLHUN
AUS
IRL
SVK
CZE
IND
IDN
RUS
KOR
FINPOL
ROM
AUT
IRL
SVK
HUN
AUT
PER
MEX
IRN
NOR
CAN
MEX
ISR
PER
SWE
MYS
MEX
IDN
KAZ
FIN
POL
PER
ISR
UKR
CZE
ESP
DNK
HUN
IRN
SVN
SWE
ISR
ISR
KOR
HUN
MYS
UKR
FIN
SVK
GRC
ECU
UKR
IRN
IRN
COL
COL
EST
MLT
SVK
CHL
NOR
HUN
IRL
GRC
SVN
BLX
SVN
NOR
IRN
ISR
NOR
NOR
AUS
TUR
SWE
NLD
BLX
SGP
PERUKR
TTO
UKR
HUN
CYP
SEN
IRN
DNK
CHL
MAR
MEX
UKR
RUS
MAR
IRN
HUN
MYS
SVK
ESP
MUS
CZE
HUN
KAZ
PRT
PER
IRL
NOR
SWE
CHL
PER
HUN
HUN
SVN
SWE
MYS
SVN
IDN
PER
NOR ISR ROM
KAZ
ISL
IDN
ESP
ROM
EGY
CAN
IRN
SVKKWT
ISR
IRLUKR
AUT
ITA
KOR
MYS
SVN
NOR
MYS
IRN
MYS
AUS
POL
FRA
ISR
AUT MYS
MEX
PRT
UKR
SWE
ETH
BGR
KOR
ROM
SVN
GRC
JOR
AUS
NLD
DNK
AUT
BLX
IDN
ROM
MAR
MEX
COL
SVK
HUN
IRN
UKR
ROM
UKR
AZE
AUT
AUT
FIN
AUT
COL
UKR
HUN
ROM
AUT
IRN
CZE
IND
EGY
SGP
PER
BRA
MAR
EGY
UKR
SVN
COL
LTU
CHL
SGP
EST
COL
UKR
FIN
LTU
IDN
HUN
UKR
NLD
SGP
PER
PRT
JOR
GRC
UKR
EST
FIN
FIN
KAZ
CZE
SWE
ROM
BGR
PER
KAZ
DNK
BGR
PER
UKR
IRN
COL
UKR
HUN
MYS
LVA UKR CHL
CZE
FIN
OMN
KEN
MEX
IND
KAZ
POL
NLD
IRL
SWE
ROM
UKR
AZE
PRT
PER
ECU
COL
SGP
GRC
IRN
CHL
COL
LVA
DNK
IDN
UKR
MAR
IRN
PRT
PER
GRC
EGY
HUN
MAR
IRN
NLD
IRN
AUT
FIN
AZE
HUN
IDN
PRT
TUR
MYS
ECUIDN
CHL
ETH
SVK
IRL
ECU
NLD
FIN
PRT
KAZ
KOR
POL
SGP
AUT
JPN
SVK
CHL
CYP
FIN
ROM
BLX
UKR
SVN
POLSWE
JOR
DNK
ROM
DNK
POL
ISR
JOR
HUN
DNK
HUN
QAT
SVN
ETH
BGR
FIN
HUN
UKR
PRT
IRL
COL
SVN
OMN
JOR
COL
LTU
MAR
ECU
COL
CYP
IDN
AZE
POL
PER
ECU
SVK
UKR
ROM
SVK
MAR
TUR
SVN
NOR
BGR
MEX
ECU
PRT
MAR
IDN EGY
SVN
ROM
LTU
ECU
IRN
HUN
SGP
POL
MYS
COL
LVA
KAZ
SVN
ROM
PER
COL
HUN
COL
IND
OMN
EGY
JOR
LTU
PER
GRC
GRC
TJK
KAZ
KAZ
MAR
PRT
IRL
KGZ
MAR
PAN
LTU
CYP
EST
BRA
MAR
FIN
COL
ECU
KAZ
IRL
NLD
SVN
JOR
HUN
LTU
ECU
MAR
CYP
KAZ
CYP
SEN
EST
CYP
SVN
SVK
SVN
PER
SVN
URY
COL
DNK
KEN
SVN
IRN
SGP
KAZ
HUN
KAZ
BGR
COL
PER
ROM
CZE
INDSVK
KAZ
SVN
GRC
SGP
MAR
KAZ IDN IRLHUN
MYS
SVN
NOR
MYS
PRT
SVN NOR
PRT
EST
CYP
BRA
TJK SVK
GRC
ECU
URY
LTU
EST
ROM
MAR
KAZ
JOR
EGY
ECU
MYS
COL
FIN
NOR
SVK
LTU
KGZ
SVN
MAR
IRN
LVA
HUN
MYS
DNK
CYP
KAZ
COL
SEN
SVK
ROM
PAN
URY
ROM
URY
PER
SWE
BGR
MAR
PER
IND
LTU
CZE
DNK
UKR
ECU
LVA
BLX
KAZ
MYS
CZE
ETH
KOR
YEM
LTU
IRN
ITA
ROM
ESP
HUN
SVN
CYP
AUS
BGR
KWT
KAZ
PRT
LTU
IRL
KOR
BGR
KAZ
PAN
COL
UKR
EST
PANLVA
COL
SGP
SVN
PRT
DEU
BLX
SVK
HUNOMN AFGRUS
KAZ
KAZ
OMN
CYP
SEN
ROM
JOR
JOR
AUT
KAZ
COL
ARM
PER
ECU
CHL
TTO
FIN
OMN
SVK
SVK
EST
SVN
VNM
URY
PER
LTU
MYSJOR
SVK
MAC
FIN
HUN
LTU
OMN
YEM
NOR
MAR
ECU
PAN
HUN
IRN
KAZ
ECU
SVN
SVN
JOR
MEX
MAR
MAR
IRL
DNK
UKR
EST
GRC
OMN
EST
UKR
CZE
CHL
ECU
FRA
FIN
JOR
KAZ
MAR
PER
UKR
ETH
OMN
EST
PER
MAR
JOR
CHL
PER
BLX
JOR
LTU
SVK
OMN
BGR
AUT
BGR
PRT
SGP
MKD
SVK
PER
ROM
IRN
LVA
BGR
TTOSEN
CZE
SVK
OMN
ECU
MLT
OMN
SVN
SVN
PER
MLT
LVA
UKR
CAN
SVK
IDN
SEN
COL
BGR
IRN
ECU
AZE
CYP
SVN
COL
SVK
AZE
LTU
NOR
PER
SVN
AZE
KAZ
LTU
LTU
KAZ
CYP
EGY
PAN
LTU
BGR
LTU
MLT
IRL
AZE
ETH
LVA
EST
JOR
LVA
PER
MAR
YEM
MDA
OMN
NLD
IRN
JOR
CYP
ISL
CHL
URY
SVK
TTO
KAZ
ECU
SVN
EST
COL
PER
KAZ
CZE
BGR
SVN
PRT
UKR
SEN
LVACHL
OMN
CHL
JOR
MDG
LTU
ROM
EST
SVN
GRCGRC
ECU
LTU
OMN
OMN
SWE
COL
LTU
OMN
URY
LVA
TTO
COL
CYP
SVK
HUN
SWE
KEN
IRN
LVA
HUN
UKR
IND
BWA
NOR
KAZ
IRN
IDN
KAZ
MYS
ECU
MLT
NOR
MAR
LVA
LTU
JOR
MAR
BGR
CYP
ETH
EST
NOR
LTU
MYS OMN
LTU
ECU
URY
LTU
AZE
OMN
ECU
BRA
MAR
EST
TTO
BGR
MLT
UKR
GBR
LVA
JOR
HUN
COL
EGY
TTO
SVN
ETH
URY
ETH
IRN
MAR
ROM
SEN
KAZ
LVA
CYP
AZE
KAZ
MAR
LVA
SEN
KAZ
KAZ
SVK
LVA
MYS
IRL
JOR
KEN
UKR
KAZ
LTU
TJK
CYP
LTU
ETH
PER
LTU
PSE
BGR
ARM
KGZ
TJK
CYP
KOR
ECU
EST
LVA
TTO
OMN
LVA
IDN
MAR
LTU
SEN
PAN
LVA
OMN
TTO
CYP
JOR
PAN
COL
IRN
ARM
MLT
SVN
FIN
ETH
FIN
MYS
JOR
EST
JOR
JOR
URY
SGP
TUR
LVA
MDA
PAN
MLT
ECU
AZE
EGY
SEN
ECU
JOR
PAN
TTO
AZE
AFG
TTO
KEN
CYP
ETH
LTU
AZE
PER
LVAMDA
HUN
IRN
LVA
EST
SVN
SEN
LTU
ETH
PER
TTO
ETH
LVA
IRN
EST
ETH
OMN
BGR
MDA
LVA
MAR
MDA
NLD
CYP
LTU
GEO
LTU
JOR
TTO
BLX
LVA
LVA
SVK
LVA
AZE
SVN
MAR
PER
MLT
MKD
LTU
LTU
GEO
SVK IRNJORAZE
MUS
CYP
EST
JOR
MLT
ECU
ETH
KAZ
POL
MLT
LTU
ETH
OMN
JOR
GEO
URY
CYP
AZE
UKR
EST
MYS
DNK
LVA
ECU
ECU
SVN
ETH
ETH
CYP
AUT PER
PER
ETH
ALB
MLT
BGR
EST
MKD
ALB
SEN
LTU
MLT
EST
OMN
EST
MWI
URY
OMN
TTO
IDN
DNK
PAN
IRN
LVA
JOR
ECU
SEN
CYP
BLX
ECU
JOR
UKR
PAN
IRN
BGR
CYP
KAZ
LTU
MAR
URY
VNM
MKD
URY
LVA
ARM
COL
MAR
HUN
KAZ
URY
OMN
JOR
HUN
LVA
KAZ
GEO
ECU
LVA
ARM
NOR
LTU
URY
AZE
EST
AZE
AZE
LTU
PER
ETH KAZ
AZE
ETH
AZE
KGZ
IRN
ECU
TTO
KAZ
MKD
ETH
AZE
AFG
CYP
ETH
TTO
MDG
MDA
GEO
SVK
EST
AZE
HUN
MAR
ECU
CHL
EST
ECU
MKD
ECU
CZE
PER
ECU
MDA
PSE
SEN
SVN
EST
MDA
MDA
SVK
IRN
SWE
PAN
PSE
LVA
JOR
YEM
MDA
KAZ
AZE
OMN
MAR
EST
PAN
MLT
IRL
GEO
ETH
UKR
COL
MKD
PAN
OMN
SVN
URY
PER
URY
URY
MWI
ETH
MDA
CYP
ALB
AZE
GEO
GEO
MWI
EGY
AZE
SVN
TTO
MAR
SEN
MYS
JOR
EGY
EST
JOR
OMN
ECU
TTO
URY
AZE
GEO
CYP
AZE
IDN
IRN
CYP
EST
GEO
SEN
MKD
MKD
ETH
OMN
MLT
HUN
SVK
KGZ
MLT
ARM
NOR
FIN
MDA
UKR
KGZ
OMNERI
MLT
MWIURY
JOR
TJK
KAZ
GEO
OMN
PER
GRC
COL
MWI
MWI
ETH
MLT
LTU
TTO
GEO
AZE
CYP
TTO
ARM
PER
PER
AZE
MLT
OMN
PER
KGZ
CYP
OMN
DNK
JOROMN
SVN
SEN
MKD
TTO
ARM
MKD
IDN
ECU
ECU
MKD
ETH
MWI
LTU
MDA
GEO
JOR
CYP CYP
IDN
MLT
LTU
MLT
ETH
MLT
BGRETH
KAZ
CYP
ARM
PSE
ECU
JOR
AZE
OMN
HUN
SEN
ETHAZE
PER
ARM
OMN
KGZ
GEO
ARM
EST
URY
AZE
MDA
IND LVA
IDN
UKR
KGZ
MLT
ECU
MAR
MLT
AZE
ETH
MDA
ETH
SEN
ECU
MKD
ARM
TTO
MWI
GEO
UKR
ETH
IND
TJK
ARM
CYP
PRT
JOR
LVA
LTUJORNOR
LVA
MYS
KGZ
MDA
NOR
SWE
KGZ
SEN
KGZ
ECU
ROM
OMNMKD
MLT
KEN
ARM
SEN
MLT
MLT
NOR
ERI
MDG
JOR
MDG ETH
PRT
EST
SEN
LTU
SENGEO
TJK
KGZ
AZE
AZE
MKD
ECU
ARMMDAETH
ECU
ISL
ARM
GEO
OMN
TTO
CYP
MKD
MWI
ARM
EGY
LTUAZE
GEO
SVK
KAZ
ERI
MKD
KGZ
MLT
KGZ
SEN
UKR
SEN
KGZ
MLT
OMN
EGY
MDA
GEO
ERI
OMN
GEO
SEN
TJKTUR
KGZ
LVA
TTO
SEN
ERI
MDA
ARM
ETH
MWI
MWI
KAZ
URY
KGZTJK
GEO
SEN
MNG
MKD
MDA
PSE
JOR MDA
MKD
MDA
MDA
MKD
MDA
MLT
KGZ
ERI
MDA
ETH
ARM
ETH
TJK
OMN
ERI
SEN
EST
GEO
GEO
TJK
TJK
MLT
ETH
KAZ
TJK
KAZ
GEO
KGZ
KGZ
ARM
TTO
MDA
KGZ
AZE
MKD
CYP
KGZ
MDA
MWI
AZE
AZE
JORAZELTU
SVN
GEO
MLT
MLT KGZ
MKD
ARM
PER
ECU
AZE
SEN
CYP
MDA PAN
GEO
OMN
MDG
MDA
AFG
MDAARM
PAN
TJK
BGR
JOR
GEO
AZE
ARM
KGZ
ARM
ARM
EST
AZE
KGZ
MLT
MDG
MWI
TTO
HUN
TTO
KGZ
MWI
CZE
AZE
PSE
MWI
KGZ
ARM
IDN
TJK
MNG
LTU
AUT
MNG
PER
TJK
HUN
BGR
ARM
ERI
OMN
KGZ
ARM
AZE
ARM
KGZKGZ
TTO
PSE
TJK
MWI
EST
PER
MWI
BGR
ETH
ARM
GEOSEN
ERI
JOR
MDA
KGZMWI
ETH
MDA MWIERIKAZ DNK
ARM
KGZ
MWI
ARM
MDAARM
ERI
KAZ
LTU
TJK
ERI KGZ
GEO
ETH
MWI
KGZLTU
JOR ERI
ERI
BGR
MAR
LTU
ARM
KGZ
MDA
MDA
TJK
LVA
ERI
MWI
ETH
ETH
KGZ
AZE
ERI
ERI
KGZ
KGZ
OMN
MARCYP MLT
CYP
ARM
ERI MUS
AZE ERIERI
PAN
PRT
KGZ
SEN
TJK GEO GEO
KGZ
EST
LVA ARM
MDG
TJK
SEN SVN
TJK
ARMSENIRL
LVA
ERI
MWI
ETH
KGZ
KGZERI MKD
SVK
ERI
KGZ
ARM
KGZ
IRNARM
KGZ
ERI
ERIGEO
JOR
AZE
KAZMWI
ERI
LTUAZE
MDG MLT
LVA
CYP
OMN ERI
AZEKGZ
ERI ERI
GEO
ARM
ERIGEO
ARM
ERI
KGZ
JOR
ERI
URY MDA
ARM
PSELVA ARM
ERI
ETH PSE ECU
TJK
MAR
ERI
ARM KGZ
AZE
KGZ
ARM
AZE
ERI
ARM KAZ
OMN
ERI
LTUERI
ECU
AZEOMN
KGZ
AZE
ERI
MDA
ERI
ERI
KAZ
CYP
ERI
PSEERI
KGZ
MDA
ERI
URY ERI
ECU
ERI
ECU JOR
GEO
ERI
KGZERI
OMN
ERI
ARM MLT
MLT
EST
ETH
MLT ARM
ECU ERI
CYP
ETH KGZ
LVA
MLT
ETH
AZE
ERI ERI
0
MAC
-4
-2
0
2
Log of Apparent Consumption Volatility (sd) - 3 digit
Note: 82 countries, 62 sectors, 2005.
Under demand or price uncertainty, risk-averse firms have to manage their risk exposure. Indeed, there exists some delay between the time an export decision is made and the
time the corresponding output reaches the market. Hence, during this delay, the foreign
demand or market price can change so that there is an uncertainty that the decision-maker
has to handle. The literature on production decision under risk shows that an increase
in risk (as measured by a higher volatility) has a negative effect on output size when the
decision maker is averse to risk.
As a result, if firms are risk-averse, they should export less to a country with more
volatile demand, ceteris paribus. In other words, a country with higher demand volatil2
ity should import less. Using the same database of world sectoral-level data, we find
prima facie evidence of a negative relationship between demand volatility and imports,
as depicted in Figure (2).1
CHNCHN
CHN
CHN
DEU
DEU
DEU
DEU
CHN
DEU CHN
BLX
GBR
BLX
CHN
DEU
BLX FRA DEU
DEU
CHN
DEU
GBR
DEU
FRAFRA
FRA
CHN
GBR
ITA
CHN
GBR
DEU
DEU
BLX
GBR
DEU
BLX
BLX
CAN
DEU
CHN
ITA
FRA
BLX
DEU
CAN
DEU
DEU
CAN
DEU
GBR
BLX
GBR
DEU
DEU
CHN
GBR
BLX
DEU
FRA
ITA
DEU
ESP
DEU
GBR
DEU
BLX
CHN
DEU
ITA
FRA
FRA FRA BLX
CAN
ITA
CHN
DEU
DEU
ITA
DEU
CHN
CHN
GBR
FRA
BLX
CHN
BLX
ITA
FRA
GBR
DEU
GBR
CHN
DEU
ESP
ITA
ITA
DEU
DEU
FRA
CAN
GBR
ITA
DEU
ITA
DEU
CHN
DEU
GBR
ESP
CHN
ITA
CAN
GBR
FRA
DEU
ESP
DEU
ITA
DEU
FRA
DEU
DEU
JPN
GBR
BLX
DEU
GBR
IND
DEU
ESP
JPN
DEU
FRA
ESP
GBR
CAN
CHN
FRA
GBR
CHN
JPN
DEU
BLX
FRA
GBR
GBR
KOR
DEU
JPN
FRA
GBR
JPN
ITA
FRA
GBR
CHN
CAN
DEU
DEU
JPN
JPN
BLX
CHN
GBR
FRA
BLX
JPN
KOR
ITA
JPN
JPN
DEU
FRA
FRA
CHN
JPN
CHN
DEU
DEU
ITA DEU
GBR
CHN
KOR
DEU
DEU
DEU
CHNCHN
JPN
JPN
BLX
CAN
GBR
ITA
GBR
FRA
DEU
ITA
CHN
CHN
JPN
GBR
JPN
JPN
FRA
ESP
FRA
DEU
ITA
GBR
GBR
JPN
DEU
CHN
FRA
FRA
IND
JPN
JPN
CHN
ESP
DEU
ITA
FRA
DEU
CAN
CAN
DEU
DEU
CAN
CHN
ITA
JPN
CAN
ITA
DEU
KOR
GBR
DEU
CAN
ITA
GBR
ITA
DEU
DEU
FRA
FRA
CHN
JPN
DEU
JPN
GBR
FRA
JPN
JPN
ITA
FRA
JPN
ITA
KOR
DEU
FRA
FRA
IND
FRA
CHN
FRA
CAN
JPN
DEU
DEU
GBR
CHN
KOR
GBR
DEU
ITA
CANCHN
ITA
ESP
FRA
DEU
GBR
CAN
DEU
GBR
JPN
JPN
FRA
CAN
CHN
FRA
CAN
CAN
DEU
CAN
FRA
CHN
DEU
ESP
GBR
DEU
GBR
AUS
CHN
FRA
JPN
JPN
IDN BLX
CAN
KOR
FRA
DEU
FRA
GBR
DEU
GBR
FRA
FRA
ESP
DEU
DEU
BLX
DEU
DEU
GBR
CHN
CHN
CAN
DEU
DEU
DEU
DEU
ESP
DEU
CAN
KOR
GBR
CAN
CHN
DEU
DEU
GBR
GBR
DEU
FRA
ESP
KOR
DEU
ITA
CHN
ITA
GBR
AUS
BLX
FRA
KOR
BLX
GBR
GBR
ESP
ESP
FRA
DEU
ESP
DEU
DEU
FRA
CAN
GBR
DEU
GBR
JPN
FRA
ITA
FRA
DEU
CHN
CHN
JPN CAN DEU
IND
DEU
BLX
ESP
ITA
DEUJPN
KOR
ESP
FDEU
RA
CAN
DEU
FRA
GBR
JPN
ESP
CHN
GBR
CAN
ITA
DEU
JPN
ESP
BLX
DEU
KOR
DEU
BLX
GBR
FRA
DEU
GBR
ITA
ITA
GBR
DEU
ITA
FRA
GBR
DEU
JPN
JPN
CHN
DEU
FRA
DEU
GBR
ESP
DEU
CAN
G
BR
CHN
JPN
FRA
BLX
FRA
KOR
DEU
FRA
ITA BLX
KOR
ESP
JPN
JPN
GBR
BLX
FRA
FRA
CAN
K
OR
FRA
ESP
FRA
FRA
GBR
ESP
FRA
GBR
GBR
DEU
DEU
ESP
CHN
CHN
CHN
ESP
ITA
JPN
FRA
ESP
F
RA
ITA
ESP
ITA
CAN
DEU
CHN
JPN
JPN
DEU
GBR
CAN
FRA
GBR
CHN
JPN
FRA
GBR
CHN
KOR
CAN
DEU
FRA
DEU
KOR
JPN
DEU JPN
CHN
DEU
FRA
FRA
DEU
DEU
DEU
FRA
ITA
DEU
DEU
GBR
ITA
FRA
GBR
IND
AUS
FRA
CAN
GBR
ESP
DEU
CHN
JPN
CHN
JPN
GBR
ITA
CAN
FRA
FRA
AUS
AUS
GBR
JPN
DEU
JPN
DEU
JPN
DEUJPN
JPN
DEU
ESP
GBR
ITA
CAN
JPN
DEU
CHN
CHN
ESP
FRA
GBR
CHN
KOR
JPN
CHN
AUS
JPN
FRA
DEU
DEU
CAN
DEU
ESP
GBR
FRA
ITA
FRA
FRA
CHN
GBR
FRA
GBR
JPN
FRA
CAN
IND
KOR
GBR
CAN
JPN
GBR
ESP
GBR
CHN
GBR
ESP
IRL
KOR
DEU
CAN
DEU
JPN
JPN
GBR
C
AN
CAN
IND
FRA
GBR
DEU
BLX
GBR
JPN
JPN
GBR
KOR
JPN
FRA
DEU
JPN
IDN
JPN
JPN
GBRGBR
ITA
GBR
ITA
FRA
JPN
ESP
FRA
GBR
GBR
FRA
ITA
IRL
DEU
ESP
GBR
BLX
JPN
GBR
CAN
BLX
DEU
JPN
GBR
IDN
DEU
CHN
FRA
DEU
GBR
BLX
ESP
IND
DEU
KOR
GBR
IDN
ITA
AUS
GBR
DEU
DEU
ESP
DEU
ESP
KOR
DEU
ESP
CHN
FRA
FRA
IND
ESP
BLX
CAN
CAN
DEU
BLX
ITA
GBR
GBR
GBR
GBR
DEU
KOR
DEU
DEU
JPN
AUS
CHN
GBR
KOR
CAN
DEU
KOR
DEU
ITA
AUT
DEU
GBR
DEU
CHN
CHN
IND
GBR
IRL
FRA
FRA
AUT
CAN
CAN
GBR
ESP
ESP
ITA
CHN
GBR
FRA
AUS
DEU
JPN
CAN
DEU
FRA
GBR
GBR
DEU
DEU
ITA
CAN
JPN
JPN
CAN
GBR
AUS
ITA
ITA
ITA
JPN
GBR
KOR
IDN
FRA
FRA
ESP
KOR
IND
CAN
DEU
JPN
DEU
CAN
IND
FRA
ITA
FRA
IDN
ITA
BLX
DEU
DEUDEU
BLX
GBR
GBR
GBR
FRA
FRA
CAN
GBR
JPN
BLX
ESP
IRL
GBR
BLX
CAN
ESP
ITA
ESP
BLX
ITA
BLX
FRA
CHN
INDGBR
JPN
AUT
ITA
IRL
DEU
DEU
ITA
CHN
ITA
FRA
AUT
ESP
GBR
FRA
DEU
ITA
BLX
W
FRA
FRA
GBR
DEU
GBR
KOR
FRA
ITA
ITA
GBR
AUT
IND
GBR
CHN
JPN
CAN
KOR
ESP
FRA
BLX
CHN
ITA
ITA
DEU
AUS
F
RA
AUS
JPN
DEU
CAN
CAN
DEU
GBR
ESP
GBR
GBR
BLX
FRA
ESP
BLX
ITA
IRL
CAN
AUS
FRA
AUT
JPN
CAN
GBR
CAN
KOR
ITA
CAN
DEU
ESP
DEU
GBR
BLX
GBR
IRL
JPN
W
GBR
DEU
ITA
GBR
ITA
FRA
FRA
JPN
JPN
JPN
DEU
FRA
ITA
FRA
W
IND
ESP
CAN
DEU
KOR
CHN
DEU
JPN
DEU
CHN
CAN
FRA
ESP
ESP
GBR
ITA
IND
CAN
FRA
ESP
FRA
GBR
GBR
AUTIDNKOR
JPN
GBR
CHN
BLX
AUT
DEU
BLX
ITA
ITA
KOR
CHE
GBR
DEU
FRA
ESP
AUT
AUT
FRA
CHN
GBR
IRL
CHN
CAN
JPN
BLX
GBR
CHN
ITA
JPN
ITAITA
AUS
ESP
DEU
DEU
FRA
DEU
GBR
ITA
FRA
JPN
GBR
AUT
ITA
FRA
DEU
JPN
GBR
DEU
FRA
JPN
GBR
BLX
GBR
F
AUS
RA
DEU
CHN
CAN
JPN
JPN
DEU
JPN
ITA
ITA
ESP
CAN
GBR
GBR
FRA
ITA
FRA
ITA
KOR
AUS
KOR
ESP
CHN
CAN
CHN
ESP
DEU
FRA
CAN
ITA
DEU
DEU
ITA
ESP
KOR
W
ESP
ESP
CHN
GBR
GBR
IRL
IND
CAN
DEU
ITA
CAN
DEU
GBR
GBR
IAUT
TA
FRA
ITA
ITA
IDN
KOR
CHN
ITA
JPN
JPN
DEU
IRN
W
KOR
FRA
IND
DEU
JPN
FRA
GBR
W
FRA
ITA
AUT
IND
CAN
AUS
JPN
BLX
DEU
ESP
ITA
ESP
BLX
CHN
W
BLX
GBR
FRA
IND FRA
CHN
DEU
GBR
FRA
KOR
KOR
FRA
W
AUS
CAN
ITA
FRA
GBR
IRN
BLX
KOR
ITA
CAN
DEU
IND
W
AUS
IDN
KOR
FRA
FRA
KOR
ESP
BLX
ITA
JPN
AUT
KOR
CHN
AUT
JPN
ESP
DEU
FRA
FRA
CAN
DEU
CAN
GBR
KOR
CAN
CHN
CAN
CAN
FRA
FRA
ESP
GBR
FRA
BLX
ESP
ITA
GBR
DEU
AUS
GBR
GBR
DEU
CAN
W
ITA
ESP
ITA
ESP
ITA
JPN
GBR
ESP
GBR
FRA
DEU
DEU
DEU
DEU
AUT
FRA
CHN
JPN
BLX
JPN
GRC
IRL AUS
GBR
CAN
GBR
CAN
KOR
CHN
W
BLX
JPN
AUS
ESP
IND
ESP
CHN
ESP
KOR
ESP
BLX
ESP
ESP
CAN
FRA
FRA
GBR
AUT
ESP
CHN
FRA
BLX
DEU
CHN
DEU
DEU
AUS
KOR
ITA
FRA
CAN
IND
IND
AUS
DEU
AUS
ESP
BLX
DEU
FRA
ITA
CZE
GBR
GBR
KOR
BLX
JPN
JPN
GBR
CHN
ESP
CAN
ITA
AUS
KOR
ITA
ITA
GBR
ESP
CHN
AUT
DEU
FRA
CAN
FRA
DEU
FRA
GBR
DEU
BLX
KOR
AUT
GBR
BLX
FIN
DEU
ITA
JPN
JPN
ESP
JESP
PN
W
IDN
DEU
DEU
IRN
JPN
AUS
GBR
JPN
BLX
KOR
GBR
KOR
ESP
JPN
W
BLX
W
AUT
DEU
GBR
FRA
CAN
JPN
ITA
ESP
BLX
FRA
FRA
IND
AUS
ESP
BLX
CHN
DEU
IDN
IDN
CAN
ITA
CAN
CHE
AUS
ITA
ITA
GBR
JPN
CAN
AUT
CAN
ESP
AUT
HUN
FRA
CAN
GBR
GBR
FRA
AUS
DEU
AUT
IRL
GBR
CAN
BRA
BLX
JPN
BLX
JPN
BLX
GBR
FRA
CAN
AUS
BLX
ESP
DNK
DEU
JPN
W
W IND W
ESP
FRA
GBR
AUT
FRA
FRA
ITA
ITA
BLX
CAN
FRA
FRA
W
DEU
IIRN
DN
CAN
JPN
ESP
DEU
JPN
HUN
CAN
ESP
BLX
FRA
FRA
DEU
IND
ITA
IND
IDN
GBR
KOR
DEU
JPN
CZE
AUT
ESP
CAN
GBR
ESP
FRA
AUS
W
FRA
BLX
DEU
KOR
AUS
BLX
KOR
ITA
JPN
BLX
CHN
KOR
W WKOR
CAN
BLX
GBR
DEU
HUN
ESP
GBR
ESP
HUN
KOR
JPN
ITA
GBR
CZE
CAN
AUT
GBR
CAN
CAN
JPN
ESP
CHE
IND
DEU
FRA
FRA
W
CAN
AUS
CAN
CAN
IND
ITA
BLX
AUS
JPN
IDN
GBR
GRC
ESP
CHE
FRA
ESP
ITA
IND
DEU
JPN
FRA
FIN
W
DEU
IND
FRAFRA
DEU
CAN
BLX
ESP
KOR
FRA
FRA
DEU
FRA
JPN
GBR
KOR
BLX
DEU
AUT
W
HUN
CAN
FRA
AUS
GBR
FIN
BLX
JPN
CHE
ESP
ITA
GBR
CHN
HUN
BLX
DEU
IND
ITAITA
AUT
CAN
ITA
DEU
KOR
BLX
GRC
KOR
HUNCAN
IND
JPN
FRA
BLX
GBR
DEU
ITA
GBR
CAN
GBR
KOR
W
CAN
GBR
DNK
JPN
ITA
BLX
ITA
ITA
JPN
GBR
IRN
CAN
KOR
FRA
GBR
DEU
BLX
GBR
ITA
KOR
JPN
JPN
FRA
HUN
GBR
CAN
ESP
JPN
AUT
KOR
CZE
GBR
JPN
HUN
AUT
FRA
CHN
GBR
ITA
FRA
ESP
ITA
CAN
CHL
BLX
AUT
DEU
GBR
BLX
KOR
FRA
FRA
CAN
ESP
GBR AUS
ESP
IRLAUSIDN KOR
DEU
JPN
W
GBR
HUN
ESP
HUN
DEU
CAN
ITA
KOR
AUT
KOR
BLX
ESP
DEU
BLX
ITA
JPN
GBRAUS
CAN
FRA
CAN
W
GBR
BLX
AUT
W
IRN
GBR
ITA
ITA
GBR
DEU
ESP
FRA
AUS
W
FRA
DEU
ESP
GBR
ESP
AUS
FRA
ITA
DEU
IND
DEU
HUN
DEU
GBR
CAN
ITA
CAN
KOR
ITA
BLX
ESP
BLX
ITA
JPN
FRA
KOR
ITA
JPN
ITA
ITA
FRA
FRA
ITA
ITA
DEU
ITA
CAN
GBR
IRN
GBR
IDN
CAN
ESP
KOR
ITA
IDN
FRA
FRA
CHN
ITA
FRA
GRC
GBR
JPN
AUT
HUN
GBR
FRA
ITA
CHN
CAN
DEU
AUS
DNK
AUS
CZE
IND
GBR
AUS
ITA
DNK
CAN
JPN
W
CZE
FIN
CAN
DEU
AUT
ESP
CAN
ESP
ESP
GBR
ITA
DEU
BLX
ITA
IND
BLX
IFRA
TA
ESP
INDKOR
FRA
ITA
ESP
DEU
DEU
DEU
AUT
ESP
ITA
CAN
ESP
CAN
ESP
IND
GBR
FRA
DEU
JPN
ITA
ESP
GBR
DEU
FRA
DEU
KOR
GBR
W
GBR
ESP
JPN
JPN
JPN
AUT
FRA
ESP
DEU
BRA
JPN
FRA
WCZE
ITA
DEU
FRA
IDN
KOR
ITA
FIN
KOR
ESP
KOR
JPN
GBR
ESP
W
DEU
ITA
FRA
DEU
BRA
CAN
ESP
FIN
AUS
W
HUN
ESP
IRN
KOR
ITA
BLX
DNK
IRL
DEU
GBR
W
AUS
DEU
ITA
W
DEU
ESP
DNK
CHN
ESP
GBR
W
CAN
ITA
ESP
FRA
JPN
DEU
AUT
DEU
JPN
HUN
CAN
JPN
AUS
JPN
IDEU
ND
GRC
W
DEU
DEU
AUT
FRA
FRA
CHN
DNK
ITA
DNK
GBR
GBR
CAN
CAN
BRA
W
ITA
DEU
CAN
W
GBR
CAN
CAN
IND
FRA
CAN
HUN
ITAITA
CAN
CAN
ITA
KOR
GBR
GBR
DEU
JPN
FRA
W
ITA
HUN
BLX
BRA
BLX
JPN
CAN
DEU
BLX
DEU
CAN
JPN
AUT
DEU
KOR
JPN
CHN
FRA
CAN
FRA
GBR
IDN
CZE
CAN
JPN
AUS
DNK
DEU
JPN
ITA
IND
ESP
ESP
BLX
ESP
FRA
ESP
CHN
ITA
BLX
FIN
CAN
DEU
DNK
COL
HUN
CZE
CAN
ESP
ITA
DEU
ITA
IND
ITA
FIN
JPN
CHL
ITA
GBR
HUN
W
HUN
DEU
FRA
ESP
IND
BLX
IRN
ESP
GBR
CAN
IRL
ITA
W
GBR
IRL
JPN
JPN
JPN
IRN
AUT
JPN
DEU
FRA
GBR
DEU
ITA
ITA
DNK
DEU
ESP
IND
KOR
JPN
BLX
AUT
DEU
BLX
GBR
CAN
GBR
IND
GBR
CAN
CAN
IRN
AUT
CAN
CAN
CAN
ITA
ITA
AUT
JPN
FRA
JPN
ITA
CAN
ITA
AUT
JPN
FRA
ITA
JPN
JPN
DEU
JPN
FRA
AUT
JPN
FRA
JPN
DEU
DEU
HUN
ESP
CAN
ITA
IRL
CAN
AUS
CAN
BLX
CHN
IND
AUT
KOR
JPN
JPN
AUS
KAZ
JPN
GBR
DEU
HUN
BLX
ITA
DEU
ESP
DEU
JPN
CZE
BLX
JPN
BLX
HUN
DNK
JPN
W
CZE
DEU
AUS
BLX
KOR
CAN
IDN
KOR
ITA
ESP
W
FRA
DEU
DEU
GBR
ITA
ITA
FIN
GBR
ESPESP
GBR
BLX
CAN
ESP
IDN
ESP
CAN
JPN
FRA
KOR
BLX
CZE
DEU
GBR
ITA
BLX
ITA
ITA
KOR
IND
W
AUT
JPN
CAN
CAN
DEU
BLX
FRA
CZE
W
KOR
IDN
BLX
FRA
ITA
DEU
ITA
DEU
FRA
ESP
CAN
FRA
ITA
HUN
DNK
IDN
ITA
HUN
DEU
W
JPN
CAN
ITA
AUT
AUT
CAN
BRA
DEU
CAN
DEU
IRL
BLX
JPN
IRN
KOR
GBR
ITA
IRN
IDN
IRL
GBR
AUS
CAN
AUT
DEU
IND
CAN
BLX
FRA
ITA
JPN
CZE
BRA
JPN
W
FIN
FIN
DEU
JPN
ITA
IRN
JPN
CAN
KOR
DEU
MAR
CAN
GBR
ESP
IRN
HUN
ESP
CAN
ITA
BRA
BLX
DNK
FRA
KWT
CAN
AUT
HUN
AUT
DEU
FIN
ITA
CZE
FRA
GBR
FRA
AUT
ESP
JPN
JPN
AUT
CHN
ITA
ITA
JPN
BLX
IDN
CAN
JPN
JPN
IND
ITA
JPN
FRA
GBR
FIN
CHN
GBR
AUT
GBR
ESP
ITA
JPN
GBR
AUT
GBR
ITA
JPN
JPN
BLX
GBR
FRA
ESP
FRA
IRL
CAN
IND
AUS
W
JPN
ITA
CAN
ESP
CAN
GBR
HUN
BLX
DNK
AUT
FRA
COL
W
ESP
JPN
KOR
BLX
DNK
HUNIRL
W
AUT
FRA
CAN
JPN
CAN
W
KOR
ESP
DNK
FRA
IDN
JPN
JPN
ESP
AUT
GBR
JBRA
PN
CAN
BLX
GRC
FRA
AUT
DNK
ESP
AUS
DNK
DEU
JPN
HUN
FRA
DEU
KOR
BRA
GRC
HUN
ITA
CHN
CZE
ESP
ITA
DNK
GBR
ITA
CAN
IDN
FIN
HUN
BLX
DEU
BLX
GBR
DNK
ESP
ITA
IRL
BLX
DEU
ESP
IRN
GBR
KOR
CZE
CAN
AUT
AUT
DEU
W
CHL
HUN
GBR
ESP
KOR
GBR
JPN
IDN
CZE
JPN
AUS
ESP
FRA
ITA
CAN
IDN
HUN
BRA
CAN
AUS
FRA
BRA
IDN
ESP
IDN
GBR
JPN
ITA
GBR
IRN
CYP
GBR
ITA
GBR
DEU
IRN
CAN
JPN
CZE
AUT
FIN
JPN
FRA
GBR
CAN
AUT
AUS
CZE
DEU
AUT
IND
IDN
GBR
AUT
GBR
FRA
ESP
FRA
BLX
W
JPN
IDN
JPN
CAN
FRA
IND
ITA
CHN
ESP
KOR
BLX
ITA
CAN
BLX
ITA
BLX
IDN
CZE FRA
ESP
HUN
DNK
JPN
AUT
AUS
HUN
CHL
FRA
FIN
DEU
GBR
CAN
ISR
BLX
IRN
W
W
JPN
ESP
BRA
AUS
W
JPN
ITA
AUT
JPN
CAN
KWT
GBR
AUT
KOR
DNK
ITA
ITA
DEU
ITA
ESP
HUN
DNK
JPN
FRA
BLX
BLX
HUN
BRA
CHN
W
ITA
IND KOR
GBR
W
JPN
FRA
W
DEU
CAN
ITA
ESP
CHN
AUT
JPN
DEU
ITA
ESP
W
BLX
AUS
FRA
BLX
GBR
JPN
COL
KWT KWT
DNK
AUS
AUS
DEU
DEU
JPN
ESP
GBR
GBR
DNK
IRL
CAN
DNK
AUS
BLX
AUT
IND
CAN
JPN
ITA
CAN
BLX
ESP
GBR
FRA
HUN
ITA
GBR
AUT
FRA
AUT
AUT
GBR
AUS
KOR
BRA
BRA
CAN
W
CAN
GBR
GBR
BLX
AUS
AUT
ESP
JPN
CHN
ESP
JPN
ITA
IND
BLX
JPN
JPN
AUT
ESP
GBR
FIN
W
KOR
GBR
IDN
CHN
ESP
W
FRA
GBR
KOR
CZE
JPN
JPN
BLX
JPN
AUS
GBR
BLX
IRN
AUS
CAN
DEU
CHN
COL
BRA
FRA
W
ITA
JPN
KOR
CHN
CZE
ITA
IND
GBR
HUN
FRA
IRN
DNK
AUS
FRA
ITA
ITA
CZE
MAR
AUT
FRA
CAN
GBR
KOR
BLX
ISR
CAN
ITA
CAN
AUS
IRN
GRC
IDN
AUT
ESP
GBR
ITAITA
DNK
DEU
ESP
ITA
CZE
ITA
KOR
CAN
CAN
AUS
FIN
JPN
ITA
ESP
FRA
AUT
ESP
DEU
KOR
DEU
DEU
CHN
AUT
ESP
DEU
ESP
AUS
CAN
DEU
JPN
W
CAN
GBR
JPN
ITA
CAN
BLX
LTU
FIN
W
GBR
AUS
DEU
FRA
BLX
CAN
BLX
AUT
FRA
DNK
AUS
CZE
GBR
ESP
GBR
W
CAN
CAN
AUS
DEU
BLX
CAN
BRA
CAN
HUN
CAN
GBR
KOR
ESP
COL
AUS
KOR
JPN
JPN
GBR
JPN
W
ITA
JPN
FRA
ESP
ITA
ESP
FRA
ITA
DNK
KAZ
CAN
FIN
GRC
GBR
IDN
FIN
IDN
GBR
FRA
COL
BLX
CAN
IRN
CZE
HUN
KOR
ITA
FRA
KOR
ESP
HUN
ESP
GBR
W
BLX
BRA
DEU
CZE
ESP
FRA
DNK
GBR
ITA
COL
GRC
BLX
GBR
W
FRA
ITA
AUS
FRA
IRL
GBR
IDN
DEU
ITA
FRA
FRA
DEU
AUT
CHN
CAN
DNK
AUS
FIN
ESP
BRA
JPN
JPN
HUN
BRA
IDN
W
DEU
ITA
ITA
ESP
ITA
HUN
CAN
BLX
HUN
AUS
IRN
IRN
CAN
DNK
GBR
FRA
CZE
CAN
ESP
IRL
ITA
AUS
FRA
CHN
GBR
ITA
FIN
FRA
JPN
ISR
GBR
W
GBR
AUT
AUS
BLX
IND
BLX
ITA
ITA
AUS
JPN
CZE
AUT
DEU
DEU
AUT
FRA
FIN
JPN
BLX
IND
GRC
ESP
DNK
ESP
JPN
CHN
FRA
KOR
FRA
IRL
DEU
W
CHN
FRA
HUN
HUN
ESP
HUN
BLX
IRN
JPN
FRA
GBR
FIN
AUT
ITA
IRL
JPN
DEU
CHN
JPN
HUN
BLX
FRA
IRL
ITA
BLX
ESP
CAN
KOR
IDN
KAZ
BLX
AUS
IRN
FRA
COL
KOR
GRC
CAN
ESP
IND
JPN
BLX
AUS
KOR
FRA
ESP
AUS
ESP
AUT
IND
DNK
BLX
FRA
KOR
AUS
ECU
COL
KOR
CHN
DNK
BLX
DEU
FRA
ESP
GBR
W
FRA
ITA
ESP
CAN
KOR
AUS
CZE
HUN
DNK
BRA
W
ITA
BLX
FRA
JPN
ITA
IRL
CHN
ESP
AUS
FRA
ESP
ITA
HUN
DEU
FRA
DNK
DEU
ESP
AUT
A
UT
DNK
FRA
CZE
FRA
BLX
ESP
GBR
FIN
IRL
KOR KWT KWT
FIN
BLX
IND
JPN
AUT
IND
IRN
IND
FRA
KOR
FRA
AUT
CHN
GRC
CHN
IND
LTU
IRN
JPN
DNK
AUS
CAN
AUT
GBR
GBR
CZE
GRC
IRL
CAN
FIN
AUT
CAN
KOR
IND
FRA
ESP
ESP
CAN
ESP
CHN
CAN
W
BRA
BRA
MAR
ITA
BLX
KAZ
FIN
IDN
IND
CZE
W
KOR
BLX
CAN
GRC
DEU
ESP
IRLIND
BRA
BLX
HUN
ESP
ITA
FIN
ITA
COL
GBR
JPN
ESP
IRL
W
IRN
DEU
AUT
IRL
AUT
GBR
DEU
IDN
HUN
GBR
AUT
JPN
FRA
JPN
GBR
GBR
DNK
ITA
IND
FRA
JPN
GBR
ITA
KOR
KOR
DEU
FRA
KOR
GBR
BRA
JPN
ESP
FRA
CAN
DEU
BLX
CHE
HUN
DNK
ITA
FRA
GRC
JPN
FRA
DEU
DNK
DNK
BLX
ITA
IDN
CHN
BRA
DEU
IND
GBR
GBR
ESP
FRA
CHN
JPN
JPN
CZE
GBR
CZE
KOR
BLX
IDN
GBR
DEU
AUT
IRN
HUN
DNK
CAN
DEU
W
DEU
AUS
BRA
AUS
GBR
CAN
ESP
CHN
GBR
IDN
DEU
GBR
JPN
W
W
GBR
CHE
AUS
W
GBRGBR
CAN
W
ITA
IND
JPN
AUT
W
IRN
IDN
JPN
KOR
GBR
KOR
FRA
W
W
BRA
FRA
JPN
EST
GBR
GBR
ITA
GBR
ESP
AUS
KOR
W
AUT
BLX
DNK
HUN
ITA
BLX
FIN
CAN
HUN
FRA
ESP
FRA
BRA
CHN
GBR
W
HUN
AUS
CAN
BRA
ITA
KOR
AUS
FRA
FIN
BLX
FRA
AUS
ESP
HUN
FRA
ITA
CHN
ESP
BLX
ITA
IRN
BLX
ESP
KOR
FRA
W
ISR
GRC
ICAN
TA
KOR
COL
ISR
JPN
W
IND
JPN
FRA
BLX
CHL
BRA
ESP
FIN
ITA
KOR
ITA
AUT
AUS
CAN
KAZ
HUN
IRN
KOR
W
AUS
IDN
AUT
JPN
DNK
ESP
AUT
DNK
GBR
W
AUS
JPN
GBR
IDN
AUT
FRA
ITA
DEU
COL
FIN
BRA
KOR
W
AUS
FIN
JPN
IRN
ESP
AUT
ISR
DEU
GBR
BLX
DEU
AUT
DNK
ESP
AUT
CAN
HUN
JPN
FIN
IRN
ITA
IND
CHN
BLX
HUN
CYP
IND
DNK
IRL
W
IRN
GRC
CHN
DNK
CHN
IDN
JPN
JPN
GBR
ESP
HUN
ITA
HUN
CHN
BLX
AUT
GBR
DNK
DNK
JPN
ITA
GBR
BLX
GRC
CHL
ITA
HUN
HUN
W
AUS
KOR
ITAAUTAUT
JPN
FIN
DEU
ESP
GBR
COL
GBR
FRA
COL
KOR
GRC
ESP
FRA
W
BLX
AUS
CAN
JPN
CAN
DEU
W
W
CAN
DNK
BRA
HUN
KOR
ECU
DNK
IRL
AUS
ESP
FIN
IND
FIN
BLX
ITA
CAN
CZE
AUS
DEU
IND
FRA
ITA
IND
IND
ITA
JPN
HUN
ESP
ESP
ESP
FIN
ITA
W
JPN
CAN
AUT
GBR
BLX
BRA
ITA
AUT
HUN
FRA
DNK
DNK
ESP
DEU
CAN
JPN
HUN
JPN
ESP
BRA
AUT
JPN
JPN
BRA
CAN
ITA
AUT
CZE
ITA
AUS
AUT
GBR
AUS
FRA
IDN
DEU
BGR
DNK
ITA
W
KOR
FRA
FRA
AUT
BRA
IDN
W
GBR
FRA
KOR
CHN
AUS
AUT
BRA
AUS
AUS
ITA
W
ITA
HUN
BLX
GBR
DEU
IRL
ITA
BLX
ESP
IDN
ESP
IRN
KOR
GBR
AUS
BLX
ITA
JPN
FIN
KOR
ESP
ITA
FIN
W
FRA
AUT
AUS
W
AUT
CZE
BLX
GBR
KOR
EGY
IDN
FIN
IRN
GRC
CHN
IDN
ITA
ESP
JPN
KOR
ESP
ESP
ESP
ESP
ITA
KOR
W
BLX
CAN
W
HUN
ITA
GRC
BLX
DNK
FRA
ESP
DNK
DEU
IRLIRL
AUS
AUS
FRA
HUN
IRN
CAN
W
IRN
W
DNK
BLX
BLX
COL
LTU
CZE
KOR
HUN
CZE
FIN
KOR
FRA
FRA
BRA
HUN
IDN
FIN
DNK
ECU
AUT
KAZ
ESP
DEU
W
IDN
CAN
ESP
BRA
AUS
CHN
IRN
W
AUS
CZE
JPN
GBR
AUS
ESP
ITA
IRL
ITA
DNK
CAN
IRL
CZE
FRA
FRA
BLX
ITA
FIN
ESP
IRN
FIN
AUS
KAZ
CAN
FRA
DEU
KOR
EGY
JPN
JPN
AUS
AUT
AUS
DEU
KOR
CHN
CAN
ESP
ESP
FRA
GRC
ESP
IND
HUN
IRN
IRN
ITA
AUT
JPN
ESP
FRA
JPN
GRC
GRC
IND
KOR
CAN
JPN
AUS
W
ESP
BLX
CAN
FIN
IDN
AUT
FRA
BLX
BLX
HUN
GBR
COL
IDNIRL
AUT
CZE
HUN
GBR
IND
ITA
AUT
BLX
AUT
ESP
CZE
FRA
BLX
GBR
ITA
DEU
W
IRL
AUS
W
IND
ITA
GBR
GRC
BLX
IDN
GBR
AUS
AUT
GBR
AUT
BLX
FIN
CAN
ETH
DEU
FRA
AUT
DNK
HUN
AUS
ESP
JPN
FIN
HUN
CYP
IDN
CAN
DEU
HUN
W
BLX
AUS
W
GBR
DNK
KAZ
ESP
IDN
W
GBR
ITA
FRA
CAN
JPN
BLX
GBR
FIN
CZE
KOR
CAN
ITA
AUT
AUS
BRA
ESP
DEU
FIN
FRA
BRA
W
AUS
KOR
IND
ITA
ESP
ITA
IDN
FRA
ISR
BRA
AUT
AUT
HUN
AUT
AUT
CYP
GBR
AUS
FIN
DNK
GBR
DEU
KOR
FIN
BLX
DNK
BLX
KOR
DEU
FRA
JPN
GBR
JOR
KOR
IDN
IND
AUT
FIN
DEU
KOR
HUN
AUT
COL
CAN
IND
IND
DNK
HUN
DNK
GBR
IRL
IDN
ESP
ITA
W
GBR
GBR
CAN
FIN
FRA
W
JPN
AUT
MAR
EGY
BRA
AUS
AUT
BLX
BRA
GBR
ESP
DNK
ITA
JPN
JPN
ITA
CZE
GBR
DNK
JPN
FRA
D
NK
ITA
GRC
BRA
CHN
CAN
IND
BLX
DEU
JPN
IRN
FRA
CZE
BLX
CHN
EST
AUS
AUT
IND
W
CAN
FRA
W
FRA
ECU
AUS
ITA
COL
ESP
AUS
ESP
DEU
BLX
ITA
DNK
KOR
ITA
CAN
BRA
COL
FIN
DEU
HUN
FIN
HUN
DNK
CAN
ESP
FRA
FRA
ESP
GBR
CHN
GBR
IRN
ISR
ESP
DEU
FRA
IRL
FRA
IRL
FRA
BRA
ITA
DNK
IRN
ITA
ESP
HUN
BLX
IND
AUT
AUT
FIN
ITA
ITA
CZE
ITA
AUS
AUS
W
CAN
IND
AUT
KOR
IRL
ESP
FIN
DNK
JPN
DEU
HUN
ESP
ITA
BLX
IRL
CAN
BLX
BRA
AUT
FIN
DNK
FRA
W
AUT
KOR
CYP
DEU
CZE
ESP
BLX
HUN
DNK
JPN
IRN
KOR
DNK
ITA
DNK
GRC
ESP
ITA
KOR
BLX
CAN
ESP
KAZ
CAN
CAN
CAN
W
AUS
KAZ
BLX
KOR
GBR
KOR
BLX
IND
IDN
CAN
ESP
IRL
DEU
AUS
DEUDEU
CAN
AUT
CZE
HUN
AUS
JPN
DEU
HUN
HUN
IRL
AUT
BLX
AUS
IDN
DNK
W
AUT
ITA
AUT
IRN
IND
AUT
DNK
IND
ITA
CZE
CAN
KAZ
GRC
DNK
ITA
CZE
AUT
ESP
W
CAN
IND
ITA
MAR
W
BLX
FRA
DNK
DNK
EGY
GBR
LTU
ITA
BGR
IRL
ITA
IDN
GBR
HUNHUN
JPN
CAN
HUN
IRN
CAN
W
JPN
W
ESP
KOR
GBR
CHN
GRC
FRA
ESP
HUN
IRL
FRA
BLX
AUT
HUN
IND
DEU
CAN
BRA
KOR
IDN
AUT
AUT
CAN
GBR
BRA
ITA
FRA
KOR
FIN
AUT
FIN
ESP
IRN
ITA
ITA
AUT
ESP
ESP
GBR
JOR
LTU
AUT
IRL
CHN
DNK
AUT
ITA
AUT
IDN
CAN
FRA
DEU
CHN
W
IND
FIN
ISR
ITA
FRA
FRA
FRA
JPN
AUS
GBR
ESP
AUS
ITA
DNK
IRN
IDN
JPN
ESP
ISR
BLX
IDN
AUT
KOR
MAR
ECU
IRN
HUN
AUT
ESP
GBR
IND
W
WW
FIN
FIN
W
IDN
W
CAN
IRL
W
KOR
AUT
ARG
COL
ESP
DEU
AUT
DNK
W
ESP
ESP
DNK
BRA
COL
IND
IRL
IND
GBR
DEU
BGR
AUS
BLX
IRL
FIN
W
DEU
JPN
CAN
ESP
ITA
JPN
JPN
AUS
DNK
BGR
CAN
ITA
ITA
COL
IDN
BRA
AUT
ESP
GRC
ITA
IRL
DNK
DNK
CAN
ESP
COL
IRN
FRA
AUTCHL AUT
IRN
BRA
ESP
IDN
COLCOL
FIN
IDN
GBR
CZE
FIN
ITA
EGY
CZE
W
IRN
IND
KOR
W
AUT
KOR
W
MAR
JPN
CAN
DEU
GBR
KOR
FIN
WW
AUS
DEU
CAN
W
IND
JPN
ITA
EGY
CAN
W
ESP
JPN
GBR
ITA
DEU
AUT
DEU
CAN
FIN
EGY
AUS
ESP
FRA
FIN
IND
KOR
IND
ITA
KOR
EGY
IRL
FIN
FIN
COL
KOR
BGR
GBR
FIN
FIN
ITA
AUT
IDN
KAZ
GRC
ECU
W
DNK
IND
ESP
CHN
HUN
FRA
BLX
FRA
KOR
IRL
IDN
ESP
ESP
IND
BLX
BLX
DEU
GRC
FRA
FIN
COL
CZE
CHN
BRA
IND
ESP
FIN
ESP
IRL
ITA
ITA
HUN
DNK
CHN
BLX
ESP
CHL
BRA
IDN
DNK
MAR
CHN
BRA
BLX
W
HUN
AUT
DEU
ESP
AUS
ITA
ESP
ESP
AUT
GRC
DNK
ITA
DEU
AUS
W
CAN
JPN
AUT
CZE
AUS
MAR
FIN
AUT
HUN
ITA
ESP
W
IRL
W
AUT
IND
GBR
DEU
HUN
JOR
CYP
ESP
CAN
DNK
IDN
ISR
IDN
W
AUT
AUT
AUS
DNK
HUN
LTU
FRA
IND
CZE
GBR
IRL
CHN
IGBR
DEU
SR
HUN
AUT
ITA
CAN
ECU
KOR
ESP
DNK
CZE
AUS
CZE
DEU
KOR
HUN
HUN
DNK
W
BLX
IND
ITA
ESP
AUS
AUS
IND
AUT
W
ITA
CHN
M
ESP
AR
AUS
ITA
IRL
LTU
COL
ESP
BLX
IDN
IRL
JPN
GBR
KOR
KAZ
GBR
BRA
AUS
GBR
MAR
BLX
IRL
KOR
GBR
IND
GBR
CAN
ITA
CHN
IRL
W
BGR
CAN
A
UT
BLX
ITA
IRL
FIN
DNK
CAN
IDN
ITA
BLX
AUS
AUS
ITA
LTU
IND
AUT
CHL
IRL
ITA
FIN
DEU
CHE
ESP
CHN
ISR
FRA
FRA
BRA
ESP
FRA
HUN
W
BLX
CHN
ESP
EGY
W
W
BLX
AUS
AUT
ITA
ESP
BLX
AUS
CZE
IDN
MAR
ESP
AUT
ITA
HUN
FIN
JPN
CAN
IRL
KOR
GBR
JPN
AUT
W
IRN
LTU
IDN
CHN
W
AUT
CZE
AUS
ISR
ITA
BRA
W
IDN
DNK
AUT
COL
W
ITA
ESP
IRN
FRA
ITA
KOR
CHN
MAR
EST
AUT
DEU
CAN
BLX
DEU
CZE
IND
DEU
KOR
FRA
W
AUS
FIN
AUS
LTU
CHN
BLX
CAN
E
SP
ITA
CHN
CAN
ITA
AUS
ESP
AUT
CAN
ISR
KOR
IND
AUT
MAR
CAN
AUS
FRA
CZE
GBR
IND
HUN
W
KAZ
CHN
DNK
MAR
FRA
IRL
ESP
KOR
DNK
CAN
DEU
FIN
IRN
JPN
GBR
AUT
HUN
FIN
AUT
IND
CZE
JPN
W
ITA
ESP
DEU
AUS
KOR
ESP
ITA
FRA
DNK
DNK
BLX
W
ITA
W
FIN
DEU
AUS
DNK
IRN
IRN
CAN
IRL
ITA
CZE
FRA
JPN
ITA
FIN
CHN
FIN
HUN
ESP
ISR
GRC
FRA
IRL
COL
COL
BGR
EGY
CHN
HUN
ESP
JPN
KOR
BLX
IND
ESP
ESP
CHN
JPN
HUN
GBR
GBR
DNK
CAN
KOR
MAR
FIN
IND
ESP
JPN
IRL
AUT
BRA
IRN
DEU
AUS
IRN
HUN
BRA
IND
W
IRN
HUN
W
ISR
AUT
W
ESP
BLX
W
DNK
IDN
KOR
CHN
GRC
AUS
DNK
IRL
GBR
ITA
HUN
IRL
ITA
AUS
COL
DEU
W
AUT
KOR
BRA
ARG
DEU
KOR
AUT
AUS
W
KOR
IND
AUS
DNK
BRA
AUS
DNK
AUT
ITA
AUS
FRA
IRN
CZE
GBR
CZE
GBR
DEU
JPN
ISR
BLX
IRL
GBR
DNK
KOR
ECU
JPN
BRA
LTU
ESP
DNK
IRN
FRA
CZE
ESP
FIN
FRA
IRL
HUN
IRN
FIN
JPN
ESP
JPN
ITA
AUT
FIN
CZE
KOR
ESP
KOR
AUT
ITA
GBR
FIN
AUT
ESP
IND
IDN
DEU
BLX
BRA
CHL
DEU
DEU
IND
CZE
IRN
ITA
BGR
CAN
ESP
ECU
FIN
K
OR
W
HUN
W
ESP
CHN
GRC
IRL
W
AUS
KOR
ISR
AUS
CZE
AUT
CHN
AUT
W
IND
DNK
IDN
MAR
ARG
AUS
KAZ
DEU
AUS
DEU
CYP
IDN
GRC
DEU
CAN
BGR
FRA
IND
ESP
AUS
IDN
JPN
COL
CHL
IDN
DEU
GBR
IRN
BRA
DNK
CAN
KOR
AUT
MAR
IND
W
WW
FRA
ITA
ESP
IRL
MAR
GRC
CAN
IRL
AUT
HUN
IRQ
KOR
ECU
BLX
CAN
BLX
CYP
FRA
BLX
CAN
DEU
BLX
ETH
IND
GRC
CHN
GRC
ISR
AUS
IND
KOR
AUT
ITA
CAN
KOR
ESP
ESP
GRC
COL
DEU
CHN
ITA
W
IDN
ITA
W
ISR
CHL
CAN
FRAFRA
CZE
DNK
BLX
BRA
DEU
CAN
HUN
ESP
CHL
JPN
AUT
W
ITA
ITA
FIN
AUT
AUT
CZE
HUN
ITA
KOR
IDN
FRA
FIN
JPN
GBR
ESP
FRA
BLX
ESP
CZE
FIN
AUT
KOR
FRA
W
BLX
CAN
W
ESP
IRL
CHN
ESP
W
LTU
AUT
AUT
IRL
KOR
BRA
IDN
IDN
JPN
DEU
ESP
W
AUS
ITA
IDN
BLX
CHL
CHN
ESP
IND
FRA
IND
GBR
CAN
JPN
IND
KOR
BLX
FRA
ESP
HUN
AUT
IND
HUN
B
LX
AUS
IND
ECU
GRC
BLX
HUN
DEU
GBR
BRA
BRA
CZE
IDN
AUT
KOR
HUN
GBR
HUN
GBR
ARG
ISR
CHN
CZE
HUN
FRA
IRL
ISR
ESP
CAN
BLX
BGR
DNK
ITA
JPN
JOR
CAN
BLX
KAZ
AUT
COL
IRN
LTU
JPN
IND
CHN
JPN
IRL
JOR
GRC
JOR
ITA
IRL
IRL
DNK
ISR
IND
GRC
DNK
CZE
DNK
GBR
FIN
AUT
FRAFRA
CZE
JPN
ESP
DNK
IRN
COL
GRC
CZE
IRQ
BLX
DNK
DEU
FRA
AUT
IRN
DNK
AZE
W
DEU
IRL
W
CHN
BLX
FRA
GBR
IND
JPN
BRA
CAN
FRA
ESP
ESP
ESP
AUT
CZE
LTU
BLX
CAN
COL
ESP
JPN
AUT
BLX
JPN
AUS
CAN
BLX
DEU
JPN
CZE
DNK
AUT
AUT
MAR
DNK
IDN
BLX
FIN
ISR
DEU
IND
AUT
AUS
IND
GBR
DEU
HUN
GBR
HUN
KOR
IRL
ESP
W
IDN
KOR
HUN
CAN
ISR
BLX
KOR
FRA
JPN
AUT
GBR
W
BRA
AUT
FIN
IRL
W
BLX
AUT
DNK
IRN
W
FIN
CHL
ITA
CAN
ITA
HUN
FRA
JPN
KOR
CAN
GRC
ITA
BRA
BGR
AUT
ECU
W
AUS
BRA
ESP
CAN
KOR
JPN
AUS
JPN
KOR
AUS
DNK
FRA
CAN
COL
KAZ
KAZ
JOR
GBR
KOR
KOR
CAN
CHN
CHN
JPN
AUS
IRL
BGR
ESP
CAN
DEU
BLX
BRA
AUT
CHL
AUT
KOR
DEU
CZE
FRA
KOR
IRN
HUN
AUS
JPN
AUT
CHN
IDN
IRL
IRN
CAN
W
W
IRN
IDN
W
DEU
KOR
W
CZE
HUN
CZE
ISR
W
MAR
ESP
ECU
IRL
FRA
W
IDN
LTU
HUN
AUT
GRC
CAN
DEU
DNK
BGR
BLX
HUN
MAR
FIN
W
CHL
KOR
CAN
JPN
KAZ
ESP
IDN
IDN
ISR
AUT
ESP
CAN
IND
DEU
IRN
GRC
KOR
FRA
BLX
IRL
ITA
ECU
FIN
FIN
FIN
IND
IDN
AUS
CZE
CHN
W
ITA
IRN
IND
DEU
IRL
IHUN
RL
CZE
FIN
IRL
BLX
CHN
HUN
IRL
IRL
ITA
AUT
CZE
DEU
ESP
IND
FIN
DNK
IRN
DEU
DNK
W
CHN
BLX
AUT
DEU
HUN
ESP
CZE
AUT
ECU
HUN
COL
IRL
DEU
BLX
ESP
CHN
LTU
JPN
ITA
W
KOR
CHL
GBR
ESP
CAN
IND
MAR
AZE
KAZ
DNK
AUT
KOR
CAN
CAN
GRC
AUS
KOR
ESP
FIN
CZE
ESP
IDN
ESP
AUS
CHN
IDN
ESP
COL
DEU
IRL
CAN
CHN
CZE
BLX
KOR
IRL
ESP
CAN
AUT
AUT
AUT
IRL
HUN
BRA
DNK
GBR
CHN
W
AUS
AUS
FRA
ESP
CAN
ETH
IRL
ARG
IND
CZE
GRC
HUN
IDN
IND
CHN
GRC
IND
ESP
IDN
AUT
MAR
BRA
BRA
DNK
IRN
BLX
HUN
IRL
FIN
GRC
IRN
HUN
CHN
BLX
JPN
HUN
GBR
BRA
LTU
CAN
DNK
DNK
LTU
IRL
FRA
JPN
HUN
FIN
BLX
JPN
ITA
IDN
AUT
AUS
IDN
ITA
IRN
CZE
IRN
ESP
AUS
IND
GRC
JPN
IRN
IDN
DEU
CAN
FRA
CZE
BLX
FIN
DNK
BLX
CAN
DNK
COL
IND
A
US
FRA
IRQ
DNK
AUS
AUT
BLX
IND
JOR
IND
FRA
ESP
LTU
W
ESP
CAN
CAN
IND
JOR
AUT
CAN
W
DEU
FIN
ISR
WW
AUT
ESP
LKA
AUT
KAZ
IDN
FRA
IRN
ITA
ITA
IRN
DEU
CAN
AUT
ESP
W
CHE
ESP
CHN
DNK
AUT
BLX
DNK
COL
AUS
AUT
BGR
JPN
BLX
BLX
LTU
ESP
ISR
BRA
BGR
ITA
BGR
KOR
FRA
W
KOR
IDN
FRA
GBR
CZE
BLX
JPN
FIN
AUS
LTU
KOR
HUN
IDN
ESP
AUS
ESP
AUS
IND
AUT
CHN
ITA
JPN
KOR
IDN
CZE
DNK
FRA
BGR
DNK
CAN
W
CHL
CAN
ITA
DEU
BGR
CAN
BLX
AUT
DNK
CAN
CZE
HUN
AUT
IRL
BRA
COL
AUS
W
KOR
KAZ
ITA
IRN
FIN
GRC
LTU
IDN
IRN
ISR
JPN
AZE
COL
GBR
HUN
ECU
COL
KOR
ECU
ARG
DEU
BGR
AUT
DEU
AUS
COL
IDN
AUT
AUS
JOR
DNK
IRL
W
GBR
ISR
CAN
FRA
W
ESP
GBR
LTU
CHN
ITA
AUS
LVA
CZE
CYP
IRL
LTU
DNK
AUT
CZE
IND
IDN
W
CAN
FIN
CZE
IRL
BLX
GRC
CAN
ESP
AUT
GBR
CHN
JPN
IND
DNK
ISR
KOR
AUS
W
AUS
CZE
CZE
ITA
BRA
ISR
GBR
BHR
IRN
AUS
FRA
FIN
CHN
FRA
FIN
KOR
W
W
W
FRA
IND
CHN
HUN
IRL
JPN
IRL
LTU
ISR
IRQ
IND
ESP
DNK
BLX
HUN AUT
DNK
CHN
EST
ITA
AUT
GBR
IND
W
CHN
HUN
JOR
CZECZE
CHL
CHE
FIN
BGR
CAN
KOR
EST
ISR
IRN
JPN
AUS
MAR
FRA
HUN
AUT
GRC
KOR
BLX
FRA
CAN
HUN
IND
BLX
KOR
KAZ
BGR
IRN
ECU
GBR
KOR
DEU
GRC
BRA
CHN
IDN
GBR
HUN
ISR
DNK
AUT
AUT
IDN
GRC
DNK
IRN
FRA
GRC
CZE
CZE
HUN
KOR
IRN
IRL
ISR
IRL
AUS
COL
GBR
CHE
AUT
IND
DNK
IDN
ESP
ESP
KOR
IRL
COL
IRN
GRC
FIN
CZE
ESP
AUT
AUT
ITA
CAN
BGR
ESP
AUS
HUN
GRC
DNK
CZE
KOR
FIN
KWT
AUSAUS
W
AUT
GBR
AUT
KOR
BRA
HUN
AUT
CYP
W
W
ESP
DNK
FRA
CAN
BLX
IND
JPN
IND
CYP
DEU
KOR
CZE
KOR
FIN
IND
FIN
GBR
FIN
ESP
AUT
CAN
ESP
BLX
AUT
ESP
GBR
FIN
IRN
BRA
FRA
CAN
FIN
FIN
BRA
IND
W
HUN
DNK
AUT
IDN
DNK
HUN
JPN
WWESP
ESP
COL
AUT
BLX
FRA
CHN
KAZ
CAN
W
KOR
W
AUS
ITA
CZE
JPN
FIN
AZE
CAN
BLX
CZE
AUS
HUN
AUS
AUS
CZE
CHN
W
HUN
CAN
W
ESP
FIN
FIN
CAN
FIN
W
IRL
ITA
EST
KOR
ESP
GBR
JOR
W
GBR
AZE
COL
GBR
DNK
CHN
IRN
IRN
CHL
AUS
ECU
ITA
IND
FIN
HUN
CZE
CAN
W
KOR
BRA
HUN
HUN
HUN
IND
FIN
CZE
AUT
GBR
DNK
LTU
AUS
AUS
CAN
BLX
W
IRN
ESP
FIN
IND
JOR
COL
JOR
WIDN
KOR
ISR
IDN IDN
GRC
ISR
CHE
CYP
ISR
IDN
DNK
COL
ISR
JPN
BLX
IDN
GBR
MAR
BRA
ESP
HUN
GRC
CAN
IRN
BLX
CZE
IDN
FRA
W
GRC
BLX
ITA
AUT
ISR
ITA
EGY
DNK
BRA
FIN
EST
HUN
ECU
IND
W
W
IND
AUS
IDN
AUS
AZE
IRL
DNK
ESP
DNK
ISR
AUS
ITA
FIN
HUN
IND
IRL
ESP
KOR
AUS
DEU
AUT
GBR
HUN
KAZ
HUN
IRN
W
DNK
AUT
COL
DNK
AUS
CAN
COL
BLX
FIN
LVA
IRL
DEU
ESP
ITA
IRN
IRN
ECU
GBR
ISR
CHL
FIN
AUS
KOR
KOR
JPN
ITA
IRL
CZE
COL
IRL
CYP
IRL
JOR
CZE
MAR
IRL
JPN
DEU
FIN
IND
ECU
BLX
FIN
KAZ
IDN
FIN
BLX
BLX
FRA
HUN
FRA
AUT
CZE
KAZ
DNK
BLX
ETH
ISR
CZE
ESP
CYP
FIN
DNK
CZE
AUS
IDN
AUS
JPN
CHL
IDN
IND
IRL
IRL
AUS
IND
AUT
AUS
EST
IDN
AUT
AUS
DNK
LVA
BRA
IRL
ITA
IRN
DNK
GBR
AUS
AUS
KOR
ISR
IRL
KOR
FRA
CHL
CAN
AUT
AUS
AUT
IRN
IRN
CYP
FRA
AUS
HUN
KOR
IRQ
BLX
DEU
BLX
IRN
W
CZE
BRA
JOR
IDN
FRA
KAZ
BRA
F
IN
ESP
IRL
AUS
AUT
HUN
IRL
IRL
EST
IRL
BLX
CAN
COL
BGR
W
KOR
CZE
KOR
ESP
HUN
JOR
IND
HUN
AUS
DEU
LTU
JPN
ESP
W
AUT
AUT
KOR
KOR
GBR
KOR
DEU
HUN
DEU
HUN
W
ITA
IDN
JPN
W
CHN
ESP
DNK
COL
BRA
HUN
IRN
IRN
BLX
BLX
GBR
IND
FIN
ESP
DNK
ESP
DEU
CYP
BRA
CHN
W
ESP
BGR
IND
GRC
ESP
CZE
W
FIN
FIN
ESP
AUT
KOR
AUT
CHN
GRC
IND
EGY
ESP
KOR
ESP
DNK
IRN
AUT
KOR
DNK
ECU
FIN
DNK
HUN
CAN
KWT
CAN
JOR
CAN
KOR
FIN
W
FIN
FIN
ESP
BLX
FIN
BLX
LTU
KAZ
KWT
FIN
CAN
FIN
IRL
ESP
GBR
GBR
DNK
KAZ
FIN
DNK
LTU
HUN
AUT
ESP
HUN
LTU
LTU
FIN
IRN
JPN
HUN
DEU
IRN
MAR
ECU
EGY
ETH
FIN
W
IRL
BGR
FRA
CZE
COL
ITA
CAN
HUN
BRA
DNK
DNK
ITA
LTU
KAZ
AUT
GBR
BGR
CHL
HUN
AZE
KOR
ESP
DNK
DEU
KAZ
DNK
IRL
KOR
LVA
AUT
IRN
CHL
ETH
DNK
IND
KAZ
IDN
CZE
FRA
IDN
ISR
CAN
IRN
AUT
FIN
JPN
COL
HUN
IND
CZE
IDN
DEU
JOR
LTU
AUT
KAZ
KOR
KAZ
CHL
W
AUS
LTU
IRN
W
ARG
FIN
IRL
BRA
IRL
AZE
GBR
IRL
JOR
BLX
AZE
HUN
AUS
FIN
JPN
AUT
IRL
AUT
COL
ITAITA
JOR
ISR
GBR
CZE
FIN
IDNIDN
LTU
HUN
FIN
KOR
JOR
ISR
EST
CAN
CZE
KOR
IDN
W
GRC
BRA
ESP
ISL
IDN
BLX
FIN
KOR
ESP
AUS
IND
MAR
COL
IRL
DNK
JOR
CHN
AUT
W
ECU
ETH
CHL
JPN
ETH
JPN
ESP
AUS
KWT
IRL
COL
CAN
KOR
AUT
KWT
IRN
AUS
AUS
COL
COL
AUT
CHL
FIN
CAN
ECU
CHN
CHN
W
AUS
AUT
BGR
COL
HUN
BRA
AUT
GRC
KAZ
IDN
IDN
W
W
HUN
DNK
KOR
BLX
GRC
CAN
AUT
BGR
AUT
ITA
LTU
IRN
IRN
JOR
COL
DNK
KGZ
GRC
IDN
IRL
HUN
HUN
GBR
ESP
ITA
IDN
IRQ
HUN
ECU
AUS
IDN
DNK
CAN
DNK
ITA
CHL
DNK
DNK
BRA
CAN
KAZ
IDN
ISR
AZE
KAZ
DNK
ISR
BRA
HUN
AUS
IRN
CZE
ISR
IND
HUN
JPN
IRL
AZE
BRA
IDN
FIN
FIN
CZE
KAZ
BLX
W
CAN
ISR
IDN
IDN
KOR
ESP
CHN
AUT
FIN
IRL
BRA
DNK
CHN
CHN
ISR
AUS
IDN
HUN
JOR
IDN
KAZ
BLX
AUS
W
CAN
AUS
ECU
GBR
W
CZE
IRN
BLX
CHL
FIN
BGR
CHL
IND
KOR
JOR
BLX EST
AUT
KOR
BLX
GBR
HUN
IND
IDN
AUS
AUS
MAR
AUT
AUS
MAR
IND
AUT
ESP
DEU
FRA
AUS
DNK
COL
FIN
IRL
LTU
CZE
ITA
AUS
EST
CZE
KOR
IRN
LVA
IND
BLX
FIN
AUS
ESP
AUS
AUT
CZE
BRA
AUS
KAZ
LVA
CZE
AUS
IRL
IRL
AUS
GRC
AUT
CZE
ISL
FIN
AUS
BLX
DNK
IND
ISR
AUS
AUT
ECU
BGR
DNK
W
ESP
CZE
HUN
CAN
COL
CZE
FIN
GRC
HUN
W
ITA
FIN
W
IRL
GBR
AUT
IRL
CZE
FIN
ITA
AUT
FIN
JPN
IRN
ECU
IDN
AUT
DNK
ECU
IRL
JPN
DEU
CZE
KOR
COL
W
FIN
AUT
BGR
KWT
AUS
GRC
BRA
KGZ
ITA
AUT
W
HUN
ISR
LTU
IND
IRL
AUT
BRA
BRA
AUT
AUT
AUS
ESP
ETH
FIN
LVA
COL
ECU
KAZ
FIN
AUT
IND
HUN
ESP
HUN
ISR
AUS
ETH
IRL
IDN
IRL
HUN
IRL
IRN
DNK
CAN
BLX
CZE
AUS
CZE
IND
ECU
W
KOR
IRL
FIN
IRN
IRL
MAR
LTU
KAZ
BRA
ESP
CHL
JOR
DNK
CYP
KOR
MAR
HUN
FIN
IDN
FIN
HUN
IDN
IDN
ESP
LTU
DNK
HUN
W
KOR
KWT
ETH
ISR
EST
IDN
DNK
W
ESP
IDN
ISR
BGR
KWT
FIN
ISR
CHN
IRL
HUN
KGZ
LVA
FIN
BLX
ISR
BLX
CYP
W
KOR
LTU
IND
W
KOR
LTU
DNK
FIN
AUS
FIN
IRN
GRC
AUS
W
KAZ
DNK
LTU
CAN
BLX
FIN
KOR
BGR
JOR
W
GRC
LVA
W
CAN
IKAZ
SR
AUS
AUT
IND
FRA
GBR
AUT
HUN
LTU
AZE
DNK
ISR
KOR
AUS
IDN
HUN
IND
FIN
IRL
CAN
HUN
AUT
LTU
DNK
CAN
CHL
IRN
MAR
IRL
CHL
ESP
CAN
IRN
FRA
CZE
IDN
ECU
KGZ
ISR
DNK
IRL
KOR
IDN
GRC
ETH
ECU
BRA
KOR
COL
KOR
CAN
COL
IRL
CZE
DNK
ISR
ESP
GRC
HUN
AUT
LTU
HUN
BRA
ETH
AUT
COL
COL
IRN
CAN
FRA
EST
AZE
DNK
HUN
GRC
ITA
IND
COL
AZE
FIN
IDN
COL
ESP
AUS
IRN
JOR
ITA
IRN
CZE
FIN
BGR
AUS
KAZ
CZE
DNK
IRL
EGY
COL
AUS
IRL
AUS
COL
FIN
KOR
MAR
AUT
FIN
IRN
BGR
AUT
ITA
FIN
HUN
AUS ISR
IRN
CZE
GBR
DNK
FIN
IRN
COL
CZE
IND
W
AUT
CAN
CZE
KOR
ISR
BRA
IRN
LVA
KAZ
CAN
W
AUT
ESP
GBR
ITA
AUT
BGR
IRL
DNK
FIN
IDN
IRN
CAN
KAZ
KOR
CZE
HUN
DNK
FIN
ESP
BLX
KOR
JPN
DNK
JOR
JOR
IDN
CAN
AUT
LTU
CZE
KOR
GRC
CZE
FIN
CAN
HUN
CHN
AUS
COL
CHL
BGR
GRC
ARG
DNK
LTU
CAN
IRL
BLX
AZE
ISR
IRN
IDN
ISR
AUT
JOR
IRN
IRL
LTU
ESP
BLX
ISR
KOR
ETH
AUT
CHL
COL
JOR
ESP
GRC
ISR
ESP
IRL
ISR
AUS
KOR
CAN
W
MAR
MAR
DNK
ISR
IDN
DNK
IRN
IRL
DNK
KOR
BLX
GRC
KOR
IDN
IRL
CAN
CYP
AUS
IRN
IDN
CAN
ESP
ETH
JOR
ESP
ARG
KAZ
ESP
ESP
IDN
FIN
IND
AUS
KAZ
HUN
HUN
IRL
ETH
IRN
BLX
AUS
LTU
KWT
AZE
W
DNK
IRL
BRA
KAZ
LVA
FIN
EST
W
IRN
IDN
IND
DNK
DNK
IND
FIN
JOR
DNK
FIN
KAZ
HUN
CHL
CHN
IRN
AUS
CHL
KOR
DNK
ESP
AUS
FIN
JOR
COL
CZE
JOR
EGY
W
ISR
CAN
IRL
BRA
W
IRL
DNK
IDN
JOR
IND
LTU
DNK
BGR
BRA
IDN
IRL
HUN
JOR
DNK
IND
AUT
IRN
AUS
KOR
IDN
FIN
HUN
W
HUN
ESP
CZE
FIN
CHL
CHL
ARG
AUT
AUS
AZE
ECU
LTU
BLX
CYP
KAZ
CAN
FIN
ECU
ITA
HUN
AUS
ETH
JOR
W
IRN
IRN
DNK
ESP
BLX
EGY
FIN
BGR
AUS
IDN
AUS
HUN
HUN
IDN
MAR
KOR
GRC
IRN
AUS
IRN
ITA
HUN
ARG
DNK
HUN
IDN
IRN
COL
IND
DNK
AUT
FIN
JOR
ECU
IRL
AUT
CZE
IRN
CHL
CZE
HUN
IRL
ECU
AZE
HUN
IRN
BRA
W
HUN
CYP
DNK
EST
ISR
AUS
IRL
JPN
IND
LTU
ETH
CZE
CZE
DNK
CHL
IRN
JPN
KAZ
HUN
LTU
CHL
AUT
IRL
AUT
IRL
AUS
AZE
CHL
IRN
IND
LTU
COL
IRL
EGY
IDN
IDN
KAZ
CZE
LTU
KOR
BRA
ISR
AUS
IRN
FIN
FIN
COL
FIN
AUT
BGR
MAR
IND
W
GBR
AZE
ITA
IRN
HUN
AUS
ARG
JOR
IND
HUN
JOR
BRA
IRQ
CHL
EST
AZE
IRN
HUN
COL
HUN
IRN
FIN
HUN
HUN
IRN
IND
HUN
IDN
LTU
ITA
KOR
IRN
CAN
CHL
ITA
MAR
IND
IRL
AZE
ETH
BLX
IDN
AUS
ARG
IND
IRN
ECU
KOR
ISR
BRA
AUS
MAR
CHL
DNK
AUT
IRN
AZE
DNK
ISR
JOR
JOR
IDN
FIN
KAZ
DNK
AUT
CYP
LVA
IRQ
LTU
IRN
AUS
IND
W
LVA
HUN
COL
KAZ
GRC
LTU
COL
AUS
IRN
ETH
IRL
CZE
KAZ
FIN
AUT
BGR
KAZ
DNK
AUT
IDN
IND
LVA
LTU
HUN
IRN
KAZ
HUN
FIN
KOR
AUS
FIN
LTU
CYP
ECU
AUTWWCHL W
AUT
FIN
AUS
EST
W
DNK
ISR
LTU
IND
ECU
IRN
ISR
ISR
ECU
IRN
IRN
W
IND
IDN
IRN
FIN
JOR
IRN
AUS
KAZ
IRN
BGR
IDN
IND
IRN
FIN
KAZ
FIN
IRL
W
AUT
ESP
AUS
HUN
DNK
AUT
CZE
COL
JOR
IRN
DNK
FIN
FRA
KOR
CHL
IND
AUS
IRN
ISR
IDN
KAZ
IND
EST
ISR
GRC
W
BGR
AZE
FIN
JOR
I
DN
JOR
IRN
ECU
ARG
JOR
HUN
HUN
AUT
IDN
ESP
W
W
IDN
KOR
DNK
KOR
GBR
LTU
AZE
CZE
IND
DNK
DNK
FIN
CHN
JPN
JOR
MAR
KAZ
CAN
FIN
IRN
CZE
GRC
FIN
EST
ECU
AUT
COL
AUS
IND
FIN
DNK
ECU
IDN
DNK
IND
W
JOR
HUN
KWT
IDN
HUN
FIN
KAZ
ITA
AUT
CAN
IDN
IRL
IND
KAZ
IRL
CHL
AUS
CAN
ARG
FRA
AUT
W
JOR
IND
GRC
IDN
KAZ
FIN
BLX
GRC
HUN
ETH
CZE
MAR
EST
IRL
IRL
DNK
AUS
AUS
FRA
IRQ
FIN
IND
CAN
EST
KAZ
DNK
FIN
ISR
IRN
KAZ
CYP
KOR
BGR
CHL
KAZ
IRL
DNK
W
DNK
HUN
W
DNK
KOR
LTU
COL
LTU
MAR
HUN
AUT
KOR
BRA
IRN
IND
BGR
IDN
ITA
AUT
DNK
HUN
AUT
CZE
COL
ISR
JPN
IRN
KOR
AUT
IDN
FIN
W
IRL
BGR
IDN
KOR
HUN
CZE
CZE
HUN
KOR
CZE
IRN
ITA
IRN
LTU
IDN
CYP
FIN
CHL
ITA
IND
AZE
IRL
HUN
BRA
CZE
IND
IRL
FIN
IDN
COL
BRA
COL
IRL
FIN
JPN
BGR
DNK
CZE
CZE
CZE
HUN
MAR
COL
HUN
KOR
JOR
ISR
LVA
KOR
JPN
ECU
IDN
GBR
HUN
COL
GRC
HUN
DNK
LTU
ESP
IRN
ETH
JOR
LVA
W
LVA
MAC
IDN
IRL
CZE
JFIN
OR
DNK
BGR
FIN
KWT
ISR
ISR
AUT
IRL
ETH
IDN
IND
CZE
BRA
GRC
COL
FIN
BGR
HUN
JOR
ITA
ISL
JPN
LTU
FIN
W
EGY
AUS
FIN
CAN
ESP
JPN
CHL
ETH
JOR
AUS
KAZ
FRA
BGR
HUN
CAN
IDN
AUT
W
BRA
KAZ
HUN
ECU
IRL
JOR
KOR
LVA
IND
IRN
IRL
LTU
CAN
KAZ
HUN
IRQ
ISR
DNK
HUN
ITA
JOR
IRN
KOR
AUS
BGR
CHL
AZE
EST
IRN
KOR
GRC
COL
W
IRN
KGZ
DNK
BGR
FIN
IDNAZE
W
IND
EST
HUN
GRC
EST
LTU
KAZ
IDN
CAN
CHL
CHL
BGR
ECU
FIN
CZE
ECU
CZE
BLX
KAZ
CZE
KOR
MAR
KOR
HUN
FIN
IRL
KOR
GBR
IDN
LTU
AUS
W
CAN
GRC
GRC
KOR
ISR
FIN
AUT
IRN
KAZ
DNK
KWT
IND
AUT
AUS
W
DNK
HUN
HUN
DNK
MAR
BGR
IND
IRL
FIN
IRL
W
HUN
KAZ
IRL
EST
ESP
KOR
FIN
IRL
GRC
IDN
IND
AUS
JOR
COL
AUS
FIN
FIN
DNK
DNK
FIN
CHN
BGR
IRN
IND
JOR
DNK
CZE
ESP
ARG
IRN
BGR
BRA
W
LTU
DNK
ITA
ECU
BLX
JOR
IDN
IRL
CZE
AUS
IDN
AUT
CHL
AUT
HUN
COL
ECU
COL
KOR
FIN
FIN
IRN
AUT
CAN
IND
GEOGEO
COL
CHL
CZE
BGR
CAN
JOR
KAZ
AUS
CAN
EST
IRN
ECU
KGZ
GBR
HUN
HUN
CYP
DNK
IDN
IND
ARG
IRL
KAZ
KAZ
FRA
W
CZE
LTU
IND
MAC
AUS
MAR
AUT
IRN
ESP
CZE
COL
JOR
AUT
DNK
IRL
JPN
COL
BRA
HUN
CZE
IRN
CHL
DNK
AUT
CHN
W BLX
AUS
IRL
COL
KOR
LTU
AZE
CZE
GRC
LTU
JOR
W
CZE
ECU
KWT
LTU
IDNIDN
ISR
KAZ
IRN
HUN
DNK
DNK
HUN
KAZ
IRL
ISR
JPN
W
AUS
AZE
BRA
BGR
BLX
KAZ
CAN
BRA
FIN
ISR
CZE
LTU
CYP
EST
LTU
KOR
AZE
EST
COL
FIN
BRA
KGZ
BLX
BGR
CZE
IRL
GBR
AUS
GRC
HUN
KAZ
COL
AUT
MAR
ETH
KAZ
HUN
DNK
CAN
CZE
KAZ
COL
W
BRA
IDN
AUT
AUT
KAZ
CYP
IND
IDN
DNK
FIN
LVA
MAR
CZE
ECU
ARM
LVA
KOR
EST
H
UN
KAZ
CZE
ISR
IRL
IRN
KGZ
IDN
W
AUS
ISR
CHL
LTU
IRL
IDN
W
IRN
KWT
HUN
HUN
IRL
W
CZE
FIN
KWT
JPN
CHL
HUN
LTU
GRC
HUN
CHN
KOR
AUS
HUN
GEO
HUN
COL
HUN
CZE
ISR
KOR
JOR
FIN
BGR
HUN
LTU
LTU
IRN
AZE
HUN
HUN
AUS
W
IDN
ETH
GRC
KOR
LTU
CZE
IRN
IND
BGR
LTU
CZE
MAR
CHL
IRN
IDN
EST
KAZ
GEO
ECU
AUT IRL
BLX
BRA
MAR
ISR
FIN
DNK
AUT
C
YP
IND
IRL
IND
IRN
CHL
AUS
IRN
AZE
IND
IDN
GRC
BGR
FIN
CZE
IND
BGR
IRL
BRA
JOR
CZE
KWT
W
ISR
GRC
ISR
GRC
LTU
ECU
AUS
LTU
IND
FIN
AUT
LTU
CZE
HUN
ECU
DNK
AUT
CAN
KOR
AUS
W
LVA
KOR
ITA
IRN
GRC
COL
ETH
HUN
ARM
ECU
LTU
COL
HUN
CHL
ECU
AUS
IRL
CZE
KOR
CZE
IRN
CYP
IRN
AUS
EGY
JOR
DNK
IRN
MAR
KOR
LTU
IND
GRC
ISR
DNK
IDN
FIN
JOR
CAN
BRA
BGR
W
KOR
ESP
GRC
FIN
AUT
ETH
W
ETH
KOR
CHN
HUN
AUT
IDN
FIN
HUN
COL
AUT
JPN
IDN
KOR
KAZ
W
CAN
FIN
KOR
EST
ARG
EST
BRA
KOR
KOR
CHL
IRN
W
LTU
ECU
AUS
HUN
ISR
HUN
LTU
AUS
IRQ
EST
HUN
FIN
IRN
IRN
LTU
AUS
ISR
HUN
ISR
KWT
IDN
AUS
AUS
MAR
EST
BRA
CHL
ISR
DNK
CHL
IRL
IRL
CYP
AZE
FIN
W
DNK
IRL
FIN
IDN
IRN
FIN
GRC
AUT
BRA
JOR
W
KAZ
LVA
ARM
IRN
AUT
W
W
BGR
HUN
IRN
AUS
CHL
IND
FIN
LTU
CZE
IRL
GRC
JOR
IDN
IDN
CAN
AUS
ECU
LVA
DNK
HUN
KOR
LTU
HUN
BGR
BGR
IDN
CZE
IRN
IND
AUT
CAN
GRC
ISR
HUN
W
LVA
LVA
IND
AUT
ETH
IRL
GRC
IRN
HUN
COL
ITA
W
IRN
JOR
EST
HUN
CYP
KOR
FIN
IRL
DNK
AZE
COL
KAZ
KOR
GRC
GRC
AUS
CZE
AUT
CZE
ITA
IRN
IND
AUT
HUN
BLX
DNK
BGR
AUS
MAR
CHL
MAR
IRL
ECU
LTU
IRL
ITA
AUT
JOR
ETH
LTU
MAR
ISR
ESP
FIN
FIN
GRC
ETH
GRC
BRA
GRC
LTU
HUN
IRL
AUS
IRL
CZE
IRN
KOR
IDN
HUN
CAN
FIN
CZE
FRA
KAZ
IDN
CZE
EST
ISR
IRN
IDN
BGR
ECU
IRL
CAN
LVA
EST
ECU
KAZ
LTU
IRN
EST
EST
DNK
LTU
IND
ARG
AUS
LVA
KAZ
AUT
W
FIN
AZE
EST
COL
AUS
HUN
W
AUT
CZE
CHN
IND
IND
ESP
FIN
W
JOR
AUS
IRN
DNK
ARG
AUT
GRC
ISR
FIN
JOR
CZE
IDN
IRL
JOR
FIN
IDN
ISR
JOR
BRA
KAZ
IRN
CYP
CHL
GRC
KAZ
FIN
IRL
LTU
EST
HUN
CZE
LTU
ETH
FIN
IND
JPN
CZE
BRA
AZE
LTU
EST
JOR
FIN
IND
ECU
AUS
DNK
EGY
ECU
KOR
ISR
IRN
KOR
BGR
LVA
BRA
HUN
HUN
ECU
EST
COL
EST
JOR
JOR
CHL
IDN
IRL
IRN
IRL
KAZ
FIN
KAZ
HUN
CAN
GBR
EST
KAZ
CZE
AUS
ECU
CZE
COL
CHL
LVA
IRN
KAZ
EST
FIN
IRL
IRN
FINFIN
BLX
IRL
AUS
IRL
ITA
FIN
ECU
AUS
IRN
ETH
AUS
IRN
KGZ
IRN
LTU
COL
MAR
ECU
ISR
JOR
KAZ
IND
AUT
DNK
IND
JOR
IRN
KAZ
KAZ
IND
KAZ
CAN
KAZ
LTU
JOR
IRN
ECU
BGR
CHL
ITA
IRN
IRN
LTU
BGR
CYP
AUS
LVA
ISR
HUN
COL
IRL
DNK
AUS
BRA
LTU
BGR
HUN
AZE
LTU
LVA
IRL
CYP
IDN
BGR
CYP
LTU
BGR
AUT
ECU
AUS
AUS
LTU
COL
IRN
ETH
BGR
BRA
KAZ
ITA
BGR
COL
JOR
FIN
CAN
AZE
AUS
KOR
AUT
FIN
CYP
W
FIN
IND
IRN
LTU
KWT
IRN
JOR
EST
CYP
FIN
ISR
JOR
LTULTU
EST
LVA
LTU
EST
IDN
IRN
GRC
W
KOR
JOR
DNK
LTU
IND
KOR
ESP
EST
IRN
CHL
IRN
CHN
ECU
MAR
W
IRN
AUS
ETH
JOR
KOR
ECU
IRL
DNK
MAR
FRA
JPN
AUT
IND
IDN
KOR
IND
HUN
IRN
HUN
IRL
ISR
KAZ
KAZ
EST
KWT
LVA
AUT
COL
IND
JOR
IRL
BGR
CYP
IRL
LTU
IDN
HUN
BRA
GRC
AUS
IDN
BRA
ECU
IRL
FIN
ESP
ETH
FIN
BGR
IRN
FIN
LVA
MAR
AZE
GEO
AUS
GEO
BRA
MAR
ESP
IRN
IRN
IRN
CHL
LTU
AUS
JPN
IND
HUN
AUT
JKAZ
OR
IND
IRN
JOR
ARG
COL
ISR
IRL
ARG
IRN
BRA
BRA
COL
CYP
ISR
DNK
IND
HUN
EST
ARG
COL
LVA
JOR
HUN
JPN
KAZ
JOR
ISR
BRA
COL
IND
IND
AUS
ISR
LTU
HUN
EST
IDN
AUT
COL
ARM
IND
IRN
DNK
CZE
IRN
LTU
FIN
IRN
LTU
HUN
DNK
FIN
CHL
LVA
GRC
ISR
ETH
FIN
BRA
IDN
ISR
ECU
ARG
FIN
IDN
IRL
EST
CZE
GRC
IDN
ISR
IRN
CZE
JOR
IND
COL
IRN
IRN
ECU
IND
CHL
BGR
IND
JOR
IRL
CZE
MAR
BLX
IDN
AZE
BLX
AUS
IRL
EST
BRA
ETH
W
ISR
IND
FIN
BLX
IRL
KGZ
COL
ITA
GRC
GEO
BGR
ESTAZE
LTU
AUT
FIN
IRN
HUN
AZE
CZE
AZE
IDN
AZE
IRL
CHL
KAZ
BGR
EST
JPN
FIN
JPN
IRL
IRN
COL
W
KOR
CYP
KGZ
JOR
GEO
AUT
COL
KAZ
HUN
IRN
IRQ
JOR
IRL
IND
IRN
CYP
FIN
KWT
JOR
IRN
BRA
MAR
W
ECU
ETH
FIN
IRL
IRL
JOR
MAR
AUT
JOR
AUT
IRN
HUN
LVA
JOR
AUT
ECU
CHL
ARG
ILTU
RN
ECU
IRN
ETH
LTU
ISR
IRN
CHN
BGR
JOR
KOR
LVA
ISR
KWT
CHL
IRN
AUT
HUN
IRN
HUN
IRL
IRL
BGR
W
GEO
CYP
BGR
JPN
BRA
IDN
IRL
GRC
KEN
IRN
AZE
W
ECU
CHL
BGR
ISR
IRL
CYP
KOR
JPN
KOR
CHL
ITA
EST
JOR
IRL
EST
HUN
IRL
LTU
IRN
KOR
GRC
BGR
JOR
IRL
JOR
ETH
IDN
AZE
HUN
CZE
DNK
CHN
CHN
IDN
JOR
LTU
BRA
LVA
HUN
IDN
CHL
DNK
KAZ
MAR
JOR
KAZ
ARM
FIN
ISR
CYP
IND
BRA
EST
KGZ
KWT
FIN
JOR
BGR
KAZ
FIN
AZE
CZE
EST
MAR
CZE
AZE
DNK
IRN
CZE
ECU
CZE
EST
W
IND
CYP
FIN
ITA
JOR
ECU
LTU
JOR
KAZ
IRL
KOR
ARG
AUS
KAZ
EST
IRL
FIN
AZE
FIN
IRL
KOR
CZE
EST
MAR
JOR
COL ISR
AZE
IRN
ISR
KAZ
IRL
LTU
FIN
FIN
BRA
HUN
HUN
EST
LVA
KAZ
KAZ
LTU
CYP
LTU
BGR
IRL
KOR
IRN
DNK
IRN
EST
BGR
EST
ARM
GEO
BGR
COL
DNK
FIN
IDN
KAZ
LTU
KAZ
COL
ETH
ECU
ETH
IRN
GBR
IND
HUN
AUS
AZE
AUS
CYP
ECU
AZE
ITA
JOR
ISR
AUT
AUS
IND
AUT
FIN
ETH
IDN
IRL
AZE
IDN
KOR
GRC
COL
IRN
LTU
JPN
GRC
IRN
ISR
FIN
AZE
JOR
JOR
CYP
ISR
LTU
LVA
EST
AUT
LVA
W
FIN
COL
ITA
ECU
LTU
ISR
BRA
IND
KAZ
LVA
AUT
FIN
LTU
IRN
JOR
IDN
CHL
HUN
KEN
W
CZE
BGR
IRN
MAR
EST
BRA
LTU
IND
COL
IRL
IND
HUN
FIN
W
IND
IRL
CHL
COL
JOR
IRN
CYP
GEO
FIN
LVA
AUS
KEN
JOR
CZE
CHL
JOR
COL
FIN
LVA
BGR
ISR
HUN
LVA
EST
KAZ
COL
EST
ESP
IRN
IDN
ISR
LVA
HUN
AUT
DNK
CZE
KOR
KAZ
IRN
IND
CAN
KOR
CYP
FIN
GEO
CZE
W
KAZ
ESP
COL
IRN
ECU
DEU
JOR
AZE
HUN
EST
CYP
CHL
CZE
ARM
JOR
CAN
AZE
KAZ
ECU
HUN
IND
IND
LVA
KGZ
DNK
AZE
FIN
JPN
ISR
FIN
EST
AUT
ARG
ETH
IDN
FIN
W
KWT
CZE
IRN
CZE
IRN
ETH
JOR
LTU
COL
AUS
JOR
ARG
LVA
MAR
IND
COL
GRC
IND
CHL
GRC
CHL
IDN
BRA
ETH
ECU
ISR
LVA
ARM
AUT
BRA
IRN
ETH
KAZ
COL
COL
JOR
ITA
IRN
IRN
AUT
ARG
ECU
LTU
ETH
JOR
CYP
LTU
BGR
LTU
FIN
BGR
IRN
IDN
HUN
ITA
LTU
KOR
IRL
ARG
KGZ
IRN
KAZ
AUT
CYP
ECU
AUS
IRL
CHL
FIN
ARG
EST
MAR
KAZ
LTU
FIN
HUN
LTU
AUT
GEO
JOR
AUS
CZE
FIN
IRN
MAR
DNK
HUN
HUN
IRN
CHL
AUT
KAZ
ARM
EST
W
EST
ISR
MAR
FIN
LTU
AZE
LTU
ARM
FIN
HUN
EST
JPN
IDN
LVA
FIN
ITA
LTU
FIN
JOR
IND
LTU
IDN
COL
EST
CZE
C
ZE
KWT
KAZ
IRN
CHL
ARG
FIN
AZE
IRL
EST
LVA
ECU
ISR
DNK
AUT
BGR
IRN
HUN
ARM
JPN
MAR
LTU
AZE
LTU
CYP
JPN
W
EST
KOR
FIN
BRA
CZE
CZE
BGR
IRN
IDN
AUS
JOR
CHL
JOR
KOR
LTU
JPN
ECU
ECU
IDN
JPN
BGR
HUN
LVA
KWT
GRC
LTU
FIN
ARM
AUS
LVA
W
IND
ITA
AZE
EGY
IDN
IRN
IND
BGR
LVA
COL
CZE
HUN
AZE
LVA
ALB
ESP
LVA
W
DEU
ETH
FIN
CYP
KAZ
ECU
ECU
LVA
AZE
AZE
IND
MAR
LVA
ISR
EST
CZE
KAZ
BGR
FIN
AZE
ITA
ETH
GBR
ARG
LTU
LTU
IRL
W
LTU
LTU
BRA
CHL
JOR
CYPCYP
KAZ
AZE
BGR
HUN
AUS
JOR
COL
DNK
ETH
IRN
BGR
ISR
LVA
IRN
IDN
MAR
EST
LTU
FIN
IND
COL
DEU
JOR
HUN
HUN
LVA
ECU
W
FIN
BRA
IND
LVA
DEU
JPN
BLX
IRN
ISR
FIN
DEU
FIN
FIN
LTU
IRL
KAZ
IND
IRN
EGY
AZE
COL
CYP
BGR
ETH
IRQ
ECU
LTU
JOR
KGZ
KAZ
IRL
CHL
KAZ
EGY
AUS
ECU
KOR
BRA
LTU
ARM
BRA
BOL
ECU
MAR
IND
KOR
CYP
FIN
AUS
JPN
ECU
BGR
BGR
ETH
EST
GRC
BLX
KGZ
IRL
W
IDN
JOR
ECU
IRN
IRN
DNK
COL
IRL
HUN
BGR
IRL
JOR
EST
JOR
COL
LTU
FIN
HUN
IRN
CZE
IDN
AZE
BRA
JOR
IRN
GRC
AUS
AZE
FIN
JOR
JPN
LTU
ECU
CYP
AZE
KAZ
FIN
AUT
CZE
AUT
ISR
BOL
ISR
LTU
BHR
AZE
ALB
COL
IRN
ETH
COL
AUS
ECU
IDN
CHL
ECU
GRC
IRN
DNK
JOR
ITA
KAZ
ESP
LVA
W
ESP
CYP
CHL
AUT
ECU
IND
LTU
LVA
IRN
KWT
JOR
AUT
JOR
IRN
KAZ
LTU
BRA
LKA
AUS
IND
IND
ETH
IRN
KOR
IRL
AZE
MAR
LTU
IRN
LVA
IRL
CYP
KGZ
ECU
CHL
ITA
COL
FIN
LVA
FIN
FIN
DNK
AZE
BGR
HUN
LVA
AZE
ECU
JPN
EST
BGR
KGZ
FIN
LTU
LTU
AUS
JOR
EST
LTU
W
HUN
IRN
FIN
EGY
IDN
ITA
LVA
LVA
IND
AZE
ETH
GEO
ECU
BRA
ETH
JOR
JPN
IRL
IRL
ECU
JOR
AUS
ECU
IND
FIN
AUT
FIN
LVA
LVALVA
CHL
EST
CZE
AZE
LTU
IDN
KOR
ARM
EST
JOR
CHL
CHL
W
JOR
FIN
CYP
BRA
KAZ
AZE
CHL
LTU
AUS
KGZ
EST
KAZ
IRN
LTU
CYP
KAZ
EGY
IND
LTU
LVA
IRN
ECU
LVA
AZE
AZE
GEO
AUS
CZE
IRL
CYP
LTU
BRA
KOR
HUN
KOR
KAZ
IRN
KAZ
IRL
EST
COL
EST
KGZ
GEO
ISR
KAZ
W
CYP
BGR
CYP
KAZ
IRN
HUN
LTU
LTU
EST
LTU
EST
AUT
JECU
OR
FIN
KAZ
AUT
ARM
EGY
JPN
EST
ECU
AZE
JOR
CHL
IRL
KAZ
FIN
EST
IRN
GEO
DNK
BGR
KAZ
KWT
CHL
AUS
JPN
AZE
ITA
MAC
HUN
KAZ
LTU
KAZ
KAZ
EST
HUN
JPN
KAZ
KAZ
FIN
BGR
JOR
JOR
W
ISL
ETH
ECU
W
KAZ
ISR
CHL
JOR
KAZ
BGR
JPN
HUN
KWT
COL
IND
CYP
ESP
LTU
JOR
BRA
LTU
COL
IDN
JOR
AUT
KEN
IRN
FIN
CZE
IAFG
DN
AZE
JOR
IRN
DNK
BRA
CYP
ECU
W
COL
IND
AUS
EST
W
CYP
W
ARM
BRA
IRL
BRA
MAR
ECU
IND
LVA
HUN
BGR
IRN
KGZ
EST
KOR
AZE
JOR
FIN
CHL
LTU
EST
IRN
ITA
AZE
CYP
BRA
AUT
IND COL
BRA
AZE
IRL
IND
ISR
FIN
EST
ETH
LTU
LVA
KAZ
IND
AZE
FIN
W
IDN
IRN
ECU
IND
KWT
BGR
CHL
IDN
IDN
COL
CYP
LTU
CYP
W
CHL
COL
COL
JPN
LTU
KOR
MAR
HUN
IND
W
JOR
CHL
JOR
IRN
HUN
IND
IND
IRN
KGZ
IDN
IRN
LVA
LTU
FIN
EST
CHL
IRL
KAZ
IDN
LVA
KGZ
IND
CYP
COL
BGR
ECU
ECU
IND
EST
AZE
AUS
LVA
AZE
ECU
LVA
ECU
EST
AUS
IRL
KAZ
ETH
KAZ
AUS
JOR
LTU
CYP
BGR
CYP
IRN
LTU
IRL
EST
ECU
LVA
MAR
HUN
GRC
BRA
IRN
W
AUT
JPN
CZE
BGR
CYP
COL
JOR
GEO
KOR
AZE
FIN
ETH
KWT
KGZ
KAZ
ECU
FIN
KAZ
IND
ALB
LTU
ECU
LTU
IND
CZE
HUN
CHN
CYP
LTU
GEO
BRA
JPN
HUN
KAZ
KWT
MAR
FIN
LVA
BGR
AUS
CYP
CHL
LVA
LKA
BGR
ECU
KGZ
JOR
COL
JOR
LTU
ARG
ISR
EST
IRN
BGR
LTU
LTU
JOR
ECU
MAR
IRN
EST
LTU
COL
IRN
COL
BRA
IND
LTU
LVA
ECU
ESP
FIN
FIN
LTU
LVA
ECU
LVA
EST
IRN
CHL
ETH
IND
DNK
CYP
KAZ
KAZ
KWT
HUN
IRL
IDN
GRC
IRL
HUN
EGY
FIN
ECU
CYP
LVA
LVA
KOR
MAR
KWT
FIN
DNK
LVA
CHL
IRN
IRN
AUT
BGR
CHL
LTU
ITA
BGR
FIN
CZE
AUS
COL
LTU
CHL
HUN
ECU
JOR
EST
EST
CYP
ECU
JOR
HUN
ARM
ITA
W
CZE
BGR
IND
AUT
EST
IDN
HUN
ECU
IRN
KAZ
BGR
COL
AUS
BRA
BRA
KAZ
COL
LTU
HUN
EST
CHN
AUS
IRN
COL
FIN
FIN
BRA
JOR
ECU
AZE
LTU
LTU
BGR
LVA
ECU
KAZ
JOR
LVA
JOR
HUN
KWT
COL
ETH
EST
HUN
ETH
MAR
ETH
IND
AZE
CYP
HUN
LTU
BRA
IND
CHL
ECU
LTU
ISR
CYP
IRN
JOR
LTU
AZE
JOR
HUN
AZE
BGR
GEO
EST
EST
MAR
IND
EST
IND
IND
BRA
AZE
LVA
KAZ
LVA
COL
EST
AZE
CZE
ISR
ECU
ETH
IDN
FIN
LTU
KAZ
JOR
WW
COL
IND
CYP
CYP
BGR
LVA
COL
ARG
ARM
JOR
ECU
EST
LTU
LVA
COL
AZE
LVA
AZE
JOR
BRA
CHL
LTU
AUS
LTU
LTU
GBR
MAR
IRN
ECU
EST
FRA
CHL
JOR
JOR
AZE
LVA
AZE
AUS
LVA
ARG
LVA
JOR
LVA
ECU
HUN
AZE
JPN
EST
CYP
ECU
IRN
IRN
FRA
KAZ
GEO
COL
LVA
IND
KAZ
ECU
IRN
MAR
LVA
KGZ
ARG
EST
EST
WW
FIN
AUS
LTU
COL
AFG
CZE
DNK
IRN
CHL
IDN
CYP
IRL
COL
HUN
IRL
JOR
LTU
AZE
JOR
CYP
IND
BRA
ISR
EST
KAZ
AUT
ECU
LTU
IND
LTU
KAZ
IDN
AUS
IND
KWT
LTU
LTU
CHL
HUN
HUN
AUS
JOR
KAZ
ETH
KOR
MAR
BRA
EST
JPN
BRA
LTU
KAZ
JOR
CHL
KOR
JOR
EST
BGR
COL
AUT
CYP
KEN
CZE
IND
ETH
BOL
JOR
ECU
HUN
AZE
AZE
ISR
ECU
COL
IRQ
AUT
BGR
EST
JOR
BRA
ARG
LTU
EGY
LTU
ARM
IRL
ARM
LVA
IRN
CHL
LVA
COL
BRA
LVA
AUS
LVA
AUT
CYP
AZE
BRA
ALB
LTU
CHL
KWT
BRA
ARM
CYP
LTU
AZE
EST
LTU
IRN
IRN
EST
IRN
LVA
LTU
IRN
ARM
ISR
BRA
KAZ
JOR
IRN
ALB
JOR
COL
CYP
EST
IRN
ISL
ETH
CHN
AZE
KAZ
MAR
BRA
KGZ
ISR
EST
EST
KAZ
IND
LTU
ECU
IND
IRN
KAZ
AUS
KAZ
ECU
ISR
EST
AZE
LTU
GEO
COL
KGZ
HUN
IRL
BRA
KWT
LVA
FRA
CHL
JOR
CYP
LVA
DNK
KOR
KOR
IDN
CHL
LVA
LTU
F
IN
ARM
MAR
JOR
COL
KOR
LVA
JOR
AZE
IRL
BRA
LVA
CZE
IRN
ECU
IRN
BRA
ARG
IND
BGR
DNK
BGR
CYP
ETH
GEO
CYP
JPN
IND
CYP
ECU
CYP
ARG
BGR
IRN
BGR
COL
IRL
COL
IRN
GEO
KGZ
ETH
BGR
ETH
AZE
EST
HUN
CHL
EST
JPN
ETH
LVA
KGZ
EST
ECU
EST
ARM
DNK
ETH
DNK
IRN
LVA
COL
CYP
LKA
GRC
JOR
KAZ
LVA
IRN
ETH
JOR
ETH
EST
IRN
KAZ
AUS
IRL
EST
AUT
HUN
W
GEO
KOR
CHN
AZE
LTULTU
EGY
GEO
BRA
AUT
COL
COL
IND
FIN
LTU
CYP
IRN
IRL
ECU
ISR
LVA
KAZ
FIN
FRA
EST
HUN
LTU
ARM
AUS
COL
LTU
LVA
COL
JOR
AZE
IRN
EST
CHL
MAR
COL
IRN
IND
ETH
FIN
ARM
ISL
LTU
W
CHL
COL
COL
BLX
JORJOR
ISR
KAZ
ARM
AUS
KAZ
JPN
LVA
LTU
CYP
IRN
AUS
CYP
EST
ECU
IRN
AZE
ECU
KAZ
AFG
CYP
CHN
CZE
COL
KGZ
IND
BGR
ETH
BGR
AUS
KGZ
LTU
BGR
LTU
LVA
KGZ
JOR
CHN
ECU
KAZ
EST
ISL
W
W
CYP
LTU
IRN
BGR
CYP
JOR
AZE
LTU
AZE
CHL
KAZ
LVA
LVA
CYP
CYP
CZE
COL
GRC
JOR
W
LTU
BLX LVA
JPN
BLX
KAZ
LTU
DNK
IND
JOR
LVA
BRA
KGZ
AUT
LTU
KAZ
ESP
FIN
ISR
ECU
CHL
LVA
JPN
EGY
FIN
JPN
KAZ
W
LTU
ECU
KAZ
LVA
JOR
KAZ
KAZ
ALB
AUT
ECU
ETH
HUN
FIN
JOR
ARG
LTU
CHL
LVA
KAZ
JOR
CHL
LVA
IRN
GEO
JOR
IRN
FIN
CHN
EST
LTU
EST
ECU
LTU
IND
IRN
CYP
BRA
EST
BRA
ECU
JOR
KGZ
W
AUT
FIN
MAR
JPN
ECU
ETH
JORJOR
ECU
JOR
LTU
HUN
CYP
KAZ
ETH
EST
KGZ
W
ARG
KAZ
AZE
JPN
IRN
LVA
EST
LVA
KAZ
LVA
LTU
CZE
EST
JPN
IRN
CZE
COL
JOR
ECU
KAZ
IRN
LTU
LVA
JPN
ECU
JOR
IRL
IND
CHN
IND
KAZ
COL
IND
CHL
ECU
ETH
ECU
KGZ
AZE
BLX
IDN
LVA
LTU
KAZ
KAZ
GEO
AZE
ECU
KGZ
ARG
CYP
ARM
AZE
KOR
EST
COL
KAZ
AZE
ARM
AZE
AUT
COL
BGR
BRA
BRA
CYP
ETH
COL
ECU
JOR
KEN
JOR
IRN
KAZ
ECU
GBR
IRN
CYP
KEN
IRN
IRN
LTU
LTU
GEO
JOR
CYP
CYP
AZE
BGR
KEN
KGZ
ECU
W
BGR
JOR
KAZ
AZE
IRN
EGY
ECU
ECU
ETH
W
BGR
AZE
IRN
FIN
ETH
IDN
IND
KAZ
ECU
KAZ
LTU
IRL
JOR
EST
LTU
IRN
IRN
ARG
KAZ
GEO
HUN
EST
JOR
IND
CYP
BRA
CHN
COL
CYP
CZE
LVA
LVA
EST
ISR
CHL
COL
BOL
LTU
ECU
LVA
GEO
JOR
ARM
COL
ECU
FIN
LVA
BGR
EST
ETH
JOR
MAR
JOR
CHL
EST
IRN
COL
ETH
KEN
MAR
KGZ
CYP
IDN
JOR
BRA
KGZ
EST
GEO
ARM
CHL
CYP
BGR
BRA
BGR
FIN
CHL
JOR
ARG
IRN
CYP
ESP
KAZ
ECU
ISR
CYP
LVA
LVA
ESP
LVA
LTU
AZE
ESP
EST
BHR
BGR
JOR
FJI
KGZ
LVA
EST
CYP
COL
KOR
ECU
ECU
COL
COL
ETH
JPN
EST
CYP
CYP
COL
EST
JPN
ISR
MAR
CYP
BOL
ISR
DNK
ESP
CYP
W
COL
JOR
AZE
HUN
CYP
ETH
LTU
IDN
KAZ
BLX
BRA
LVA
BGR
IDN
AUT
AUS
AZE
ISR
CYP
CYP
BRA
C
YP
ESP
LTU
CHL
AZE
ECU
HUN
KGZ
AUT
JOR
BGR
LVA
IDN
GRC
JPN
CYP
LVA
JOR
HUN
JOR
FIN
IRN
COL
JOR
LVA
CYP
LTU
LVA
LTU
ECU
FIN
LTU
CYP
AZE
BGR
IND
KAZ
MAR
EST
ECU
ECU
AZE
LTU
LTU
W
JOR
AZE
IRN
BRA
KGZ
ETH
AZE
IRN
CYP
EST
LVA
GEO
LTU
IDN
W
ARM
HUN
CYP
CYP
HUN
JOR
LVA
ECU
AZE
AUT
ECU
LVA
ISL
ETH
LVA
LTU
FIN
IRN
GEO
BGR
AZE
JOR
ETH
LTU
CYP
COL
CHN
JOR
ERI
CZE
CYP
CYP
ECU
ISR
LVA
LVA
BGR
ETH
KAZ
ETH
CHL
COL
FIN
ETH
CYP
ARG
IRQ
LTU
MAR
ALB
ECU
LVA
LTU
CYP
EST
JOR
KAZ
KAZ
LVA
CYP CYP
CHN
COL
ETH
AUS
KAZ
IRN
KGZ
ISR
COL
BOL
COL
AUS
ECU
KOR
EST
LTU
KGZ
LTU
JOR
LVA
JOR
LVA
IRN
ISR
CYP
HUN
ETH
JOR
ARG
AUS
EST
MAR
ECU
CHL
BRA
GEO
KOR
JOR
IRL
GEO
BOL
KWT
KAZ
COL
LVA
LKA
AZE
CYP
AUS
JOR
AZE
GBR
LTU
GEO
AUT
GEO
COL
LVA
CYP
ECU
ETH
BGR
ETH
ESP
EST
AZE
FIN
KAZ
HUN
LTU
LTU
ECU
JOR
W
FIN
AZE
LTU
AZE
JPN
ECU
W ARM
CHL
COL
LTU
AZE
LTU
COL
IRN
LTU
BGR
LVA
COL
EST
LTU
LVA
IRN
CYP
ETH
AUS
KOR
ETH
ECU
ETH
JOR
KAZ
IDN
CYP
EST
ECU
COL
BRA
GEO
IND
IRN
HUN
W
KWT
LVA
CYP
CHL
HUN
ECU
HUN
FIN
GRC
FIN
LVA
CYP
LTU
LVA
ARM
JOR
CHN
CYP
KAZ
COL
AZE
CZE
JOR
JOR
EST
CAN
KOR
CYP
JOR
ETH
EGY
JOR
LTU
GRC
GRC
IRN
EGY
ETH
LTU
LVA
GEO
ARM
ARM
AZE
IDN
BOL
ARM
GRC
ECU
KAZ
FIN
CZE
EST
AZE
IDN
JOR
CYP
CHL
ECU
CYP
CYP
ECU
LTU
IRN
AZE
BGR
KAZ
ECU
IRN
ECU
KGZ
IRN
ETH
LVA
LVA
AUS
IDN
AUT
ARM
IND
CZE
BRA
IND
EST
AUS
ETH
LTU
IDN
ISR
HUN
IDN
KGZ
AZE
LTU
AZE
JOR
ARM
KOR
KAZ
ECU
LVA
ARG
AZE
CHL
LVA
LVA
IND
COL
KGZ
ARM
ETH
EST
ECU
JOR
IDN
JOR
LVA
LTU
ECU
LTU
CHL
IND
IND
KAZ
ECU
EST
LVA
LVA
CYP
ETH
KAZ
ETH
BGR
CYP
IND
IND
KGZ
ARM
KAZ
CYP
JOR
IRN
IND
IRL
DNK
ETH
CYP
IDN
CHL
CYP
DNK
ECU
ETH
ECU
ECU
EST
COL
ALB
ALB
COL
GEO
LTU
W
FIN
BGR
LVA
LTU
ETH
MAR
JOR
COL
KAZ
CHN
JOR
KOR
ARM
LVA
EST
ISL
KOR
LVA
BGR
IRN
IDN
KOR
ETH
ARM
LTU
AZE
COL
GEO
BRA
AZE
EGY
CYP
LVA
EST
ECU
BRA
JOR
COL
ETH
ECU
IRN
JOR
KGZ
IRN
ESP
LTU
IND
CYP
ETH
JOR
JOR
IRN
IRN
AUS
AZE
BRA
IND
COL
EST
CZE
FIN
LVA
LVA
LTU
LVA
IRL
JOR
ETH
ETH
W
ETH
IDN
IND
KWT
CYP
JOR
CYP
CYP
MAR
BGR
AFG
KAZ
ECU
AZE
EST
KENKEN
LTU
BGR
KAZ
AZE
IND
ISR
HUN
CYP
LTU
KGZ
FIN
FIN
HUN
AZE
MAR
CHL
HUN
IRN
COL
HUN
IRN
IND
MAR
LTU
GEO
ECU
ARM
ECU
BGR
LTU
AUS
LTU
KAZ
KWT
KGZ
IDN
HUN
IND
GEO
IND
EST
ETH
CYP
MAR
LVA
AZE
IRN
AZE
CHL
LVA
LVA
IND
GEO
AZE
COL
COL
EST
BGR
LVA
ECU
ISR
KAZ
CHL
KAZ
BRA
LTU
IDN
IND
GEO
JOR
AZE
CHLCHL
KEN
LTU
IRN
GEO
ECU
KAZ
HUN
LTU
GEO
BGR
KAZ
AZE
AZE
EST
LTU
AZE
BGR
HUN
ARM
KGZ
FRA
COL
COL
MAR
LTU
AUS
KAZ
AZE
KAZ
LVA
KWT
ETH
JOR
JOR
LTU
AZE
IDN
LVA
ECU
ETH
HUN
EST
CYP
LVA
FIN
LTU
CYP
ECU
BGR
HUN
GEO
CHN
KWT
BGR
CHL
LVA
IRL
CYP
CHL
KOR
ECU
IDN
IRN
CYP
AZE
EST
CHL
KAZ
HUN
KAZ
ARM
KGZ
JOR
CHL
ECU
CYP
IRN
CHL
COL
ECU
CHL
CYP
ARM
LVA
CHL
CZE
MAR
LVA
IRN
CYP
ETH
LVA
LTU
GEO
LVA
CHL
CZE
KAZ
LVA
LVA
JOR
ECU
ARM
IDN
CYP
LTU
IRN
LVA
BGR
IDN
MAR
IND
LTU
CYP
CYP
KAZ
KAZ
IRN
LTU
AZE
KAZ
CYP
AZE
LVA
IRL
LVA
ETH
ETH
CHL
CYP
LTU
LVA
ETH
CYP
ISR
JOR
IRN
IRN
ISL
LVA
JOR
AUT
CHN
GEO
BRA
KEN
ECU
JOR
AZE
AZE
ISR
KAZ
IDN
ESP
ECU
ARM
JOR
BRA
ARM
IDN
MAR
AZE
KWT
ISR
ETH
JOR
COL
CHL
ETH
AZE
AZE
AZE
JOR
JOR
GEO
CYP
KAZ
ARM
IRQ
ALB
JOR
IDN
CYP
IRN
BGR
EST
LVA
ETH
ECU
FIN
ETH
AZE
AZE
EST
CHL
BOL
CYP
LKA
JOR
JOR
CZE
AUS
LVA
ECU
AZE
ETH
JOR
ESP
JOR
ARM
ECU
CYP
JOR
AZE
COL
LTU
ECU
KGZ
KAZ
COL
COL
KGZ
CHL
KGZ
LTU
IRN
AZE
HUN
ETH
KAZ
LTU
CYP
ECU
ECU
CHL
KGZ
GEO
GEO
IND
AZE
ECU
KGZ
IDN
ETH
CYP
JOR
LTU
IDN
LVA
EST
ISL
CHL
ECU
CYP
LTU
KGZ
ERI
CZE
IRN
LTU
JOR
IRN
ETH
FIN
CHL
LVA
KGZ
FIN
KAZ
BGR
JOR
IRN
MAR
AZE
LVA
KAZ
IND
IRN
CYP
CZE
CHL
IDN
IDN
ISL
COL
JOR
CHL
CYP
EST
KOR
LVA
IRN
ETH
EST
ISR
EST
LTU
EST
IRN
EST
LTU
CYP
ECU
COL
LTU
LVA
EST
HUN
IDN
HUN
EST
IRN
AZE
ECU
LTU
GEO
IRN
COL
ARM
EST
ECU
JOR
ECU
CYP
AZE
BGR
ECU
C
YP
KGZ
KGZ
IRL
COL
LVA
AZE
EST
ETH
EST
BGR
DNK
IND
IND
IRL
LTU
AUS
ECU
GEO
KGZ
HUN
ARM
KAZ
IND
CYP
LTU
JOR
GEO
ETH
GEO
BOL
CHN
AZE
ECU
LVA
EGY
HUN
MAR
HUN
IND
ARM
CHL
KGZ
ECU
LTU
KAZ
LTU
ARM
KAZ
LTU
IND
GEO
LTU
EST
IDN
ETH
ECU
GEO
JOR
CHL
LVA
BGR
GEO
ETH
ECU
ECU
EST
JOR
IRN
KOR
BRA
KAZ
CYP
BGR
ETH
BOL
JOR
MAR
IRN
JOR
KAZ
CYP
BOL
ETH
BOL
KGZ
CHL
ARM
AZE
LVA
CHL
ETH
AUT
IDN
JOR
KAZ
LVA
KGZ
COL
JOR
GEO
JOR
IRN
ECU
AZE
AZE
CYP
AZE
FRA
BGR
IRN
LTU
LTU
DNK
EST
COL
COL
BRA
IRL
ETH
IND
BGR
CYP
FIN
BRA
ETH
LTU
CHN
JOR
ARM
CYP
FIN
LVA
EST
EST
AZE
ECU
AZE
CHL
LKA
ETH
AZE
JOR
BOL
AFG
ISR
LVA
LTU
DNK
CYP
LTU
EST
JOR
KGZ
FIN
JOR
CYP
CYP
W
CHL
EST
IRN
LTU
COL
EST
LTU
ETH
BGR
AZE
CHL
ECU
IRQ
KGZ
KEN
JOR
LTU
CZE
DNK
JOR
IRN
IND
LTU
KAZ
AZE
GBR
IRN
JOR
AZE
ECU
ETH
IRN
BGR
BGR
IND
ARM
CYP
IND
ARM
ECU
IDN
ARM
COL
CYP
LVA
KAZ
MAR
JOR
BGR
GRC
LVA
ETH
IRN
JOR
CYP
BRA
CYP
LTU
IRN
KOR
ETH
CYP
EST
LVA
KGZ
AZE
CYP
JOR
ECU
BGR
GEO
JOR
LVA
EST
BOL
AFG
ECU
ECU
ARM
W
ARG
W
IRN
AFG
ALB
ETH
ECU
MAR
ECU
LTU
MAR
ARM
ALB
LTU
COL
LTU
LVA
JOR
JOR
ARM
ECU
HUN
ISR
CYP
ARM
COL
IND
KWT
ECU
ECU
BOL
KGZ
ECU
IRN
LVA
CHL
LVA
BRA
EST
LTU
LVA
ARM
LTU
IRL
ECU
ETH
CHL
COL HUN
KEN
HUN
BGR
LTU
GRC
HUN
LVA
IDN
KGZ
HUN
KAZ
AZE
CYP
ARM
KAZ
JOR
KOR
C
AN
KWT
CYP
CHL
CYP
AZE
LTU
IRL
CYP
LVA
IND
ARM
LTU
GEO
LTU
AZE
IRNIRN
KAZ
ETH
LVA
JOR
ARG
IRN
DNK
COL
KGZ
KGZ
ECU
W
BOL
CYP
LVA
BGR
ECU
ECU
W
W
MAR
AZE
HUN
COL
BGR
EST
MAR
IRL
LTU
LTU
GEO
LVA
LTU
BOL
CAN
CYP
LVA
KGZ
EST
ECU
FRA
BOL
FIN
BRA
ARM
LTU
MAC
GEO
LTU
LVA
KEN
ESP
W
KGZ
ITA
ALB
W
ETH
BGR
LTU
KAZ
ECU
AZE
EST
FIN
COL
KGZ
EST
IND
IND
IRN
CHL
ECU
CHL
CYP
KGZ
LVA
GEO
ARM
JOR
MAR
ECU
IND
LVA
KAZ
BGR
CYP
W
ECU
KAZ
KAZ
KAZ
CZE
AZE
ETH
ARM
JOR
CYP
AZE
LTU
BGR
LVA
LTU
IRL
ECU
EST
AZE
IRN
JOR
BOL
KGZ
COL
ETH
KAZ
CHL
ARM
AZE
JOR
CYP
BOL
KAZ
GEO
KAZ
JOR
ARM
ETH
EST
GEO
JOR
ISR
LTU
ARM
COL
GEO
KGZ
EST
GEO
GEO
IRL
EST
ARM
CYP
LTU
ETH
EST
ARM
KAZ
LVA
GEO
ECU
IND
AZE
ARG
IRN
ETH
AZE
JOR
CHL
ALB
ECU
CYP
W
IDN
CHL
COL
ETH
ARG
KAZ
JOR
EST
KAZ
BGR
LVA
ECU
ARM
ETH
HUN
ARM
LTU
CYP
ETH
KAZ
LTU
EST
ETH
EST
IRL
LTU
AZE
LVA
LVA
KAZ
AZE
AZE
AZE
EST
AZE
ARM
KAZ
LVA
AZE
LVA
KAZ
KGZ
MAR
LTU
FIN
LTU
LVA
LTU
KAZ
AZE
EST
JOR
LTU
CHL
COL
BOL
COL
IRN
JOR
LTU
COL
GEO
ARM
ARM
MAR
COL
ECU
HUN
JOR
IND
ECU
GEO
ESP
LTU
BGR
IND
AZE
CHL
CYP
CYP
ALB
HUN
KGZ
ECU
ETH
ARM
GRC
BGR
LVA
ARM
COL
GEO
ETH
AZE
KAZ
ALB
AZE
LVA
BRA
BGR
COL
JOR
CYP
LTU
ERIIRN
CAN
KGZ
GEO
BGR
ARM
IDN
ARM
FJI
JOR
CHL
KAZ
LAZE
TU
CAN
BGR
AZE
W
EST
FIN
HUN
CZE
KAZ
LVA
KGZ
IRN
IRN
LVA
ECU
AZE
FIN
ECU
ETH
LVA
ARM
GEO
IDN
GEO
CYP
JOR
CYP
HUN
GEO
LVA
EST
GEO
IDN
ISR
JOR
CYP
IND
CHL
ECU
KGZ
KGZ
LVA
EST
EST
ETH
GEO
ECU
KGZ
W
ARM
AZE
IRN
FJI
CYP
KGZ
EST
W
EST
ARM
ARM
ETH
AZE
LTU
IDN
KAZ
CYP
KGZ
ECU
CYP
ESP
LVA
KAZ
BGR
ETH
ARM
LVA
JOR
ETH
EST
LVA
JOR
KGZ
AZE
IND
KGZ
LTU
ECU
ARM
LTU
LTU
BOL
COL
ECU
LTU
KAZ
ECU
GEO
LVA
ETH
KGZ
EST
ECU
LTU
LVA
GEO
ARM
LTU
GEO
IND
ARM
IDN
BOL
BGR
LVA
ETH
AZE
AZE
LTU
KGZ
CYP
KAZ
CYP
AZE
LVA
JOR
MAR
EST
LTU
CYP
KGZ
ETH
CAN
KAZ
AUS
JOR
ETH
ECU
JOR
ARM
ETH
IRN
LVA
KAZ
KAZ
ECU
IDN
AZE
LVA
CYP
W
AZE
IRL
ETH
IRN
LTU
AZE
FIN
EST
JOR
BGR
KOR
ECU
JOR
AZE
LTU
LTU
CZE
AZE
KAZ
IRN
LTU
ECU
CHL
IDN
IND
LVA
LTU
AZE
AZE
GEO
EST
IND
ECU
HUN
CYP
AZE
ETH
ETH
IRN
HUN
LTU
CYP
ARM
BGR
ECU
EGY
EST
BGR
GEO
GEO
CHL
EST
EST
HUN
AZE
KAZ
CHL
BGR
IRN
LTU
AZE
LTU
ETH
ECU
IND
ALB
EST
ARM
ARM
GEO
AZE
FIN
JOR
ECU
ETH
BRA
ETH
INDIND
EST
CAN
AZE
GEO
W
CYP
IND
CZE
IND
CYP
LVA
CYP
BOL
BGR
KGZ
AZE
ECU
CHL
EST
W
EST
BRA
JOR
IDN
COL
KGZ
GEO
IRN
ECU
LTU
JOR
AZE
IND
ETH
LTU
ETH
BGR
MAR
CAN
LVA
CAN
GBR
AZE
CHL
W
JOR
CYP
BGR
KGZ
IND
ARM
KAZ
KAZ
KAZ
AZE
LVA
COL
LTU
KGZ
LTU
ECU
ECU
KOR
KGZ
ETH
J
OR
CYP
JOR
EST
JOR
GEO
ETH
W
EST
KGZ
JOR
IDN
ISR
IND
W
EST
AZE
CYP
LTU
ARM
AZE
AZE
EST
GEO
AZE
IRN
ECU
ETH
IDN
AZE
COL
LVA
CYP
CHL
KGZ
KWT
BGR
ARM
KAZ
LVA
EST
BGR
FIN
LVA
KGZ
ARM
HUN
ERI
CYP
CAN
EGY
FIN
FJI
ARG
KGZ
CYP
JOR
IRN
GEO
CYP
CHL
LVA
LTU
W
LKA
AZE
GEO
KAZ
KAZ
ETH
LVA
ECU
LVA
ARM
CYP
KGZ
LVA
LVA
CAN
GEO
KGZ
CYP
KAZ
LTU
HUN
CYP
DNK
IND
IRN
IND
AZE
ETH
AZE
KGZ
LTU
ETH
JOR
AZE
AUT
KGZ
COL
IRN
JOR
AZE
CYP
CYP
AZE
JOR
EST
EST
ETH
ECU
HUN
ARG
KAZ
EST
LTU
LTU
BGR
KAZ
W
ECU
CAN
IND
ETH
ETH
CHL
ECU
KOR
ARM
ECU
BOL
GEO
BRA
LTU
GEO
ARM
ARG
COL
MAR
LVA
EST
JOR
AZE
KAZ
JOR
GEO
LVA
AZE
AZE
LTU
JOR
ECU
AZE
AZE
BGR
AZE
ETH
KOR
CYP
EST
BGR
COL
CYP
KOR
EST
ECU
HUN
GEO
ETH
ECU
ECU
CYP
LVA
AZE
EST
JOR
EST
IND
KGZ
ECUECU
BGR
COL
GEO
LTU
GEO
AZE
JOR
BGR
IRN
IRN
ETH
JOR
CYP
BOL
LVA
COL
ISR
MAC
ECU
KGZ
ARM
COL
KWT
EST
ECU
LTU
ARM
AZE
IDN
LTU
ARG
KGZ
HUN
ECU
CYP
ETH
KGZ
ARG
LVA
JOR
GEO
ETH
ISR
IDN
W
JOR
CYP
ETH
JOR
BGR
LVA
LTU
KOR
ETH
GEO
EST
CYP
ARM
KGZ
IRN
MAC
IRN
LVA
JOR
ERI
JOR
MAR
CHL
KAZ
KAZ
MAC
LVA
EST
CYP
ETH
JOR
KEN
JOR
W
AZE
ETH
COL
GEO
LKA
IND
ARM
CAN
EST
AZE
ARM
AZE
ETH
IRN
EST
AZE
GEO
ETH
ARM
GEO
EST
COL
KGZ
COL
CYP
DNK
ALB
JOR
AZE
LVA
ETH
ETH
W
ETH
GEO
AZE
KGZ
ECU
BOL
EST
LVA
LTU
JOR
EST
IRN
ETH
LVA
LTU
ERI
JOR
LTU
KOR
EST
JOR
AZE
KGZ
COL
AZE
CYP
AZE
ERI
ETH
BGR
KGZ
ETH
KGZ
KAZ
ECU
IRN
KAZ
IND
GEO
ERI
FIN
KAZ
CYP
W
CZE
ETH
KEN
GEO
CYP
LTU
JOR
ARM
CYP
BGR
BMU
W
KAZ
GEO
ETH
JOR
JOR
LTU
ETH
IDN
AZE
LKA
AZE
LVA
JOR
MAR
BOL
BRA
JOR
GEO
AZE
GEO
KGZ
ETH
LTU
EST
BOL
EST
AZE
EST
W
CYP
ETH
KAZ
JOR
KGZ
EST
ECU
KGZ
AZE
KAZ
HUN
ALB
LTU
JOR
BOL
CHL
KAZ
ARM
LTU
AZE
KAZ
ARM
EST
IDN
EST
ARM
EST
EST
KGZ
KGZ
ECU
KAZ
AZE
KAZ
W
ECU
IDN
ETH
LVA
COL
W
ARM
COL
ETH
ECU
GEO
ARM
CAN
ARM
KAZ
LVA
IND
BOL
AZE
GEO
AZE
IDN
AZE
ETH
ARG
KGZ
GEO
ARM
BOL
KAZ
CYP
CHL
AZE
KWT
KGZ
AZE
JOR
EST
MAR
IRN
KAZ
KEN
LVA
ECU
ETH
LVA
FIN
ARM
BGR
CYP
KGZ
EST
GEO
GEO
IND
EGY
LVA
ETH
COL
AZE
GEO
LVA
IDN
CYP
ARM
DNK
JOR
MAR
W
W
AZE
HUN
IRN
IRN
AZE
LVA
HUN
EST
KAZ
KAZ
COL
GEO
ARM
JOR
ETH
KGZ
CYP
ETH
GEO
KGZ
ECU
ETH
IRL
IRN
AZE
COL
LTU
IRN
JOR
LVA
AZE
ECU
ECU
W
ERI
ARG
IND
ALB
IND
KGZ
ETH
BGR
LVA
CYP
WW
AZE
ALB
BRA
LTU
KGZ
ETH
ETH
EST
W
AZE
KGZ
LTU
ECU
ECU
W
LTU
ARM
GEO
ETH
IRN
AZE
LTU
BOL
IND
LVA
LTU
GEO
IRL
HUN
ECU
KAZ
IDN
IRN
ECU
CYP
JOR
W
W
JOR
KAZ
DNK
A
RM
ETH
ARM
W
ETH
BGR
GEO
ETH
BRA
AZE
CYP
IRN
CYP
LVA
AUS
HUN
BRA
EST
KAZ
KAZ
AZE
W
FJI
JOR
LVA
AZE
ECU
ECU
ETH
KGZ
ETH
GEO
KAZ
IRN
AZE
BOL
LTU
LTU
BGR
AZE
ETH
BGR
GEO
BGR
MAR
BOL
EST
ECU
AZE
KGZ
ARM
ECU
ETH
ETH
ARM
AZE
EST
IND
ARM
AZE
BOL
AZE
LTU
W
KGZ
BGR
KGZ
KGZ
HUN
KAZ
EST
ETH
GEO
JOR
IND
ALB
ETH
GEO
CYP
BGR
ETH
KAZ
JOR
MAR
JOR
EST
ERI
LTU
HUN
EST
EST
ARM
KAZ
CYP
LVA
COL
ETH
EST
KAZ
ECU
GEO
IDN
KGZ
AZE
ETH
ARM
ETH
LVA
KAZ
ECU
KAZ
ARM
KGZ
ETH
GEO
LTU
ECU
KGZ
IND
W
MAR
GEO
ETH
KGZ
ARM
LVA
KAZ
BGR
KAZ
KOR
EST
CYP
ARG
KGZ
CYP
GEO
HUN
DNK
COL
ECU
KOR
KAZ
KGZ
KGZ
LTU
AZE
CYP
GEO
GEO
EST
LVA
ERI
IDN
JORJOR
ETH
EST
LTU
ARG
BOL
GEO
FIN
ETH
IDN
CHL
IND
ETH
LVA
JOR
EST
ETH
CYP
LVA
COL
COL
BOL
GEO
AZE
ETH
LVA
ARM
ECU
W
ETH
AZE
ECU
KGZ
JOR
ECU
GEO
CYP
CHN
CYP
JOR
COL
IRN
EST
DNK
KGZ
AZE
AZE
ERI
COL
IND
ARM
JOR
KGZ
IND
KGZ
IRN
KAZ
IRL
BGR
CYP
KAZ
ETH
KOR
ARM
BGR
IRN
KGZ
LVA
AZE
ECU
KGZ
KOR
JOR
IDN
GEO
BOL
LTU
W
EST
IDN
KOR
LVA
LTU
EGY
KAZ
JOR
ALB
IND
EST
JOR
GEO
KAZ
KOR
LVA
AZEAZE
IRN
AZE
KAZ
AZE
JOR
KAZ
ETH
ETH
EST
ETH
LVA
ARM
KAZ
AZE
IND
GEO
GEO
ETH
ETH
GEO
KGZ
ECU
CYP
W
KGZ
COL
JOR
KGZ
GEO
HUN
EST
IDN
JOR
IDN
ERI
EST
KGZ
AZE
ARM
BGR
JOR
COL
AUT
KGZ
CYP
ETH
AZE
GEO
KWT
KAZ
KGZ
AZE
LVA
W
LVA
LVA
ARM
ARM
KOR
ETH
KOR
DNK
ECU
KAZ
ARM
GEO
ECU
KAZ
CYP
JOR
AZE
ECU
BGR
ARM
KGZ
IRN
DNK
CYP
ARM
KGZ
GEO
ETH
CYP
KGZ
IDN
KGZ
CYP
AZE
ETH
ARM
ETH
JOR
ARM
LTU
KGZ
ECU
ERI
EST
KOR
W
ETH
GEO
ETH
ETH
AZE
LTU
EST
IND
ETH
AZE
KGZ
ARM
EST
KGZ
ETH
ALB
BRA
ECU
LTU
ETH
KGZ
IRN
ARM
EST
JOR
KEN
ERI
KGZ
ERI
AZE
AZE
ETH
W
KAZ
KGZ
AUT
ARM
COL
JOR
ISL
GEO
AZE
KGZ
AZE
IRN
GEO
LTU
ETH
IND
JOR
AFG
LTU
EST
GEO
ARM
EST
COL
KGZ
ECU
EGY
ARM
ARM
BGR
BOL
CYP
W
ECU
BRA
IDN
EST
W
AUT
ARM
JOR
JOR
BLX
IND
ETH
BGR
CYP ECU
COL
LTU
ISL
KAZ
JOR
W
ERI
KGZ
ECU
COL
COL
ETH
EST
LTU
KAZ
ARM
ECU
ARM
BGR
LVA
KGZ
ECU
ERI
FJI
KEN
JOR
ARM
ETH
KOR
ALB
KAZ
GEO
W
W
ARM
BGR
ETH
ARM
KGZ
CYP
CYP
ERI
HUN
MAR
BOL
COL
CYP
JOR
LTU
LVA
LVA
ARM
ERI
JOR
KGZ
IRN
KGZ
ETH
COL
BOL
KGZ
AZE
MAR
GEO
KGZ
W
AZE
AZE
ARG
ARM
AZE
ETH
BGR
KGZ
FJI
KAZ
IRN
ETH
KGZ
IDN
ECU
JOR
ARM
EST
GBR
GEO
AZE
IRN
WJOR
KGZ
AZE
KAZ
W
LTU
BGR
ARM
LVA
ETH
W
ARM
AZE
KGZ
AZE
ARG
MAR
ARG
ECU
KAZ
LTU
JOR
IDN
ARM
LVA
AFG
CYP
AZE
KGZ
ARM
BOL
IDN
AUS
MAR
LTU
KAZ
LVA
ETH
GEO
LTU
IND
IECU
DN
ETH
EST
KAZ
JOR
ERI
JOR
EST
AUS
ECU
AZE
BOL
ARM
ALB
ECU
EJOR
TH
ARM
KAZ
GEO
JOR
ARM
ETH
DNK
W
KAZ
KAZ
EST
JOR
ERI
CYP
ARM
KGZ
KGZ
W
FIN
W
COL
AUS
IDN
ETH
AZE
ETH
KGZ
CYP
ARM
LTU
GEO
FJI
CYP
IRN
KGZ
DNK
AZE
ETH
ARM
JOR
KGZ
AUT
CYP
AZE
W
LTU
KGZ
ETH
ETH
BMU
LVA
LVA
ERI
W
BGR
LVA
GEO
ETH
KAZ
W
ETH
ETH
IDN
ETHETH
BGR
AZE
BOL
KEN
GEO
W
JOR
JOR
JOR
ECU
LTU
EST
ARM
KGZ
LVA
ETH
ARM
ETH
BGR
ECU
W
ARM
BGR
LVA
ECU
W
JOR
ERI
ECU
GEO
GEO
CHL
GEO
KGZ
KGZ
FJI
KGZ
EST
GEO
ETH
CHL
AZE
ERI
BOL
EST
AZE
KGZ
JOR
KGZ
KGZ
ALB
ETH
IRN
MAR
AZE
MAR
MAC
AZE
KGZ
AZE
ETH
JOR
IDN
LVA
AZE
GEO
LTU
KGZ
ETH
MAR
LKA
ETH
KAZ
ARM
ARM
AZE
ERI
ISL
W
ECU
W
ETH
AZE
LVA
IDN
LVA
ERI
ECU
AZE
ECU
LTU
JOR
GEO
ARM
W
ARM
KAZ
GEO
KAZ
ERI
KEN
ECU
ARM
BOL
W
ARM
IRQ
ECU
EST
KAZ
HUN
ARM
ARM
ALB
W
ARM
KGZ
KGZ
KGZ
JOR
KGZ
KAZ
AZE
EST
ARM
MAR
ETH
ETH
ECU
W
ETH
FIN
ERI
ETH
ARM
GEO
ISL
JOR
AZE
BMU
MAR
AZE
AZE
ARM
ERI
GEO
IND
GEO
AZE
ISL
BRA
ECU
CYP
AUS
JOR
W
BOL
IND
EST
ECU
JOR
AZE
KGZ
IDN
BOL
AZE
LTU
W
KGZ
KAZ
GEO
DNK
KAZ
ETH
EST
LVA
GEO
W
ECU
BGR
ECU
KGZ
HUN
MAC
ETH
AFG
CHL
ETH
ARM
W
AZE
GEO
W
ARM
IDN
ARM
IDN
COL
BGR
JOR
LTU
ETH
ECU
LTU
LTU
EST
AZE
ARM
LVA
IRN
W
ETH
KAZ
GEO
ARM
KGZ
KGZ
KGZ
ECU
ETH
JOR
IRN
AZE
ARM
ETH
CYP
AUS
AZE
ECU
EST
AZE
ARM
ETH
KGZ
ECU
ETH
ECU
ETH
BOL
ERI
ERI
ERI
CYP
KGZ
EST
KGZ
COL
ARM
IRN
W
AZE
GEO
ECU
GEO
AFG
BGR
BGR
CHL
KGZ
ARM
AZE
KAZ
AZE
ARM
ECU
GEO
LTU
BRA
KGZ
AZE
KGZ
KAZ
KGZ
KAZ
LVA
ETH
BMU
ARM
KGZ
ARM
COL
ERI
ARM
BOL
LTU
KAZ
KGZ
KGZ
GEO
HUN
LVA
ARG
AZE
IRL
ALB
KGZ
LVA
LVA
GEO
AZE
AZE
ECU
ECU
KAZ
ARM
JOR
KAZ
BGR
CHL
LVA
INDKEN
LTU
CYP
IND
JOR
KGZ
W
BGR
ETH
GEO
MAR
LVA
W
ECU
IRN
COL
GEO
IRN
ETH
ECU
ETH
LTU
W
CYP
KAZ
GEO
KGZ
GEO
AZE
AZE
ETH
BRA
ETH
KAZ
ISL
ALB
ECU
W
JOR
KEN
BGR
HUN
BGR
EGY
ECU
LVA
ECU
ETH
W
ETH
ETH
AZE
BOL
ETH
IRN
BGR
AZE
ERI
ISL
CYP
GEO
KGZ
JOR
IDN
GEO
ARM
HUN
GEO
ARM
ARM
AUT
ETH
W
ARM
AZE
ECU
BRA
ARG
ERI
CHL
JOR
AZE
LVA
ETH
KEN
ETH
ETH
ETH
AZE
KGZ
ECU
KGZ
ARM
IRN
KEN
ECU
W
FJI
JOR
COL
LVA
KEN
ARG
ECU
JOR
KGZ
EST
KAZ
LTU
BOL
ARM
LTU
W
ECU
KGZ
ERI
IRN
KAZ
ARM
BRA
IRN
GEO
KGZ
KGZ
BDI
ARM
AZE
AZE
AZE
ARM
JOR
CZE
ARM
W
ERI
KGZ
EKGZ
RI
IND
ECU
ETH
AZE
IRN
CHL
ARM
CHL
ECU
ARM
ETH
AZE
KGZ
KAZ
ARM
CYP
ARM
GEO
ARM
ECU
IRN
ETH
AZE
KEN
ERI
ERI
IRN
IDN
HUN
ARM
AZE
EST
KGZ
ECU
ETH
LTU
ERI
ETH
AZE
LTU
BOL
W
ISL
ARM
LTU
EST
GEO
AZE
GEO
JOR
LVA
GEO
LTU
EST
LVA
ECU
LVA
ETH
ETH
KGZ
ERI
IND
W
ETH
BGR
ARM
ERI
ERI
AZE
W
BRA
KAZ
IRN
BGR
AZE
ARM
CYP
CZE
ETH
W
AZE
IND
AZE
KGZ
W
ERI
ETH
GEO
KGZ
BOL
IND
ISL
KGZ
AUS
ARM
JOR
ERI
KGZ
AZE
BGR
KGZ
W
W
BHR
BRA
ECU
AZE
ECU
COL
KGZ
ARM
GEO
ARM
BGR
BGR
ETH
KAZ
ECU
ARM
IDN
AZE
GEO
KGZ
W
IRN
AZE
KGZ
KGZ
HUN
ARM
W
KAZ
MAR
ARM
AZE
KGZ
W
ECU
CZE
ARG
ETH
IRN
JOR
JOR
KGZ
MAR
LKA
ETH
KGZ
GEO
AZE
GEO
ETH
AZE
JOR
ETH
JOR
ETH
EST
AZE
ETH
JOR
GEO
LVA
LTU
BOL
GEO
JOR
GEO
GEO
W
KGZ
JOR
AZE
LTU
AUT
ALB
KGZ
IRN
BGR
KGZ
KGZ
ARM
AZE
KGZ
ARM
IRN
CYP
ARM
ECU
IDN
ARM
BGR
AUT
HUN
GEO
ETH
BOL
ETH
W
ARM
AZE
HUN
ARM
KGZ
KGZ
GEO
ETH
LVA
KGZ
ERI
ETH
HUN
ERI
ARM
ETH
CZE
KGZ
JOR
EST
ERI
ARM
CYP
ARM
LTU
KGZ
ARM
AUT
CYP
ETH
KAZ
CYP
BMU
ETH
BRA
AZE
ERI
LVA
ARM
W
AZE
BRA
HUN
CZE
W
IND
KEN
IRN
KGZ
LVA
KGZ
ERI
BOL
KGZ
BRA
ERI
ARM
LTU
ETH
AZE
GEO
GEO
ERI
KGZ
KAZ
ARM
GEO
CHN
EST
BGR
GEO
ETH
GEO
LTU
BOL
AZE
AUT
CYP
KGZ
LTU
KGZ
AZE
KGZ
ARM
W
AZE
KAZ
KAZ
GEO
BOL
ECU
GEO
GEO
BOL
ECU
ETH
E
RI
ALB
CZE
BRA
ARM
AUS
LVA
KGZ
MAR
BRABRA
IDN
LVA
LVA
W
KGZ
GEO
AZE
IND
CYP
ARM
ARM
GEO
BOL
W
BOL
AZE
AUT
ECU
ERI
KGZ
KAZ
IDN
ETH
AZE
AZE
KGZ
CYP
ARM
LTU
ETH
JOR
W
ECU
JOR
ALB
HUN
ARM
ETH
MAC
BRA
EST
FIN
KGZ
AZE
W
LTU
GEO
LVA
IRN
ARM
BGR
AFG
HUN
LVA
KGZ
IND
GEO
ETH
JOR
AZE
ARM
WBGR
KAZ
ERI
BRA
ERI
KGZ
ECU
W
KGZ
AZE
BOL
ARM
LTU
KGZ
ECU
ETH
BMU
KGZ
COL
ETH
HUN
GEO
GEO
CYP
COL
GEO
ARM
AZE
EST
ETH
KAZ
GEO
ARM
IDN
KGZ
GEO
BGR
ERI
IDN
LVA
AZE
ARM
AUS
ERI
KGZ
AZE
W
BGR
KGZ
W
CYP
AZE
ERI
CYP
GEO
KAZ
IND
JOR
ETH
ETH
ERI
ARM
W
KGZ
KAZ
KAZ
BGR
CZE
ETH
ETH
MAC
ERI
ECU
ARM
W
IRN
ARM
LVA
KGZ
ETH
GEO
CYP
CYP
ECU
GEO
COL
W
W
KGZ
GEO
ARM
KAZ
AZE
ARM
LVA
W
KGZ
W
MAR
GEO
CYP
HUN
HUN
GEO
KGZ
ETH
JOR
ETH
KGZ
JOR
JOR
GEO
CYP
KGZ
GEO
KGZ
ARM
BOL
KGZ
ARM
KGZ
GEO
ARM
LTU
GEO
ECU
IDN
W
ERI
JOR
LTU
W
JOR
GEO
KGZ
ARM
KGZ
ARM
ALB
AZE
ERI
BOL
KGZ
ARM
ERI
ARM
ERI
ERI
ECU
KAZ
ERI
ERI
COL
IDN
ARM
ETH
COL
ERI
KGZ
KGZ
ERI
BMU
BOL
BMU
ETH
W
BRA
AFG
KGZ
ERI
JOR
JOR
IND
GEO
ETH
KGZ
ARM
ERI
ETH
KAZ
LKA
KAZ
ETH
ARM
JOR
JOR
GEO
ARM
AZE
ECU
ARM
JOR
ECU
ETH
AZE
GEO
W
AZE
W
LVA
KGZ
ARM
GEO
ARM
ARM
KAZ
ERI
FIN
KGZ
GEO
BMU
GEO
W
KGZ
JOR
ERI
BOL
LTU
BOL
KGZ
AZE
ERI
W
LTU
WJOR
ARM
GRC
GEO
ETH
JOR
JOR
IRN
AZE
W
BMU
JOR
ETH
CHL
ARM
ARG
ECU
KWT
KGZ
DNK
ETH
LVA
GEO
GEO
CHN
IRN
AZE
GRC
JOR
ARM
ERI
ARM
AZE
KGZ
AZE
MAR
ETH
ARM
BOL
ARM
JOR
LVA
ERI
AUS
W
GEO
W
GEO
ERI
EST
ECU
ARM
ETH
ETH
W
GEO
ARM
ETH
GEO
ETH
ERI
ETH
ETH
ERI
KGZ
BMU
ETH
GEO
ERI
ECU
BOL
KGZ
LTU
AZE
ERI
DNK
ECU
KGZ
ETH
DNK
KAZ
HUN
ETH
ARM
JOR
LVA
W
GEO
GEO
ETH
BMU
W
AZE
FIN
ARG
IDN
JOR
ETH
BOL
ECU
ETH
ERI
IDN
KGZ
AZE
ECU
JOR
W
AZE
ERI
ETH
MAR
KGZ
JOR
LTU
AZE
LTU
ARM
GEO
IDN
KGZ
ARM
ETH
GEO
AZE
ARM
ETHETH
KGZ
ETH
JOR
ERI
ETH
KGZ
WWARM
MAR
GEO
ECU
LVA
ERI
GEO
BMU
ETH
ECU
ETHAUS
BRA
ERI
AZE
ARM
KEN
LTU
AZE
ARM
AZE
ERI
GEO
ARM
ARM
LVA
ERI
ECU
ERI
ERI
IRN
KGZ
KGZ
W
BGR
AZE
ETH
ERI
GEO
LTU
ARM
KGZ
AZE
ARM
ERI
AZE
LTU
KGZ
W
W
GRC
CYP
KGZ
ECU
BMU
W
MAR
W
W
ERI
KAZ
KGZ
W
BGR
JOR
COL
ETH
IRN
DNK
IRN
BOL
ERI
ARM
ERI
ERI
BGR
ERI
ECU
GEO
IND
ETH
BMU
W
ARM
KAZ
KGZ
ARM
ARM
CYP
KGZ
ETH
ETH
GEO
JOR
KGZ
GEO
KGZ
KGZ
ARM
KGZ
DNK
ERI
ECU
KGZ
ARM
W
ETH
ARM
ERI
ERI
ARM
AZE
JOR
ETH
KGZ
KGZ
GEO
IRN
ETH
AUS
ECU
ARM
KGZ
ARM
ERI
LTU
ETH
KGZ
BDI
ARM
ERI
KGZ
LTU
ERI
ARM
ERI
KGZ
AZE
KGZ
ARM
AUS
KGZ
GEO
KEN
W
ERI
KGZ
ARG
ETH
ERI
JOR
ERI
ETH
ERI
ARM
ERI
ERI
AZE
KGZ
KGZ
GEO
KEN
KGZ
ERI
GEO
LTU
GEO
KGZ
W
W
AFG
IRN
DNK
JOR
AZE
ARG
W
ERI
ERI
ERI
ETH
ERI
AZE
ARM
ERI
KGZ
KGZ
ARM
IND
ARM
KGZ
GEO
ETH
AZE
KGZ
KGZ
ECU
BOL
ARM
BMU
IND
KGZ
ERI
ETH
ERI
GEO
KGZ
KEN
BGR
HUN
ETH
W
AUS
COL
ERI
COL
ETH
KGZ
KGZ
ERI
KGZ
ERI
IND
ERI
GEO
ERI
LTU
AZE
ARM
ARM
W
ERI
GEO
HUN
KGZ
KGZ
ARM
KGZ
ETH
MAR
ERI
ERI
ERI
W
ERI
ERI
ERI
ECU
COLLTU
ARM
MAR
W
LTU
CYP
KGZ
W
ARM
KGZ
ERI
ARM
ETH
LVA
LKA
JOR
IND
KGZ
ARM
ARM
ERI
KGZ
IRN
LVA
GEO
ERI
KGZ
ARM
ERI
AZE
ERI
AZE
W
ERI
ERI
W
AZE
KAZ
ETH
GEO
KGZ
GEO
KGZ
ECU
CYP
ETH
AZE
IND
ERI
ERI
ERI
ERI
ERI
BOL
ECU
W
KGZ
JOR
W
KGZ
ERI
ETH
ARM
EST
AZE
ERI
ERI
IRN
W
ERI
ETH
W
AUS
AUS
GEO
GEO
KGZ
JOR
IRL
ERI
GEO
KGZ
ARM
GEO
BMU
KWT
AZE
ERI
AZE
ARM
ERI
AZE
ERI
IRL
AZE
ERI
KGZ
KGZ
AZE
ERI
ERI
AZE
ERI
ETH
ARM
AZE
KAZ
ARM
AZE
IRN
ERI
KGZ
BOL
ERI
BGR
ARM
GEO
ERI
BHR
KGZ
ETH
ARM
KAZ
ARM
AZE
GEO
KGZ
ECU
W
GEO
CYP
ETH
ARM
ERI
AZE
KGZ
ERI
ERI
COL
ERI
KGZ
ARM
KAZ
KGZ
KGZ
KGZ
BOL
BGR
GEO
ERI
ERI
AZE
ERI
KGZ
GEO
ERI
ARM
JOR
AZE
ETH
W
ETH
ETHEST
ERI
IND
IND
KGZ
GRC
AFG
ETH
AZE
ERI
BOL
GEO
JOR
JOR
ETH
KEN
ERI
LVA
ERI
KGZ
ERI
KGZ
ERI
CYP
KGZ
ETH
KGZ
GEO
KGZ
ECU
AZE
ERI
JOR
ARM
ERI
KGZ
ERI
ETH
IND
KGZ
KGZ
COL
ERI
ERIKGZ
BOL
ERI
ARM
ERI
IND
ERI
ARM
KEN
IRN
KGZ
KGZ
LVA
ERI
ERI
CYP
ETH
ERI
ERI
ERI
LVA
KGZ
ETH
GEO
BOL
KGZ
ARM
KEN
ERI
ERI
FJI
KGZ
AZE
ERI
ARM
ERI
ERI
CYP
BOL
ETH
ERI
ERI
ARM
ERI
ERI
JOR
KGZ
ERI
ARM
ERI
ERIERI
IRL
KGZ
ARM
W
GEO
AUS
KGZ
ARM
BGR
IRN
GEO
AZE
IRL
KGZ
ERI
KGZ
ARM
ETH
ERI
ERI
GEO
BGR
ARM
ERI
ALB
ERI
KGZ
AZE
AZE
ERI
ARM
AZE
ERI
ETH
W
ARM
ERI
ERI
LVA
AZE
ERI
JOR
ERI
ERI
ARM
KGZ
ERI
AZE
KAZ
KGZ
ARM
ARM
KEN
ERI
IRL
KWT
IRL
KGZ
KGZ
ERI
ETH
CYP
ERI
BOL
ERI
GEO
ERI
ERI
ARM
CHN
ARM
ERI
ARM
KEN
AZE
KGZ
AZE
W
KAZ
KGZ
ERI
LVA
KGZ
ERI
ERI
ERI
AZE
JOR
JOR
ECU
AZE
ERI
ERI
ERI
ERI
GEO
ERI
KGZ
IRL
ERI
ERI
AUSBMU IRN
KGZ
GEO
JOR
BGR
WKGZARM
LVA
ARM
ERI
KGZ
ERI
ECU
ERI
LVA
ERI
ERI
AZE
ARM
ERI
ERI
CYP
ARM
KGZ
ARM
KGZ
IRN
AZE
ERI
KGZ
ERI
AZE
LTU
ARM
ERI
ECU
ETH
AZE
ERI
ERI
KGZ
ERI
AFG
IRL
IDN
GEO
AZE
ERI
ARM
ERI
WKGZ
IDN
KGZ
ERI
BGR
ERI
IRN
ERI
ERI
ERI
ERI
ETH
KGZ
ERI
ALB
GEO
KGZ
GEO
KGZ
ALB
COL
ERI
ETH
ERI
BOL
ETH
ERI
KGZ
AZE
GEO
ARM
IDN
AZE
CYP
ARM
GEO
FJI
IRN
AFG
LVA
AZE
ERI
KEN
ECU
JOR
ETH
ETH
ERI
ARM
KGZ
ERI
KGZ
BDI
ARM
ERI
CYP
LVA
ARM
ERI
BGR
ARM
LTU
ARM
KGZ
GEO
ARM
ERI
IRN
ERI
AZE
ERI
ERI
ETH
AFG
KGZ
LTU
AZE
GEO
ARM
AZE
ARM
ECU
AZE
BOL
ERI
ARM
GEO
ERI
ERI
IRN
ARM
ERI
KGZ
AZE
ERI
ARM
KGZ
KGZ ARM
LTU
JOR
BGR
BOL
LVA
ERI
KAZ
IND
ARM
ARM
ERI
LVA
ETH
ERI
ERI
ERI
GEO
ERI
KGZ
ERI
ERI
EST
ERI
AZE
JOR
KGZ
KGZ
AZE
ERI
ERI
AZE
KGZ
ERI
KGZ
ECU
IDN
ARM
CYP
W ERI
GEO
LTU
ERI
ETH
ERI
CYP
KAZ
GEO
KAZ
ERI
KWT
ARM
ERI
ECU
ERI
AZE
ERI
ETH
ERI
ARM
ERI
ERI
ARM
ERI
ARM
AZE
W
AZE
CYP
AZE
ERI
ERI
KGZ
ECUERI
ARM
ERI
KAZ
AZE
ERI
ERI
KEN
ECU
KGZ
ERI
ERI
AZE
WERI
ERI
ERI
KGZ
ERI
ERI
KGZ
ARM
W
KWT
GEO
KGZ
KGZ
ERI
ARM
KGZ
ARM
IRN
ERI
ERI
KGZ
ERI
KGZ
ERI
KGZ
KGZ
ARM
ARM
AZE
KGZ
JOR
ARM
ERI
W ERI
AZE
ARM
ARM
KGZ
GEO
KGZ
KGZ
ERI
ARM
KGZ
ERI
KGZ
KGZ
AZE
KGZ
ERI
ERI
ERI
ARM
ARM
ERI
GEO
KGZ
KGZ
ERI
GEO
IRN
KGZ
AFG
ERI
ERI
AZE
ERI
W
JOR
ARM
AZE
KGZ
ERI
AFG
ERI
ETH
ARM
KGZ
KGZ
ERI
KGZ
ERI
ERI
AZE
COL
ERI
JOR
ERI
KGZ
LVA
KGZ
ETH
AFG
ERI
GEO
GEO
ERI
ARM
ECU
AFG
KGZ
ARM
KGZ
WERI
ERI
ARM
ARM
GEO
ERI
CYP
ERI
ERI
ERI
KGZ
ERI
ECUECU
ERI
KGZERI
ARM
ERI
GEO
ARM
KGZ
KGZ
KGZ
AZE
GEO
ECU
AZE
KGZ
ARM
ERI
JOR
AZE
ECU
GEO
ERI
ERI
ECU
ERI
ERI
ECU
ERI
COL
ERI
GEO
ERI
ERI
ECU
KGZ
AZE
ERI
KGZ
KWT
KGZ
ECU
KWT
ERI
ARM
ERI
ERI
ERI
ERI
KGZ
ERI
ETH
KGZ
KEN
ERI
ERI
ERI
KGZ
ERI
AZE
ERI
AZE
ARM
LVA
ERI
JOR
JOR
ETH
ERI
ERI
ERI
KGZ
ARM
KGZ
ERI
ERI
ETH
ERI
ERI
ERI
ERI AFG
ERI
ERI
KGZ
ARM
JOR
ETH
ERI
ERI
KGZ
ARM
ERI
ERI
ECU
KGZIRN
KGZ
ERI
ERI
GEO JOR
ERI
ERI
JOR
ERI
KGZ
ERI
KGZ
ERI
JOR
ECUECU
KGZ
KGZ
KGZ
ERI ARM
ERI ERI
KAZ
ERI
ARM
ERI
JOR
KGZ
KGZ
ECU
AZE
ECU
ERI
ERI
ERI
ERI
ERI
ECUERI
KGZ KGZ
ERI
ARM
ERI
ERI
ERI
ERI
JOR
ERI
ARM
ETH
ERI
ETH
ERI
ETH ERI
KGZ
ERI
ETHKEN
ERI
ERIERI
AUS
ERI
ERI
GEO
ARM
ERI
AZE
KEN
ERI
ERI
JOR
ERI
ARM
ERI ERIERI
ERI
ERI
W
ERI
GEO
ERI
ERI
GEO
GEO
ERI
ERI
ERI
ERI
ETH
KGZ
ERIERI KEN
ERI
ERI
ERI
ETH
ARM
ETH
ERI
ERI
ERI ERI
KGZ
ERI
ETH
CYP
ERIERI
EST
ERI
W
CYP
W ERI ECU
EST
KGZ
ECU ERI KGZ
KGZ ERI
ERI
ETH
AZE
CYP
ECU
ETHERI
ECU
AZE ETH
LVA
JOR
KEN
ARM ARM
ERI
ECU
ERI LVA
W IRN
KGZ
ESTKGZ
ETH
ERI
LVA ERI ARM
ETH
ERI
ERI
ECU
ECU
ERI ERI
ECU
ETH KEN
ERI
ECU
AZE
W
ERI LVA
WERI
KENETH
ETH
ETH
KEN
ERI ERI
ARM
LVA
ETH
ECU
ETH
ARM
KGZ
ETH
ETH
IRN ECU
ECU
ERI
AZE
ECU
ETH
KGZ
KENERI
ETH
ECU
ETH
ERI ERI
ERI
ETH
ECU
ERI
ETH
KGZ
MAC
ETH
ARG
MAC
ETH
ETH
ETH
MAC
ERI
MAC
MAC
MAC
ERI
MAC
MAC MAC
E as c y= 1 19 s e = 02
0
Log o Sec o mpo s 3 d g
5
10
15
20
Figure 2: Relationship between imports and demand volatility
53
33
13
Log o Appa en Consump on Vo a
7
y sd
3dg
No e 100 coun es 63 sec o s 2000 09
However, risk-averse firms react differently to uncertainty according to their characteristics. Indeed, demand fluctuation may force some producers to not enter the export
market or to cease exporting and, in turn, the demand for the incumbent exporting firms
may rise. Additionally, change in uncertainty may modify the relative prices among varieties supplied leading to a reallocation of market shares among the incumbent exporters.
Hence, the effects of industry-specific uncertain demand on export performance at the
firm level are not a priori clear.
Further, managers can be sensitive to downside losses, relatively to upside gains. It
has been shown that macroeconomic fluctuations are skewed rather than symmetric (see
e.g., Popov 2011). Ceteris paribus, managers might prefer to serve a country exhibiting
a high probability of an extreme event associated with a high level of demand than a
country with a high probability of an extreme event associated with a very low demand.
1
Th s ev dence s supported by an adjusted part a res dua p ot contro ng for year and country
fixed effects The correspond ng e ast c ty of demand vo at ty s −0 17 (p<0 01) suggest ng that an 1%
ncrease n vo at ty n a dest nat on country s assoc ated w th a 0 17% decrease n sectora mports
3
Yet, the variance does not distinguish between upside risk versus downside risk. Skewness
(the third central moment of a distribution) can be used as a measure of downside risk.
Indeed, the sign of the skewness provides information on the asymmetry of the demand
distribution, and thus on downside risk exposure. For a same mean and variance, countries
with a demand distribution which is more skewed to the right can be viewed as providing
better downside protection or smaller downside risk. A basic intuition is that an increase in
skewness involves a smaller probability for low (or large negative) returns. A distribution
exhibiting more downside risk than another is less skewed to the right.2 For a same mean
and variance, a decision-maker therefore prefer a distribution with the highest skewness.
To illustrate our point, consider the demand pattern of two hypothetical countries A
and B. Each country exhibits a demand distribution with the same mean (6000 ke) and
same variance ((6000)2 /3 ke). Assume that, in country A, the level of demand is either
4000 ke with a probability 3/4 or 12000 ke with a probability 1/4 while, in country B,
the level of demand is either 0 ke with a probability 1/4 or 8000 ke with a probability
3/4.3 Despite an equal demand variance in each country, the manager may prefer to
serve the country with a higher skewness (country A) because of a lower exposure to
downside risk. In this case, the decision-maker is averse to downside risk. As a result,
a manager prefers to serve a country with a large mean demand, a small variance and a
large (unweighted) skewness.
In this paper, we study theoretically and empirically how firms adjust their intensive
and extensive margins to a change in the variance and skewness of foreign demand. To
achieve our goal, we first build a trade model where heterogeneous firms producing under
imperfect competition face same industry-wide uncertainty over foreign demand. We
adopt a mean-variance-skewness analysis so that firms are assumed to be averse both to
risk and to downside losses. A comment is in order. By adopting this decomposition
analysis, we consider a “small” risk. Indeed, export sales in a foreign country represent a
low share in total sales of firms.
Our theory leads to the following predictions. A higher variance of foreign demand in a
2
3
However, the converse is not necessarily true (Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler, 1980).
A similar example can be found in Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger (2005) in a different context.
4
market raises the unit prices set by firms in this market through a change in their markup.
The magnitude of this effect increases with the productivity of firms but decreases with
trade costs. We also show that, even though a higher foreign demand volatility reduces
the volume of industry export sales, its effect on the probability of exporting (extensive
margin) and on the level of export sales at the firm level (intensive margin) is ambiguous.
Indeed, a rise in demand volatility induces a reallocation of market share from most
productive (and largest) firms to smaller firms. As a result, the probability of exporting
may increase when fixed trade costs are not too high. Under this configuration, the export
sales of medium-sized firms (or the smallest exporters) may grow. However, this effect is
weakened when the skewness of foreign income increases.
To test our predictions, we use firm-level data from the French customs over the period
2000-2009. This database reports the volume (in tons) and value (in euros) of exports
for each product (combined nomenclature) and destination, for each firm located on the
French metropolitan territory. Our different estimations confirm our main predictions.
Hence, decision-makers seem to act as if they were risk-averse and averse to downside
losses. Our results are robust over different sized panels and to the inclusion of a plethora
of fixed effects, and additional controls.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We present the related literature in Section 2. We
then develop our multi-country model of trade with heteregeneous firms under imperfect
competition in Section 3. Section 4 exposes the empirical strategy and the results. We
conclude in Section 5.
2
Related literature
Although macroeconomic volatility plays a key role in a wide variety of economic outcomes (in long-run growth, investment and production decisions, welfare), rather little
consideration has been given to its impact on export decision.
The determinants of macroeconomic volatility has received much attention. In particular, it has been argued that freer trade increases volatility at the country level. Industries
more open to international trade are more volatile even though the industries exporting in
5
foreign countries or importing from different countries depend less on the domestic shocks
(Giovanni and Levchenko 2009). On the one side, the industries exporting (or importing) a large fraction of their production (or their intermediate products) are vulnerable
to world demand shocks (or supply shocks). On the other side, trade openness leads
to a less diversified production structure, implying a greater specialization and, in turn,
an increase in volatility. In addition, trade openness can exacerbate domestic volatility
through a decline in the number of firms (Gabaix, 2011). Indeed, since lowering trade
barriers induces an exit of small firms and boosts the size of large firms (Melitz, 2003),
the economy becomes more and more dependent on the shocks at the firm level.
Besides, the macroeconomic volatility is a source of uncertainty which potentially
influences the export decision. Indeed, trade decision are often made before the resolution
of uncertainty. When an export commitment is made, the price received is unknown. The
expected utility theory has been used to analyze international trade under risk and perfect
competition (see Helpman and Razin 1978). More recently, the framework supplied by
real option theory (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) has been introduced in trade model under
imperfect competition. Given export sunk costs, the decision whether and when to export
is very similar to an investment decision. For example, Baldwin and Krugman (1989)
explain trade hysteresis despite large exchange rate fluctuations. In addition, Handley
and Limao (2013) model trade policy uncertainty as a rare event to explain world trade
patterns. A standard assumption in new trade theory is that firms are risk-neutral.
A recent literature emphasizes that uncertainty shocks may affect the choice to serve
a foreign market through exports or affiliate sales. Lewis (2014) considers nominal uncertainty. He finds that when multinational sales are priced in the local currency while
exports are priced in the producer currency, destination volatility benefits exporters: during a foreign nominal contraction, the foreign exchange rate appreciates, causing exports
to be relatively cheaper. Exporters gain non-linearly through demand, making profit
convex in prices. Ramondo, Rappoport, and Ruhl (2013) consider real uncertainty and
changes in relative costs between exporters and multinationals. Exporters hire labor
at home compared to affiliates. Exporters’ expected profits are thus increasing in the
6
volatility of production costs in the destination country.
Our approach contributes to the trade literature in a number ways. First, we consider
that when a firm chooses a certain quantity to serve a foreign market, the price that will
obtain in the market is uncertain. The real value taken by foreign demand for each product
is not known ahead of time. Second, we consider that firms are averse to risk and more
particularly to downside risk. Third, we develop a model where firms are heterogeneous in
productivity supplying a differentiated product (horizontal and vertical differentiation).
Our approach differs from the current trade literature since we consider that managers
know the productivity of their firm but do not have perfect information about the level
of foreign demand.
3
Theory
In this section, we develop a multi-country model of trade with heterogeneous firms under imperfect competition. Firms differ in productivity, but unlike Melitz (2003), they
know with certainty their production technology. Firms face instead an industry-wide
uncertainty over foreign demand. Industry-specific demand is uncertain because industry level expenditures in destination country j, denoted by Rj , are subject to random
shocks. Factors beyond the firm’s control that influence the demand realization are climatic conditions, changes in consumer tastes, opinion leaders’ attitudes, popularity of
competing products, etc. We assume that Rj is independently distributed with a mean, a
variance, and a skewness given by E(Rj ), V(Rj ), and S(Rj ) respectively. Note that E(Rj )
and V(Rj ) are always positive while S(Rj ) can be positive or negative. The economic
interpretation of these three moments of Rj distribution is discussed below.
Hence, each firm located in country i and producing a variety v faces a downward
sloping demand curve in destination country j given by pij (v) = f [qij (v), Rj , .], where
pij (v) and qij (v) are the price and the quantity of variety v respectively. We assume that
the demand is not known for certain at the time the contracts with the importers are
signed. As above-mentioned Rj is subject to random shocks that cannot be observed
at the time strategic variables (pij or qij ) are chosen. The actual demand realization
7
is therefore uncertain, and can be either higher or lower than the average expenditures,
E(Rj ). As a result, the dependence of price on quantity (and vice-versa) is given for every
state of nature. In other words, the marginal revenue of each firm is volatile and not
known with certainty at the time the contracts are signed.
Our objective is to analyze how risk-averse firms react to industry-level uncertainty
in export decisions (both at the intensive and extensive margins), according to their
characteristics and the features of destination country. On the one hand, the level of
output may decrease for all firms due to demand fluctuations in accordance with the
standard theory of production under uncertainty. On the other hand, some producers
may not enter the export market or cease to export because of these fluctuations so that
the demand for the remaining exporters may rise (due to a reallocation of demand). In
addition, even if the demand shocks are common for all firms within an industry, it may
modify the relative prices among varieties supplied by the surviving firms in this industry,
leading to a reallocation of market shares. Hence, the effects of industry-specific uncertain
demand on export performance at the firm level are not a priori clear.
Market structure, technology, and firm behavior
Varieties are provided by heterogeneous monopolistically competitive firms. Each variety is produced by a single firm and each firm supplies a single variety. This means that
producers are negligible to the market, behave as monopolists on their market and their
decisions do not account for the impact of their choice on aggregate statistics.
Labor is the only production factor and is assumed to be supplied inelastically. The
production of qij (v) units of variety v requires a quantity of labor equals to `ij (v) =
τij qij (v)/ϕ, where ϕ is the labor productivity and τij > 1 is an iceberg trade cost. We
assume that the labor productivity is known a priori but differs among firms. Thus, the
marginal requirement in labor is specific to each firm and to each destination, but does
not vary with production.
Under imperfect competition, the choice of the action variables (quantity or price)
merits a discussion. We know from Leland (1972) and Klemperer and Meyer (1986) that,
if the choice of behavioral mode by a monopolistic firm is unimportant under certainty,
8
this is no longer the case under uncertainty. The firm has two options: (i) set quantity
before demand is known and thereafter the actual demand curve yields the market clearing
price or (ii) set price before demand is known and thereafter the actual demand curve
yields the market clearing quantity. Ideally, we would determine endogenously if firms
choose either a quantity to produce or a price to charge, as in Klemperer and Meyer
(1986). In this section, we consider that firms set quantity first, before demand is known.
In Appendix (A), we report the case where price is the strategic variable. We show that
this configuration yields the same predictions than the case where firms set quantity even
if the level of prices and quantities differ according to the behavioral mode.
Hence, without loss of generality, we assume that firms determine quantity, qij , for
each destination j before knowing the value of Rj . Equilibrium prices pij are determined
ex post in accord with realized demand. We assume that firms cannot adjust ex post
quantity with respect to the demand shock. The decision to produce for exports has been
taken ex ante and thus ex post adjustments of quantity are not feasible. The producer
cannot refuse the deal ex post once the price is realized. This implies that products cannot
be sent back. They are sold once exported.
As the shocks to market demand are unobservable, the impact of quantity on price is
uncertain. The expected export profit in a given market is
E [πij (v)] = E [pij (v)] qij (v) −
wi τij
qij (v) − wi fij ,
ϕ
(1)
where wi is the wage rate prevailing in the exporting country i. Firms located in country
i serving the destination country j have to pay a fixed cost fij to serve foreign markets,
which are the costs to maintain a presence, (i.e., maintaining a distribution and service
network, minimum freight and insurance charges, costs of monitoring foreign customs
procedures and product standards, etc.).
We assume that markets are segmented and that shocks are not correlated across countries, such that the covariance between πij and πik , with k 6= j, is zero as Cov(Rk , Rj ) = 0.
The uncertain terminal profit of a firm producing variety v and located in country i, πi ,
can be decomposed into two parts: the profit of domestic sales πii and the profit of to9
tal exporting sales Σj πij , such that πi = πii + Σj πij . Throughout, we assume that the
domestic profit πii is known with certainty.
Uncertainty and firm behavior
We consider an utility function of a manager Π(πi ) representing his/her risk preferences
with Π0 (πi ) > 0. The manager is made better off by an increase in his/her terminal profit.
Assume that the utility function Π(πi ) is continuously differentiable up to order 3. We
follow the methodology developed in Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Schlesinger (2005). A third
order Taylor series expansion of Π(πi ) evaluated at E(πi ) gives
1 000
1 00
0
Π(πi ) ≈ Π(E(πi )) + Π [πi − E(πi )] + Π [πi − E(πi )]2 + Π [πi − E(πi )]3 .
2
6
Taking the expectation and assuming that the moments exist lead to
1 00
1 000
EΠ(πi ) ≈ Π[E(πi )] + Π E[πi − E(πi )]2 + Π E[πi − E(πi )]3 .
2
6
According to the expected utility theory, in the neighborhood of E(x) where x is
a random variable, we have EΠ(x) = Π(E(x) − Γ) where Γ is the risk premium. In
our case, the risk premium Γ is defined as the sure amount of money a manager would
be willing to receive to become indifferent between receiving the risky return πi versus
receiving the sure amount E(πi ) − Γ. Because EΠ(πi ) can also be approximated as follows
EΠ(πi ) = Π[E(πi )] − ΓΠ0 , we have
00
000
1Π
1Π
Γ≈−
S(πi ),
0 V(πi ) −
2Π
6 Π0
00
0
000
(2)
0
where −Π /2Π and −Π /6Π are the marginal contributions of variance (V(πi ) = E[πi −
E(πi )]2 ) and skewness (S(πi ) = E[πi − E(πi )]3 ) of πi to the risk premium Γ, respectively.
00
0
The term −Π /2Π is known as the so-called Arrow–Pratt absolute risk aversion coef000
0
000
ficient. The term −Π /6Π captures a preference for positive skewness when Π
> 0,
because it implies a low probability of obtaining a large negative return. Note that skewness to the left (S(π) < 0) is associated with “downside risk” exposure, while skewness to
10
the right (S(π) > 0) is associated with “upside risk” exposure.
Two remarks are in order. First, risk aversion can decrease with wealth of the individuals. Under this configuration, decision makers exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA preferences) implying Π000 > 0. This entails that the risk aversion of the exporter
decreases with its level of domestic sales. Second, Π000 > 0 corresponds to “downside risk
aversion”, implying that a rise in downside risk (a decrease in S(π)) would tend to increase
the willingness to pay to avoid risk (Menezes, Geiss, and Tressler, 1980).
Finally, we know from expected utility theory that maximizing EΠ(x) is equivalent
to maximizing the certainty equivalent E(x) − Γ. Since expression (2) provides a local
approximation to the risk premium Γ, it follows that the objective function of a decisionmaker can always be approximated by
Πv (πi ) ≈ E(πi ) − ρv V(πi ) + ηv S(πi ),
00
0
000
(3)
0
with ρv ≡ −Π /2Π and ηv ≡ Π /6Π . Remember that ρv > 0 expresses the absolute
degree of the firm’s risk aversion. If ρv = 0, firms are risk neutral. This general formulation
does not require a full specification of the utility function Πv (π) and it allows us going
beyond a simple mean-variance analysis in the investigation of export decision under
demand uncertainty. This may be particularly useful in the analysis of “downside risk”
exposure. However, the reader should keep in mind that expression Πv (π) is valid only in
the neighborhood of the point E(πi ). In other words, we only consider small risk. Given
that the share of export sales in one country to total sales is low, this assumption is not
too restrictive.
Preferences and demand
To study the effect of uncertainty on export decision, we use a simple and tractable
utility function yielding a specific demand curve.4 The consumer preferences are identical
4
We could use the general setting in which the demand curve is pij = f (qij , Rj ). However, this
increases the complexity of the formal developments while the gains in results are limited. What matters
for most of our results is that export prices (1) decrease in export quantities (∂pij /∂qij < 0), (2) increase
in destination demand (∂pij /∂Rj > 0), (3) with a diminishing marginal effect as export quantities increase
∂ 2 pij /(∂Rij ∂qij ) < 0.
11
and the utility of the consumption of the differentiated good is given by
Uj =
Z
v∈Ωj
uj (v)dv,
(4)
where Ωj is the set of available varieties v in country j. Hence, as in Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977), Krugman (1979) and Zhelobodko et al. (2012), we assume that preferences over
the differentiated product are additively separable across varieties. To keep things simple,
we consider uj (.) = θv qj (v)1/2 where θv is the quality of variety v and q(v) is the quantity
consumed. Given that ∂u(v)/∂q(v) > 0 and ∂ 2 u(v)/∂q(v)2 < 0, consumers exhibit a
preference for variety.
The budget constraint faced by a consumer is given by
Z
Ωj
pkj (v)qkj (v)dv = Rj ,
(5)
where Rj represents the income of the consumer and its total expenses, while pkj (v) is
the price of variety v produced in country k with k = i, j, ..K.5 Notice that deviations
from expected demand in individual foreign markets, due to random shocks, may lead to
potential gains and losses. By neglecting their effect on total income, which may cancel
out, we adopt a partial equilibrium approach.
Maximizing (4) under the budget constraint (5) leads to the inverse demand:
pij (v) =
−1
θv
qij (v) 2 ,
2λ
(6)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Plugging (6) into (5) implies λ = Ψj /2Rj with
Ψj ≡
Z
Ωj
1
θv qkj (v) 2 dv.
(7)
The expression Ψj can be interpreted as a measure of industry supply. As a consequence,
5
Note that we could extend easily this framework by considering the case where U is embodied in a
Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility.
12
the inverse demand for each variety is now
pij (v) = Rj θv qij (v)
−1
2
Ψ−1
j .
(8)
As expected, the price of a variety increases with its quality (θv ) and the market size (Rj )
but decreases with its quantity (qij ) and rivals’ quantity and quality of products (Ψj ).
Intensive margin of exports with no uncertainty
We start by analyzing briefly the export decision with no uncertainty before introduction uncertainty. Each firm maximizes its profit (1) by setting its output qij (v) to serve
market j and by taking into account its impact on prices pij (v) given in (8). Profitmaximizing quantity is given by
1
qij (v) 2 =
Rj ϕθv −1
Ψ ,
2 wi τij j
(9)
so that
pij (v) = 2
wi τij
.
ϕ
Thus, under certainty, the equilibrium price is equal to the marginal cost wi τij /ϕ times
a constant (equals to 2), while exports (in value and quantity) increase with productivity,
quality and demand.
In what follows, we analyze how uncertain demand curve affect equilibrium prices and
quantities at the firm level.
Intensive margin of exports with uncertainty
Under uncertainty, remember that exporting firms face a downward sloping demand
curve characterized by a random shift parameter Rj (common to all firms in a given
industry). Rj is not known for certain at the time the contracts with the importers are
signed. The expected price prevailing for each firm in the foreign market is therefore given
by
E [pij (v)] = E(Rj )θv qij (v)
13
−1
2
Ψ−1
j .
(10)
For the sake of clarity, we first consider a mean-variance utility function such that
ηv = 0 (i.e., downside and upside risks are not accounted for). Then, we will consider the
role of skewness with ηv 6= 0. The payoff of each firm when ηv = 0 is as follows:
Πv (πi ) = E(πi ) − ρv V(πi ) =
X
j
E(πij ) − ρv
X
j
V(πij ),
where E(πij ) is given by (1) and Σj V(πij ) = V(πi ) because Cov(Rk , Rj ) = 0 for all
k 6= j. Hence, the marginal revenue is uncertain while the marginal cost is known with
certainty. The expected export sales E [pij (v)] qij (v) increases with qij but decreases with
the industry’s output size (captured through Ψj ). The profit variance is
V(πij ) = V(Rj )θv2 qij (v)Ψ−2
j ,
(11)
which increases with the firm’s output size qij and decreases with the industry’s output
size. Hence, the mass of rivals serving the same market has an ambiguous effect on the
export performance at the firm level. Indeed, a rise in Ψj decreases the marginal revenue
of the firm but reduces the variance of profits.
First order condition ∂Πv /∂qij = 0 implies
−1
wi τij
1
E(Rj )θv qij (v) 2 Ψ−1
− ρv V(Rj )θv2 Ψ−2
j −
j = 0,
2
ϕ
(12)
and it is readily to check that ∂ 2 Πv /∂qij2 < 0. As a result, Payoff -maximizing quantity is
given by
"
θv2 ϕ
E(Rj )θv ϕ −1
qij (v) =
Ψj 1 + ρv V(Rj )Ψ−2
j
2wi τij
wi τij
1
2
#−1
.
(13)
In accordance with the standard literature related to producer theory under uncertainty,
the risk averse firms produce less than they would under certainty (because ρv > 0 so
that ∂qij /∂V(Rj ) < 0), for a given mass of exporters. Further, we can readily check that
quantities are concave in productivity (∂qij /∂ϕ > 0 and ∂ 2 qij /∂ϕ2 < 0). Thus, the most
productive firms are the largest in terms of labor and quantity produced. Another result
standard in the trade theory literature is that quantities are convex in trade costs, such
14
that ∂qij /∂τij < 0 and ∂ 2 qij /∂τij2 > 0). Hence, export sales decrease with trade costs,
while they increase with productivity. New and more original is the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1 For a given positive degree of the firm’s risk aversion (ρv > 0) and industry supply (Ψ), the negative effect of demand volatility on export quantities is strengthened when firm productivity increases and trade costs decrease.
As a simple proof, we can establish from equation (13)
∂ 2 qij
∂ 2 qij
<0<
,
∂ϕ∂V(Rj )
∂τ ∂V(Rj )
when ρv > 0. Remember that the variance of profits in a given foreign market is equal
to the variance of foreign demand times the output size dedicated to that foreign country
(see equation 11). Stated differently, the variance of profits of a firm increases with its
productivity and decreases with trade costs for a given mass of firms.
Using (8) and (13), we can now determine the ex post equilibrium price of variety v
prevailing in country j:
"
θv2 ϕ −2
wi τij Rj
2
1 + ρv V(Rj )
pij (v) =
Ψ
ϕ E(Rj )
wi τij j
#
(14)
The equilibrium price is equal to the marginal cost (wi τij /ϕ) times a markup. Remember
that, under demand certainty, the markup is equal to 2 (because of E[Rj /E(Rj )] = 1
and V(Rj ) = 0). With uncertain demand and risk-averse firms, the markup is higher
on average than the markup prevailing under certain demand due to the fluctuations of
income. Hence, uncertain demand curve tends to increase prices through a higher markup.
It is worth stressing that, unlike models of monopolistic competition with perfect information, the markup is not a constant. Firms charge variable markups even under
CES preferences. In other words, demand uncertainty and risk-averse firms allow for variable markups even though demand curve is iso-elastic. Markup depends on the demand
volatility, firm’s productivity and features of origin and destination countries. Note also
that the markup increases with the firm’s productivity (ϕ) and decreases with trade costs
15
(τij ) and the mass of rivals (captured by Ψj ). Those findings are in accordance with industrial organization theory. However, the mechanisms at work are different. Our results
are related to the existence of demand fluctuations and risk aversion. The variance of
profits being high for the most productive firms, they charge greater markups. Similarly,
low market size induces low variance of profits so that the markup is lower for destinations with a low potential market. Hence, even though preferences exhibit an iso-elastic
demand, markups vary according to destinations and firms.
In addition, under demand uncertainty, the markup captures two opposite effects
associated with the destination income (Rj ). On the one side, higher income raises the
markup and, in turn, prices (demand effect). On the other side, higher expected foreign
demand increases the competition across firms (which have an incentive to reduce their
level of production) and, in turn, decreases the markup. However, on average, both effects
cancel each other out (E[Rj /E(Rj )] = 1). The next proposition sums up our results on
destination prices:
Proposition 3.2 For a given positive degree of the firm’s risk aversion (ρv > 0) and
industry supply (Ψ), the markup increases more with foreign demand uncertainty, the
higher the firm productivity and the lower the trade costs.
Propositions (3.1) and (3.2) are related to the intensive margin of trade, i.e., variation
in trade of existing trade relationships. They are established without accounting for the
adjustment in the industry supply (Ψ). However, uncertainty leads to an adjustment in
the quantities produced by the competitors. This adjustment reinforces proposition (3.2)
on export prices but renders proposition (3.1) on exported quantities more ambiguous.
Before presenting the effect of the industry adjustment, we study the role of uncertainty
on the extensive margin of trade, i.e., on the emergence of new trade relationships and/or
the death of existing ones.
Extensive margin of exports with uncertainty
The mass of domestic firms in each country is exogenously given,6 while the mass of
6
An endogenous mass of domestic firms can be incorporated in the analysis without qualitatively
changing any of the main results.
16
exporting firms is treated as endogenous. There is a large supply of potential entrants in
the international market. However, firms located in country i serving destination country
j have to pay a fixed cost fij to serve foreign markets (see equation 1). The decision to
exit or enter a foreign market is taken on the basis of the expected payoff. A firm exports
to destination j if and only if ex ante payoff Πv is positive, i.e., E(πij ) − ρv V(πij ) > wi fij .
It is straightforward to check that Πv = sij /2 where sij ≡ E(pij )qij with
#−1
"
E(Rj )2 wi τij 2
Ψ + ρv V(Rj )
sij =
2
θv2 ϕ j
(15)
.
As a result, Πv = 0 when ϕ = 0 and ∂Πv /∂ϕ > 0. Hence, there exists a quality-adjusted
productivity cutoff θv2 ϕ above which a firm serves country j. As expected, the probability
of exporting decreases with V(Rj ). In addition, we have ∂ 2 Πv /∂ϕ∂V(Rj ) < 0 so the
payoffs of large firms are more impacted by a rise in demand volatility than the small
n
2
firms. Notice also that ∂Πv /∂Ψj < 0 and sign{∂ 2 Πv /∂ϕ∂Ψj } = sign ρv V(Rj ) wθivτϕij − Ψ2j
o
so that a higher total supply decreases the ex ante payoff of each incumbent firm. However,
the high productivity firms are less affected by a rise in Ψj .
Until now, we have studied the impact of V(Rj ) on exports and prices for a given Ψj .
However, Ψj adjusts when V(Rj ) changes. Therefore, we have to take into account the
indirect effect of demand volatility on prices and quantities through Ψj . In what follows,
we determine the relationship between Ψj and V(Rj ) and the total effect of V(Rj ). Let
ξ ≡ 1/(θv2 ϕ) ≥ 0 be an inverse measure of quality-adjusted productivity and µ(ξ) is the
distribution of ξ. The cutoff for exporting ξbij is such that Πv (ξbij ) = wi fij or, equivalently,
Ψ−2
E(Rj )2
j
b
− ρv V(Rj )
.
ξij ≡
4wi fij
wi τij
"
#
(16)
It follows that a firm exports as long as ξ < ξbij . As expected, high productivity firms are
more likely to be exporters while high fixed and variable trade costs reduce the probability
of exporting. However, unlike trade models with heterogeneous firms, the exporting zeropayoff cutoff conditions ξbij can be non positive. No firm finds a priori profitable to serve
country j if the expected income E(Rj ) is not sufficiently high relatively to its variance
17
V(Rj ). Hence, we provide a rationale for the prevalence of zeros in bilateral trade without
making an ad hoc assumption on the distribution of productivity across firms. Helpman
et al. (2008) allow also for zero bilateral trade volumes as the authors assume that the
most productive firms exhibit a level of productivity which is below than the exporting
threshold.
Uncertainty and industry adjustment
Although our modeling strategy gives our framework a partial equilibrium flavor, it
does not remove the interdependence among firms within industries. We can show that
Ψj ≡ −
V(Rj ) ∂Ψj
> 0,
Ψj ∂V(Rj )
or, equivalently, ∂Ψj /∂V(Rj ) < 0 (see Appendix (B)). As expected, an increase in the
variance of income reduces the aggregate supply for destination market j and, in turn,
the equilibrium prices. Hence, equilibrium prices (14) increase with demand fluctuations
through two effects: (i) a direct effect due to risk aversion (as explained above) and (ii)
an indirect effect via the exit of firms relaxing competition among surviving firms. In
contrast, the effect of demand volatility on the export sales (or profits) is ambiguous
when Ψj adjusts to a change in V(Rj ). Indeed, we have
dsij (v)
∂sij (v)
∂sij (v) ∂Ψj
sij 2wi τij ξΨj − ρv V(Rj )Ψ−2
j
=
+
=
,
−2
dV(Rj )
∂V(Rj )
∂Ψj ∂V(Rj )
V(Rj ) wi τij ξ + ρv V(Rj )Ψj
where ∂sij (v)/∂V(Rj ) < 0 while ∂sij /∂Ψj < 0 and ∂Ψj /∂V(Rj ) < 0 (see above). It
follows that a rise in demand volatility induces a reallocation of market shares from larger
firms to smaller ones as dsij (v)/dV(Rj ) increases with ξ. Hence, the aggregate productivity of exporters can decrease ceteris paribus with a higher uncertainty, in accordance with
empirical facts (see Bloom, 2014). In addition, as the larger firms reduce their export
sales in high proportion when demand fluctuations increase, the export sales of smaller
exporters may expand at their expense (see Figure 3).
As a result, the effect of demand volatility on the probability of exporting is also
18
Figure 3: Productivity and reallocation of export sales when demand volatility increases
Export Sales (sij /2)
A
sij (ξ, V + )
sij (ξ, V − )
Production costs (ξij )
Note: V − and V + mean low and high volatility, respectively.
ambiguous. Some standard calculations reveal that
"
1
dξbij
∂ ξbij
∂ ξbij ∂Ψj
E(Rj )2
− ρv V(Rj ) 1 +
=
+
=
dV(Rj )
∂V(Rj ) ∂Ψj ∂V(Rj )
4wi fij
2Ψj
!#
2Ψj Ψ−2
j
V(Rj )wi τij
where ∂ ξbij /∂V(Rj ) < 0 while ∂ ξbij /∂Ψj < 0 and ∂Ψj /∂V(Rj ) < 0 (see above). Hence,
the probability of serving a country decreases with the volatility of its demand provided
that fixed trade costs or demand volatility are not too high. If fixed trade costs are low
enough, more medium sized firms can export when demand fluctuations rise as the export
sales of large firms decrease (see Figure 4).
When we focus the total effect of demand fluctuation on quantity, it appears
qij (v) wi τij ξ − ρv V(Rj )Ψ−2
dqij (v)
j (1 + Ψj )
=
dV(Rj )
V(Rj )
wi τij ξ + ρv V(Rj )Ψ−2
j
and
d2 qij
d2 qij
<0<
dϕ∂V(Rj )
dτ dV(Rj )
so that the effects of V(Rj ) on qij (v) when Ψj reacts to a change in demand volatility are
qualitatively similar to the effects on export sales. It also be noted that higher uncertainty
can make trade policy (lowering trade costs) or innovation policy (rising productivity) less
effective, in accordance with Bloom (2014).
To summarize:
19
Figure 4: The impact of higher demand volatility on exporting cutoff
Payoff (Πij )
Payoff (Πij )
Πij (ξ, V − )
wi fij
Πij (ξ, V + )
A
A
Πij (ξ, V + )
wi fij
Πij (ξ, V − )
ξˆij (V − ) ξˆij (V + )
ξij
(a) Low export fixed costs wi fij
ξˆij (V + ) ξˆij (V − )
ξij
(b) High export fixed costs wi fij
Notes: V − and V + mean low and high volatility, respectively. ξij : production costs.
Proposition 3.3 A rise in industry-level foreign demand uncertainty decreases industry
export sales but
(i) decreases the export sales of large firms and increases the market share of medium
sized firms;
(ii) increases the probability of exporting and the export sales of medium-sized firms
when trade costs are not too high.
The bad and the good variance: the role of skewness
We have considered a mean-variance analysis. The basic intuition is that the exporters
prefer higher expected returns and lower risk. However, we should consider that, ceteris
paribus, entrepreneurs prefer a high probability of an extreme event in the positive direction over a high probability of an extreme event in the negative direction. In order to take
into account the fact that the marginal willingness of exporter to accept a risk increases
when the distribution of the risk becomes more skewed to the right, we now consider the
mean-variance-skewness utility function where ηv > 0. The payoff of each firm is given
20
by (3). Given the inverse demand of consumers, we have
3
S(πij ) = S(Rj )θv3 qij2 (v)Ψ−3
j .
(17)
and the Payoff -maximizing quantity is implicitly given by ∂Πo /∂qij = 0, or, equivalently,
3S(Rj )θv3 Ψ−3
1
E(Rj )
τij
j
2 −2
2 + η
θv Ψ−1
−
w
+
ρ
V(R
)θ
Ψ
q
(v)
qij (v) = 0.
i
v
j
ij
v
j
v j
2
ϕ
2
!
(18)
Clearly, if the income distribution is positively (resp., negatively) skewed, each exporter
has an incentive to increase (resp., decrease) its level of output for a given V(Rj ). The
degree of skewness modifies the desirability of risk. It is readily to check that our predictions related to the impact of V(Rj ) on quantity and prices according to the level of
productivity and trade costs hold when S(Rj ) 6= 0. Using envelop theorem, it is straightforward to verify that ∂qij /∂S(Rj ) > 0 whereas ∂pij /∂S(Rj ) < 0 when the second order
condition holds (E(Rj )Ψ2j − ηv 3S(Rj )θv2 qij (v) > 0). Regardless of the sign of S(Rj ), an
income distribution that is more skewed to the right induces higher level of output. More
interesting, standard calculations show that
∂ 2 qij
∂ 2 qij
>0>
∂ϕ∂S(Rj )
∂τ ∂S(Rj )
and
∂pij
∂pij (v)
>0>
∂τ ∂S(Rj )
∂ϕ∂S(Rj )
as ∂qij /∂ϕ > 0 and ∂qij /∂τ > 0. The magnitude of the positive impact of a higher S(Rj )
on production is stronger for firms exhibiting a higher productivity and for destination
implying lower trade costs. The prices move in the opposite direction.
4
4.1
Empirical Analysis
Identification strategy
According to our theoretical predictions exporters react in response to volatility by decreasing volumes
∂qij
<
∂V(Rj )
0 and increasing prices
21
∂pij
>
∂V(Rj )
0 , while in response to
upside gains exporters increase volumes
∂qij
>
∂S(Rj )
0 and reduce prices
∂pij
<
∂S(Rj )
0 .
The estimations of these predictions may be plagued by potential endogeneity at the
aggregate level between trade openness and demand volatility. To mitigate this potential
bias we exploit the following strategy of identification. We use French firm exports at the
4-digit level k in a given year as our dependent variable. Then, we regress disaggregated
French exports on three different moments of the distribution of demand R in destina
K
K
) and the skewness
) , the volatility V(Rjt
tion j: the lagged expected value E(Rj,t−1
K
S(Rjt
) of demand at the 3-digit sector level. We expect variation in French 4-digit
exports to be explained by 3-digit demand shifters in destination countries. However, in
turn, it is unlikely that a particular 4-digit export in a destination affects substantially
a 3-digit sector demand in that destination. The 3-digit demand in a country is made
of imports from all sources (including itself) and all 4-digit sub-sectors. To reinforce this
strategy of identification, we remove French flows to compute countries’ demand and its
moments. Moreover, we exploit the different sources of variation of our panel and use
various combinations of fixed effects to control for unobservables: firm f , destination j,
4-digit sector k and time (year) t fixed effects.
4.2
Data
Demand R in destination country j is proxied with apparent consumption such as: aK
jt =
K
K
ProductionK
jt + Importsjt − Exportsjt , where K is 3-digit sector and t year. Our sectoral
data on production, exports and imports come from COMTRADE and UNIDO and covers
the period 1995 to 2009. Using the absorption formula and the sector data, we construct
three important regressors at the industry 3-digit level K in the destination country j.
They correspond to three different moments of apparent consumption:
K
1. The mean demand or absorption E(Rj,t−1
) computed in year t as the log of the
lagged value of mean absorption over the 5 previous years;
K
2. The volatility of demand V(Rjt
) computed as the standard deviation of the yearly
growth rates of aK
jt over 6 years and the sub-sectors k. As an example, consider
22
the manufacture of beverages (K=155) in the United Kingdom in 2000. We first
compute the yearly growth rates of the UK’s apparent consumption over 1995 to
2000, and over the 4 sub-sectors of 155.7 Then, we compute the standard deviation of
the 20 growth rates. Figure (5) reports the volatility of demand in the manufacture
of beverages in 2005. For a same level of mean demand for beverages in 2005, we
observe different levels of demand volatility.
K
3. The unbiased skewness of demand S(Rjt
) computed as the skewness of the yearly
growth rates of aK
jt over 6 years and the sub-sectors k.
Figure 5: Demand level and demand volatility of a given 3-digit sector
USA
16
JPN
DEU
CHN
GBR
ESP
MEX
CAN
14
POL
ITA
TUR
NLD
PRT
GRC
FRA
AUS
BLXKOR
UKR
IND
COL
NOR
ROM
HUN
12
PER
MYS
CYP
FIN
IDN
ECU
SVK
PAN
KAZ
MAR
IRN
LTU
EGY
OMN
LVA
TTO
URY
MLT
DNK
JOR
EST
ETH
MDA
MWI
10
Log of Apparent Consumption (Mean) - 3 digit
18
Manufacture of beverages in 2005
SVNSEN
MKD
GEO
AZE
ARM
KGZ
ERI
8
TJK
-2.7
-.7
Log Volatility (standard deviation) of destination county - 3 digit
To construct our dependent variable and test our theoretical predictions we use very
rich firm-destination specific export data from the French customs over the period 2000
to 2009. We observe volume (in tons) and value (in euros) of exports for each product
and destination, for each firm located on the French metropolitan territory. Unit values
are computed as the ratio of export value to export volume.
4.2.1
Descriptive Statistics
We present in this section some descriptive statistics on French exports and firms, and
on the volatility and skewness of demand in sectors and destination countries included
7
The 4 sub-sectors are: 1551 - Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits; ethyl alcohol production
from fermented materials; 1552 - Manufacture of wines; 1553 - Manufacture of malt liquors and malt;
1554 - Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral waters.
23
in our sample. In our empirical analysis, we focus on manufactured exports. French
manufactured export flows reach on average 258,062 millions USD and 94,072 millions of
tons per year. On average, our sample includes 70,239 firms per year, serving 81 countries
and 119 4-digit sectors. Table (1) provides the annual statistics. All sectors are served
every year. By contrast, we observe some changes in the number of destinations, with an
increase over the 2000-2006 period and a significant decrease during the 2008-2009 crisis.
The number of exporting firms is decreasing over time (except in 2006).
Table 1: Number of French firms and destinations per year
Year
Nb. exporters
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Note: 119
Nb. destinations
79151
77115
76509
74304
72021
70871
71207
68400
65803
47011
4-digit sectors per
80
80
81
86
85
83
88
86
79
66
year.
The turnover of firms in sectors and destinations is rather high in our sample over
the period 2000-2009. On average, a firm is present 2.77 years in one destination-sector
(4-digit). Firms serve on average 1.96 sectors per destination-year and 3.14 destinations
per sector-year.
Each year, exporting firms may export to one sector (4-digit) and one destination
(mono-destination and mono-sector firms), to various sectors but to one destination
(mono-destination and multi-sectors firms), to various destinations and to one sector
(multi-destinations and mono-sector firms) or to multi destinations and sectors (multidestinations and multi-sectors firms). Table (2) presents the share of each of the four
categories in the total of exporting firms. The two main categories of firms in our sample
are mono-destination and mono-sector firms (col. 1), and multi-destinations and multisectors firms (col. 4). The shares are fairly stable over time. However, the share of
multi-destinations firms has slightly decreased in 2009. Some firms, which were present
in several destinations, seem to have reduced their international exposure in 2009 because
24
of the world crisis.
Table 2: Share of the four categories (mono- vs. multi-destinations/sectors) of firms
Year
Mono-dest.
& Mono-sector
(1)
Mono-dest.
Multi-dest.
& Multi-sector & Mono-sector
(2)
(3)
2000
35.8
2001
36.1
2002
36.1
2003
35.5
2004
34.5
2005
33.3
2006
33.5
2007
32.7
2008
32.9
2009
37.7
Dest. means destination.
8.2
7.9
7.9
7.5
7.5
7.8
7.5
7.6
7.6
8.2
Multi-dest.
& Multi-sector
(4)
19.3
18.9
18.6
19.1
19.4
19.7
19.7
20.1
20.5
17.7
36.7
37.1
37.4
37.9
38.6
39.2
39.3
39.5
39.0
36.4
Figure (6) reports the distribution of demand volatility (in logs) and demand skewness
across 2-digit sectors. The ranking of sectors is not similar for both moments and only
one sector (Tobacco) has a negative median skewness.
Figure 6: Distribution of volatility and skewness demand
Volatility, by industry
Rubber and plastics
Paper
Tobacco
Other mineral products
Food & beverages
Textiles
Office, accounting
Wearing apparel
Wood
Leather
Chemicals
Motor vehicles
Basic metals
Electrical machinery
Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c
Fabricated metal products
Medical, optical instruments
Publishing, printing
coke, petroleum, nuclear fuel
Machinery and equipment
Radio, tv, comm. equipment
Other transport equipment
Skewness, by industry
Tobacco
Office, accounting
Rubber and plastics
Paper
Electrical machinery
Radio, tv, comm. equipment
Medical, optical instruments
Wood
Motor vehicles
Fabricated metal products
coke, petroleum, nuclear fuel
Leather
Basic metals
Wearing apparel
Chemicals
Textiles
Other mineral products
Food & beverages
Publishing, printing
Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c
Other transport equipment
Machinery and equipment
−4 −3 −2 −1 0
1
−4
Outside values excluded
−2
0
2
4
Outside values excluded
Figure (7) presents the distribution volatility across the destinations of French exports.
For clarity, we select the 20 top main destinations and the 20 minor destinations over the
2000-2009 period. The figure reports the median (log) volatility for each of these partners.
For each country, the median is computed using all 3-digit sectors and years for which
25
we are able to compute the absorption (at most we have 10 years * 57 three-digit sectors
= 570 observations). We can observe that the main destinations of French exports have
lower median volatilities that minor destinations. Note that there is also a composition
effect: main partners are often developed countries, which are less volatile than developing
ones. This pattern is confirmed in Figure (8), where we try to answer to the question:
which are the most/least volatile countries? The United States has very low volatility,
as well as the United Kingdom and Canada. By contrast, the most volatile countries (in
the left panel) tend to be developing countries. On average, developed countries are less
volatile than developing ones.
Figure 7: Volatility of demand across destinations
Volatility (median), 20 main partners
01−DEU
02−ESP
03−GBR
04−ITA
05−BLX
06−USA
07−NLD
08−JPN
09−CHN
10−POL
11−PRT
12−SWE
13−TUR
14−AUT
15−MAR
16−CAN
17−SGP
18−DNK
19−HUN
20−IRL
Volatility (median), 20 minor partners
01−BOL
02−ERI
03−KGZ
04−MWI
05−TTO
06−ARM
07−MDA
08−MKD
09−GEO
10−URY
11−VNM
12−ETH
13−QAT
14−PHL
15−ECU
16−AZE
17−PER
18−KWT
19−ARG
20−LVA
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−.5
0
−2
Outside values excluded
−1.5
−1
−.5
0
Outside values excluded
Which are the more/least skewed countries? Results are reported in Figure (9). As
previously done, each sub-figure presents 20 countries and reports the median (log) skewness for each of these countries over 2000-2009. We keep only countries for which we have
at least 10% of the 570 potential observations (we do the same for Figure 8). We can
notice that developed countries are often less skewed. The difference for skewness between developing and developed countries seems to be less pronounced than for volatility.
However, one limit of our approach is the number of observations per country: for some
(developing) countries, the number of sector-year for which we are able to compute the
volatility (and even more the skewness) is rather small and this restriction may of course
26
bias the median value that we obtain.
Figure 8: Most and least demand volatile countries
20 least volatile countries
20 most volatile countries
USA
GBR
CAN
CHN
ESP
DNK
PRT
PER
DEU
JPN
NOR
BLX
POL
FIN
GRC
AUT
IRL
ITA
ISR
NLD
LTU
SVK
MYS
SEN
UKR
MLT
TUR
KAZ
ECU
IRN
OMN
ETH
KWT
AZE
MDA
ARM
GEO
KGZ
IDN
ERI
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
median volat.
−.5
0
−1.5
−1
−.5
median volat.
0
Figure 9: Most and least demand skewed countries
20 least skewed countries
20 most skewed countries
RUS
CHN
USA
CAN
IRN
BRA
JPN
BLX
ESP
PRT
COL
MKD
GBR
CYP
URY
KOR
LVA
ARG
ROM
POL
SWE
EGY
SVN
ECU
MYS
BGR
AZE
HUN
MDA
ETH
SVK
UKR
OMN
KAZ
KGZ
ARM
ERI
GEO
MLT
IDN
−.1
4.3
0
.1
.2
median skewness
.3
0
.2
.4
.6
median skewness
.8
Empirical results
We now present our empirical results on the intensive and the extensive margin of trade.
27
4.3.1
Intensive trade margin
Export volumes
The estimated equation for the export volumes comes directly from the theoretical
model:
K
K
K
) + FE + εkf jt ,
) + ηS(Rjt
) + ρV(Rjt
ln qfkjt = ln E(Rjt
(19)
where qfkjt is French firm f export volumes to j in 4-digit k in year t. This variable is
regressed on different moments of demand defined in the data section (4.2). FE represents
a vector of different combinations of fixed effects. The estimations of equation (19) is
reported in Table (3). The sample covers the period 2000 to 2009.
Table 3: Firm level estimations: export volumes
Dep. Var.:
Firm export volumes: ln qfkjt
(1)
(2)
(3)
Ln Mean Demand3K
j,t−1
0.250a
0.075a
0.060a
(0.028)
(0.025)
(0.21)
b
-0.017
b
-0.029
-0.022b
(0.008)
(0.014)
(0.011)
b
0.007
b
0.012
0.009b
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.004)
0.814
0.377
0.635
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
Ln
Volatility3K
jt
Skewness3K
jt
AdjustedR2
Fixed Effects:
Firm.Destination.Sectorf jk
Timet
Firm.Destination.Timef jt
Sector (4-digit)k
Firm.Sector.Timef kt
Destinationj
Note: Robust and industry-destination clustered standard errors in
parentheses. a : p < 0.01, b : p < 0.05, c : p < 0.1. N=5,668,638.
The results are in line with our theoretical predictions. An increase in demand level
and demand skewness in destination markets increases export volumes. In contrast, an
increase in volatility reduces exports. How economically meaningful are the estimates
of volatility and skewness? Based on the first column within estimates, we find that in
2005 a one standard deviation increase in the average of volatility of Belgium, reduces
aggregate French exports to Belgium by 1.2%, while a one standard deviation increase in
the average of volatility of China, reduces aggregate French exports to China by 1.3%.
Moreover, if the United Kingdom market would be as volatile as Vietnam, French exports
28
to the UK would decrease by 2.5%. On the other hand, if the UK would be as skewed
as Vietnam, French exports to the UK would increase by 0.5%. This implies that both
absolute and downside risk matter for exporters.
Export prices
The estimated equation for the export prices comes from the theoretical model as well:
K
Rj,t−1
K
K
+ ρV(Rjt
) + ηS(Rjt
) + FE + εkf jt ,
= ln
K
)
E(Rj,t−1
!
ln pkf jt
(20)
where pkf jt is French firm f export unit values to destination j in 4-digit sector k in
year t. Table (4) reports the estimates of equation (20) with the same sets of fixed effects
as for the export volumes.
Table 4: Firm level estimations: export prices
Dep. Var.:
Firm export unit values: ln pkf jt
(1)
(2)
(3)
Ln Demand3K
j,t−1
0.022b
0.001
0.001
(0.011)
(0.017)
(0.006)
-0.038c
-0.003
-0.004
(0.021)
(0.020)
(0.008)
Ln Mean Demand3K
j,t−1
Ln Volatility3K
jt
Skewness3K
jt
R2
Fixed Effects:
Firm.Destination.Sectorf jk
Timet
Firm.Destination.Timef jt
Sector (4-digit)k
Firm.Sector.Timef kt
Destinationj
0.014b
0.004
0.002
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.003)
-0.005b
-0.003
-0.001
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.001)
0.844
0.658
0.811
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
Note: Robust and industry-destination clustered standard errors in
parentheses. a : p < 0.01, b : p < 0.05, c : p < 0.1. N=5,668,638.
Results on export prices are in line with our predictions but are not robust across all
specifications. The within estimates, reported in column (1), highlight the two opposite
effects associated with demand in the destination market. On the one side, higher lagged
demand raises export prices (demand effect). On the other side, higher expected foreign
demand, captured by the mean demand variable, increases the competition across firms
(which have an incentive to reduce their level of production) and, in turn, decreases prices.
29
As expected, the volatility and skewness estimates have an opposite effect compared with
their influence on export volumes.
Interaction effects of uncertainty
Proposition (3.1) establishes that the negative effect of demand volatility on export
quantities is strengthened when firm productivity increases and trade costs decrease.
Remember that the variance of profits in a given foreign market is equal to the volatility
(variance) of foreign demand times the output size dedicated to that foreign country.
Given that the most productive firms export more, they are at the margin more affected
by the increase in demand volatility. With the same logic, the lower the trade costs, the
higher the quantities sold and the larger the effect of demand volatility at the margin.
To capture the non-linearity of demand volatility related to trade costs, we use the
distance variable to destination markets, which is a usual proxy for trade costs. More
precisely, we split the distance variable into quartiles. The four distance intervals (in km)
are: [0, 440); [440, 1110); [1110, 1875); and [1875, maximum]. Then, we interact the four
categories with the volatility of demand and compute the predicted mean trade volumes
(in logs) for the deciles of volatility. Results are presented in Figure (10).
Figure 10: Volatility, distance and export volumes
Predicted Mean Trade Volume (logs)
-.4
-1.2 -1
-.8
-.6
-.2
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
-2.69
-2.45
-2.27 -2.11 -1.96 -1.8
-1.62
Deciles of Demand Volatility
-1.4
-1.01
Distance (km) < 440
440 <= Distance < 1110
1110 <= Distance < 1875
Distance >= 1875
As expected and depicted in Figure (10), the lower the distance to a destination, the
higher the exports, ceteris paribus. However, the increase in demand volatility affects
differently the quartiles of distance. In particular, export volumes to the more distant
30
markets are line with our theoretical prediction: ∂ 2 qij /∂τij ∂V(Rj ) > 0.
To capture the non-linear effect of firm productivity and volatility on export volumes
(∂ 2 qij /∂ϕ∂V(Rj ) < 0), we use a similar strategy: we split the log of productivity into
quartiles and interact the four categories with demand volatility. Then, we compute the
predicted mean trade volumes (in logs) for the deciles of volatility and the quartiles of
productivity. The different predictions of trade are plotted in Figure (11). This plot shows
three interesting results: (1) the most productive firms export more than the others; (2)
the larger the demand volatility, the lower the export volumes for all levels of productivity;
and (3) the marginal decrease in exports is larger for the most productive firms as the
volatility increases.
Figure 11: Volatility, productivity and export volumes
Predicted Mean Trade Volume (logs)
-.85 -.8 -.75 -.7 -.65 -.6
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
-2.69
-2.45
-2.27 -2.11 -1.96 -1.8
-1.62
Deciles of Demand Volatility
-1.4
-1.01
Log Productivity < P(25)
P(25) <= Log Productivity < P(50)
P(50) <= Log Productivity < P(75)
Log Productivity >= P(75)
4.3.2
Extensive trade margin
Entry and exit
We now explore the impact of uncertainty on the extensive margin of trade. We distinguish between the entry of new firms on the international market and the exit of the
incumbents from that market. For the entry, our dependent variable is the probability
for a firm f to start exporting to destination j in 4-digit sector k in year t. This choice
model can be written in the latent variable representation, with y ∗ f jkt the latent variable
that determines whether or not a strictly positive export flow is observed from firm f to
31
destination j on sector k in year t. Our estimated equation is therefore as follows:




1 if yf∗jkt > 0


0 if yf∗jkt ≤ 0
P r(yf jk,t |yf jk,t−1 = 0) = 
(21)
with
K
K
K
) + FE + εkf jt .
) + ηS(Rjt
) + ρV(Rjt
yf∗jkt = ln E(Rjt
K
K
K
As previously, E(Rjt
), V(Rjt
) and S(Rjt
) represent different moments of demand (see
section 4.2). This equation is estimated using a linear probability model. The inclusion
of fixed effects (FE) in a probit would give rise to the incidental parameter problem. The
linear probability model avoids this issue. In all regressions, we account for correlation of
errors by clustering at country-4-digit sector level. Results are reported in the first three
columns of Table (5). Estimations cover the entry on the international market over the
2000-2009 period.
In addition to the probability of entry, one can also study the exit transition. Higher
volatility or lower upside gains may indeed increase exit of firms from the export market.
In that case, our dependent variable is the probability that firm f in destination j and
sector k in year t − 1 stop exporting to this destination that product k in year t. Explanatory variables are the same as for the entry estimations and results are reported in
the last three columns of Table (5)
Results are again in line with the theoretical model. The probability for a firm to enter
the export market is positively and significantly influenced by an increase in demand and
in potential upside gains (skewness) in the destination markets, while an increase in
volatility reduces the firm’s entry. Opposite effects are observed for the probability of
exit: a higher demand and skewness lower the probability of exit, while a higher volatility
increases it.
Interaction effects of uncertainty
We now investigate whether the impact of volatility on the probability of entry and
exit from the export market is affected by trade costs. To do so, we interact the volatility
32
Table 5: Firm level estimations: probability of entry and exit from the international
market
Dep. Var.:
Firm’s entry:
Firm’s exit:
P rob(yf jk,t = 1|yf jk,t−1 = 0) P rob(yf jk,t = 0|yf jk,t−1 = 1)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Ln Mean Demand3K
j,t−1
0.005a
0.004a
0.002a
-0.019a
-0.003
-0.012a
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
(0.0002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
a
a
a
c
a
Ln
Volatility3K
jt
Skewness3K
jt
R2
Fixed Effects:
Firm.Destination.Sectorf jk
Timet
Firm.Destination.Timef jt
Sector (4-digit)k
Firm.Sector.Timef kt
Destinationj
-0.029
-0.019
-0.009
0.020
0.043
0.008
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.011)
(0.009)
(0.010)
0.0003a
0.0002b
0.0002b
-0.0009
-0.001b
-0.001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0007)
(0.0006)
(0.0005)
0.205
0.144
0.066
0.374
0.279
0.259
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
Note: Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.
a
: p < 0.01, b : p < 0.05, c : p < 0.1. N= 52,752,877 for entry and N = 4,308,691 for exit.
variable with the distance between France and the destination market j. Results are
presented in Table (6). According to our theoretical predictions, we expect a positive
estimated coefficient on the interaction term for the probability of entry and a negative
one for the probability of exit: trade costs tend to lower the impact of volatility.
Empirical estimations are in line with these theoretical predictions. The interaction
term is positive and highly significant for the probability of entry, and to a lesser extent for
the probability of exit. Furthermore, following the inclusion of the interaction term, the
coefficients on the volatility variable remain very similar to the ones obtained in Table (5).
33
Table 6: Interaction of volatility with distance: probability of entry and exit from the
international market
Dep. Var.:
Firm’s entry:
P rob(yf jk,t = 1|yf jk,t−1 = 0)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Firm’s exit:
P rob(yf jk,t = 0|yf jk,t−1 = 1)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Ln Mean Demand3K
j,t−1
0.005a
0.004a
0.002a
-0.019a
-0.003
-0.012a
(0.0002)
(0.0001)
(0.0002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
a
a
a
c
a
Ln
Volatility3K
jt
Ln Volatility3K
jt × Ln Distancej
Skewness3K
jt
R2
Fixed Effects:
Firm.Destination.Sectorf jk
Timet
Firm.Destination.Timef jt
Sector (4-digit)k
Firm.Sector.Timef kt
Destinationj
-0.029
-0.019
-0.009
0.020
0.043
0.008
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.011)
(0.009)
(0.010)
0.004a
0.002a
0.001a
-0.003c
-0.005a
-0.0002
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
a
b
b
b
0.0003
0.0002
0.0002
-0.0009
-0.001
-0.001
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0007)
(0.0006)
(0.0005)
0.205
0.145
0.066
0.374
0.279
0.259
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
-
Yes
Yes
Note: Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.
a
: p < 0.01, b : p < 0.05, c : p < 0.1. N= 52,752,877 for entry and N = 4,308,691 for exit.
5
Preliminary conclusion
Does demand volatility matter for exports? Yes and skewness as well!
References
Baldwin, R., and P. Krugman (1989): “Persistent Trade Effects of Large Exchange
Rate Shocks,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(4), 635–654.
Bloom, N. (2014): “Fluctuations in Uncertainty,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
28(2), 153–175.
Dixit, A. K., and R. S. Pindyck (1994): Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton
University Press.
Dixit, A. K., and J. E. Stiglitz (1977): “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity,” American Economic Review, 67(3), 297–308.
34
Eeckhoudt, L., C. Gollier, and H. Schlesinger (2005): Economic and Financial
Decisions under Risk. Princeton University Press.
Gabaix, X. (2011): “The Granular Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations,” Econometrica,
79(3), 733–772.
Giovanni, J. d., and A. A. Levchenko (2009): “Trade openness and volatility,”
Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(3), 558–585.
Handley, K., and N. Limao (2013): “Policy Uncertainty, Trade and Welfare: Theory
and Evidence for China and the US,” Discussion Paper 19376, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Helpman, E., and A. Razin (1978): “A theory of international trade under uncertainty,” Discussion paper, Academic Press, Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch.
Klemperer, P., and M. Meyer (1986): “Price competition vs. quantity competition:
the role of uncertainty,” RAND Journal of Economics, 17(4), 618–638.
Krugman, P. R. (1979): “Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade,” Journal of international Economics, 9(4), 469–479.
Leland, H. E. (1972): “Theory of the firm facing uncertain demand,” American Economic Review, 62(3), 278–291.
Lewis, T. L. (2014): “Exports versus Multinational Production under Nominal Uncertainty,” Journal of International Economics, forthcoming.
Melitz, M. J. (2003): “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity,” Econometrica, 71(6), 1695–1725.
Menezes, C., C. Geiss, and J. Tressler (1980): “Increasing Downside Risk,” American Economic Review, 70(5), 921–932.
Popov, A. A. (2011): “Output Growth and Fluctuations: The Role of Financial Openness,” Discussion paper, ECB Working Paper.
35
Ramondo, N., V. Rappoport, and K. J. Ruhl (2013):
“The Proximity-
Concentration Tradeoff under Uncertainty,” Review of Economic Studies, 80(4), 1582–
1621.
Zhelobodko, E., S. Kokovin, M. Parenti, and J.-F. Thisse (2012): “Monopolistic competition: Beyond the constant elasticity of substitution,” Econometrica, 80(6),
2765–2784.
Appendices
A
Price setting
The demand for a variety v is
−2
qij (v) = Rj2 θv2 Ψ−2
j pij (v)
so that
pij qij (v)
−1
= Rj θv2 Ψ−2
j pij (v)
Rj
Summing this expression over each variety consumed in country j yields
Ψ−2
j
=
Rj−1
#−1
"Z
Ωj
θv2 pij (v)−1 dv
implying the demand for a variety can be rewritten as follows
qij (v) =
Rj θv2
"Z
Ωj
#−1
θv2 pij (v)−1 dv
pij (v)−2 = Rj θv2 Pj p−2
ij
with
Pj ≡
"Z
Ωj
#−1
θv2 pij (v)−1 dv
36
.
Hence, the export profit is
πij = Rj θv2 Pj /pij − cij Rj θv2 Pj p−2
ij − wi fij
with cij ≡ wi τij /ϕ. The payoff of each firm is as follows:
Πo (v) = E(πi ) − ρv V(πi ),
Given the demand of consumers, we have
E(πij ) = E(Rj )θv2
Pj
Pj
− cij E(Rj )θv2 2 − wi fi ,
pij
pij
and
2 4
V(πij ) = p2ij − c2ij p−4
ij Pj θv V(Rj )
It appears that the expected profit is maximized when the price is equal 2 times the
marginal cost cij while the variance is minimized whens the price is equal to the marginal
cost.
The first order condition implies that the equilibrium price is implicitly given by
Φ(pij ) = 0 with
2
Φ(pij ) ≡ − (pij − 2cij ) E(Rj ) + ρv p2ij − 2c2ij 2p−2
ij Pj θv V(Rj )
(22)
while the second order condition implies
2
E(Rj ) − ρv 8c2ij p−3
ij Pj θv V(Rj ) > 0
or, evaluated at Φ(pij ) = 0,
p2ij − 2c2ij pij − 4c2ij (pij − 2cij ) > 0
Without uncertainty, the equilibrium price would be pij = 2cij , which is identical to the
37
price prevailing when firms determine strategically the level of quantity. However, under
uncertainty, pij = 2cij is not an equilibrium as long as ρv > 0. Introducing pij = 2cij into
(22) implies Φ(pij ) > 0 so that the equilibrium price under uncertainty is higher than
2cij . Using the envelop theorem:
∂pij
E(Rj )
pij − 2cij
=
>0
∂V(Rj )
V(Rj ) E(Rj ) − 8ρv c2ij Pj θv2 V(Rj )p−3
ij
B
Industry supply and income volatility
In this Appendix, we show that ∂Ψj /∂V(Rj ) < 0. According to (7) and (13), we have
Λ[Ψj , V(Rj )] = 0 with
Λ ≡ Ψj −
X
Mk
k
Z ξbkj
0
i−1
E(Rj ) −1 h
µ(ξ)dξ,
Ψj wk τkj ξ + ρv V(Rj )Ψ−2
j
2
1/2
where ∂Λj /∂V(Rj ) > 0 because both θv qij
and ξbij decrease with V(Rj ). The envelop
theorem implies
sign
∂Ψj
∂ 2Λ
= −sign
,
∂V(Rj )
∂Ψj
as ∂Λ/∂V(Rj ) > 0. Standard calculations show that
1 − Ψ−1
j
∂Λ
=
∂Ψj
P
k
Mk
R ξbkj
0
1
θv [qkj (ξ)] 2
∂ ξb
− ∂Ψkjj θv
h
qkj
ρv V(Rj )Ψ−2
j −wk τkj ξ
ρv V(Rj )Ψ−2
j +wk τkj ξ
(ξb
kj )
i1
2
µ(ξ)dξ
(23)
,
where ∂Λ/∂Ψj > 0 as the second term on the RHS of (23) is inferior to 1 and ∂ ξbkj /∂Ψj < 0.
As a result,
Ψj ≡ −
V(Rj ) ∂Ψj
> 0.
Ψj ∂V(Rj )
38