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Curriculum Vitae
TED PARENT
Oct. 2014
Department of Philosophy (0126)
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Blacksburg, VA 24061
parentt@vt.edu
http://www.unc.edu/~tparent
Cell: (919) 260-4897
EMPLOYMENT:
Virginia Tech, Department of Philosophy: Visiting Assistant Professor, Aug. 2009 – present.
Vanderbilt University, Department of Philosophy: Lecturer, Aug. 2008 – Aug. 2009.
EDUCATION:
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: Ph.D. (Philosophy), Aug. 2009.
Dissertation: “Metatheoretical Semantics: On the Limits of Semantic Theory.”
Committee: William G. Lycan (Director), Dorit Bar-On, Thomas Hofweber, Ram Neta,
Keith Simmons.
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: M.A. (Philosophy), May 2002.
Masters Thesis: “Introspection and Its Epistemology.”
Committee: William G. Lycan (Director), Dorit Bar-On, Douglas C. Long.
Indiana University, Bloomington: M.A. (Philosophy), May 2000.
University of Portland: B.A., maxima cum laude and Honors Program; (Philosophy and English
with French minor), May 1998.
RESEARCH AREAS:
Philosophy of Mind and Language
Metaphysics (especially meta/ontology, modality)
Epistemology (especially self-knowledge, knowledge-wh)
PUBLICATIONS:
1. “Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical Studies, 133.3; Apr. 2007, pp. 411–424.
2. “Quine and Logical Truth,” Erkenntnis, 68.1; Jan. 2008, pp. 103–112.
3. “Modal Metaphysics,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, J. Feiser & B. Dowden
(eds.), 14 Mar. 2012, http://www.iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/
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[Publications, continued]
4. “Note on Induction,” Think [Cambridge UP], 12.33; Spring 2013, pp. 37–39.
5. “Externalism and Self-Knowledge,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Zalta (ed.),
Summer 2013 edition, http://plato.stanford.edu/self-knowledge-externalism/.
6. “Infallibility Naturalized: Reply to Hoffmann,” dialectica, 67.3; Sept. 2013, pp. 353–358.
7. “In the Mental Fiction, Mental Fictionalism is Fictitious,” The Monist, 96.4; Oct. 2013, pp.
608–624.
8. “Knowing-Wh and Embedded Questions,” Philosophy Compass, 9.2; Feb. 2014, pp. 81–95.
9. “Ontic Terms and Metaontology, or: On What There Actually Is,” Philosophical Studies,
170.2; Sept. 2014, pp. 199–214.
10. “Theory Dualism and the Metalogic of Mind-Body Problems,” The Palgrave Handbook of
Philosophical Methods, C. Daly (ed.), Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, forthcoming.
11. “Self-Knowledge and Externalism about Empty Concepts,” Analytic Philosophy,
forthcoming.
WORK IN PROGRESS:
Book manuscript:
Philosophical Method for the Self-Blind
Table of Contents
[Chapters are complete except chs. 10–12.]
0. Preamble: Neo-Sellarsian Metaphilosophy
1. Introduction: How is Reflective Inquiry Possible?
2. The Empirical Case against Infallibilism
3. Infallibilism about One’s Own Thoughts
4. Objection 1: It’s Apriori that Water Exists
5. Objection 2: Slow Switched Thoughts
6. Objection 3: Self-Blind Equivocation
7. Infallibilism about One’s Own Judgments
8. Infallibilism about Autological Answers
9. Objection 1: It’s Apriori that the Mental Exists
10. Objection 2: Slow Switched Attitudes
11. Objection 3: Self-Blind Attitude Shift
12. Conclusion: The Rationality of Reflective Inquiry
Blurb, detailed table of contents, and excerpts are available at:
http://www.unc.edu/~tparent/research.html
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[In Progress, continued]
Articles under review:
“Conservative Meinongianism.”
“Content Externalism and Equivocal Inference.”
“Content Externalism and Quine’s Criterion are Incompatible.”
“The Empirical Case against Infallibilism.”
“Externalism and ‘Knowing What’ One Thinks.”
“Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge II: Paratactic Judgment.”
“The Modal Ontological Argument meets Modal Fictionalism.”
“Modal Realism and the Meaning of ‘Exist’.”
“Neo-Sellarsian Metaphilosophy.”
“A New Modal Liar.”
“An Objection to the Laplacean Chalmers.”
“On the PROVER9 Ontological Argument.”
“Paradox with just Self-Reference.”
“A Puzzle about Kinds and Kind Terms.”
“Rule Following and Metaontology.”
Drafts in preparation:
“Composites without Composition (Remarks prompted by Barker & Jago).”
“Ghosts and Montero” [w/ William G. Lycan].
“Is Content Externalism Beyond Dispute? On Primary and Secondary Extensions.”
“Kripke’s Theories of Empty Terms.”
“Self-Reference is Sufficient for Paradox” [complete draft].
“Review of Transparent Minds by J. Fernandez,” invited by Philosophical Quarterly.
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PAPER PRESENTATIONS:
“Second-Order Judgment and Autological Examination,” invited, Virginia Tech, Workshop in
Philosophy of Mind, April 2015.
“Theory Dualism: Incomplete Physicalism b/w Mental Fictionalism,” invited, the University
of Edinburgh, Conference on Mental Fictionalism, July 2014.
“The Modal Argument Meets Modal Fictionalism,” presented at Southern Illinois University at
Edwardsville, Illinois Philosophical Association, Nov. 2013.
“On Rasmussen’s Modal Cosmological Argument,” presented at Pacific University, 65th
Annual Northwest Philosophy Conference, Oct. 2013.
“Rule Following and Metaontology,” presented at Virginia Tech Philosophy Department
Colloquium Series, Sept. 2013.
“Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge II: Autological Judgment,” presented at the University of
Glasgow: Conference on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, June 2013.
“In the Mental Fiction, Mental Fictionalism is Fictitious,” presented at Oregon State
University, 64th Annual Northwest Philosophy Conference, Nov. 2012.
“Rule Following and Metaontology,” presented at: Washington & Lee University, 4th Regional
Wittgenstein Conference, Mar. 2012.
“Modal Realism and the Meaning of ‘Exist’,” presented at Lewis & Clark College, 63rd
Annual Northwest Philosophy Conference, Nov. 2011.
“Modal Realism and the Meaning of ‘Exist’,” presented at Virginia Tech, Philosophy
Department, Oct. 2010.
“What the Externalist Cannot Know A Priori,” presented at the Central Division of the
American Philosophical Association, Feb. 2010.
“Ontic Terms and Metaontology,” presented at Virginia Tech, Philosophy Department
Colloquium Series, Oct. 2009.
“What Does the Slow-Switch Argument Show?” presented at Vanderbilt University
Philosophy Department Colloquium Series, Oct. 2008.
“What Does the Slow-Switch Argument Show?” presented at University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, Oct. 2008.
“On What There Actually Is,” presented at University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Sept.
2007.
“Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge,” presented at The Eastern Division Meeting of the
American Philosophical Association, Dec. 2004.
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[Presentations, continued]
“Infallibilism about Self-Knowledge,” presented at The University of Memphis: Mid-South
Conference in Philosophy, Feb. 2004.
“Quine and Logical Truth,” presented at The Central Division Meeting of the American
Philosophical Association, Apr. 2004.
“Quine and Logical Truth,” presented at Reed College: 55th Annual Northwest Philosophy
Conference, Oct. 2003.
“The Coherence Theory of Subjective Probability,” presented at Indiana University, Mar. 2000.
“The Liar Paradox, T-Sentence Analysis, and Epistemology,” presented at DePauw University,
Meeting of the Indiana Philosophical Association, Nov. 1998.
INVITED COMMENTARIES:
On James Davies’ “Mathematical Fictionalists Cannot Be Sceptics about Reference to Abstract
Objects,” to be presented at the Central Division of the American Philosophical
Association, Feb. 2015.
On Justin Remof’s “Object Constructivism and Unconstructed Objects,” presented at the
Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Mar. 2014.
On Kate Nolfi’s “Why We Ought to Care about the Epistemic Status of our Beliefs,” to be
presented at the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Feb. 2014.
On Joseph Hedger’s “Frege’s Puzzle Left Unsolved: Reply to Sainsbury & Tye,” presented at
the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, Mar. 2013.
On Derek Ball & Brian Pickel’s “One Dogma of Millianism,” presented at the Pacific Division
of the American Philosophical Association, Apr. 2012.
On Pieranna Garavaso & Nicla Vassallo’s “Frege’s Thinking,” presented at the Eastern
Division of the American Philosophical Association, Dec. 2011.
On Andrew Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen’s “Physicalism and the Puppet Argument,” presented
at the Illinois Philosophical Association, Nov. 2011.
On Daniel Pearlman’s “Modifying the Interventionalist Solution to the Problem of Causal
Exclusion,” presented at Lewis & Clark College: 63rd Annual Northwest Philosophy
Conference, Nov. 2011.
On David Cheely’s “The Role of Memory in the Fineness of Grain of Demonstrative
Concepts,” presented at the Kentucky Philosophical Association, Apr. 2011.
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[Commentaries, continued]
On Jason Decker’s “Quining Quarrels: Indifference and Deep Agnosticism,” presented at the
Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, Dec. 2010.
On Alex Grzankowski’s “Are All Attitudes Propositional Attitudes?,” presented at the Pacific
Division of the American Philosophical Association, Apr. 2010.
On Tuomas Manninen’s “An Argument Against Animalism,” presented at the Pacific Division
of the American Philosophical Association, Apr. 2009.
On Chase Wrenn’s “Practical Success and the Nature of Truth,” presented at the Eastern
Division of the American Philosophical Association, Dec. 2007.
On Ryan Robinson’s “Tibbles without Tib,” presented at Reed College: 55th Annual Northwest
Philosophy Conference, Oct. 2003.
TEACHING EXPERIENCE:
Virginia Tech:
Grad Level: Philosophy of Language, Modality and Ontology, Metaontology, Symbolic
Logic [incl. soundness/completeness], Kripke (independent study), Philosophy
and Neuroscience (independent study), Metaphilosophy [for Fall 2014]
Majors/Grad Level: Philosophy of Mind (Writing Intensive), Metaphysics (Writing
Intensive), Philosophy of Science, Modal Logic and Its Applications
Undergrad Level: Knowledge and Reality [Intro M&E], Philosophy of Religion,
Symbolic Logic, Reason and Revolution [Intro Phil Science], Language and
Logic [Critical Thinking]
Vanderbilt University: Intro Philosophy (Writing Intensive), General Logic [Critical Thinking].
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: Experience and Reality [Intro M&E], Philosophy of
Religion, Symbolic Logic, Intro Philosophy.
FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS:
Mary Williams Fellowship, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: Aug. 2004 & Sept. 2005.
Graduate School Opportunity Grant, June 2004.
Bertha Williams Fellowship, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Jan. 2004.
Fellow, Future Faculty Program, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Aug. 2003.
Kenan Fellowship, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, Nov. 2002.
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[Awards, continued]
Henry Horace Williams Fellowship, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: Sept. 2000, Jan.
2001, Sept. 2001, Jan. 2002, Jan. 2003, & Sept. 2003.
The Open Fellowship, Indiana University, Bloomington, Aug. 1998.
Finalist for the Rhodes Scholarship (Oregon), Apr. 1998.
DEPARTMENT, UNIVERSITY, AND PROFESSIONAL SERVICE:
Referee, Philosophical Studies, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Synthese (x2), Erkenntnis,
Springer Books, Res Philosophica, Philosophical Quarterly (x3), The Monist, MIT
Press, Australasian Journal of Philosophy (x4), Routledge, Continuum Books (x2),
Oxford University Press (x2), American Philosophical Quarterly (x2), Dialogue
[Cambridge UP], Journal of Philosophical Research (x3), Congress of the Canadian
Philosophical Association.
Editor, “Ontology” category on Phil Papers (Bourget & Chalmers, General Eds.),
http://philpapers.org/browse/ontology, Jan 2013. Includes the subcategory “Existence.”
Editor, “Knowledge-Wh” category on Phil Papers (Bourget & Chalmers, General Eds.),
http://philpapers.org/browse/knowledge-wh, Nov 2012.
Editor, “Externalism and Self-Knowledge” category on Phil Papers (Bourget & Chalmers,
General Eds.), http://philpapers.org/browse/externalism-and-self-knowledge, June 2011.
Includes the subcategories “Externalism and Armchair Knowledge,” “Externalism and
Slow-Switching,” and “Externalism and Self-Knowledge, misc.”
Masters Thesis Committees, Virginia Tech: Jessica McCormack, Chris Stiso (May 2013)
Masters Exam Committees, Virginia Tech: Brad Hewitt, Eric Hodges (May 2010); Cristin
Chall, Yael Loewenstein (May 2011); Grace McGee, Joseph Miller, Amanda Price
(May 2012); Amiel Bernal, Matthew Bartlett (May 2013); Tyler Jerrell (May 2014)
Member, Canadian Philosophical Association, Dec. 2006-present.
Research Assistant for Dorit Bar-On, Fall 2004 and Spring 2008.
Teaching Assistant Co-ordinator, Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, July 2004 – July 2005. Responsible for running teaching workshops, and
coordinating as well as advising the department’s teaching assistants.
Chair, Colloquium on Dorit Bar-On’s “Externalism, Skepticism, and the Recognitional
Conception of Self-Knowledge,” at a workshop on Self-Knowledge and the Self,
Bigorio, Switzerland, Aug. 1-6, 2004.
Member, American Philosophical Association, Fall 1998, 2000 – present.
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LANGUAGES:
French, German (reading only).
REFERENCES:
Jody Azzouni, Professor of Philosophy, Tufts University, jody.azzouni@tufts.edu , (617) 6272345.
Christopher Daly, Professor of Philosophy, University of Manchester,
christopher.daly@manchester.ac.uk, +44 (0) 161 275-4892.
James C. Klagge, Professor of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic and State University,
jklagge@vt.edu, (540) 231-8487.
William G. Lycan, William Rand Kenan Professor of Philosophy, The University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, ujanel@email.unc.edu, (919) 962-2576.
Joseph C. Pitt, Professor of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic and State University, jcpitt@vt.edu,
(540) 231-5760.